Ethics of chemical synthesis

Hyle

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 103-124

  Schummer, Joachim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KARLSRUHE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Chemical weapons research; Ethics of synthetic chemistry; Freedom of research; Responsibility; Utilitarian and nonutilitarian ends of synthesis

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344343000     PISSN: 14335158     EISSN: 14335158     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (23)

1. I start with a simplified version of the approach suggested by Hans Lenk ('Über Verantwortungsbegriffe und das Verantwortungsproblem in der Technik', in: H. Lenk, G. Ropohl (eds.), Technik und Ethik, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1987, pp. 112-148) and then introduce some modifications, additions, and consequences required for the following sections.
2. Many philosophical discussions of responsibility deal only with attribution or imputation and thereby ignore the z in our phrase. This is because imputation already raises many interesting issues, such as the question of free will and determinism, on which many prominent philosophers have written. In the present context, these metaphysical issues are less important since we can assume that chemists are free to choose among their scientific activities.
3. From these paradigms, Hans Jonas (Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Insel, Frankfurt, 1979) has tried to derive humanity's care responsibility for nature as a whole.
4. see extra file.
5. In the Christian tradition, the ultimate institution has been God at the Last Judgement.
6. Conscience may be briefly defined as the personal capacity to distinguish between morally right and wrong and thus allowing to make moral judgements about one's own actions. In the Christian tradition, following Jerome and Augustine, God's moral law is revealed in one's conscience, such that the ultimate institution to which one is responsible is God. In moral psychology, conscience results from adopting moral values during one's particular socialization; in Freudian terms, this constitutes the quasi-personal institution of the Über-Ich. Apart from the questions of how conscience originates and whether or not a quasi-personal shape, an imagined tribunal, is required, responsibility to humanity requires a level of conscience beyond the values of particular social groups, i.e. a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with respect for humanity. Normative theories in philosophical ethics try to provide guidelines for that from the point of view of impartiality, which corresponds to the principle of universalizability expressed below in requirement 3.
7. Since the notion of responsibility refers to consequences of one's actions, there is some emphasis on consequentialist reasoning, though nonconsequentialist arguments will ocassionally be considered too.
8. The following data are taken from J. Schummer: 'Scientometric Studies on Chemistry I: The Exponential Growth of Chemical Substances', 1800-1995', Scientometrics, 39 (1997), 107-123;
9. 'Scientometric Studies on Chemistry II: Aims and Methods of Producing New Chemical Substances', Scientometrics, 39 (1997), 125-140;
10. and from CAS Statistical Summery 1907-2000, Columbus/Ohio, 2001.
11. Cf. also J. Schummer: 'Challenging Standard Distinction between Science and Technology: The Case of Preparative Chemistry', Hyle, 3 (1997), 81-94.
12. Cf. J. Schummer: 'Towards a Philosophy of Chemistry', Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 28 (1997), 307-336 (316);
13. 'Epistemology of Material Properties', in: Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Boston/MA, USA, August 10-16, 1998, Boston 1999 [http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoSchu.htm].
14. Cf. J. Schummer, Realismus und Chemie. Philosophische Untersuchungen der Wissenschaft von den Stoffen, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1996, chap. 6.6.
15. For details about the properties of new substances that chemists actually determine, see J. Schummer: 'The Impact of Instrumentation on Chemical Species Identity', in: P. Morris (ed.): From Classical to Modern Chemistry: The Instrumental Revolution, London 2001 (forthcoming).
16. Cf. J. Schummer: 'Coping with the Growth of Chemical Knowledge. Challenges for Chemistry Documentation, Education, and Working Chemists', Educación Química, 10 (1999), 92-101.
17. The only way to interpret the synthesis of new substances as the exploration of unknown, but preestablished, fields would be by replacing the physical space with the chemical space, which is topologically defined by all chemical relations between all possible substances (see my Realismus und Chemie, op. cit., chap 5.2.7).
18. By analogy, one might argue that, due to the infinite potential of properties, there is also a probability that a new substance may turn out to be useful some time. While this is undeniable, it is also true that three quarters of synthetic chemists do not care about any probably useful properties, as they determine only properties required for substance characterization (see the empirical studies quoted above). Furthermore, referring to a probability of unintended usefulness is neither a moral argument that might excuse from actual harm caused by the substance, nor does it reveal a rational or scientific attitude; rather it seems to be mocking of the large scale scientific search for useful substances (see next Section). The fuss made about the later found useful properties of buckminsterfullerene and cubane (2 out of several million substances produced in the past few years) suggests that many chemists actually feel a lack of justifying synthesis as an end in itself.
19. Philosophers might probably think of Kant here. However, his ethical approach does not judge actions (neither by consequences nor by intentions) but moral maxims for actions according to his ideal of a rational will expressed in his categorical imperative. E.g. "Die Ethik giebt nicht Gesetze für Handlungen (denn das thut das Ius), sondern nur für die Maximen der Handlungen." (Metaphysik der Sitten, AA, vol. VI, p. 388) Moreover, Kant's judgement of maxims (whether or not they are acceptable as general laws) includes the consideration of consequences of their possible implementation as general laws, as his fourth example in his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (AA, vol. IV, p. 423) makes undoubtedly clear.
20. For more details and various approaches, see the papers in Glück und Ethik, ed. J. Schummer, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 1998.
21. It should be noted that chemical research of new toxic substances for possible warfare use has never been prohibited by international conventions, which makes prohibition by any national law very unlikely. Following the vague Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the equally vague Convention of 10 April 1972, eventually we have now the detailed Chemical Weapons Convention, effective since 29 April 1997 and signed, ratified, or acceded by 174 states as per 12 February 2001. (For the full text and details, see the web site of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons http://www.opcw.org/). The conventions prohibits "the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons" and provides for the first time powerful tools to supervise the obedience to the convention. However, since the definition of a chemical weapon combines both the toxicity of a substance and a quantity consistent with warfare purposes (Art. II, § 1 a) the production of small quantities is allowed and needs no declaration. In addition, "purposes not prohibited under this convention" explicitly includes "research" without any specification of the aims of research (Art. II, § 9 a/c). Furthermore, because the convention actually refers only to a list of well-known toxic substances, it does not cover research of new substances. In sum, chemical weapons research, in the sense of searching for and synthesizing new toxic substances for possible warfare use, is not prohibited by international or national law and still calls for moral regulation.
22. Despite some differences, favoring of needy people follows from both utilitarianism and the most famous modern counter-approach, John Rawl's A Theory of Justice (Oxford UP, 1971). Philosophers might miss further concepts of distributive justice. I omit the idea of favoring people according to their moral merits because that is a circular concept in ethics
23. (cf. W.K. Frankena, Ethics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963, p. 40). Furthermore, for the utilitarian idea of favoring people according to their ability to use the goods for the benefit of humanity, I do not see any instance directly relevant to synthetic chemistry.