The insanity defense: Matricide in a French Quarter hotel

Journal of Psychiatry and Law

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 251-284

  Slovenko, Ralph ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALCOHOL; MATRICIDE; UNCLASSIFIED DRUG;

ADOLESCENT; ALCOHOL INTOXICATION; AUDITORY HALLUCINATION; CASE REPORT; CHILD PSYCHIATRY; COURT; CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR; DRUG DEPENDENCE; FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY; HOMICIDE; HUMAN; KNIFE CUT; MALE; MENTAL DISEASE; MOTHER; NOTE; PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA; POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER; PRACTICE GUIDELINE; PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS; PSYCHIATRIST; RESPONSIBILITY; SCHIZOPHRENIA; STAB WOUND;

EID: 0242291035     PISSN: 00931853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/009318530303100211     Document Type: Note

References (86)

1. State of Louisiana v. Robert Currie III, La. Court of Appeal, 4th Cir., Feb. 13, 2002, No. 2000-KA-2284. Two views are extant as to who must carry the burden of persuasion on insanity. Approximately half of the states place the burden of persuasion on the prosecutor to disprove the elements of the defendant's insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The other states label insanity an affirmative defense, on which the defendant has the burden of persuasion by "clear and convincing evidence." Following the trial of John Hinckley, the law was changed for the federal courts and a number of states to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant, making it more difficult for the defendant to achieve an NGRI verdict. Some of these states place the burden of persuasion on the defendant by a "preponderance of the evidence." See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 226-228.
2. State of Louisiana v. Robert Currie III, La. Court of Appeal, 4th Cir., Feb. 13, 2002, No. 2000-KA-2284. Two views are extant as to who must carry the burden of persuasion on insanity. Approximately half of the states place the burden of persuasion on the prosecutor to disprove the elements of the defendant's insanity defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The other states label insanity an affirmative defense, on which the defendant has the burden of persuasion by "clear and convincing evidence." Following the trial of John Hinckley, the law was changed for the federal courts and a number of states to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant, making it more difficult for the defendant to achieve an NGRI verdict. Some of these states place the burden of persuasion on the defendant by a "preponderance of the evidence." See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 226-228.
3. The saying was used as the title of a book, Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream, by Dr. Robert I. Simon (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996). Children who are angry with their parents often wish they would die or go away (and when that happens they feel guilty, though they were not responsible). See S.H. Fraiberg, The Magic Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), pp. 206-209.
4. The saying was used as the title of a book, Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream, by Dr. Robert I. Simon (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press, 1996). Children who are angry with their parents often wish they would die or go away (and when that happens they feel guilty, though they were not responsible). See S.H. Fraiberg, The Magic Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), pp. 206-209.
5. Drawing by Robert Weber, New Yorker, March 31, 2003, p. 32.
6. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992.
7. In a much publicized 1995 case occurring in New Zealand, two sisters, Juliet Hulme and Pauline Parker, killed their mother; they put a brick in a stocking and hit her over the head with it. Dr. Reginald Meldicott testified, "There was a gross reversal of moral sense." They were sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Upon their discharge they changed their names and moved to England. A film about the crime, "Heavenly Creatures," led to the discovery that Juliet Hulme had become mystery writer Anne Perry, and Pauline Parker had become Hilary Nathan.
8. Quoted in R.I. Simon, supra note 2 at p. 3. It has often been said that if individuals could be incarcerated for evil thoughts, no one would be living outside of a penitentiary. Lev. 6:1-8:36. The late renowned psychiatrist Karl A. Menninger would say that mercifully he was not punished for his thoughts. To shield one's thoughts, people prize privacy. Personal communication to Ralph Slovenko.
9. The thesis is amplified in W. Gaylin, Hatred: The Psychological Descent into Violence (New York: Public Affairs, 2003).
10. 259 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
11. 259 F.2d at 948 n. 4.
12. It is not surprising that fights erupt in barrooms and nightclubs. These are places where people lose control. With the blend of alcohol and other things, deafening music, and darkness, a lot of people there are in an altered state. On the other hand, fights do not erupt in ice cream parlors. See R. Slovenko, "The Joy of Ice Cream," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):121.
13. A state could make voluntary intoxication itself a crime on the ground that it produces an unreasonable risk of uncontrollable harmful conduct (as has been done in the case of drunk driving).
14. See Reg. v. Gamelin, l F & F 90 (1858); Reg. v. Moore, 3 C & K 153 (1852); Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C.C. 463(1945).
15. See State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974); see also Comment, "Intoxication as a Criminal Defense," Colum. L. Rev. 55(1955):1210. In Currie, the present case, the judge instructed the jury: The fact that the defendant was in an intoxicated or drugged condition at the time of the commission of the crime is usually not a defense. However, where the circumstances indicate that the defendant voluntarily became intoxicated or drugged and that his intoxicated or drugged condition precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime. In order to convict the defendant of the offense charged, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had that specific intent. Therefore, if you find that the defendant was in such an intoxicated or drugged condition that he did not have the specific intent required to commit those offenses, you must find the defendant not guilty of those offenses.
16. See State v. Hall, 214 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1974); see also Comment, "Intoxication as a Criminal Defense," Colum. L. Rev. 55(1955):1210. In Currie, the present case, the judge instructed the jury: The fact that the defendant was in an intoxicated or drugged condition at the time of the commission of the crime is usually not a defense. However, where the circumstances indicate that the defendant voluntarily became intoxicated or drugged and that his intoxicated or drugged condition precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a defense to a prosecution for that crime. In order to convict the defendant of the offense charged, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had that specific intent. Therefore, if you find that the defendant was in such an intoxicated or drugged condition that he did not have the specific intent required to commit those offenses, you must find the defendant not guilty of those offenses.
17. People v. Hood, 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370 (1969).
18. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 2001), pp. 324-325.
19. People v. Kelley, 176 N.W.2d 435, 443 (Mich. App. 1970).
20. In Currie, the trial judge instructed the jury: Second-degree murder is the killing of a human being when the defendant has the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Therefore, in order to convict the defendant of second-degree murder, you must find, one: That the defendant killed the victim; and two, that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. Now, again, the defendant is charged with second-degree murder. To convict the defendant of the offense charged, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the State proved every element of their charge. If you're not convinced that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, you may find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense if you're convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a lesser charge. I will also define "specific criminal intent." Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the defendant actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. Whether criminal intent is present must be determined in light of ordinary experience. Intent is a question of fact which may be inferred from the circumstances. You may infer that the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of his act. Now, [manslaughter is a] responsive lesser [offense]. Therefore, the following verdicts may be returned: Guilty as charged of second-degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not guilty. Also, if you find that the defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence the defense of insanity at the time of the offense, then your verdict should be: We the Jury find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity....
21. For first-degree murder, the individual must have acted "intentionally, deliberately and with premeditation." "Premeditation" of first-degree murder is a prior determination to do an act, but the courts say such determination need not exist for any particular period before it is carried into effect-indeed, it can be the second before the commission of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 166 N.C. 379, 81 S.E. 748, 749 (1914); Commonwealth v. Dreher, 274 Pa. 325, 118 Atl. 215, 216 (1922). As a consequence, "premeditation" as a legal concept reduces to an absurdity. Thus it can be said that Robert Currie premeditated the killing of his mother as he went up to the hotel room to get his knife and came back and killed her.
22. For first-degree murder, the individual must have acted "intentionally, deliberately and with premeditation." "Premeditation" of first-degree murder is a prior determination to do an act, but the courts say such determination need not exist for any particular period before it is carried into effect-indeed, it can be the second before the commission of the offense. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 166 N.C. 379, 81 S.E. 748, 749 (1914); Commonwealth v. Dreher, 274 Pa. 325, 118 Atl. 215, 216 (1922). As a consequence, "premeditation" as a legal concept reduces to an absurdity. Thus it can be said that Robert Currie premeditated the killing of his mother as he went up to the hotel room to get his knife and came back and killed her.
23. G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
24. Letter of Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski, dated July 14, 1916, in Holmes-Laski Letters (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953), p. 4.
25. "Doctrinally, all criminal liability depends on one 'fundamental predicate': A defendant's guilt must be based on conduct and that conduct must include a 'voluntary act.'" D.W. Denno, "Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts," Minn. L. Rev. 87(2002):269 at 275. The voluntary-act requirement can apply either to the defendant's mental state or to the defendant's acts; that is, it is applicable to either the mens rea or the actus reus element of a crime. The difficulty of classifying the voluntary-act requirement was raised in Regina v. Harrison-Owen, 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App. 1951). In that case, a burglary trial, the defendant contended that he entered the dwelling in a state of automatism. The prosecution responded to the defense with evidence of the defendant's previous burglary convictions. On appeal, the conviction was overturned because similar prior convictions were admissible only to refute a claim of lack of mens rea, and in this case the defendant claimed he lacked actus reus. Id. at 727-728.
26. See D.W. Denno, "Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts," Minn. L. Rev. 87(2002):269; B. McSherry, "Getting Away with Murder?/Dissociative States and Criminal Responsibility," Int'l J. Law & Psychiatry 21(1998):163.
27. See D.W. Denno, "Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts," Minn. L. Rev. 87(2002):269; B. McSherry, "Getting Away with Murder?/Dissociative States and Criminal Responsibility," Int'l J. Law & Psychiatry 21(1998):163.
28. See S.L. Halleck, "Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?" Am. J. Psychotherapy 42(1988):338; E.W. Mitchell, "Madness and Meta-Responsibility: The Culpable Causation of Mental Disorder and the Insanity Defence," J. For. Psychiatry 10(1999):597; P.H. Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine," Va. L. Rev. 71(1985):1; R. Sherlock, "Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):483; M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness," Case West. Res. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271.
29. See S.L. Halleck, "Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?" Am. J. Psychotherapy 42(1988):338; E.W. Mitchell, "Madness and Meta-Responsibility: The Culpable Causation of Mental Disorder and the Insanity Defence," J. For. Psychiatry 10(1999):597; P.H. Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine," Va. L. Rev. 71(1985):1; R. Sherlock, "Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):483; M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness," Case West. Res. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271.
30. See S.L. Halleck, "Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?" Am. J. Psychotherapy 42(1988):338; E.W. Mitchell, "Madness and Meta-Responsibility: The Culpable Causation of Mental Disorder and the Insanity Defence," J. For. Psychiatry 10(1999):597; P.H. Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine," Va. L. Rev. 71(1985):1; R. Sherlock, "Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):483; M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness," Case West. Res. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271.
31. See S.L. Halleck, "Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?" Am. J. Psychotherapy 42(1988):338; E.W. Mitchell, "Madness and Meta-Responsibility: The Culpable Causation of Mental Disorder and the Insanity Defence," J. For. Psychiatry 10(1999):597; P.H. Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine," Va. L. Rev. 71(1985):1; R. Sherlock, "Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):483; M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness," Case West. Res. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271.
32. See S.L. Halleck, "Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?" Am. J. Psychotherapy 42(1988):338; E.W. Mitchell, "Madness and Meta-Responsibility: The Culpable Causation of Mental Disorder and the Insanity Defence," J. For. Psychiatry 10(1999):597; P.H. Robinson, "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine," Va. L. Rev. 71(1985):1; R. Sherlock, "Compliance and Responsibility: New Issues for the Insanity Defense," J. Psychiatry & Law 12(1984):483; M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness," Case West. Res. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271.
33. No. CR 42116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980), noted in M.D. Slodov, "Criminal Responsibility and the Noncompliant Psychiatric Offender: Risking Madness, " Case West. L. Rev. 40(1989-90):271 at 303.
34. The epileptic, however, is held responsible for reckless endangerment when causing harm as a result of not taking antiseizure medication. Epilepsy is not a defense where an epileptic disregards a known condition. See, e.g., People v. Decina, 138 N.W.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956), where the court noted that the "defendant knew he was subject to epileptic attacks and seizures that might strike at any time." The operation of the vehicle resulted in the deaths of several persons. The decision in Decina implicates the issue of "time-framing" in a determination of voluntariness. Law professor Joshua Dressler points out, "If a court constructed an extremely narrow time-frame-specifically, the conduct at the instant the car struck the victims-[the defendant's] conduct did not include a voluntary act. A broader time-frame, however, would include the voluntary acts of entering the car, turning the ignition key, and driving." J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), p. 91. In State v. Welsh, 508 P.2d 1041 (Wash. App. 1973), the court held that a jury should be instructed that unconsciousness is not a complete defense when an epileptic seizure is voluntarily induced by intoxication.
35. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 156 Ariz. 464, 753 P.2d 154 (1988).
36. Thus a psychiatrist was not allowed to testify on mental state in support of one Erin M. Cottrell's sleep-disorder defense, as it was tendered as a claim of "sane automatism" (as distinguished from "insane automatism," or NGRI). It was claimed that Cottrell, a nuclear engineer, was essentially dreaming-a "confusional dissociative state"-when he repeatedly stabbed, choked and tried to smother his wife. It was claimed to be an involuntary act, but not as a result of insanity, so the psychiatrist could not testify on mental state. D. Doege, "Psychiatrist's testimony limited in stabbing trial," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 2003, p. B-3. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 215-216. In claims of self-defense, duress, or provocation, the law examines these matters by what a "reasonable person" would have done under similar circumstances; hence expert testimony is excluded. Experts may speak on abnormality but not on normality. Expert testimony on normality is not considered helpful, and the role of the judge and jury is not to be usurped by experts testifying on matters within ordinary knowledge. Thus an expert is precluded from testifying that the defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion as the result of serious provocation. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1987). However, in the typical homicide prosecution of a "battered woman," defense counsel may introduce expert testimony so as to explain to the jurors why the defendant did not leave the abusive relationship. In the absence of such testimony, jurors are apt to disbelieve the defendant's claim of prior abuse and that self-defense was the motive for her conduct. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), pp. 242-244. A number of jurisdictions have the concept of "diminished capacity," and New York has "extreme emotional disturbance," allowing the introduction of psychiatric testimony. The result is not an acquittal but conviction for a lesser-included offense. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 151-168; see also K.R. Thompson, "The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense." Mich. Bar J., Feb. 2003, pp. 17-19. The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" that may be returned when an NGRI plea is entered is the same as a guilty verdict; Slovenko 1995 at pp. 169-178.
37. Thus a psychiatrist was not allowed to testify on mental state in support of one Erin M. Cottrell's sleep-disorder defense, as it was tendered as a claim of "sane automatism" (as distinguished from "insane automatism," or NGRI). It was claimed that Cottrell, a nuclear engineer, was essentially dreaming-a "confusional dissociative state"-when he repeatedly stabbed, choked and tried to smother his wife. It was claimed to be an involuntary act, but not as a result of insanity, so the psychiatrist could not testify on mental state. D. Doege, "Psychiatrist's testimony limited in stabbing trial," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 2003, p. B-3. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 215-216. In claims of self-defense, duress, or provocation, the law examines these matters by what a "reasonable person" would have done under similar circumstances; hence expert testimony is excluded. Experts may speak on abnormality but not on normality. Expert testimony on normality is not considered helpful, and the role of the judge and jury is not to be usurped by experts testifying on matters within ordinary knowledge. Thus an expert is precluded from testifying that the defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion as the result of serious provocation. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1987). However, in the typical homicide prosecution of a "battered woman," defense counsel may introduce expert testimony so as to explain to the jurors why the defendant did not leave the abusive relationship. In the absence of such testimony, jurors are apt to disbelieve the defendant's claim of prior abuse and that self-defense was the motive for her conduct. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), pp. 242-244. A number of jurisdictions have the concept of "diminished capacity," and New York has "extreme emotional disturbance," allowing the introduction of psychiatric testimony. The result is not an acquittal but conviction for a lesser-included offense. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 151-168; see also K.R. Thompson, "The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense." Mich. Bar J., Feb. 2003, pp. 17-19. The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" that may be returned when an NGRI plea is entered is the same as a guilty verdict; Slovenko 1995 at pp. 169-178.
38. Thus a psychiatrist was not allowed to testify on mental state in support of one Erin M. Cottrell's sleep-disorder defense, as it was tendered as a claim of "sane automatism" (as distinguished from "insane automatism," or NGRI). It was claimed that Cottrell, a nuclear engineer, was essentially dreaming-a "confusional dissociative state"-when he repeatedly stabbed, choked and tried to smother his wife. It was claimed to be an involuntary act, but not as a result of insanity, so the psychiatrist could not testify on mental state. D. Doege, "Psychiatrist's testimony limited in stabbing trial," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 2003, p. B-3. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 215-216. In claims of self-defense, duress, or provocation, the law examines these matters by what a "reasonable person" would have done under similar circumstances; hence expert testimony is excluded. Experts may speak on abnormality but not on normality. Expert testimony on normality is not considered helpful, and the role of the judge and jury is not to be usurped by experts testifying on matters within ordinary knowledge. Thus an expert is precluded from testifying that the defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion as the result of serious provocation. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1987). However, in the typical homicide prosecution of a "battered woman," defense counsel may introduce expert testimony so as to explain to the jurors why the defendant did not leave the abusive relationship. In the absence of such testimony, jurors are apt to disbelieve the defendant's claim of prior abuse and that self-defense was the motive for her conduct. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), pp. 242-244. A number of jurisdictions have the concept of "diminished capacity," and New York has "extreme emotional disturbance," allowing the introduction of psychiatric testimony. The result is not an acquittal but conviction for a lesser-included offense. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 151-168; see also K.R. Thompson, "The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense." Mich. Bar J., Feb. 2003, pp. 17-19. The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" that may be returned when an NGRI plea is entered is the same as a guilty verdict; Slovenko 1995 at pp. 169-178.
39. Thus a psychiatrist was not allowed to testify on mental state in support of one Erin M. Cottrell's sleep-disorder defense, as it was tendered as a claim of "sane automatism" (as distinguished from "insane automatism," or NGRI). It was claimed that Cottrell, a nuclear engineer, was essentially dreaming-a "confusional dissociative state"-when he repeatedly stabbed, choked and tried to smother his wife. It was claimed to be an involuntary act, but not as a result of insanity, so the psychiatrist could not testify on mental state. D. Doege, "Psychiatrist's testimony limited in stabbing trial," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 2003, p. B-3. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 215-216. In claims of self-defense, duress, or provocation, the law examines these matters by what a "reasonable person" would have done under similar circumstances; hence expert testimony is excluded. Experts may speak on abnormality but not on normality. Expert testimony on normality is not considered helpful, and the role of the judge and jury is not to be usurped by experts testifying on matters within ordinary knowledge. Thus an expert is precluded from testifying that the defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion as the result of serious provocation. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1987). However, in the typical homicide prosecution of a "battered woman," defense counsel may introduce expert testimony so as to explain to the jurors why the defendant did not leave the abusive relationship. In the absence of such testimony, jurors are apt to disbelieve the defendant's claim of prior abuse and that self-defense was the motive for her conduct. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), pp. 242-244. A number of jurisdictions have the concept of "diminished capacity," and New York has "extreme emotional disturbance," allowing the introduction of psychiatric testimony. The result is not an acquittal but conviction for a lesser-included offense. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 151-168; see also K.R. Thompson, "The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense." Mich. Bar J., Feb. 2003, pp. 17-19. The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" that may be returned when an NGRI plea is entered is the same as a guilty verdict; Slovenko 1995 at pp. 169-178.
40. Thus a psychiatrist was not allowed to testify on mental state in support of one Erin M. Cottrell's sleep-disorder defense, as it was tendered as a claim of "sane automatism" (as distinguished from "insane automatism," or NGRI). It was claimed that Cottrell, a nuclear engineer, was essentially dreaming-a "confusional dissociative state"-when he repeatedly stabbed, choked and tried to smother his wife. It was claimed to be an involuntary act, but not as a result of insanity, so the psychiatrist could not testify on mental state. D. Doege, "Psychiatrist's testimony limited in stabbing trial," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 2003, p. B-3. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry in Law/Law in Psychiatry (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), pp. 215-216. In claims of self-defense, duress, or provocation, the law examines these matters by what a "reasonable person" would have done under similar circumstances; hence expert testimony is excluded. Experts may speak on abnormality but not on normality. Expert testimony on normality is not considered helpful, and the role of the judge and jury is not to be usurped by experts testifying on matters within ordinary knowledge. Thus an expert is precluded from testifying that the defendant was acting under sudden and intense passion as the result of serious provocation. See, e.g., People v. Elder, 579 N.E.2d 420 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. 1987). However, in the typical homicide prosecution of a "battered woman," defense counsel may introduce expert testimony so as to explain to the jurors why the defendant did not leave the abusive relationship. In the absence of such testimony, jurors are apt to disbelieve the defendant's claim of prior abuse and that self-defense was the motive for her conduct. See J. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (New York: Lexis, 3d ed. 2001), pp. 242-244. A number of jurisdictions have the concept of "diminished capacity," and New York has "extreme emotional disturbance," allowing the introduction of psychiatric testimony. The result is not an acquittal but conviction for a lesser-included offense. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 151-168; see also K.R. Thompson, "The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense." Mich. Bar J., Feb. 2003, pp. 17-19. The verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" that may be returned when an NGRI plea is entered is the same as a guilty verdict; Slovenko 1995 at pp. 169-178.
41. In Currie, the judge instructed the jury: If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity in this case, the Court will remand him to a parish jail or to a private mental institution approved by me. The Court will promptly hold a hearing. The district attorney will represent the State and participate in the hearing. At the hearing the defendant will have the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he can be discharged or he can be released on probation without danger to others or himself. If the Court determines that the defendant can be discharged or can be released on probation without danger to others or to himself, I shall either order his discharge or order him released on probation subject to the specified conditions for a fixed or indeterminate period of time. If I determine that the defendant cannot be released without danger to himself or to others, then I shall order him committed to a private mental institution approved by me for his custody, care, and treatment. If committed, the defendant shall not be released until I determine that he can be released without danger to himself or to others.
42. By and large, those who would abolish the insanity defense do not spell out what psychiatric evidence, if any, they would allow to establish or negate mens rea or actus reus. For arguments to abolish the insanity defense, see A.L. Halpern, "The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, " J. Leg. Med. 2(1980):18; id., "The Politics of the Insanity Defense," Am. J. For. Psychiatry 14(1993):1. Dr. Halpern maintains: "[I]t is my belief that the use of the insanity plea, rather than uplifting the law's moral character, makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practicial application is hurtful to the population it is intended to benefit; that it undermines the processes of the law; that it tarnishes the public sense of justice; and that in the United States ... it has resulted ... in the hospitalization in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions for the criminally insane of substantial numbers of individuals who are not mentally ill and may not have been mentally ill in the first place.... In my view the exculpatory insanity concept is inapplicable to a rational criminal law. Every insanity definition is irrelevant and essentially meaningless. In almost 35 years of psychiatric practice, I have never seen a deserving case of acquittal by reason of insanity that could not have been dealt with in a more humane and compassionate manner by other means available to the justice system.... [O]perationally the insanity defense is a tribute to our hypocrisy rather than to our morality.... I would emphasise in statutes abolishing the insanity rule that outright acquittal of a mentally disordered defendant must occur (that is, a finding of not guilty of crime) if that defendant lacked, as a result of mental illness, the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Secondly, I would ensure the following: [P]resentation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the courtroom when appropriate." [Query: When would it be appropriate?] A.L. Halpern, "Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Victoria," in Emerging Issues of the 1990's in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1989, pp. 20-36). See also K.A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking, 1968); T.S. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
43. By and large, those who would abolish the insanity defense do not spell out what psychiatric evidence, if any, they would allow to establish or negate mens rea or actus reus. For arguments to abolish the insanity defense, see A.L. Halpern, "The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, " J. Leg. Med. 2(1980):18; id., "The Politics of the Insanity Defense," Am. J. For. Psychiatry 14(1993):1. Dr. Halpern maintains: "[I]t is my belief that the use of the insanity plea, rather than uplifting the law's moral character, makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practicial application is hurtful to the population it is intended to benefit; that it undermines the processes of the law; that it tarnishes the public sense of justice; and that in the United States ... it has resulted ... in the hospitalization in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions for the criminally insane of substantial numbers of individuals who are not mentally ill and may not have been mentally ill in the first place.... In my view the exculpatory insanity concept is inapplicable to a rational criminal law. Every insanity definition is irrelevant and essentially meaningless. In almost 35 years of psychiatric practice, I have never seen a deserving case of acquittal by reason of insanity that could not have been dealt with in a more humane and compassionate manner by other means available to the justice system.... [O]perationally the insanity defense is a tribute to our hypocrisy rather than to our morality.... I would emphasise in statutes abolishing the insanity rule that outright acquittal of a mentally disordered defendant must occur (that is, a finding of not guilty of crime) if that defendant lacked, as a result of mental illness, the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Secondly, I would ensure the following: [P]resentation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the courtroom when appropriate." [Query: When would it be appropriate?] A.L. Halpern, "Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Victoria," in Emerging Issues of the 1990's in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1989, pp. 20-36). See also K.A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking, 1968); T.S. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
44. By and large, those who would abolish the insanity defense do not spell out what psychiatric evidence, if any, they would allow to establish or negate mens rea or actus reus. For arguments to abolish the insanity defense, see A.L. Halpern, "The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, " J. Leg. Med. 2(1980):18; id., "The Politics of the Insanity Defense," Am. J. For. Psychiatry 14(1993):1. Dr. Halpern maintains: "[I]t is my belief that the use of the insanity plea, rather than uplifting the law's moral character, makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practicial application is hurtful to the population it is intended to benefit; that it undermines the processes of the law; that it tarnishes the public sense of justice; and that in the United States ... it has resulted ... in the hospitalization in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions for the criminally insane of substantial numbers of individuals who are not mentally ill and may not have been mentally ill in the first place.... In my view the exculpatory insanity concept is inapplicable to a rational criminal law. Every insanity definition is irrelevant and essentially meaningless. In almost 35 years of psychiatric practice, I have never seen a deserving case of acquittal by reason of insanity that could not have been dealt with in a more humane and compassionate manner by other means available to the justice system.... [O]perationally the insanity defense is a tribute to our hypocrisy rather than to our morality.... I would emphasise in statutes abolishing the insanity rule that outright acquittal of a mentally disordered defendant must occur (that is, a finding of not guilty of crime) if that defendant lacked, as a result of mental illness, the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Secondly, I would ensure the following: [P]resentation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the courtroom when appropriate." [Query: When would it be appropriate?] A.L. Halpern, "Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Victoria," in Emerging Issues of the 1990's in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1989, pp. 20-36). See also K.A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking, 1968); T.S. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
45. By and large, those who would abolish the insanity defense do not spell out what psychiatric evidence, if any, they would allow to establish or negate mens rea or actus reus. For arguments to abolish the insanity defense, see A.L. Halpern, "The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, " J. Leg. Med. 2(1980):18; id., "The Politics of the Insanity Defense," Am. J. For. Psychiatry 14(1993):1. Dr. Halpern maintains: "[I]t is my belief that the use of the insanity plea, rather than uplifting the law's moral character, makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practicial application is hurtful to the population it is intended to benefit; that it undermines the processes of the law; that it tarnishes the public sense of justice; and that in the United States ... it has resulted ... in the hospitalization in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions for the criminally insane of substantial numbers of individuals who are not mentally ill and may not have been mentally ill in the first place.... In my view the exculpatory insanity concept is inapplicable to a rational criminal law. Every insanity definition is irrelevant and essentially meaningless. In almost 35 years of psychiatric practice, I have never seen a deserving case of acquittal by reason of insanity that could not have been dealt with in a more humane and compassionate manner by other means available to the justice system.... [O]perationally the insanity defense is a tribute to our hypocrisy rather than to our morality.... I would emphasise in statutes abolishing the insanity rule that outright acquittal of a mentally disordered defendant must occur (that is, a finding of not guilty of crime) if that defendant lacked, as a result of mental illness, the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Secondly, I would ensure the following: [P]resentation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the courtroom when appropriate." [Query: When would it be appropriate?] A.L. Halpern, "Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Victoria," in Emerging Issues of the 1990's in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1989, pp. 20-36). See also K.A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking, 1968); T.S. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
46. By and large, those who would abolish the insanity defense do not spell out what psychiatric evidence, if any, they would allow to establish or negate mens rea or actus reus. For arguments to abolish the insanity defense, see A.L. Halpern, "The Fiction of Legal Insanity and the Misuse of Psychiatry, " J. Leg. Med. 2(1980):18; id., "The Politics of the Insanity Defense," Am. J. For. Psychiatry 14(1993):1. Dr. Halpern maintains: "[I]t is my belief that the use of the insanity plea, rather than uplifting the law's moral character, makes a mockery of the criminal justice system; that its practicial application is hurtful to the population it is intended to benefit; that it undermines the processes of the law; that it tarnishes the public sense of justice; and that in the United States ... it has resulted ... in the hospitalization in overcrowded and chronically understaffed institutions for the criminally insane of substantial numbers of individuals who are not mentally ill and may not have been mentally ill in the first place.... In my view the exculpatory insanity concept is inapplicable to a rational criminal law. Every insanity definition is irrelevant and essentially meaningless. In almost 35 years of psychiatric practice, I have never seen a deserving case of acquittal by reason of insanity that could not have been dealt with in a more humane and compassionate manner by other means available to the justice system.... [O]perationally the insanity defense is a tribute to our hypocrisy rather than to our morality.... I would emphasise in statutes abolishing the insanity rule that outright acquittal of a mentally disordered defendant must occur (that is, a finding of not guilty of crime) if that defendant lacked, as a result of mental illness, the state of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Secondly, I would ensure the following: [P]resentation of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the courtroom when appropriate." [Query: When would it be appropriate?] A.L. Halpern, "Abolition of the Insanity Defence in Victoria," in Emerging Issues of the 1990's in Psychiatry, Psychology and Law (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Congress of the Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 1989, pp. 20-36). See also K.A. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment (New York: Viking, 1968); T.S. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
47. In an often discussed decision, Judge David Bazelon of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), abandoned the M'Naghten test and opened the door wide to psychiatric testimony. It provided that a person shall not be held accountable criminally for an act that was the "product" of mental disorder. It was confounding and short-lived, but its resurrection in effect is urged in G.B. Palermo, "Editorial: Forensic Mental Health Experts in the Court - An Ethical Dilemma," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 47(2003):122.
48. The Louisiana statute exempts from criminal responsibility if "because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with reference to the conduct in question." La. Rev. Stat. 15:14. The tests of legal insanity in the various jurisdictions are set out in Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, vol. 30, no. 2, 2002 supp.
49. See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 at 365 (Utah 1995).
50. I. Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 15. Original work published in 1838.
51. 49 N.H. 399 (1869).
52. 49 N.H. at 402.
53. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 859 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (D.C. Cir. 1961).
54. C.P. Erlinder, "Paying the Price for Vietnam: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Behavior." B.C.L. Rev. 25(1984):305.
55. Of course, the definition of mental illness is only the threshold question-the required consequences (impact on cognition or control) of that mental illness are different in the law on civil commitment or criminal responsibility.
56. United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C.C. 1981), op. clarified, reconsideration denied, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.C.C. 1982), aff'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
57. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 141 Mich. App. 209, 366 N.W. 2d 593 (1985).
58. Ga. Crim. Proc. Law § 27-1503(a)(2).
59. ALI Model Penal Code § 4.01.
60. In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957).
61. See e.g., State v. Plummer, 117 N.H. 320, 374 A.2d 431 (1977).
62. See J. Cornwell, The Power to Harm (New York: Viking, 1960). See also S.H. Jurand, "Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug Is Worse Than the Disease," Trial, March 2003, pp. 14-18.
63. See J. Cornwell, The Power to Harm (New York: Viking, 1960). See also S.H. Jurand, "Lawsuits Over Antidepressants Claim the Drug Is Worse Than the Disease," Trial, March 2003, pp. 14-18.
64. People v. Chapman, 165 Mich. App. 215, 418 N.W.2d 658 (1987); People v. Matulonis, 115 Mich. App. 263, 325 N.W.2d 238 (1982). The law does not automatically preclude for all time the assertion of an insanity defense if a person is rendered insane by the voluntary ingestion of a drug. People v. Conrad, 148 Mich. App. 433, 385 N.W.2d 277(1986).
65. Some evidence of a mental disease or defect is needed to submit the issue of insanity to a jury. Heard v. United States, 248 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Green v. United States, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Kelly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875 (1973). See G.W. Lunter, "The Effect of Drug-Induced Intoxication on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility," Crim. L. Bull. 8(1972): 731; M.G. Paulsen, "Intoxication as a Defense to Crime," Current Problems in Criminal Law 1961(Spring):1; P. Wolin, "LSD-Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility," DePaul L. Rev. 17(1968):365.
66. Some evidence of a mental disease or defect is needed to submit the issue of insanity to a jury. Heard v. United States, 248 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Green v. United States, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Kelly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875 (1973). See G.W. Lunter, "The Effect of Drug-Induced Intoxication on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility," Crim. L. Bull. 8(1972): 731; M.G. Paulsen, "Intoxication as a Defense to Crime," Current Problems in Criminal Law 1961(Spring):1; P. Wolin, "LSD-Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility," DePaul L. Rev. 17(1968):365.
67. Some evidence of a mental disease or defect is needed to submit the issue of insanity to a jury. Heard v. United States, 248 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Green v. United States, 383 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1967); People v. Kelly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875 (1973). See G.W. Lunter, "The Effect of Drug-Induced Intoxication on the Issue of Criminal Responsibility," Crim. L. Bull. 8(1972): 731; M.G. Paulsen, "Intoxication as a Defense to Crime," Current Problems in Criminal Law 1961(Spring):1; P. Wolin, "LSD-Its Effect on Criminal Responsibility," DePaul L. Rev. 17(1968):365.
68. "Practice Guideline, Forensic Psychiatry Evaluation of Defendants Raising the Insanity Defense," J. Am. Acad. Psych. & Law 30(2002), no. 2, supp.
69. In a much publicized event, the 1973 convention of the American Psychiatric Association was punctuated by protests from the gay community. Under pressure, the members voted to delete homosexuality from the manual, but they left a new diagnosis, sexual orientation disturbance.
70. Shifting the focus of attention from the deed to the doer of the deed is criticized by Dr. Willard Gaylin in his book The Killing of Bonnie Garland (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). Richard Herrin, a Yale student, split Bonnie Garland's head with an axe, and by admitting the killing but pleading insanity, the defense kept out evidence of the offense.
71. In the Currie case, in the opening instruction, the judge said to the jury: "It is your duty to follow these instructions in reaching your verdict. Although you are the sole judges of the law and the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, you have the duty to accept and apply the law as given by me." Numerous commentators have pointed out that (1) juries do not understand the instructions given by the judge or (2) they cast them aside, and (3) they make recourse to their own intuitions, drawn from "everyday morality." Se K.I. Kersch, "Juries on Trial," Public Interest, Winter 2003, no. 150, pp. 121-130. Dr. Emanuel Tanay, a veteran forensic psychiatrist, considered it an outrage that the jury did not find Robert Currie insane-and, he argued, a directed verdict of insanity was justified. "Obviously, the bias of the jury and the current state of the law and public opinion contributed to the jury's verdict." Personal communication, Feb. 25, 2003.
72. Vacating a guilty verdict and entering NGRI is rarely done, but it is not unheard of. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. App. 1957).
73. The complex process involved in identifying insanity defense pleas is set out in L.A. Callahan, H.J. Steadman, M.A. McGreevy & P.C. Robbins, "The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study," Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & Law 19(1991):331.
74. H.B. Terrell, "Malingering Since Three-Strikes in California," Forensic Examiner, May/June 1999, p. 22. Some states require a mental health hearing before accepting a plea based on insanity. Rennich-Craig v. Russell, 609 N.W.2d 123 (S.D. 2000).
75. See R. Slovenko, Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability (New York: Wiley, 1995), pp. 179-196.
76. F. Wertham, Dark Legend (New York: Doubleday, 1949).
77. J.W. Mohr & C.K. McKnight, "Violence as a Function of Age and Relationship with Special Reference to Matricide," Can. Psychiat. Assn. J. 16(1971):20. See also G.B. Palermo & M.T. Palermo, "Patricide" in Affari di famiglia: Dall'abuso all' omicidio (Disrupted Families: From Abuse to Homicide) (Rome: Edizioni Magi, 2003).
78. J.W. Mohr & C.K. McKnight, "Violence as a Function of Age and Relationship with Special Reference to Matricide," Can. Psychiat. Assn. J. 16(1971):20. See also G.B. Palermo & M.T. Palermo, "Patricide" in Affari di famiglia: Dall'abuso all' omicidio (Disrupted Families: From Abuse to Homicide) (Rome: Edizioni Magi, 2003).
79. F. Wertham, Dark Legend (New York: Doubleday, 1949), p. 42.
80. See R.A. Friedman, "Revising the Script on Mental Illness and Violence," New York Times, March 4, 2003, p. D-6.
81. J. Campion et al., "A Study of 15 Matricidal Men," Am. J. Psychiatry 142(1985):312; S.A. Clark, "Matricide: The Schizophrenic Crime?" Med. Sci. Law 33(1993):325; L.H. Rubinstein, "The Theme of Electra and Orestes: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Matricide," Br. J. Med. Psychology 41(1969):99; J.A. Silberstin, "Matricide: A Paradigmatic Case in Family Violence," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 41(1998):210; E. Tanay, "Psychiatric Study of Homicide," Am. J. Psychiatry 125(1969):1252.
82. J. Campion et al., "A Study of 15 Matricidal Men," Am. J. Psychiatry 142(1985):312; S.A. Clark, "Matricide: The Schizophrenic Crime?" Med. Sci. Law 33(1993):325; L.H. Rubinstein, "The Theme of Electra and Orestes: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Matricide," Br. J. Med. Psychology 41(1969):99; J.A. Silberstin, "Matricide: A Paradigmatic Case in Family Violence," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 41(1998):210; E. Tanay, "Psychiatric Study of Homicide," Am. J. Psychiatry 125(1969):1252.
83. J. Campion et al., "A Study of 15 Matricidal Men," Am. J. Psychiatry 142(1985):312; S.A. Clark, "Matricide: The Schizophrenic Crime?" Med. Sci. Law 33(1993):325; L.H. Rubinstein, "The Theme of Electra and Orestes: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Matricide," Br. J. Med. Psychology 41(1969):99; J.A. Silberstin, "Matricide: A Paradigmatic Case in Family Violence," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 41(1998):210; E. Tanay, "Psychiatric Study of Homicide," Am. J. Psychiatry 125(1969):1252.
84. J. Campion et al., "A Study of 15 Matricidal Men," Am. J. Psychiatry 142(1985):312; S.A. Clark, "Matricide: The Schizophrenic Crime?" Med. Sci. Law 33(1993):325; L.H. Rubinstein, "The Theme of Electra and Orestes: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Matricide," Br. J. Med. Psychology 41(1969):99; J.A. Silberstin, "Matricide: A Paradigmatic Case in Family Violence," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 41(1998):210; E. Tanay, "Psychiatric Study of Homicide," Am. J. Psychiatry 125(1969):1252.
85. J. Campion et al., "A Study of 15 Matricidal Men," Am. J. Psychiatry 142(1985):312; S.A. Clark, "Matricide: The Schizophrenic Crime?" Med. Sci. Law 33(1993):325; L.H. Rubinstein, "The Theme of Electra and Orestes: A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Matricide," Br. J. Med. Psychology 41(1969):99; J.A. Silberstin, "Matricide: A Paradigmatic Case in Family Violence," Int'l J. Offender Therapy & Comp. Criminology 41(1998):210; E. Tanay, "Psychiatric Study of Homicide," Am. J. Psychiatry 125(1969):1252.
86. See R. I. Simon, Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1996), pp. 283-284.