The demand for physician services: Evidence from a natural experiment

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 22, Issue 6, 2003, Pages 881-913

  Cockx, Bart ^a   Brasseur, Carine ^a  

^a Department of Economics ^*  (Belgium)

Author keywords

Copayment; Demand system; Differences in differences estimator; Health care; Moral hazard; Physician service

Indexed keywords

DEMAND ANALYSIS;

ADULT; ANALYTIC METHOD; ARTICLE; BELGIUM; BUDGET; CONTROLLED STUDY; DATA ANALYSIS; EXPERIMENT; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE FINANCING; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; HEALTH SERVICE; HUMAN; MAJOR CLINICAL STUDY; MALE; PHYSICIAN; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE; SEX DIFFERENCE;

EID: 0242298207     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6296(03)00047-X     Document Type: Article

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