Forward markets and signals of quality

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 478-494

  Mahenc, Philippe ^a   Meunier, Valérie ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE PERPIGNAN   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242595785     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593742     Document Type: Article

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