Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy

Ethics

Volumn 108, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 719-745

  Brighouse, Harry ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0344022584     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233849     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
2. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
3. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
4. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
5. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
6. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
7. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
8. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
9. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
10. On the side of teaching autonomy, see Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), and "Civic Education and Social Diversity," Ethics 105 (1995): 557-79; Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls?" Ethics 105 (1995): 468-96; Eamonn Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," Review of Politics 58 (1996): 5-33; and against, see Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); William Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and "Two Concepts of Liberalism," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34. For a liberal who rejects both civic education and autonomy-facilitating education, see Shelley Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defence of an Illiberal Education." Review of Politics 56 (1994): 51-70, and "In Defense of Yoder: Parental Authority and the Public Schools," in NOMOS XXXVIII: Political Order, ed. Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 412-37.
11. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137. Rawls appears to think that constitutions could be legitimate while failing to implement his theory of justice: see his "The Law of Peoples" in On Human Rights, ed. Steven Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41-82. For criticism of Rawls's view expressed in that paper, see Darrell Moellendorf, "Rethinking the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 132-54.
12. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137. Rawls appears to think that constitutions could be legitimate while failing to implement his theory of justice: see his "The Law of Peoples" in On Human Rights, ed. Steven Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41-82. For criticism of Rawls's view expressed in that paper, see Darrell Moellendorf, "Rethinking the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 132-54.
13. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 137. Rawls appears to think that constitutions could be legitimate while failing to implement his theory of justice: see his "The Law of Peoples" in On Human Rights, ed. Steven Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 41-82. For criticism of Rawls's view expressed in that paper, see Darrell Moellendorf, "Rethinking the Law of Peoples," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 132-54.
14. See Galston, Liberal Purposes, p. 250.
15. Ibid., p. 253.
16. Gutmann, Democratic Education, p. 51.
17. Ibid., pp. 52, 42.
18. Gutmann, "Civic Education and Social Diversity," p. 578.
19. Ibid., pp. 578, 573.
20. Galston, Liberal Purposes, pp. 222, 223, 224, 221 (emphasis added); courage is "the willingness to fight and die for one's country" (p. 221).
21. Ibid., pp. 243-44.
22. For an excellent and far more detailed critique of Galston's civic education, see Eamonn Callan, "Beyond Sentimental Civic Education," American Journal of Education 102 (1994): 190-221. Callan focuses not on the problems for liberal legitimacy but on the moral problems with this sort of education, and the possibility of providing a nonsentimentalizing civic education which engages citizens in public life.
23. Gutmann, Democratic Education, p. 43.
24. Ibid.
25. Gutmann's civic republicanism is not essential for radically egalitarian democracy. Consider the analogy with equality of resources. Egalitarians say that all should have available roughly equal resources, but would not say that all should consume the resources available to them: those who prefer to consume less than equality gives them may do so. Similarly, one can say that all citizens should have available roughly equal influence, without advocating that all citizens should take up the equal influence available to them. Radical democracy privileges politics as a sphere of activity because it advocates a principled insulation of the distribution of political power from the distribution of other goods, but it does not necessarily require citizens to use that power. See my "Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence," Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996): 118-41.
26. The following argument appears in very truncated form in my "Liberal Egalitarians and School Choice," Politics and Society 22 (1996): 457-86, p. 465. See also Ian Shapiro, Democracy's Place (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 167-71 (in a chapter co- authored with Richard Arneson) for a similar argument.
27. The following argument appears in very truncated form in my "Liberal Egalitarians and School Choice," Politics and Society 22 (1996): 457-86, p. 465. See also Ian Shapiro, Democracy's Place (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 167-71 (in a chapter co-authored with Richard Arneson) for a similar argument.
28. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 369-70.
29. See the discussion in ibid., pp. 370-78.
30. See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 80-84 for an elaboration of the idea of living a life from the inside.
31. It might be objected that this notion of living well unacceptably demotes unchosen commitments - e.g., commitments to the welfare of our parents or other relatives. I think that is wrong: whether one lives well in carrying out such commitments depends not on rationally choosing them, but on whether the obligations flowing from them are accepted "from the inside." The obligations are undertaken from the inside if the agent identifies with them. She does not live well if she undertakes them with deep resentment and anger, even if what she is doing is good. But she can live well consistent with undertaking them, without choosing them or the commitments from which they flow.
32. See Stephen Bates, Battleground: One Mother's Crusade, the Religious Right, and the Struggle for Control of Our Classrooms (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) for an account of Mozert v. Hawkins, in which parents demanded that textbooks teaching, among other things, that a central ideal of the Renaissance was a belief in the equal worth of all human beings, be removed from the school. The Mozert parents, like the Amish parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder, took the prospective autonomy of their children as a threat to their continued adherence to their religion.
33. I owe this example to Laura Osinski, who helped me identify the different levels of abstraction relevant to my argument.
34. In the case of children, furthermore, it is not clear that the principle of equal opportunity even permits inequalities arising from choices.
35. Thanks to Jocelyn Johnson for this example.
36. I doubt that homosexuality would be a way of life in nonoppressive circumstances, any more than heterosexuality is in most contemporary societies: but in oppressive circumstances it sometimes is.
37. See Callan, "Beyond Sentimental Civic Education," esp. pp. 205-14, for a detailed discussion of two texts that contribute to an education of the sort I am suggesting.
38. As Mill says of adults, "Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest and do their very utmost for them." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 36.
39. There may be reasons that children should be taught these virtues. The instrumental argument does not provide them.
40. Although I have focused on the "skills associated with autonomy" I am skeptical that any cognitive skills can be taught without teaching knowledge. See E. D. Hirsch, Jr., The Schools We Need and Why We Don't Have Them (New York: Doubleday, 1996), chap. 2.
41. I have not shown that autonomy facilitation is all that is owed to children and am open to the possibility that autonomy should be actively promoted. However, the considerations I invoke concerning legitimacy, while they do suggest that critical reflection on the values underlying social institutions should be actively encouraged, make me uneasy about active encouragement of autonomy.
42. Thanks to Erik Olin Wright and an editor of Ethics for pointing out these difficulties.
43. I'm grateful to Shelley Burtt for forcing me to make a number of distinctions I had hitherto missed in this and the ensuing paragraphs.
44. Galston, Liberal Purposes, p. 244.
45. Some examples of the first kind of argument can be found in Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Galston, Liberal Purposes; and Lomasky. I discuss them in my "School Choice: Some Theoretical Considerations," in Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis et al., Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for Equity and Accountability through Markets, Communities, and Governments (London: Verso, 1998), in press.
46. Some examples of the first kind of argument can be found in Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Galston, Liberal Purposes; and Lomasky. I discuss them in my "School Choice: Some Theoretical Considerations," in Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis et al., Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for Equity and Accountability through Markets, Communities, and Governments (London: Verso, 1998), in press.
47. Some examples of the first kind of argument can be found in Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976); Galston, Liberal Purposes; and Lomasky. I discuss them in my "School Choice: Some Theoretical Considerations," in Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis et al., Recasting Egalitarianism: New Rules for Equity and Accountability through Markets, Communities, and Governments (London: Verso, 1998), in press.
48. Richard Arneson, "Democracy at National and Workplace Levels," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), gives a nice statement of this view.
49. I discuss the possibility that neutrality must be seen to be done in "Neutrality, Publicity, and State Funding of the Arts," Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 36-63.
50. Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," esp. pp. 22-23. Callan's more general argument is that political liberalism is in fact "a kind of closet ethical liberalism" (p. 22), and that the distinction between political liberalism and ethical (or comprehensive) liberalisms is thus of limited interest. make a similar argument in "Is There Any Such Thing as Political Liberalism?" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1994): 318-32.
51. Callan, "Political Liberalism and Political Education," esp. pp. 22-23. Callan's more general argument is that political liberalism is in fact "a kind of closet ethical liberalism" (p. 22), and that the distinction between political liberalism and ethical (or comprehensive) liberalisms is thus of limited interest. make a similar argument in "Is There Any Such Thing as Political Liberalism?" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1994): 318-32.
52. Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools," p. 63.
53. Burtt, "In Defense of Yoder," pp. 425, 426; and see p. 428: "Children need a moral and sentimental education: we owe them an upbringing that provides the material and psychological resources that allow for a full and flourishing human life."
54. Burtt, "Religious Parents, Secular Schools," pp. 66, 67.
55. Gutmann's recommendations would, in my view, be likely to have similar effects, but that is not part of her aim.
56. Burtt, "In Defense of Yoder," p. 432.
57. Ibid., p. 433.
58. Rawls makes a similar point: "It may be objected that requiring children to understand the political conception in these ways is, in effect, though not in intention, to educate them in a comprehensive liberal conception. Doing the one may lead to the other, if only because once we know the one we may of our own accord go on to the other. It must be granted that this may indeed happen in the case of some" (Political Liberalism, pp. 199-200).
59. Galston, Liberal Purposes, p. 255.
60. Burtt, "In Defense of Yoder," p. 428.
61. Francis Schrag points out, in "Education, Diversity, and the State," Studies in Philosophy and Education (in press), that most of the charges laid against deeply religious parents by participants in the mainstream have direct reciprocal analogues (I would be as horrified if my daughter became Amish as an Amish parent would be if her son became a liberal socialist). The desirability of permeability between ways of life seems an exception: religious parents would not welcome more permeability because it would make their children more likely to leave, whereas many secular parents would welcome more permeability even if it raised the probability of their children leaving.
62. I am grateful to Randall Blumenstein for raising this issue with me.