Principal-agent theory and research policy: An introduction

Science and Public Policy

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 302-308

  Braun, Dietmar ^a   Guston, David H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

^b RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

POLICY MAKING; RESEARCH; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0242624898     PISSN: 03023427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3152/147154303781780290     Document Type: Article

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