Conceptual foundations for environmental ethics: A Daoist perspective

Environmental Ethics

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 247-266

  Lai, Karyn L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242287333     PISSN: 01634275     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics200325317     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. Prominent collections include Environmental Ethics 8, no. 3 (Winter 1986); Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (April 1987); and J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, eds., Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
2. Prominent collections include Environmental Ethics 8, no. 3 (Winter 1986); Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (April 1987); and J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, eds., Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
3. Prominent collections include Environmental Ethics 8, no. 3 (Winter 1986); Philosophy East and West 37, no. 2 (April 1987); and J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames, eds., Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
4. Po-Keung Ip, "Taoism and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics," Environmental Ethics 5 (1983): 335-43.
5. See, for example, Chung-ying Cheng's "On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch'i," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 351-70.
6. See Roger Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317-50; R. P. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3-22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175-86.
7. See Roger Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317-50; R. P. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3-22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175-86.
8. See Roger Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317-50; R. P. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3-22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175-86.
9. See Roger Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317-50; R. P. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3-22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175-86.
10. See Roger Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," Environmental Ethics 8 (1986): 317-50; R. P. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism: A Reconstruction of Daoist Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics 13 (1991): 3-22; Chung-yuan Chang, Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry (New York: Julian Press, 1963); Chung-yuan Chang, Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); and Kirill Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17 (1990): 175-86.
11. The numbers here refer to chapter numbers in the Daodejing; this system of referencing (bracketed numbers) will be used throughout this essay unless otherwise indicated.
12. Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 192-93.
13. Peter Marshall, Nature's Web: Rethinking Our Place on Earth (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 9.
14. The terms dao and de (Pinyin transliteration system) correspond to tao and te (Wade-Giles system commonly used in earlier literature) respectively. The Pinyin system is used in this essay because it is more up-to-date and widely used.
15. With the oldest existing versions of the Daodejing excavated from the Han tombs at Mawangdui in China in 1973, the bamboo strips on which the texts are inscribed are arranged in such a way that the final forty-four chapters of the received text, the De Jing, are placed first. Hence, a translator of the Mawangdui Daodejing has labelled his translation the "Dedaojing." See Robert Henricks, Lao-tze Te-tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-Tui Texts (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). See also Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," esp. sec. 4: "Taoism Misnamed."
16. With the oldest existing versions of the Daodejing excavated from the Han tombs at Mawangdui in China in 1973, the bamboo strips on which the texts are inscribed are arranged in such a way that the final forty-four chapters of the received text, the De Jing, are placed first. Hence, a translator of the Mawangdui Daodejing has labelled his translation the "Dedaojing." See Robert Henricks, Lao-tze Te-tao Ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-Wang-Tui Texts (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). See also Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," esp. sec. 4: "Taoism Misnamed."
17. Lionel Giles, The Sayings ofLao Tzu (London: John Murray. 1907).
18. Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (New York: Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). Chan writes, "[t]he main objective of [the Daodejing] is the cultivation of virtue or te" (pp. 10-11).
19. D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963). Although Lau contemplates a richer interpretation of de, he proceeds very quickly to dismiss the significance of that nterpretation, together with the role of de within the Daodejing. He writes: "In its Taoist usage, te refers to the virtue of a thing (which is what it 'gets' from the tao). In other words, te is the nature of a thing, because it is in virtue of its te that a thing is what it is. But in the Lao tzu the term is not a particularly important one and is often used in its more conventional senses" (p. 42).
20. See Daodejing 5, 18, 19, 20, 38.
21. Chan's translation from The Way of Lao Tzu. This translation is used throughout this essay, unless otherwise specified.
22. See Daodejing 8, 27, 30, 49, 54, 61 and 81.
23. Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu. Chan's interpretation of de is based partly on a traditional definition of the term which draws from its homophone, de (to obtain). See Chan's comments on p. 11.
24. Lau, Lao Tzu, p. 42.
25. J. L. Duyvendak, Tao Te Ching: The Book of the Way and Its Virtue (London: John Murray, 1954).
26. Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its Place in Chinese Thought (New York: Grove Press, 1958).
27. Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, trans. Roger Greaves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).
28. Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 31. Waley's view of de is predicated on correlative thought. The theme of correlative thinking assumes an intrinsic relatedness between all things and beings, covering a wide sweep of all existence including cosmic forces, all species and natural objects, and even aspects of human life such as government. Chinese scholar A. C. Graham provides a comprehensive account of correlative thinking in "Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking," Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Occasional Paper and Monograph Series, no. 6, 1986.
29. Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 31. Waley's view of de is predicated on correlative thought. The theme of correlative thinking assumes an intrinsic relatedness between all things and beings, covering a wide sweep of all existence including cosmic forces, all species and natural objects, and even aspects of human life such as government. Chinese scholar A. C. Graham provides a comprehensive account of correlative thinking in "Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking," Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Occasional Paper and Monograph Series, no. 6, 1986.
30. Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris, 1934), p. 303; cited in Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, p. 27.
31. Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris, 1934), p. 303; cited in Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism, p. 27.
32. Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and Taoism pp. 27-28.
33. Cheng, "On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch'i," p. 353.
34. Chan (The Way of Lao Tzu) adds the word man at this point in the statement. Chan states that some interpreters have taken the phrase to mean the best man, while others take it to mean the "highest good." In Chan's view, both interpretations are possible (see pp. 113-14). However, prefer to ellipt the word because the addition narrows the applicability of these ideas to humankind.
35. Daodejing 10, 36, 43, 76, 78.
36. Ibid., 36, 52, 55, 76, 78.
37. Ibid., 15, 16, 26, 37, 39, 45, 57, 64.
38. Ibid., 8, 22, 66, 68, 73, 81.
39. The sentiments in this passage are echoed in Daodejing 2 and 10.
40. Ames, "Taoism and the Nature of Nature," p. 331.
41. Ames takes issue with the fact that reasoning in Chinese philosophy is not reducible to, or cannot be subsumed under existing categories in Western philosophies. However, where the ideas in this paper might differ from Ames' is in the latter's suggestion that an aesthetic rather than logical order is fundamental in Chinese thought (as contrasted with Western science) in ibid, pp. 320-26. While the distinction between aesthetic and logical order is meaningful and useful, Ames' assertion that the aesthetic order is the ground of Chinese cosmology may neglect or omit other integrated modes of operation such as the moral or the rational (or reasonable).
42. See the comprehensive discussions of wuwei by Benjamin Schwartz, "The Ways of Taoism," in The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), and Angus C. Graham, "Heaven and Man Go Their Own Ways" in Disputers of the Tao (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1989).
43. Ames takes issue with the fact that reasoning in Chinese philosophy is not reducible to, or cannot be subsumed under existing categories in Western philosophies. However, where the ideas in this paper might differ from Ames' is in the latter's suggestion that an aesthetic rather than logical order is fundamental in Chinese thought (as contrasted with Western science) in ibid, pp. 320-26. While the distinction between aesthetic and logical order is meaningful and useful, Ames' assertion that the aesthetic order is the ground of Chinese cosmology may neglect or omit other integrated modes of operation such as the moral or the rational (or reasonable).
44. See Daodejing 5, discussed later in this section.
45. "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique," in Andrew Brennan, ed., The Ethics of the Environment (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1995), pp. 239-52.
46. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism."
47. This understanding of ziran as spontaneity, when applied to the final sentence in chapter sixty-four, would read, "[the Daoist sage] supports all things in their spontaneous development by not taking any action that interferes with their spontaneity." The translation of ziran as "spontaneity" instead of "nature" in chaps. 23, 51, and 54 is also particularly effective.
48. See Daodejing 12, 18, 19, 20, 37 and 53.
49. Cheng, "On the Environmental Ethics of the Tao and the Ch'i," p. 356.
50. Daodejing 4, 5, 25, and 64.
51. Thompson, "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order," p. 177.
52. Lau, Lao Tzu, p. 61.
53. Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge Publishing. 1993), pp. 48-55.
54. See, for example, John Rodman, "Review Discussions: The Liberation of Nature?" Inquiry 20 (1977): 83-145; Richard and Val Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, and Richard Routley, eds., Environmental Philosophy (Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of the Social Sciences, 1980), pp. 96-99.
55. See, for example, John Rodman, "Review Discussions: The Liberation of Nature?" Inquiry 20 (1977): 83-145; Richard and Val Routley, "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics," in Don Mannison, Michael McRobbie, and Richard Routley, eds., Environmental Philosophy (Canberra: Australian National University, Research School of the Social Sciences, 1980), pp. 96-99.
56. See, for example, Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100, and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
57. See, for example, Arne Naess, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement," Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100, and Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.
58. Defenders of weak anthropocentricism include Eugene Hargrove, "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value," in Max Oelschlaeger, ed., After Earth Day: Continuing the Conservation Effort (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 1992). Those who propose versions of strong anthropocentricism include William Baxter, People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). See also Bryan Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 131-48.
59. Defenders of weak anthropocentricism include Eugene Hargrove, "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value," in Max Oelschlaeger, ed., After Earth Day: Continuing the Conservation Effort (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 1992). Those who propose versions of strong anthropocentricism include William Baxter, People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). See also Bryan Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 131-48.
60. Defenders of weak anthropocentricism include Eugene Hargrove, "Weak Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value," in Max Oelschlaeger, ed., After Earth Day: Continuing the Conservation Effort (Denton, Tex.: University of North Texas Press, 1992). Those who propose versions of strong anthropocentricism include William Baxter, People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). See also Bryan Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 131-48.
61. See Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentricism."
62. See Plumwood (1993) Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, chap. 2: "Dualism: The Logic of Colonisation."
63. Daodejing 2, 5, 7, 19, 32.
64. There are fine distinctions made between some versions: metaphysical holism (that wholes exist apart from their part and may be more real than their parts), methodological holism (which asserts that in order to understand the constituent parts, we need to understand various phenomena associated with the whole), and ethical holism (that moral consideration should be extended to wholes). See the discussion in Joseph DesJardins, Environmental Ethics, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2001), pp. 176-77.
65. For example, Eric Katz, "Organiscism, Community and the 'Substitution Problem,'" Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 241-56; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Don Marietta, Jr., "Environmental Holism and Individuals," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 251-58.
66. For example, Eric Katz, "Organiscism, Community and the 'Substitution Problem,'" Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 241-56; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Don Marietta, Jr., "Environmental Holism and Individuals," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 251-58.
67. For example, Eric Katz, "Organiscism, Community and the 'Substitution Problem,'" Environmental Ethics 7 (1985): 241-56; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Don Marietta, Jr., "Environmental Holism and Individuals," Environmental Ethics 10 (1988): 251-58.
68. Peerenboom, "Beyond Naturalism," pp. 20-21.
69. Ibid., p. 21.
70. See Charles Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 74.
71. I b i d.
72. I b i d.
73. Cover story, "Owl versus Man," Time Magazine, 25 June 1990. The report article itself is not as polarized as the cover suggests, but the point here is how such issues are commonly distorted and misrepresented.
74. A Chinese scholar, Chung-yuan Chang, trans., Tao: A New Way of Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), suggests that Daoist philosophy upholds a holism that strives to achieve the best "unity of multiplicities." Chang's idea resembles the notion of compossibility discussed here.