Myths and money: Four years of Hariri and Lebanon's preparation for a new Middle East

Middle East Report

Volumn , Issue 203, 1997, Pages 16-21

  Perthes, Volker ^a  

^a GERMAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS   (Germany)

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EID: 0343880222     PISSN: 08992851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3012641     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. Such partnership agreements, as part of the EU's so-called Mediterranean initiative launched with the Barcelona Conference of November 1995, basically stipulate the establishment of a free trade zone between the EU and its individual partners by 2010, financial aid from the EU, and an institutionalized political dialogue. As an example of demonstrative Lebanese self-confidence regarding the prospects of globalization and even competition with Israel, see the interview with the president of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, Jacques Sarraf, al-Nahar, May 20, 1996.
2. See, among others, Joseph Samaha, Qada'an, la Qadar fi-Ihlaq al-Jumhuriya al-Thaniya (By Decision, Not by Fate: On the Morals of the Second Republic), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid) 1996.
3. Economic data and estimates are based on Banque Audi's Quarterly Economic Report, various issues.
4. See Antoine Haddad, "The Poor in Lebanon," The Lebanon Report (Summer 1996), pp. 36-42.
5. See Volker Perthes, "Die Parlamentswahlen im Libanon: Akzeptanz des Faktischen," Orient 38/1 (1997).
6. Quoted from al-Hayat, October 11, 1993. Some other myths and legends that have been invented to patch over the differences of the war (such as the myth that the militias did not represent anyone but themselves) are dealt with by Samaha, Qada'an, la Qadar, op. cit., pp. 27-38.
7. Quoted from al-Hayat, October 11, 1993. Some other myths and legends that have been invented to patch over the differences of the war (such as the myth that the militias did not represent anyone but themselves) are dealt with by Samaha, Qada'an, la Qadar, op. cit., pp. 27-38.
8. For details of the proceedings and outcome of the conference, see Theoder Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: I.B. Tauris and Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1993).
9. One of the authors extensively riding this argument (Ta'if being good but unfairly implemented) is Albert Mansur. See his Al-Inqilab 'ala Ta'if (The Coup Against Ta'if), (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1993).
10. See Paul Salem, "In the Wake of'Grapes of Wrath': Meeting the Challenge," in Rosemary Hollis and Nadim Shehadi, eds., Lebanon on Hold: Implications for Middle East Peace (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1996), pp. 75-78.
11. Ja'ja' has been sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1990 assassination of Dany Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party and a rival for the leadership of the Maronite community. He has been acquitted of having blown up a church in 1994, but he is still accused of being involved in the civil war-time assassination of a Christian lawyer and of then Prime Minister Rashid Karame.
12. Berri has officially denied that he is involved in the establishment of the network. See al-Hayat, September 18-19, 1996.
13. See Perthes, "Die Parlamentswahlen im Libanon," op. cit.
14. In the first place, these are Maronite Christian elites, including the remnants of the Forces Libanaises, the Chamounists (National Liberal Party), and some independent leaders who supported the Ta'if agreement in expectation of a better share in the postwar order than they actually obtained. Some leaders from other communities share similar attitudes; a prominent example is former speaker of parliament Hussein al-Husseini.
15. We can certainly expect that Lebanon will be called upon not only to disarm Hizb Allah, but also to contain it politically, along with and after an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied southern border strip. Apart from that, one of the most important issues for Lebanon in the peace process is the issue of Palestinian refugees. As it is unlikely that more than a tiny minority of Lebanon's Palestinian population would be able to "return" to the Palestinian Territories (the majority of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon come from towns and villages now inside Israel, not in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), most of them are likely to remain in Lebanon. This implies that Lebanon will remain the most fertile ground for radical Palestinian opposition factions that may try to carry on the struggle with Israel even after a "final-status" agreement. It is likely that Lebanon will have to grant permanent residence and civil rights close to citizenship to most of its Palestinian inhabitants, a possibility not very much to the liking of a substantial part of the Lebanese population.
16. See Volker Perthes, "Problems with Peace: Post-War Politics and Parliamentary Elections in Lebanon," Orient 33/3 (September 1992), pp. 409-432.