Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 451-458

  Marchand, Maurice ^a,b   Pestieau, Pierre ^a,c,d   Sato, Motohiro ^e  

^a CORE ^*  (Belgium)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c CREPP   (Belgium)

^d UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

^e Graduate School of Economics   (Japan)

Author keywords

Tax competition; Tax coordination; Withholding tax

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242570498     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00057-3     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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4. C. Fuest, B. Huber, Can tax coordination work? FinanzArchiv 56 (1999) 443-459.
5. A. Haufler, Taxation in a Global Economy, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2001.
6. M. Marchand, P. Pestieau, M. Sato, Can piecewise fiscal coordination be welfare improving? A model of income redistribution, 2002, unpublished.
7. D. Wellich, The Theory of Public Finance in a Federal State, Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, 2000.
8. J.D. Wilson, Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal 52 (1999) 269-304.