Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU

World Policy Journal

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 17-24

  Calleo, David P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344065037     PISSN: 07402775     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/07402775-2003-4001     Document Type: Review

References (15)

1. For a critique of the importance of this shift, see Joseph P. Quinlan, Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), which notes that sales of foreign affiliates greatly exceed trade flows and that both European and American investment stocks and flows are much greater across the Atlantic than with all other recipients, Asia included.
2. Rising American interest in Asia, however, does not automatically mean declining interest in Europe. I have been running a graduate program in European Studies at a leading school of international affairs for 30 years. We have a flourishing Asian Studies program, but, for what it may be worth, interest in Europe has never been low, and never higher than at present.
3. For Roosevelt's views on Europe, see John L. Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
4. Dreams brilliantly adumbrated in Warren Zimmerman's study of American globalism at the turn of the last century, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made the Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002). Roosevelt's views were, of course, also heavily influenced by Woodrow Wilson, in whose administration he served as assistant secretary of the navy (1913-20).
5. Robert J. A. Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes, vol. 3, Fighting for Britain, 1937-1946 (London: Macmillan, 2000).
6. For my own extended attempt to develop these arguments, see The German Problem Reconsidered (U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
7. Quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 52.
8. See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa, 1922 bis 1966 (Vienna: Harold Druck und Verlag, 1966). For his influence, see Bernard Voyenne, Histoire de l'idée européene (Paris: Peyrot, 1964). For my own more extended discussion of how hegemonic and confederal solutions coexisted in postwar Europe, see Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, A Century Foundation Book, 2001), part 2, pp. 23-28, 85-181.
9. See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa, 1922 bis 1966 (Vienna: Harold Druck und Verlag, 1966). For his influence, see Bernard Voyenne, Histoire de l'idée européene (Paris: Peyrot, 1964). For my own more extended discussion of how hegemonic and confederal solutions coexisted in postwar Europe, see Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, A Century Foundation Book, 2001), part 2, pp. 23-28, 85-181.
10. See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Paneuropa, 1922 bis 1966 (Vienna: Harold Druck und Verlag, 1966). For his influence, see Bernard Voyenne, Histoire de l'idée européene (Paris: Peyrot, 1964). For my own more extended discussion of how hegemonic and confederal solutions coexisted in postwar Europe, see Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, A Century Foundation Book, 2001), part 2, pp. 23-28, 85-181.
11. For a detailed and authoritative American account of the two-plus-four talks, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). The following text from p. 368 summarizes their position: "The Bush administration was riveted on institutions - principally NATO - that had sustained the Western alliance and American power in Europe for forty-five years. History will judge whether that preoccupation turns out to have been warranted. In this sense Europe had been transformed by a general acceptance of the Western status quo. NATO remained; American troops and nuclear weapons stayed in Europe; and German power continued to be tightly integrated into the postwar structures. The Americans repeatedly defended the stabilizing virtues of this arrangement to the Soviets, and the arguments had a real impact on them. So one security system collapsed, but the other remained intact, ready to become a foundation for reconstruction of the whole." For a more detached view, see Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
12. For a detailed and authoritative American account of the two-plus-four talks, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). The following text from p. 368 summarizes their position: "The Bush administration was riveted on institutions - principally NATO - that had sustained the Western alliance and American power in Europe for forty-five years. History will judge whether that preoccupation turns out to have been warranted. In this sense Europe had been transformed by a general acceptance of the Western status quo. NATO remained; American troops and nuclear weapons stayed in Europe; and German power continued to be tightly integrated into the postwar structures. The Americans repeatedly defended the stabilizing virtues of this arrangement to the Soviets, and the arguments had a real impact on them. So one security system collapsed, but the other remained intact, ready to become a foundation for reconstruction of the whole." For a more detached view, see Stephen Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
13. As Mitterrand recalls in his memoirs: "I emphasized that the German people, on the eve of taking control of their destiny once more, needed to take the European balance into account, and could not ignore this reality...that in the interests of all, German unity and European unity needed to move forward together" (François Mitterrand, De l'Allemagne, de la France [Paris: Odile Jacob, 1998], p. 114).
14. For a well-informed French view of conflicting French and American European aims during the first Bush administration, I am indebted to Jacques Andréani, "Le devenir des institutions européenes et les relations transatlantiques," Intervention au colloque de la Fondation Robert Schuman, organisé par Paris-1 et SAIS, January 17, 2003.
15. For my own extended analysis of the difference between European and American "geopolitical wavelengths," see chap. 16 and the "Afterword" in the paperback edition of Rethinking Europe's Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, A Century Foundation Book, 2003).