What is environmental history? Why environmental history?

Capitalism, Nature, Socialism

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 1997, Pages

  O'Connor, James ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0344368336     PISSN: 10455752     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10455759709358733     Document Type: Review

References (34)

1. A disclaimer: Paul Buhle reminds me that "the emergence of history from an examination of collective myth begins with Vico, and without his attempts to recollect folklore, and Boehme's parallel recuperation of the dialectic, history would be a...dry subject. The general narrative you lay out (political to economic to social to cultural and then ecological history) is a good one. But the idea that it proceeds scientifically, without big injections of myth, romanticism, etc., quite beyond mere class prejudices is itself potentially lacking in dialectical observation" (personal correspondence).
2. Ibid.
3. J. Donald Hughes, "Ecology and Development as Narrative Themes of World History," Environmental History Review, Spring, 1995, p. 9. In Hughes' definition of environmental history, ecology is not seen as one leg of world history, but rather "its major theme" ("The new narrative of world history must have ecological processes as its major theme" [ibid.]). Another passage: "What is asked for is a world history that adopts ecological process as its organizing principle" (ibid., p. 10).
4. J. Donald Hughes, "Ecology and Development as Narrative Themes of World History," Environmental History Review, Spring, 1995, p. 9. In Hughes' definition of environmental history, ecology is not seen as one leg of world history, but rather "its major theme" ("The new narrative of world history must have ecological processes as its major theme" [ibid.]). Another passage: "What is asked for is a world history that adopts ecological process as its organizing principle" (ibid., p. 10).
5. J. Donald Hughes, "Ecology and Development as Narrative Themes of World History," Environmental History Review, Spring, 1995, p. 9. In Hughes' definition of environmental history, ecology is not seen as one leg of world history, but rather "its major theme" ("The new narrative of world history must have ecological processes as its major theme" [ibid.]). Another passage: "What is asked for is a world history that adopts ecological process as its organizing principle" (ibid., p. 10).
6. Donald Worster, ed., The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press, 1988), "Appendix: Doing Environmental History," pp. 290-291. This is a historian's definition. Two social scientists have defined "political ecology" thusly: "Political ecology...is a historical outgrowth of the central questions asked by the social sciences about the relations between human society, viewed in its bio-cultural-political complexity, and a significantly humanized nature. It develops the common ground where various disciplines intersect" (James Greenberg and Thomas Park, "Political Ecology," The Journal of Political Ecology, 1, 1994, p. 1).
7. Donald Worster, ed., The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (Cambridge [U.K.]: Cambridge University Press, 1988), "Appendix: Doing Environmental History," pp. 290-291. This is a historian's definition. Two social scientists have defined "political ecology" thusly: "Political ecology...is a historical outgrowth of the central questions asked by the social sciences about the relations between human society, viewed in its bio-cultural-political complexity, and a significantly humanized nature. It develops the common ground where various disciplines intersect" (James Greenberg and Thomas Park, "Political Ecology," The Journal of Political Ecology, 1, 1994, p. 1).
8. Worster, op. cit., p. 293.
9. Ibid. Worster makes a valuable sketch of the different approaches that have been taken by anthropologists and others to this "whole," although I am dubious about his call to "merge the two theories" of Marvin Harris and Karl Marx. Harris' concept of a "techno-environmental system" can not be abstracted (in my view) as a kind of independent variable, from the organization of work and social organization, e.g., forms of property or cultural organization. I think it's possible to "ecologize" Marx but not to "Marxize" Harris. A final comment: in his account of culture (Ibid., p. 302 passim), Worster's usually keen formulations of issues gives way to a discursive meandering. I believe that this is so because he doesn't see that culture provides modes of cooperation, normative rules, etc., which are imported into production or labor, in this way becoming productive forces in their own right (ibid.). Worster's account does not quite make the transition from an "interactional" to a dialectical mode; a dualism runs through much of his pathbreaking work. See, for example, his "reflection" theory of ideas (p. 303) and his account of Rappaport (pp. 304-305). Nature and culture are separated; the latter permits people to live within the constraints of the former; labor itself drops out of this account, i.e., material activity seems to merely function as a way for humans to "live in equilibrium."
10. Ibid. Worster makes a valuable sketch of the different approaches that have been taken by anthropologists and others to this "whole," although I am dubious about his call to "merge the two theories" of Marvin Harris and Karl Marx. Harris' concept of a "techno-environmental system" can not be abstracted (in my view) as a kind of independent variable, from the organization of work and social organization, e.g., forms of property or cultural organization. I think it's possible to "ecologize" Marx but not to "Marxize" Harris. A final comment: in his account of culture (Ibid., p. 302 passim), Worster's usually keen formulations of issues gives way to a discursive meandering. I believe that this is so because he doesn't see that culture provides modes of cooperation, normative rules, etc., which are imported into production or labor, in this way becoming productive forces in their own right (ibid.). Worster's account does not quite make the transition from an "interactional" to a dialectical mode; a dualism runs through much of his pathbreaking work. See, for example, his "reflection" theory of ideas (p. 303) and his account of Rappaport (pp. 304-305). Nature and culture are separated; the latter permits people to live within the constraints of the former; labor itself drops out of this account, i.e., material activity seems to merely function as a way for humans to "live in equilibrium."
11. Ibid. Worster makes a valuable sketch of the different approaches that have been taken by anthropologists and others to this "whole," although I am dubious about his call to "merge the two theories" of Marvin Harris and Karl Marx. Harris' concept of a "techno-environmental system" can not be abstracted (in my view) as a kind of independent variable, from the organization of work and social organization, e.g., forms of property or cultural organization. I think it's possible to "ecologize" Marx but not to "Marxize" Harris. A final comment: in his account of culture (Ibid., p. 302 passim), Worster's usually keen formulations of issues gives way to a discursive meandering. I believe that this is so because he doesn't see that culture provides modes of cooperation, normative rules, etc., which are imported into production or labor, in this way becoming productive forces in their own right (ibid.). Worster's account does not quite make the transition from an "interactional" to a dialectical mode; a dualism runs through much of his pathbreaking work. See, for example, his "reflection" theory of ideas (p. 303) and his account of Rappaport (pp. 304-305). Nature and culture are separated; the latter permits people to live within the constraints of the former; labor itself drops out of this account, i.e., material activity seems to merely function as a way for humans to "live in equilibrium."
12. Worster excludes "the built or artifactual environment" from environmental history. While this exclusion "may seem especially arbitrary, and to an extent it is...the distinction [between "nature and artifact"] is worth keeping, for it reminds us that there are different forces at work in the world and not all of them emanate from humans; some remain spontaneous and self-generating. The built environment is wholly expressive of culture....But with such phenomena as the forest and water cycle, we encounter autonomous energies that do not derive from us. Those forces impinge on human life, stimulating some reaction, some defense, some ambition" (ibid., pp. 292-293). Geographers might question this distinction. Urban space, for example, has unintentional consequences for the lives of human beings, i.e., not only is it a human construct, it also helps construct what is human. In a fully active materialist approach, there are certainly "autonomous energies that do not derive from us"; but most of these energies have been modified in small and large ways by human action. The ocean, the atmosphere, the soil have not only "made themselves" over time but also have been made by human activity, again in some (very) small or large part, depending on circumstances.
13. "...our project of exploring the human past as part of a web of systematic relationships with the natural world offers exciting opportunities for seeing things whole at a time when the historical profession seems desperately in need of such a synthesis" (William Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1993, p. 4). However, Cronin points out that while there are many studies of the idea of nature and also of the economy-nature nexus, there are few if any studies bridging ideas and culture, economy, and nature taken as a whole ("Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History," Journal of American History, 76, 4, March, 1990, p. 1124). He is thus skeptical about environmental history as a totalizing method and field, stressing the "particularism of its storytelling." One way to bring in the missing culture-economy nexus is by investigating cultural norms and practices which are imported into the workplace and economic system generally, and valorized as capital. These have been variously called "social capital," "community capital," and "cultural capital." Greenberg and Park write that there are "two major theoretical thrusts that have most influenced the formation of political ecology. These are political economy, with its insistence on the need to link the distribution of power with productive activity and ecological analysis, with its broader version of bio-environmental relationships" (op. cit.).
14. "...our project of exploring the human past as part of a web of systematic relationships with the natural world offers exciting opportunities for seeing things whole at a time when the historical profession seems desperately in need of such a synthesis" (William Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1993, p. 4). However, Cronin points out that while there are many studies of the idea of nature and also of the economy-nature nexus, there are few if any studies bridging ideas and culture, economy, and nature taken as a whole ("Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History," Journal of American History, 76, 4, March, 1990, p. 1124). He is thus skeptical about environmental history as a totalizing method and field, stressing the "particularism of its storytelling." One way to bring in the missing culture-economy nexus is by investigating cultural norms and practices which are imported into the workplace and economic system generally, and valorized as capital. These have been variously called "social capital," "community capital," and "cultural capital." Greenberg and Park write that there are "two major theoretical thrusts that have most influenced the formation of political ecology. These are political economy, with its insistence on the need to link the distribution of power with productive activity and ecological analysis, with its broader version of bio-environmental relationships" (op. cit.).
15. "...our project of exploring the human past as part of a web of systematic relationships with the natural world offers exciting opportunities for seeing things whole at a time when the historical profession seems desperately in need of such a synthesis" (William Cronon, "The Uses of Environmental History," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1993, p. 4). However, Cronin points out that while there are many studies of the idea of nature and also of the economy-nature nexus, there are few if any studies bridging ideas and culture, economy, and nature taken as a whole ("Modes of Prophecy and Production: Placing Nature in History," Journal of American History, 76, 4, March, 1990, p. 1124). He is thus skeptical about environmental history as a totalizing method and field, stressing the "particularism of its storytelling." One way to bring in the missing culture-economy nexus is by investigating cultural norms and practices which are imported into the workplace and economic system generally, and valorized as capital. These have been variously called "social capital," "community capital," and "cultural capital." Greenberg and Park write that there are "two major theoretical thrusts that have most influenced the formation of political ecology. These are political economy, with its insistence on the need to link the distribution of power with productive activity and ecological analysis, with its broader version of bio-environmental relationships" (op. cit.).
16. The "particular" is the individual (person, species, etc.), where "individual" is that which is irreducible to a smaller unit of analysis. The "concrete" is what individuals have in common with other individuals, (birth, life, death; class, gender, community, etc.). The "specific" is that which distinguishes one individual from another or others. The "whole" or "totality" is constituted by the "particular" and constitutes the "concrete."
17. Worster, op. cit., p. 289. Within the social sciences, political science, economics, sociology, and cultural and environmental studies also had their own logic of development which roughly paralleled the development of the four types of history. For example, social science began as "moral science" (the 18th century term for human science) but in the late 19th century economics was separated from other social sciences, indicating that a capitalist economy had been established in fact. "Sociology of culture" developed in the mid and late 20th century; environmental studies in the late 20th century.
18. James O'Connor, Accumulation Crisis (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1983).
19. Ibid. In a later passage, however, Worster speaks of "social, economic, and cultural history" (Ibid., p. 290), which reverses the order of economic and social change and transformation in the development of capitalism itself.
20. Ibid. In a later passage, however, Worster speaks of "social, economic, and cultural history" (Ibid., p. 290), which reverses the order of economic and social change and transformation in the development of capitalism itself.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid. Stephen Dovers explains the emergence of environmental history in terms of the "rising concern over the ecological sustainability of modern human societies" ("Sustainability and 'Pragmatic' Environmental History: A Note from Australia," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1994, p. 22). This explanation, which misses the development of a specifically capitalist nature, leads Dovers to a "pragmatic" view of environmental history. "This is a history which...makes a positive and practical contribution to environmental management and the quest for ecological sustainability" (Ibid., p. 21). Such an approach guts the profoundly critical content of the best environmental history, turning the field into a handmaiden of capitalist rationalization.
23. Ibid. Stephen Dovers explains the emergence of environmental history in terms of the "rising concern over the ecological sustainability of modern human societies" ("Sustainability and 'Pragmatic' Environmental History: A Note from Australia," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1994, p. 22). This explanation, which misses the development of a specifically capitalist nature, leads Dovers to a "pragmatic" view of environmental history. "This is a history which...makes a positive and practical contribution to environmental management and the quest for ecological sustainability" (Ibid., p. 21). Such an approach guts the profoundly critical content of the best environmental history, turning the field into a handmaiden of capitalist rationalization.
24. Ibid. Stephen Dovers explains the emergence of environmental history in terms of the "rising concern over the ecological sustainability of modern human societies" ("Sustainability and 'Pragmatic' Environmental History: A Note from Australia," Environmental History Review, Fall, 1994, p. 22). This explanation, which misses the development of a specifically capitalist nature, leads Dovers to a "pragmatic" view of environmental history. "This is a history which...makes a positive and practical contribution to environmental management and the quest for ecological sustainability" (Ibid., p. 21). Such an approach guts the profoundly critical content of the best environmental history, turning the field into a handmaiden of capitalist rationalization.
25. Ibid., p. 290.
26. I ignore here the important subject of ecological science, on which ecological history depends, and which, in turn, is informed and modified by ecological history. My belief is that ecological science is the culmination of past science, as environmental history is the culmination of past history-writing - in the sense that ecology is the science that must combine methodological individualism or atomism with holism or organicism across all scientific levels of analysis and also must encompass more levels of analysis than other sciences, which are bounded by a particular, specified analytic level. Other sciences may also be dialectical but they are so within more constrained parameters than ecological science, which may be the only truly dialectical science. About the account above, Alan Rudy writes: "what gets lost is the history of 'natural history,' how 'science' was the study of 'nature's economy' and 'natural history.' This goes back to Gilbert White and Linnaeus in the 18th century and becomes part and parcel of colonialism as 'naturalists' (Humboldt, Darwin, etc.) explored natural history, species diversity, evolution, and geologic relations important to the imperial mission and visions of Europe. As Worster's Nature's Economy,
27. Kloppenberg's First the Seed,
28. Hecht and Cockburn's The Fate of the Forest,
29. and Crosby's Ecological Imperialism make clear, colonialism and exploration were as much about eco-agricultural appropriation as they were about the mercantile and industrial exploitation and industrialization of the globe. The processes of political, economic, and social history are written, or inscribed, in the language of natural history - including the natural history of class, gender, racial and social superiority/inferiority" (personal communication).
30. Jay Moore writes: "Populism and Progressivism 'produce' economic history a la Charles Beard: Depression era union struggles and socialism 'produce' labor history; the Civil Rights Movement and the Sixties 'produce'...political and professional interests in the new social movements manifested first as social, then cultural, and now environmental histories" (personal correspondence).
31. Geoffrey Elton once said, "When I meet a historian who cannot think that there have been great men, great men moreover in politics, I feel myself in the presence of a bad historian." That historians often neglect "great men" today indicates how far history writing has come, and how dependent it is on social science. Not yet have historians found a way to incorporate "great men" into their economic, social, cultural, and environmental histories, e.g., how important, really, was John Muir in the evolution of environmentalism?
32. Most of Marx's own important writings focused on politics and economy. In the first half of the 20th century, specifically cultural subjects made their appearance within Marxism (Lukacs, critical theory). Today, environmental subjects are becoming the center of what's living in Marxist thought (the eco-Marxist school). In the 19th century, political history had yet to develop contending theories of the capitalist state that are now common currency in Marxist writings, mainly because of the low coefficient of development of capitalist classes and society a century or so ago. Economic history neglected the theme of consumption and consumerism for the same reason and environmental history could scarcely be said to exist at all. Today, as cultural and environmental themes are rapidly becoming more important within Marxism, economic themes ("the logic of capital") are regarded by many as mere sub-texts (a mistake in an age when world economy is simulating the model of economy expounded in Capital). The chapter titled "Cooperation" was neglected in the most important readings of Capital until recently: today, the study of cultural forms of cooperation and their import for the workplace, and ecological systems ("nature's cooperation") and their central role in production, are being taken up by more scholars in the Marxist and other critical traditions.
33. The "environmental determinism" of 19th and early 20th century geography largely neglected nature as an autonomous "actor." New environmental histories (e.g., of Australia) have reintroduced nature as an autonomous force without slipping back into the old environmental determinist view.
34. Robert Young ("Biography: The Basic Discipline for Human Sciences," Free Associations, 11, 1988) makes a similar claim with respect to biography (and much of environmental history is biography of a place, region, or resource).