State subsidies to political parties: Confronting rhetoric with reality

West European Politics

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 1-24

  Pierre, Jon ^a   Svåsand, Lars ^a   Widfeldt, Anders ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM; SUBSIDY SYSTEM;

EID: 0342646954     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402380008425381     Document Type: Article

References (62)

1. See Charles S. Maier (ed.), Changing Boundaries of the Political (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1987).
2. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization: The Emergence of the Cartel Party', Party Politics 1/1 (1995), pp.5-28;
3. Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1981)'
4. Gullan Gidlund, Partistod (Lund: CWK Gleerup 1983).
5. Arthus Lipow, Political Parties and Democracy: Explorations in History and Theory (Buckingham: Polity Press 1996), Chapter 3.
6. Karl Heinz Nassmacher, 'Party Finance in Western Democracies: A Framework for Analysis' (paper presented at the conference 'Party Politics in the year 2000', UMIST, Manchester, 13-15 Jan. 1995).
7. See, e.g., Katz and Mair, 'Changing Models of Party Organization'.
8. Mogens N. Pedersen, "The Birth, Life and Death of Small Parties in Denmark', in Ferdinand Muller-Rommel and Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Small Parties in Western Europe: Comparative and National Perspectives (London: Sage 1991), pp.95-114.
9. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1970).
10. It appears that the initial opposition of the Norwegian Conservative Party to state subsidies for party organisations was not motivated by its own financial strength. On the contrary, Sejersted has shown that the central office of the Conservative Party was constantly in financial difficulties. However, state funding for parties as such was seen as blurring the distinction between the state and the voluntary associations of society. Albinsson has shown that the Swedish Conservative Party was initially of the same opinion.
11. Francis Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon (1945-1981). H0yres historié, 3 (Oslo: Cappelen 1984);
12. Per Albinsson, Skiftningar I Blatt. Förändringar I Moderata Samlingspartiets Riksorganisation 1960-1985 (Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag 1986).
13. Anthony King, 'Political Parties in Western Democracies', Polity'112 (1969), pp. 111-41.
14. Sidney Verba and Steven Kelman, Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden, and the United States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1987);
15. Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1987);
16. O.K. Wilson, Business and Politics: A Comparative Introduction (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House 1990).
17. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), Party Organizations: A Data Handbook (London: Sage 1992);
18. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (eds.), How Ponies Organize: Adaptation and Change in Party Organization in Western Democracies (London: Sage 1994).
19. Peter Burnell and Alan Ware (eds.), funding Democratization (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998).
20. See, e.g., Herbert E. Alexander, Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1989);
21. A.T. Barbrook, 'Atlantic Crossing: Campaign Finance in Britain and the USA', Parliamentary Affairs 47/3 (1993), pp.434-45;
22. Justin Fisher, 'Donations to Political Parties', Parliamentary Affairs 50/2 (1997), pp.235-15;
23. M. Hofnung, 'Public Financing, Party Membership and Internal Party Competition', European Journal of Political Research 29/1 (1996), pp.73-86;
24. R.J. Johnston and C.J. Pattie, 'The Impact of Spending on Party Constituency Campaigning in Recent British General Elections', Party Politics 1/2 (1995), pp.261-73;
25. Jonathan Mendilow, 'Public Party Funding and the Schemes of Mice'and Men: The 1992 Elections in Israel', Party Politics 2/3 (1996), pp.329-54.
26. David M. Farrell, 'Ireland: Centralization, Professionalization and Competitive Pressures', in Katz and Mair (eds.). How Parties Organize, p.235.
27. The Norwegian Constitution of 1814 for example specified that MPs could travel free of charge and would receive allowances.
28. David Farrell, 'Ireland', in Katz and Mair (eds.), Party Organizations, p.452.
29. Kris Deschouwer, 'Belgium', in ibid., p.191.
30. Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlino, 'Italy', in ibid., pp.608ff.
31. Mogens N. Pedersen and Lars Bille, 'Public Financing and Public Control of Political Parties in Denmark', in Matti Wiberg (ed.), The Public Purse and Political Parties (Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 1991), p.157.
32. Wolfgang C. Müller, 'The Development of Austrian Party Organizations in the Post-War Period', in Katz and Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize, p.55;
33. Gullan Gidlund, 'Public Investments in Swedish Democracy', in Wiberg (ed.), Tlie Public Purse, pp. 13-54;
34. Ds. 1994: 31, Del offentliga stodet tillpartiema - Inriktning och omfattning (Stockholm: Fritzes 1994), p.20. /
35. A number of political scandals in France, Belgium, Spain and Italy in during the'early 1990s reveal extensive covert and illegal financial activities of parties discrediting official party data. Bardi and Morlini report that illegal contributions to Italian parties were probably ten times the official party figures. Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlini, 'Italy: Tracing the Roots of the Great Transformation', in Katz and Mair (eds.). How Parties Organize, p.260, Italy abolished state subsidies to parties in 1994, following a referendum. At the time of writing, attempts to re-introduce party subventions have been unsuccessful.
36. This also now applies to France.
37. Herbert E. Alexander, 'American Presidential Elections since Public Funding, 1976-84', in Herbert E. Alexander (ed.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1990s (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1989), pp.95-121;
38. Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1992).
39. Since 1998 parties must make available information about the sources of their income.
40. Personal communication, Lars Bille, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.
41. E.g., Denmark: Jörgen Goul Andersen, 'Politisk deltagelse i 1990 sammenlignet med 1979', in J.G. Andersen et al., Medborgerskab: Demokrat! ofpolitisk deltagelse (Herning: Forlaget Systime 1993), pp.45-74;
42. and Sweden: Anders Widfeldt, Linking Parties with People? Party Membership in Sweden 1960-1997 (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999).
43. See, however, note 22.
44. Koole reports that despite the introduction of some forms of state subsidies to the Dutch parties in the 1960s/1970s (see Table 1), more than half of the annual income for several parties comes from the members. Ruud Koole, 'The "Modesty" of Dutch Party Finance', in Alexander (éd.), Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s, pp.200-219;
45. Ruud Koole, 'The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands', in Katz and Mair (eds.), How Parlies Organize, pp.278-303.
46. See, e.g., Katz and Mair, 'Cartel Party'; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, 'Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Rejoinder', Party Politics 2/4 (1996), pp.525-34;
47. Thomas Poguntke, 'Parties and Society in Western Europe: Declining Linkage?' (paper presented at the conference 'Party Politics in the Year 2000, UMIST, Manchester, 13-15 Jan. 1995);
48. Ruud Koole, 'Cadre, Catch-AIl or Cartel? A Comment', Party Politics 2/4 (1996), pp.507-23.
49. Lars Bille, 'Denmark: The Decline of the Membership Party?', in Katz and Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize, p.145;
50. Ruud Koole, "The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands', in ibid., p.289.
51. George Tsebelis, Nested Games (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1990), p.93.
52. Richard S. Katz, 'Party as Linkage: A Vestigial Function?', European Journal of Political Research 18/1 (1990), pp.143-61.
53. Paul D. Webb, 'Are British Political Parties in Decline', Party Politics 1/3 (1995), p.306.
54. Comments to Figure 1: The vertical axis represent indexes on total party membership. Index=100 at the year of introduction of public subsidies. The indexes are averages of the respective index for different party families. The horizontal axis represents the years, where year 0 is the year of the introduction of state subsidies, negative years are years before the introduction and positive years after the introduction. For Denmark we have used the year of introduction of parliamentary subsidies, for other countries the year of introduction of subsidies to central party organisations. Included parties are as follows: Christian Democratic parties: Christian People's Party (Norway), DC (Italy), CDU/CSU (West Germany), ÖVP (Austria). Liberal parties: FPÖ (Austria), Venstre (Denmark), Folkpartiet (Sweden), PLI (Italy), and FDP (West Germany). Socialist parties: SPD (West Germany), Arbeiderpartiet (Norway), Socialdemokraterna (Sweden), Socialdemokratiet (Denmark), Suomen Sosialidemokrattiinen Puolue (Finland), PSI (Italy), and SPÖ (Austria). Conservative parties: Hoyre (Norway), Konservative Folkeparti (Denmark), Moderata Samlingspartiet (Sweden), Kansallinen Kokoomus (Finland). Source: Data from Katz and Mair (eds.), Party Organizations, reanalysed by the present authors. We have also conducted a similar analysis comparing membership development in different national contexts. There had been a negative membership trend in Sweden prior to the introduction of party subsidies, but in Germany the trend was positive, and in other countries it is difficult to speak of any trend at all. The development after the subsidies had been introduced has either been stable or negative. The only exception is Germany, where the positive trend continued. Thus, on the country level, there is no general support for the hypothesis of party subsidies as a response to a membership decline; nor is there anything to suggest that the introduction of subsidies had a systematic and general effect on membership development.
55. Susan Scarrow, Parties and Their Members: Organizing for Victory in'Britain and Germany (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), pp.42-5.
56. Lauri Karvonen, Med van vastra grannland somforebild (Turku: Abo Akademi 1982).
57. See, e.g., Financing of Political Parties: A Cornerstone of Pluralist Democracies Report on the committee on parliamentary and public relations (Council of Europe 1989).
58. Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Polities', in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1992), pp.1-32.
59. Katz and Mair, 'Cartel Party'.
60. Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Danish Folketing Election of 1973: The Defeat of all Parties', in Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1988), pp.257-81.
61. Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: The Free Press 1968 [1911]).
62. Giovanni Sartori, Parlies and Party Systems. A Frameworkfor Analysis, vol.1 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press 1976), p.95.