Doing right by our animal companions

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 159-185

  Burgess Jackson, Keith ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Animals; Children; Companions; Needs; Obligation; Partialism; Relationship; Responsibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242658214     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009756409422     Document Type: Article

References (143)

1. Henry S. Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, with a Preface by Peter Singer (Clarks Summit, PA: Society for Animal Rights, 1980), pp. 43-14. Salt's book was originally published in 1892.
2. John Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," Philosophical Studies 43 (1983), p. 97.
3. Throughout the essay I use "animals" as an abbreviation for "animals other than human." This is not unproblematic. See Tom Regan, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1975), p. 184, n. 7 ("The fact that this is an ordinary use of the word ["animal" for "animal other than human"], despite the fact that humans are animals, suggests that this is a fact that we are likely (and perhaps eager) to forget. It may also help to account for our willingness to treat (mere) animals in certain ways that we would not countenance in the case of humans" [italics in original]). For an insightful essay on nomenclature
4. see Kenneth Shapiro, "Language: Referring to Animals Other Than Humans," ISAZ [International Society for Anthrozoology] - The Newsletter (November 1997), pp. 20-23.
5. The number of human-animal companionships is staggering. As of 1980, there were nearly half a billion (475.4 million) companion animals in the United States alone. This figure includes forty-eight million dogs (in thirty-two million households), 27.2 million cats, 25.2 million birds, 250 million fish, and 125 million other animals (including raccoons, hamsters, gerbils, rabbits, reptiles, rodents, and guinea pigs).
6. See Alan M. Beck, "Animals in the City," in Aaron Honori Katcher and Alan M. Beck (eds.), New Perspectives on Our Lives with Companion Animals (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 238.
7. I prefer "animal companion" or "companion animal" to "pet" on grounds that the first and second of these terms, but not the third, imply (or at least do not preclude) equality and mutuality. Nothing substantive - that is, nothing in my argument - hinges on this terminological choice. For a different approach to the matter.
8. see Carol J. Adams, "Bringing Peace Home: A Feminist Philosophical Perspective on the Abuse of Women, Children, and Pet Animals," Hypatia 9 (1994), p. 64.
9. Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975; 2nd ed., 1990). All citations are to the second edition of this work.
10. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).
11. One happy exception to this generalization is Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981; rev. ed., 1992). (All citations are to the revised edition of this work.) Rollin's book is divided into four chapters: the first on moral theory; the second on rights; the third on research; and the fourth, amounting to twenty-eight pages, on "Morality and Pet Animals." (Note that Rollin, like Adams, uses "pet" rather than "animal companion.") Rollin is a pioneer of what has come to be known as "veterinary ethics." He has also published an important work on animal pain. See Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science, with a Foreword by Jane Goodall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; paperback ed., 1990).
12. This is not a claim of or about legal responsibility. It is a moral claim. For the sake of simplicity (and with only a few exceptions) I omit the word "moral" throughout the essay. Nonetheless, the law illuminates the concept of special responsibility. Innkeepers are deemed by law to have special responsibilities toward their guests, lifeguards toward their charges, common carriers toward their passengers, and so on. These responsibilities go beyond the general duty (which everyone has) of reasonable care under the circumstances.
13. See James A. Henderson, Jr., and Richard N. Pearson, The Torts Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1975), pp. 281, 369-396. Note that in each of these cases, the role is voluntarily assumed. Nobody is required to be an innkeeper, lifeguard, or common carrier. By the same token, nobody is required to assume the role of companion to an animal.
14. "The domestic dog is one of the most popular companion animals with an estimated population of 90 million in Western Europe and the USA. One in every four households in Western Europe owns a dog, and the figure rises to two in every five households in the USA.
15. Chris Thorne, "Feeding Behaviour of Domestic Dogs and the Role of Experience," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 104.
16. The focus on dogs is appropriate for another, more troubling reason. "[H]umane society statistics reveal that dogs are by far the most common animal victims of human negligence and abuse.
17. James Serpell, "From Paragon to Pariah: Some Reflections on Human Attitudes to Dogs," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 252.
18. On species-specificity, see Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 68.
19. With respect to diversity among dogs, it should be noted that there are 400 breeds in the world today, many of which are the product of selective breeding. See Juliet Clutton-Brock, "Origins of the Dog: Domestication and Early History," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 16.
20. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
21. Here I agree with Paul Taylor, who argues for a "principle of restitutive justice" with respect to harmed organisms, species-populations, and biotic communities. See Taylor, Respect for Nature, pp. 186-192, 194-195, 196-197.
22. This principle (he also calls it a rule) arises where "an agent has broken a valid moral rule and by doing so has upset the balance of justice between himself or herself and a moral subject." Ibid., p. 186. Taylor's four rules of duty are nonmaleficence, noninterference, fidelity, and restitutive justice. See ibid., chap. 4.
23. Stated differently, I am arguing for an acquired duty toward (certain) animals. For a discussion of the distinction between acquired and unacquired duties, see, e.g., Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 273-276.
24. Regan, quoting John Rawls, says that unacquired duties (what Rawls calls "natural" duties) "apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts" and"irrespective of⋯institutional relationships." Acquired duties, in contrast, arise "because of our voluntary acts or our place in institutional arrangements." Ibid., p. 273
25. (the first two quotations are from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971], pp. 114-115).
26. I do not argue (in this essay, at any rate) for the existence of institutional duties toward animals. On an unrelated note, I have been criticized by an anonymous reviewer for using the pronouns "it" and "its" (possessive case) to refer to nonhuman animals. The criticism is that this objectifies animals, which (allegedly) undermines the thesis of the essay. I am not convinced by the criticism; but even if the use does objectify, it is interesting to observe that humans are also routinely objectified in this way - usually when the context is abstract, as it is here. Jane Flax, for example, writes that "The initial euphoria present in the discovery of the child's own powers and skills diminishes as it discovers the limitations as well as the possibilities of its developing skills. The child painfully learns that not only is it not omnipotent, but that the mother, too, is not all powerful." Jane Flax, "Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics," in Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), p. 252
27. (emphasis added). Bernard Rollin, who can hardly be accused of insensitivity to animals, also uses "it" to refer to particular animals where their sex is irrelevant. See Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 216.
28. According to Juliet Clutton-Brock, a zoologist, "the dog was the first species of animal to be domesticated." Clutton-Brock, "Origins of the Dog," p. 10.
29. Michael W. Fox, The Dog: Its Domestication and Behavior (New York and London: Garland STPM Press, 1978), p. 262 (emphasis added).
30. For a sketch of such an argument, see Bernard E. Rollin, "Morality and the Human- Animal Bond," in Aaron Honori Katcher and Alan M. Beck (eds.), New Perspectives on Our Lives with Companion Animals (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 504
31. ("[P]et animals, at least, do stand in precisely this relationship to man, be- haviorally [sic], biologically, and evolutionarily. There is a strong social contract between man and dog" [italics in original]). See also Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, pp. 216-220.
32. For doubts about the usefulness of a contractual model, see Carole Pateman, "The Sexual Contract and the Animals," Journal of Social Philosophy27 (1996), pp. 70-72 (arguing that since animals cannot refuse to enter into contracts, and since the possibility of refusal is "the basic criterion for the existence of a genuine practice of contract" [ibid., p. 72], animals cannot be contractors).
33. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1979), p. 1093 (s.v. "Promissory estoppel")
34. and John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 202-203.
35. To estop is to stop, so estoppel is the act of stopping (i.e., preventing) someone from doing something. Promissory estoppel is the doctrine that one ought, legally, to be stopped or prevented from breaking one's promise. For a gesture in this direction with respect to human obligations to animals, see Roslind Godlovitch, "Animals and Morals," Philosophy 46 (1971), p. 25 ("The function of the practice of promising is to incur ' special' obligations ⋯").
36. Annette C. Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 110.
37. An anonymous reviewer has suggested that this is "something of a straw man objection," since "Common moral practice, and most moral theory, certainly recognizes special obligations, e.g. to our loved ones, one's own community, etc." I agree that common moral practice recognizes special obligations, but I deny that the main moral theories do so. Consequentialists, for example, have a notoriously difficult time accommodating special obligations. See the discussion and references in Part III. It may be - and here I speculate - that this is why the main moral theories fail to resonate with ordinary people. I say this as someone who has taught practical and theoretical ethics for many years and who assumes that beginning students are "ordinary people." For a discussion of where, in my view, moral theory goes bad, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, "The Problem with Contemporary Moral Theory," Hypatia 8 (1993), pp. 160-166 (arguing that moral theory is unacceptably foundational).
38. Here I concur with Philip Pettit, who writes: "Considering the repeatable features of his situation, each parent must acknowledge, not just his duty to look after his child, but the duty on all parents to take like care of their progeny." Philip Pettit, "Social Holism and Moral Theory: A Defence of Bradley's Thesis," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., 86 (1985/86), p. 183.
39. See also Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), p. 174.
40. See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 41
41. ("[G]enerality is the opposite of specificity, whereas universality is compatible with specificity, and means merely the logical property of being governed by a universal quantifier and not containing individual constants"). I do not address the more fundamental question whether, in order for a judgment to count as a moral judgment, it must be universalizable. I assume so. For a discussion of this point, see ibid., p. 55; see also Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," passim.
42. Rawls addresses this point when he distinguishes two types of natural duty (the contrast being to nonnatural or acquired duty). Positive natural duties are duties "to do something good for another," while negative natural duties "require us not to do something that is bad." Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 114. Rawls finds it "plausible to hold that, when the distinction is clear, negative duties have more weight than positive ones." Ibid.
43. He does not, however, argue the point. The two distinctions (natural/acquired and positive/negative) cut across one another, generating the following four types: (1) positive natural duties; (2) negative natural duties; (3) positive acquired duties; and (4) negative acquired duties. An example of a positive natural duty would be providing aid to a stranger (this is Rawls's example). An example of a negative natural duty would be refraining from harming a stranger (also one of Rawls's examples). An example of a positive acquired duty would be educating one's child or keeping a promise. An example of a negative acquired duty would be not harming one's child. My argument, cast in Rawlsian terminology, is that we have duties of type 3 and 4 with respect to companion animals. The voluntary act of taking an animal in generates both positive and negative duties toward it. This does not entail that we lack duties of type 1or2.
44. Perhaps "everyone" is extreme. An ethical egoist, for example, might deny that there are natural duties (positive or negative) in Rawls's sense. If one's governing principle is the maximization of self-interest, as it is to a rational egoist, then in a particular case one may be required to harm others, whether stranger or nonstranger.
45. I use the language of rights loosely. It is not my aim to defend any kind of rights for animals in this essay. But by the same token, I do not deny their existence or possibility. In this regard I part ways with Paul Taylor, with whom I am otherwise in agreement. See Taylor, Respect for Nature, Chap. 5 (arguing that moral rights, strictly and properly conceived, are such that it is impossible for animals - or plants - to be bearers of moral rights, but conceding that there is an extended sense of "moral right" in which animals - as well as plants - may be said to have moral rights). My argument is about human responsibility and duty, which may or may not correlate with animal rights. Stated differently, I do not embrace the correlativity thesis, which maintains that every right entails a duty and every duty a right. For a formal statement and discussion of the correlativity thesis, see Keith Burgess-Jackson, "Duties, Rights, and Charity," Journal of Social Philosophy 18 (1987), pp. 3-12.
46. I say "typically" because there are exceptions. It has been argued, for example, that there are logical limits on the sorts of rights that might exist. See Hillel Steiner, "The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights," The Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), pp. 767-775. I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this essay to my attention.
47. By "ad hominem" I mean addressed to particular people with particular beliefs, values, ideals, principles, and commitments. This is the Lockean sense of the term. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. with a foreword by Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975; 1st ed., 1689), Bk. IV, Chap. XVII, Sec. 21, p. 686
48. ("A third way [to persuade] is, to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already known under the Name of Argumentum ad Hominem" [italics in original]). Joel Feinberg describes this method, which he employs throughout his tetralogy, as follows: "The appeal in [ad hominem] arguments is made directly 'to the person' of one's interlocutor, to the convictions he or she is plausibly assumed to possess already. If the argument is successful, it shows to the person addressed that the judgment it supports coheres more smoothly than its rivals with the network of convictions he already possesses, so that if he rejects it, then he will have to abandon other judgments that he would be loath to relinquish." Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the CriminalLaw,vol. 1: Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 18.
49. This sort of ad hominem argument should not be confused with the fallacious sort. There is a difference, however one marks it, between (1) dismissing a person's argument on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics (attack on the person) and (2) drawing out the consequences of someone's beliefs, values, ideals, principles, or commitments (appeal to the person). Only the first of these is fallacious.
50. I agree with Christina Hoff Sommers that "The contemporary philosopher is, on the whole, actively unsympathetic to the idea that we have any duties defined by relationships that we have not voluntarily entered into." Christina Hoff Sommers, "Philosophers Against the Family," in George Graham and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), Person to Person (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 82 (italics in original). The prevailing idea seems to be that all duties are self-imposed. I do not share this belief, but that is neither here nor there as far as my argument in this essay is concerned. My argument is addressed to those who have this belief. I try to show them that their principles commit them to acknowledging duties to companion animals.
51. According to Beck, "Most companion animals ⋯are domesticated or captive-born species that thrive better in captivity than when free of human care." Beck, "Animals in the City," p. 240. Note that this is a comparative judgment. Beck is not saying that all companion animals thrive. If he were, and if he were correct, there would be no need to write this essay. He is making a claim about species, not specimens.
52. "[T]here is evidence that loose [unconstrained] dogs account for more than 6 percent of all automobile accidents ⋯ " Ibid., p. 241. This is not to blame the animals who cause such accidents but to suggest the degree of danger to which they are exposed. Beck advocates leash laws as a way to minimize this loss. See ibid.
53. See, e.g., Harlan B. Miller, "Introduction: 'Platonists' and 'Aristotelians'," in Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983), p. 10.
54. I am not the first to notice or draw the analogy. See Leslie Pickering Francis and Richard Norman, "Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others," Philosophy 53 (1978), p. 523
55. ("[H]uman beings can be something like the voluntary parents of animals - their pets. However, ⋯the human role in such cases will normally be 'parental' only in the sense of being a protective and nurturing one; the distinctive developmental features which we have stressed in the human parent-child relation will be present to a very small degree, if at all, in the relations between human beings and their pets. Even so, such relations may be treated as bearing some moral resemblance to the parent-child relationship; a pet owner would not be blamed for rescuing his/her pet rather than someone else's"). Francis and Norman are not here concerned to deny the possibility of special responsibilities to animals. What they claim is that not all animals are so related to humans. Rollin has also made the adoption comparison. See Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 230 ("[A]cquiring an animal is morally more like adopting a child than it is like buying a wheelbarrow").
56. See, e.g., Jeffrey Blustein, "Procreation and Parental Responsibility," Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (1997), pp. 79-86.
57. See Rollin, "Morality and the Human-Animal Bond," pp. 500-501;
58. Taylor, Respect for Nature, p. 17. There may be nonsentient animals - insects and mollusks, for example - but these are not likely to be human companions
59. Baier, Moral Prejudices, p. 116.
60. Here I deviate from my announced practice of using the unadorned "responsibility," but only to distinguish it from causal responsibility, which, in and of itself, has no normative or evaluative significance. For a discussion of the psychic dependency of dogs on their human companions, see Fox, The Dog, pp. 250-257.
61. See generally Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 217 ("The dog in its current form is essentially dependent upon humans for its physical existence, behavioral needs, and for fulfillment of its social nature").
62. James Rachels examines three arguments in favor of what he calls "the Compromise View," which is the "idea that one's own children have a superior claim [vis-a-vis other children] to one's care." James Rachels, "Morality, Parents, and Children," in George Graham and Hugh LaFollette (eds.), Person to Person (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 50.
63. The first argument asserts that parenthood is a role and that certain responsibilities and obligations (as well as rights) inhere in roles. Since one occupies the parental role only in relation to one's own children, one has responsibilities and obligations only to them. The second argument maintains that parents have special responsibility to their own children (as opposed to the children of others) because they (the parents) are "better situated to look after their own." Ibid., p. 53 (italics omitted). The third argument maintains that love is a personal good of great importance and that, without special relationships, it would be unrealizable. As Rachels puts it, "An ethic that required absolute impartiality would therefore require forgoing a great personal good." Ibid., p. 54.
64. None of these arguments captures what I take to be the basis of our responsibility to companion animals. I have not argued for the existence of a social role involving companion animals, much less tried to give content to such a role. Thus, I do not use the term "special responsibility" in the way Philip Pettit (for example) uses "special duty." Pettit defines "special duties" as "those that belong to the occupants of certain social roles." Pet- tit, "Social Holism and Moral Theory," p. 173. Some - but not all - special responsibilities derive from roles (elsewhere in his essay Pettit uses the term "special duties" more broadly. See ibid., p. 180. I am arguing for special duties in that broader sense). Nor is it my contention that we have special responsibilities to companion animals because we are best situated (spatiotemporally or otherwise) to provide for their needs. This may be true in many or most cases, but it is not the basis of my argument. Finally, I do not rest my case for responsibility on emotions such as love, however good and valuable they may be. While there is undoubtedly genuine affection (perhaps amounting to love) between many humans and their companion animals, this is not the basis of the responsibility humans have toward them. Rather, the responsibility flows from the act of acquisition and the fact of vulnerability. Oddly, Rachels does not consider this possibility.
65. When he compares his own children to other children, he finds no relevant differences. One morally relevant difference is that he, Rachels, has brought some of these children (but not others) into existence. See Oldenquist, "Loyalties," p. 186.
66. A computerized search of The Philosopher's Index for the years 1940 through March 1998 (inclusive) turned up only ten references to the conjunction of "companion" and "animal" (or variants thereof), ten references to "pet(s)," and sixty-five references to "dog(s)." Many of the references to dogs concern their cognitive and linguistic abilities rather than questions of moral status. Only a handful of the eighty-five items address the subject of this essay, and will, accordingly, be discussed herein. One of the best-known anthologies in the field, published in 1983, contains twenty-six essays arrayed in eight sections. Seventeen of the contributors are listed as philosophers. Not one of the essays, or even a section of an essay, is devoted to companion animals, let alone to human responsi- bilitiesto companion animals. See Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1983). The second edition of another widely used anthology contains thirty-nine essays arrayed in nine sections. At least twenty-three of the contributors, by my count, are philosophers. Again, not one section of one essay is devoted to companion animals. See Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989; 1st ed., 1976).
67. I am pleased to report that since the completion of this essay I discovered a brief but serious discussion, by a philosopher, of the morality of keeping companion animals. David DeGrazia argues for a principle (one of fifteen he sets out) to the following effect: "Provide for the basic physical and psychological needs of your pet, and ensure that she has a comparably good life to what she would likely have if she were not a pet." David De-Grazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 280. One hopes that other, more detailed studies follow.
68. The term "impartialist" is Cottingham's. See Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," passim. Impartialists are so called because they embrace the impartiality thesis, which "implies that when we are making moral decisions (e.g. about how to allocate goods and resources), we ought not to give any special weight to our own desires and interests; instead of giving preferential treatment to ourselves, or to members of our own particular social group, we should try to adopt a neutral standpoint, detaching ourselves as far as possible from our own special desires and involvements." Ibid., p. 83. Cottingham's essay is a sustained argument against the impartiality thesis.
69. For another and more recent critique of impartialism (and therefore a partial defense of partialism), see Stephen R.L. Clark, "Enlarging the Community: Companion Animals," in Brenda Almond (ed.), Introducing Applied Ethics (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), pp. 318-330. Despite his title, Clark says very little about companion animals.
70. This, I believe, is the thrust of Thomas Jefferson's immortal phrase "all men are created equal" (from the Declaration of Independence). See Brian L. Blakeley and Jacquelin Collins, Documents in English History: Early Times to the Present (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p. 271. Jefferson is saying that in spite of obvious material differences, humans are morally alike.
71. Singer, not surprisingly, is one of Cottingham's targets. See Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," pp. 83-84.
72. This fear pervades Animal Liberation, where Singer insists that rats (for example) are "as capable of suffering as dogs are." Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 30. He then speculates about why dogs and rats are viewed differently: "People tend to care about dogs because they generally have more experience with dogs as companions." Ibid.; see also ibid., pp. 214, 218-219.
73. Singer is worried that we will limit our moral attention to familiar, friendly, or cuddly animals, of which dogs are an exemplar. What Singer ignores is the possibility that the greater care and concern for dogs than for rats is a function of greater responsibility for the former, which in turn stems from having taken them in. In other words, the difference is moral, not psychological. One wonders whether people care more about feral or stray dogs than about rats. I suspect not.
74. The same mindlessness, if I may call it that, attends the abortion debate. Until recently, when radical (as opposed to liberal) feminists began to address the subject, it was assumed that the moral status of a fetus must be a function of its intrinsic properties rather than of its relation to the woman in whom it develops (or to other humans). The only question was which properties were relevant to this status. For a pioneering discussion of this issue, see Lynn M. Morgan, "Fetal Relationality in Feminist Philosophy: An Anthropological Critique," Hypatia 11 (1996), pp. 47-70.
75. I am by no means the first to point this out. Twenty years ago Cora Diamond criticized a line of argument that she called, revealingly, "the Singer-Regan approach." Cora Diamond, "Eating Meat and Eating People," Philosophy 53 (1978), p. 467.
76. Diamond writes: "It is a mark of the shallowness of these discussions of vegetarianism that the only tool used in them to explain what differences in treatment are justified is the appeal to the capacities of the beings in question."
77. Cora Diamond, Philosophy, Ibid., p. 468
78. (emphasis added); see also ibid., p. 479.
79. This sounds like a critique of what I am calling "intrinsicalism. " Diamond does not, however, emphasize relationships, as I do. Instead, she stresses the fact that other animals are "fellow creatures."
80. Cora Diamond, Philosophy, Ibid., p. 474.
81. But even wild (i.e., nondomesticated) animals such as songbirds (her example is a titmouse) turn out to be fellow creatures, so she is not concerned, after all, with those particular animals with whom we form relationships. For a more recent and slightly different critique of Singer and Regan, see Richard Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 213 ("I can now state my chief doubt about the two principal modern theories [those of Singer and Regan], and that is that they take only one main consideration into account: preference satisfaction (supplemented by pleasure and pain equations) or inherent value. But there are so many other considerations"). If I understand him correctly, Sorabji's complaint is that Singer and Regan are monists. This is brought out by the title of the chapter in which he discusses their work: "The one-dimensionality of ethical theories."
82. In an important essay, Mary Anne Warren has urged rejection of "two common assumptions about the theoretical foundations of moral rights," namely, "the intrinsic-properties assumption" and "the single-criterion assumption." Mary Anne Warren, "The Moral Significance of Birth," Hypatia 4 (1989), p. 47.
83. The former "is the view that the only facts that can justify the ascription of basic moral rights or moral standing to individuals are facts about the intrinsic properties of those individuals" Ibid. (citations omitted; italics in original). The latter "is the view that there is some single property, the presence or absence of which divides the world into those things which have moral rights or moral standing, and those things which do not." Ibid. I agree with Warren not only that these assumptions are widespread, but that they should be rejected.
84. Singer, Animal Liberation, pp. 8-9. In an early critique of Singer's arguments for vegetarianism, Francis and Norman point out that he is, in my terms, an intrinsicalist: "What is notable is that the properties he [Singer] considers as likely candidates [for distinguishing between humans and other animals] are all non-relational: possessing reason, being able to feel pain, having interests. We suggest that what are important are the relations in which human beings stand to one another, and that with few exceptions they do not stand in the same relations to animals." Francis and Norman, "Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others," p. 518 (italics in original). The exceptions, of course, are crucial, for my argument is that we have special responsibilities to those animals we voluntarily bring into our lives and homes.
85. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, p. 243.
86. Two points. First, according to Regan, being a subject of a life is not a matter of degree. "One either is a subject of a life, in the sense explained, or one is not. All those who are, are so equally. The subject-of-a-life criterion thus demarcates a categorical status shared by all moral agents and those moral patients with whom we are concerned."
87. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Ibid., p. 245
88. (italics in original). Second, being a subject of a life is (for Regan) sufficient but not necessary for having moral status (what he calls "inherent value").
89. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Ibid., pp. 245-246.
90. But see Deborah Slicer, "Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue," Hypatia 6 (1991), p. 110, who maintains that for Regan, "the possession of preference interests [is] a necessary condition" for "being owed moral consideration." Singer, in contrast, makes sentience both necessary and sufficient for having interests. See Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 8. Presumably, for Singer, all and only beings with interests have moral status.
91. See, e.g., Francis and Norman, "Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others," pp. 513-518, who take issue with Singer and Regan both individually and collectively.
92. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 48.
93. Regan devotes several paragraphs of his book to analyzing the case of the lifeboat, which goes as follows. Four humans and one dog (of the same size and weight) are in a lifeboat that can hold only four individuals. Someone - a human or the dog - must be thrown overboard if any of them are to survive. Who should it be? Regan says it should be the dog (although not because it is a dog). See Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, p. 324.
94. At no point in his discussion does Regan consider the relation of the dog to any of its lifeboat companions, or, more specifically, whether any of the humans has undertaken responsibility for the dog's welfare. One wonders whether Regan would ignore this relational aspect if the dog were a mildly retarded human being who happened to be the child of one of the others in the lifeboat. Would the fact that the parent is responsible to/for the child make a difference to his assessment? If so, then why should it not make a difference to his assessment of the dog case? I am not saying that the relational aspect is dispositive; I am saying that it is relevant.
95. Cottingham puts it nicely: "The maxim that a person should give preference to those who stand in some specific relationship with him is, from the logical point of view, a perfectly coherent one. There is nothing 'magical' about relational properties, nor is there anything necessarily irrational about maxims which refer to them." Cottingham, "Ethics and Impartiality," p. 89.
96. Impartialists find this puzzling. Rachels, for instance, says that, "Like everyone else, I have a deep feeling, that I cannot shake, that my responsibilities to my own children are special. If I have to choose between feeding my own children, and giving the food to starving orphans, I am going to feed my own." James Rachels, "Moral Philosophy as a Subversive Activity," in Earl R. Winkler and Jerrold R. Coombs (eds.), Applied Ethics: A Reader (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), p. 114.
97. But Rachels has qualms. "[M]y children were merely lucky to have been born into a relatively affluent family, while the orphans, who have the same needs and are equally deserving, were unlucky to have gotten stuck with their situation. Why should the just distribution of life's goods, right down to food itself, be determined in this way?" Ibid., p. 115.
98. Rachels's puzzlement is puzzling. It appears to stem from his unarticulated assumption that only intrinsic properties of individuals are relevant to other people's responsibility to/for them. Notice how he emphasizes "the same needs" of the children, as well as the fact that they are "equally deserving." These are intrinsic properties. What he fails to notice is that there is a morally relevant difference between the children, namely, their relations to him. Rachels assumed responsibility for his children when he brought them into existence (or into his life). He performed no such act with respect to the orphans, however needy and however deserving they may be. This relational asymmetry is sufficient to explain his "deep feeling ⋯that [his] responsibilities to [his] own children are special."
99. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229-243.
100. See Singer, Animal Liberation, p. 2. Singer takes pains, and rightly so, to distinguish equal treatment and equal consideration. "The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights." Ibid. (italics in original).
101. I said that one explanation of the philosophical neglect of companion animals is a fear that if special responsibilities to animals are acknowledged, a person may be more likely to reject general responsibilities to humans, which Singer (for one) believes to be unacceptable. We can see this strategic move graphically. The fear is that by acknowledging obligations of Type 4, we increase the likelihood of not (or no longer) acknowledging obligations of type 1. In other words, we come to see all obligations - even obligations to humans - as being based on relational properties. Singer, it would appear, consciously risks losing 4 in order not to lose 1.
102. I should mention in passing a third explanation of the philosophical neglect of companion animals. It may reflect an assumption that animals are "other" - that the lives of animals and humans are distinct and independent. This may in turn reflect an assumption that animals, but not humans, are part of nature. On one side (so the thinking goes) there are humans and the culture they produce; on the other side there are animals and nature. It is tempting, when laboring under this assumption, to view the moral status of animals as but one aspect of the larger question of the moral status of the natural world (or of human responsibilities thereto). This would explain why philosophical anthologies tend to lump the subjects together. See, e.g., James P. Sterba, ed., Morality in Practice,5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), the eleventh chapter of which is entitled "Animal Liberation and Environmental Justice."
103. This is an egregious category mistake. The lives of many animals - especially dogs and cats - are interwoven with the lives of human beings. Dogs and cats are not misplaced, pitiable wild creatures, longing for some imagined freedom; they are urban and suburban denizens like their human companions. See, e.g.,Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 227.
104. This point is ignored by certain writers, such as Lori Gruen, who says that "When humans bring animals into their homes, the animals are forced to conform to the rituals and practices of the human's [sic] that live there. Cats and dogs are often denied full expression of their natural urges when their 'owners' keep them indoors or put bells around cats' necks to prevent them from hunting or forbid dogs from scavenging for food." Lori Gruen, "On the Oppression of Women and Animals," Environmental Ethics 18 (1996), p. 443.
105. I do not know whether Gruen believes that every human-animal relationship is of this sort. It seems clear to me that some, perhaps many, are not, and that only those that are of this sort are objectionable. If dogs and cats are to be viewed as unauthentic or infantile versions of their wild cousins, then, for the sake of consistency, human beings should be viewed as unauthentic or infantile versions of the primates from which they descended and to whom they are presently related. Dogs, cats, and other companion animals are viable and contributing members of human culture. If we are to make sense of this fact, as Rosemary Rodd notes, we must refuse to see animals as just "part of the environment." See Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 105.
106. Unlike Singer and others, I do not fear the backsliding effect described in a previous note. I do not fear that by arguing for obligations of Type 4, I risk undermining people's belief that there are obligations of Type 1. In part this is because people tend to compartmentalize their beliefs about humans and animals. I see potential for a Pareto-superior move (for an explication and discussion of this and related concepts, such as Pareto-optimality, see Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], Chaps. 3 and 4). We can secure obligations of Type 4 for animals without risking the loss of obligations to anyone else, human or animal. In saying this, I rely on the fact that most people acknowledge obligations of Type 3. My argument, recall, is analogical. Why should relationships with particular humans give rise to obligations when relationships with particular animals do not give rise to obligations?
107. See National Research Council, Nutrient Requirements ofDogs, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985).
108. Some medical care is made necessary by human ignorance or neglect. See Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 226 ("Our lack of understanding of the animals' nutritional and biological needs results in myriad medical problems that arise out of bad diet, overfeeding, and lack of exercise"). Ignorance is particularly problematic. "To put it bluntly, the average person is either ignorant or misinformed about dog and cat behavior, training, biology, nutrition, in short, about the animal's nature."
109. Rosemary Rodd, Biology, Ethics, and Animals, Ibid.
110. Dogs, like humans, suffer from obesity, which is causally linked to other health problems (such as diabetes and heart, kidney, and liver disease). It has been estimated that "one-third of the British population of pet dogs is obese." Roger A. Mugford, "Canine Behavioural Therapy," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 150
111. see also Robert Hubrecht, "The Welfare of Dogs in Human Care," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 180.
112. Veterinarian Ron Epps of Bedford, Texas, says that "About 60 percent of dogs are overweight." Stacy Ann Thomas, "Free Weight Checks Stick to the Ribs," The Dallas Morning News 148 (8 June 1997), p. 40A. It may be - and here I speculate - that obesity is more of a problem for dogs in affluent nations than for dogs in nonaffluent nations.
113. Dogs suffer from many types of worms, the most common of which are ringworms, roundworms, hookworms, tapeworms, whipworms, and heartworms. All are internal parasites, which, if allowed to grow, can cause severe illness and even death to the host.
114. For a discussion of various animal needs, see Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 88-94. Under "psychological and social needs," Regan lists "companionship, security and liberty."
115. Stacy Ann Thomas, The Dallas Morning News, Ibid., p. 90.
116. According to Michael W. Fox, dogs are similar to human infants in their emotional needs: "The dog has basically the same limbic or emotional structures capable of generating specific feelings or affects reflected in overt emotional reactions and also in changes in sympathetic and parasympathetic activity which are linked with psychosomatic and emotional disorders." Fox, The Dog, p. 258.
117. This structural parallel between humans and dogs explains why dogs suffer from some of the same behavioral disorders as humans. These disorders range from "psychogenic epilepsy to asthma-like conditions, compulsive eating, sympathy lameness, hypermotility of the intestines with hemorrhagic gastroenteritis, possibly ulcerative colitis, not to mention sibling rivalry, extreme jealousy, aggression, depression, and refusal to eat food (anorexia nervosa)."
118. Stacy Ann Thomas, The Dallas Morning News, Ibid., p. 259.
119. Dogs also suffer from stress, which, as in the case of humans, can produce gastric ulcers, heart conditions, impairment of the immune system, and reproductive and growth problems. See Hubrecht, "The Welfare of Dogs in Human Care," p. 184.
120. "All too often, a veterinarian is asked to kill a dog, sometimes a puppy, but more often an older dog, that is tearing up the house or urinating on the bed. The owners have tried beating, yelling, caging; nothing has worked. They are shocked to learn that the dog, as a social animal, is lonely. Often the older dog has been played with every day for years by children who have now gone to college. Often the dog has been accustomed to extraordinary attention from his mistress, a divorcee, who suddenly has a new boyfriend and has forgotten the dog's needs. Often the dog has been a child substitute for a young couple who now have a new baby, and the dog is being ignored and is jealous." Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 224.
121. See Fox, The Dog, pp. 183-184;
122. see also James Serpell, In the Company of Animals: A Study of Human-Animal Relationships, rev. and updated ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 131.
123. For my review of Serpell's book, see Ethics and the Environment 3 (1998), pp. 105-110.
124. Hubrecht writes that "human social contact is important for dog welfare, possibly even more important than canine contact." Hubrecht, "The Welfare of Dogs in Human Care," p. 192.
125. According to one longtime observer, the thing dogs most want is ⋯tobearound other dogs. See Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, The Hidden Life of Dogs (New York: Pocket Books, 1993), pp. 111, 134.
126. This state of affairs is both intrinsically and instrumentally bad - bad because of what it is and bad because of what it does (causes). Among other things, "Long periods of daily social isolation or abandonment by the owner may ⋯provoke adult separation problems and excessive barking." James Serpell and J. A. Jagoe, "Early Experience and the Development of Behaviour," in James Serpell (ed.), The Domestic Dog: Its Evolution, Behaviour, and Interactions with People (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 98.
127. Baier, Moral Prejudices, p. 108.
128. Throughout the essay I have been concerned with what I call the needs of companion animals. I have argued that human companions are responsible for fulfilling those needs. Most of us, however, make a distinction between needs (necessities) and mere wants (luxuries). I have not argued - indeed, I deny - that one has an obligation to go beyond a companion animal's needs. Rachels argues (convincingly, in my opinion) that one "may provide the necessities for [one's] own children first, but [one is] not justified in providing them luxuries while other children lack necessities." Rachels, "Morality, Parents, and Children," p. 60.
129. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, with respect to one's companion animals. Our responsibility to them is to provide fully for their needs, which are, as I have shown, many and varied. Once we reach that point we must turn our attention to other animals (or to humans). For examples of the lengths to which some humans go to "pamper" their animal companions, see Serpell, In the Company of Animals, pp. 28-30, 54-55.
130. Rollin says that he is "morally certain that much of this money is spent to assuage the guilty consciences of animal owners [sic] who deny the animals something far more precious: time, love, and personal interaction." Rollin, Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 219.
131. For a discussion of this difference, see Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 87-88.
132. Regan has a valuable discussion of paternalism toward animals in ibid., Sec. 3.6. I agree with Regan as against certain of his critics that the concept of paternalism applies (literally) to animals. I find it odd, however, that Regan's example of paternalism toward animals is that of frightening a hungry raccoon away from a leghold trap. See ibid., pp. 104, 108.
133. There would seem to be many and better examples drawn from our lives with companion animals. Perhaps Regan intended to show that paternalism is justified even in cases where one has no special relation to the beneficiary. If so, then a fortiori paternalism is justified in cases where one stands in a special relation (for example, to one's children or friends). For a brief discussion of paternalism toward animals, see Beth A. Dixon, "The Feminist Connection Between Women and Animals," Environmental Ethics 18 (1996), p. 188.
134. Let me cite one example - to my mind a clear case - of irresponsibility. Elizabeth Marshall Thomas allowed dogs in her care to run free in an urban area (Cambridge, Massachusetts). She admits that the traffic in this area was dangerous and marvels at how one particular dog, Misha, avoided injury during his many nocturnal excursions. Thomas estimates that Misha had "a home range of approximately 130 square miles," a range that subsequently "expanded considerably." Thomas, The Hidden Life of Dogs,p.2.
135. I am not saying that all paternalism of companion animals is justified. Like Regan and Taylor, I believe that there can be unjustified infringements of animal liberty or autonomy. See Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, pp. 91-92
136. Taylor, Respect for Nature, pp. 173-179.
137. The autonomy of animals may be of a different or lesser sort than that of humans, however. Regan calls it "preference autonomy," which he defines as the ability "to initiate action to satisfy [one's] desires and preferences." Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, p. 92.
138. As in the case of humans, there is a danger of overpaternalism. Dogs, like children, can suffer in various ways from being indulged and protected ("smothered"). The main way they suffer is by becoming excessively dependent on their "mother" or "father," which can result in behavioral problems such as depression, aggression, and separation anxiety. See Fox, The Dog, pp. 259-261.
139. A wise person (parent) finds the right mix of paternalism and autonomy for his or her animal companion (child).
140. One incidental benefit of spaying and neutering (sterilization) is that "Sterilized animals⋯tendto livelonger and less restricted lives than intact animals." Hubrecht, "The Welfare of Dogs in Human Care," p. 182. While this does not by itself justify the procedure - any more than it would in the case of humans - it is a relevant consideration.
141. Another example of meta-irresponsibility is the taking in of more animals than can be properly cared for. James Serpell reports that "So-called 'animal collectors' - people with a compulsion to adopt stray animals in such numbers that they eventually overwhelm the person's ability to provide them with adequate care - are an increasingly common problem in Europe and North America." Serpell, In the Company of Animals, p. 32.
142. This raises the question of joint responsibility for companion animals. If a family of two or more individuals adopts a dog, is each member responsible for and to it? Perhaps the moral analogue of the legal doctrine of joint and several responsibility applies here, meaning that each individual is severally (i.e., individually) responsible for the animal and that the set of people is jointly responsible. I cannot pursue this matter here.
143. Children are provided for by means of trusts, inheritance (wills and intestacy), and insurance proceeds. There is no reason, legally or morally, why these instruments cannot be used for the benefit of companion animals. If the laws do not currently allow it, then reform is necessary. I hope that this essay goes some way toward effecting such reform.