Privatizing Telebrás: Brazilian Political Institutions and Policy Performance

Comparative Politics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2003, Pages

  Kingstone, Peter R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242307172     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150158     Document Type: Review

References (77)

1. For example, Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democralization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Argelina Figueiredo Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil," Comparative Politics, 32 (January 2000), 151-70.
2. For example, Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democralization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Argelina Figueiredo Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil," Comparative Politics, 32 (January 2000), 151-70.
3. For example, Scott Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democralization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Barry Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Argelina Figueiredo Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil," Comparative Politics, 32 (January 2000), 151-70.
4. Stephan Haggard and Matthew McCubbins, Presidents, Parliament, and Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 1.
5. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
6. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
7. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
8. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
9. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
10. The study of political institutions has focused largely on the durability of democracy under different institutional arrangements, for example, Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), or the representativeness of democratic governance under alternative arrangements, for example, Mainwaring, Rethinking Party Systems. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), examine the connection between economic outcomes and different institutional arrangements. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy, examines a few select policy outcomes as part of his larger consideration of electoral institutions, while Kurt Weyland, Democracy without Equity: The Failure of Reform in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), draws on institutional arguments in his assessment of social policy in Brazil. There is as well a larger literature on the relationship between electoral systems and budgets, reviewed in the Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997. Perhaps the most explicit effort to connect specific institutional configurations to policy outcomes is Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). Their discussion illustrates the difficulty in establishing linear connections between specific institutions and well-defined outcomes.
11. The absence of obvious connections between Brazil's political arrangements and the character of the policy echoes Weaver and Rockman's findings.
12. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
13. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
14. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
15. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
16. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
17. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
18. Barry Ames, "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation," American Journal of Political Science 39 (1995), 406-33. Also, Barry Ames, "The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party Organization in the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election," American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 95-111; Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy; Scott Mainwaring and Timothy S. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy," in Mainwaring and Scully, eds.; Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
19. Esp. Figueiredo and Limongi, "Presidential Power," and Argelina Figueiredo Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Executive e legislative na nova ordeM constitucional (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fapesp, 1999).
20. Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
21. Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Inter-American Development Bank, Annual Report, 1997; Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions.
22. Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System; Mainwaring and Scully, eds.
23. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy.
24. The impediments to effective policymaking are even more profound if several other aspects of Brazil's political system are considered. These added factors include a party system characterized by high levels of polarization, a federalist system with unusually strong governors with extensive capacity to influence their own state caucuses in the national legislature, and a highly detailed constitution that requires supermajorities to amend. Fernando Luiz Abrucio, "Os barões do poder: O poder dos governadores no Brasil, pos-autoritário" (Master's thesis, Department of Sociology, Universidade de São Paulo, 1994); Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System.
25. The impediments to effective policymaking are even more profound if several other aspects of Brazil's political system are considered. These added factors include a party system characterized by high levels of polarization, a federalist system with unusually strong governors with extensive capacity to influence their own state caucuses in the national legislature, and a highly detailed constitution that requires supermajorities to amend. Fernando Luiz Abrucio, "Os barões do poder: O poder dos governadores no Brasil, pos-autoritário" (Master's thesis, Department of Sociology, Universidade de São Paulo, 1994); Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System.
26. Figueiredo and Limongi, "Presidential Power."
27. Timothy Power, "Political Institutions in Democratic Brazil: Politics as a Permanent Constitutional Convention," in Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power, eds., Democratic Brazil: Actors, Institutions, and Processes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
28. Maria Helena de Castro Santos, "Governabilidade, Governança e Democracia: Criação de Capacidade Governativa e Relações Executivo-Legislativo no Brasil pos-Constituinte," Dados, 40 (1997), 335-76.
29. Walter Molano, The Logic of Privatization: The Case of Telecommunications in the Southern Cone of Latin America (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 23.
30. Armin Ludwig, Brazil: A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1985), p. 266.
31. Molano, p. 26.
32. Ibid., p. 24.
33. Ibid., p. 34.
34. Molano provides detailed evidence of Telebrás' inferior position relative to Latin American standards.
35. Renato Guerreiro, Anatel Director, cited in Ethevaldo Siqueira, "Reavaliando o papel da Anatel," O Estado de São Paulo, Oct. 29, 2000, p. B11.
36. Luigi Manzetti, Privatization South American Style (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
37. This observation was made in three separate interviews with former Telebrás employees, Brasília, November 2000.
38. Data are from the International Telecommunications Union, Annual Statistical Yearbook, 2001.
39. This enshrining of the sector's status in the constitution is a clear example of the kind of highly detailed rigidity that Mainwaring discusses as an added impediment to effective governance in Brazil.
40. Kurt Weyland, "The Brazilian State in the New Democracy," in Kingstone and Power, eds.; Ben Ross Schneider, "Brazil under Collor: Anatomy of a Crisis," World Policy Journal, 8 (Spring 1991), 321-47.
41. Kurt Weyland, "The Brazilian State in the New Democracy," in Kingstone and Power, eds.; Ben Ross Schneider, "Brazil under Collor: Anatomy of a Crisis," World Policy Journal, 8 (Spring 1991), 321-47.
42. Schneider reports that a relatively large share of the public (43 percent) indicated support for privatization, and a sizable share preferred expansion of the private sector to the state-owned sector (49 to 33 percent). He notes, though, that most respondents did not have a clear understanding that privatization meant sale of state assets. Ben Ross Schneider, "Privatization in the Collor Government: Triumph of Liberalism or Collapse of the Developmental State," Douglas Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, and Atilio Boron, eds., The Right and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1992).
43. Timothy Power, "Brazilian Politicians and Neoliberalism: Mapping Support for the Cardoso Reforms, 1994-1997," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, 40 (Winter 1998), 58. As noted above, there is reason to suspect that ideology is not the decisive factor in explaining legislators' behavior and that patronage can overcome ideological resistance. Nevertheless, the same survey indicates that a majority of the members of congress labeled themselves as moderate socialists or social democrats. It is reasonable to expect that ideological resistance would make buying support more difficult.
44. Weyland, "The Brazilian State in the New Democracy."
45. Peter Kingstone, Crofting Coalitions for Reform: Business Preferences, Political Institutions, and Neoliberal Reform in Brazil (College Park: Penn State University Press, 1999).
46. Departamento Intersindical de Assesoria Parlamentar (DIAP), "D1AP Pesquisa Reforma Constitucional: Monopólio Estatal das Telecomunicaçoes" (Brasilia: mimeo, DIAP, 1995).
47. Interview, Palácio do Planalto, Brasília, November 2000; interview, Liderança do Governo, Brasília, June 2001.
48. Furthermore, Petrobrás was a significant money maker for the government, with profits over 1 billion dollars in 1988, almost triple Telebrás' performance. Molano, p. 36.
49. As a creation of the military dictatorship, Telebrás lacked the symbolic meaning attached to Petrobrás, a creature of Getulio Vargas' populist campaign.
50. DIAP's research shows that 28 percent of deputies opposed any constitutional amendment. In the senate, only 20 percent opposed any amendment. However, 59 percent of deputies and 71 percent of senators expressed a preference for liberalizing the sector, which required a constitutional amendment as much as full privatization.
51. In fact, the outcome is overdetermined. It would be helpful to try to evaluate the causal weight of the different explanatory factors. Unfortunately, the limits of this type of case analysis make it difficult if not impossible to conduct such an evaluation. The methodological issue is discussed below.
52. It is impossible to document allegations of corruption, and such documentation is not the purpose of this article. But former Telebrás officials detailed numerous decisions that involved dubious transactions and in general expressed the view that it had been routinely used for all manner of kickbacks. Interviews, Brasilia, June 2001. These ex-Telebrás officials are for the most part current employees of the newly privatized telecommunications firms or employees of the regulatory agency, Anatel.
53. This point was made in four separate interviews with federal deputies, from both the opposition and the government, Brasília, November 2000.
54. Manzetti, Privatization South American Style, p. 216. One leading member of the PT involved in the privatization debate indicated that this strategy ultimately worked against the party. This member observed that organizing opposition around the interests and agenda of the striking workers made it easy to portray resistance as protection of narrow interests at the expense of national welfare. His preference would have been to accept the government's mandate to pursue privatization but then force more debate about the specifics of the model of privatization.
55. The public sparring was centered on the role of domestic versus foreign capital. This issue remained the most polemical throughout the debate on privatization and even afterwards. Motta, who publicly defended the role of domestic capital earlier in the debate, sparred with representatives of the PFL, who pointed out that the distinction violated the government's earlier amendment that eliminated the distinction between domestic and foreign capital. Ultimately, Motta's proposal supported unlimited access to foreign capital, and the restriction was removed quietly and without public or congressional debate.
56. Interviews, Brasilia, November 2000 and June 2001.
57. Motta's vision is highlighted in the self-serving yet informative biography by former staff members, Sérgio Motta: O Trator em Acão (Praa, Beirão: Tomioka, 1999).
58. Interviews, Brasilia, November 2000.
59. This strategic orientation is consistent with the analysis of Castro Santos, "Governabilidade, Governança e Democracia."
60. Interviews, Legislative Consultancy, Chamber of Deputies, Science and Technology Section, Brasilia, November 2000.
61. Ames, The Deadlock of Democracy.
62. Mainwaring, Rethinking the Party System.
63. Haggard and McCubbins, Presidents, Parliament, and Policy.
64. For example, Brian Levy and Pablo Spiller, Regulations, Institutions and Commitment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
65. The term comes from Michael Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy: Alcohol in Brazil's Energy Strategy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
66. For an excellent comparative discussion of Latin American telecommunications regulatory agencies and the conditions affecting their autonomy, see Bjørn Wellenius, "Regulating the Telecommunications Sector: The Experience of Latin America," Luigi Manzetti, ed., Regulatory Policy in Latin America: Post-Privatization Realities (Miami: North-South Center Press, 2000).
67. For a complete discussion of the measures governing the functioning of ANATEL, see Aline Diniz Amaral, "O Processo de Formulação do Novo Arcabouço Regulatório dos Serviçes de Telecommunicações no Brasil" (Master's thesis, University of Brasilia, 2000).
68. In addition, the opening of the market to competition in cellular phone service led to a rapid of expansion of cell phone subscribers, from over 500, 000 in 1994 to over 23 million by 2000.
69. Interview, Leadership of the Chamber of Deputies, June 2001.
70. Manzetti, Privatization South American Style, p. 182, discusses the evolution of public opinion in favor of ending the state's monopoly in telecommunications.
71. See Peter Kingstone, "Democratic Governance and the Dilemma of Social Security Reform in Brazil," in Ana Margheritis, ed., Current Policy Dilemmas in Latin America's Foreign Economic Relations (Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center Press, forthcoming).
72. For example, see the discussion of the power of largely passive, uninformed voters in American democracy by Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
73. Amaral, "O Processo de Formulação," documents carefully and extensively the range of alternative positions and the strong connection between the telecommunications law and the government's position.
74. For example, see Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
75. Vilson Vedana, "Política nacional de telecomunicações," Cadernos Aslegis, 4 (January-April 2000), 26-35; also Bernardo Estellita Lins, "Privatização das telecomunicações brasileiras: Algumas lições," Cadernos Aslegis, 4 (January-April 2000), 9-25.
76. Vilson Vedana, "Política nacional de telecomunicações," Cadernos Aslegis, 4 (January-April 2000), 26-35; also Bernardo Estellita Lins, "Privatização das telecomunicações brasileiras: Algumas lições," Cadernos Aslegis, 4 (January-April 2000), 9-25.
77. For example, Barry Ames, Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil, provides ample quantitative documentation of the dynamics of electoral politics and the logic of different kinds of representation, However, when Ames turns to consider policy outcomes, he falls back on qualitative, interpretive methods highly dependent on interviews, despite his sharply worded skepticism about the nature of such inquiry.