Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 45, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 434-441

  Osborne, Martin J ^a   Rubinstein, Ariel ^b,c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

^b TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Sampling equilibrium; Strategic voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242570456     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00147-7     Document Type: Article

References (4)

1. McKelvey, R.D., Ordeshook, P.C., 1985. Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources. J. Econ. Theory 36, 55-85.
2. McKelvey, R.D., Palfrey, T.R., 1995. Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38.
3. Myatt, D.P., 2002. A new theory of strategic voting (revised). Unpublished paper. Oxford University.
4. Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A., 1998. Games with procedurally rational players. Amer. Econ. Rev. 88, 834-847.