Managing Contract Performance: A Transaction Costs Approach

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 275-297

  Brown, Trevor L ^a   Potoski, Matthew ^b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242465484     PISSN: 02768739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/pam.10117     Document Type: Review

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