Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 232-233

  Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Sandholm, Tuomas ^a  

^a Carnegie Mellon University   (United States)

Author keywords

Automated mechanism design; Gamey theory

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTOMATION; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; CONSTRAINT THEORY; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; RANDOM PROCESSES;

AUTOMATED MECHANISM DESIGN; PROBLEM COMPLEXITY;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0242624656     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779950.779974     Document Type: Conference Paper

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