Passive attack analysis for connection-based anonymity systems

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2808, Issue , 2003, Pages 116-131

  Serjantov, Andrei ^a   Sewell, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; DATA PRIVACY;

AMOUNTS OF TRAFFICS; ATTACK ANALYSIS; DEGREE OF PROTECTION; LOW LATENCY; MINIMUM DEGREE; PASSIVE ADVERSARY; PASSIVE ATTACKS;

COMPUTERS;

EID: 0142250280     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-39650-5_7     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (25)

1. P. Boucher, I. Goldberg, and A. Shostack. Freedom system 2.0 architecture. http://www.freedom.net/info/whitepapers/, 2000. Zero-KnowledgeSytems, Inc.
2. A. Back, U. M¨oller, and A. Stiglic. Traffic analysis attacks and trade-offs in anonymity providing systems. In Information Hiding Workshop, pages 245–257. LNCS 2137, 2001.
3. O. Berthold, A. Pfitzmann, and R. Standtke. The disadvantages of free MIX routes and how to overcome them. In Workshop on the Design Issues in Anonymity and Observability, LNCS 2009, pages 10–29. 2000.
4. D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84–88, 1981.
5. L. Cottrell. Mixmaster and remailer attacks, 1994. http://www.obscura.com/˜loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html.
6. G. Danezis. Mix-networks with restricted routes. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, LNCS 2760. Dresden, Germany, 2003.
7. G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson. Type III (Mixminion) Mix Protocol Specifications, 2002. http://mixminion.net/minion-spec.txt.
8. G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson. Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol. In IEEE Security and Privacy. 2003.
9. M. J. Freedman and R. Morris. Tarzan: A peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer. In Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 2002.
10. D. Goldschlag, M. Reed, and P. Syverson. Onion Routing for anonymous and private internet connections. Communications of the ACM, 42(2):39–41, 1999.
11. C. Gülcü and G. Tsudik. Mixing Email with Babel. In Internet Society Symposium on Network and Distributed Sytem Security, pages 2–16. 1996.
12. H. Hodara. Secure fiberoptic communications. In Symposium on Electromagnetic Security for Information Protection. Rome, Italy, 1991.
13. The JAP project. http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index_en.html.
14. D. Kesdogan, J. Egner, and R. Büschkes. Stop-and-go MIXes: Providing probabilistic anonymity in an open system. In Information Hiding Workshop. LNCS 1525, 1998.
15. U. Moeller and L. Cottrell. Mixmaster Protocol Version 3, 2000. http://www.eskimo.com/˜rowdenw/crypt/Mix/draft-moeller-v3-01.txt.ord. Onion Routing developers mailing list. http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/.
16. A. Pfitzmann, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner. ISDN-mixes: Untraceable communication with very small bandwidth overhead. In Proceedings of the GI/ITG Conference on Communication in Distributed Systems, pages 451–463. 1991.
17. J. Raymond. Traffic analysis: Protocols, attacks, design issues, and open problems. In Workshop on the Design Issues in Anonymity and Observability, LNCS 2009, pages 10–29. 2000.
18. M. Rennhard. Practical anonymity for the masses with mix-networks. Technical Report 157, ETH Zurich,Switzerland, 2003.
19. M. Rennhard and B. Plattner. Introducing morphmix: Peer-to-peer based anonymous internet usage with collusion detection. In Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES). Washington, DC, USA, 2002.
20. R. Sherwood, B. Bhattacharjee, and A. Srinivasan. P5: A protocol for scalable anonymous communication. In IEEE Security and Privacy. 2002.
21. A. Serjantov and G. Danezis. Towards an information theoretic metric for anonymity. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies, LNCS 2482. 2002.
22. A. Serjantov, R. Dingledine, and P. Syverson. From a trickle to a flood: Active attacks on several mix types. In Information Hiding Workshop, LNCS 2578. 2002.
23. V. Shmatikov. Probabilistic analysis of anonymity. In 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 119–128. 2002.
24. P. F. Syverson, G. Tsudik, M. G. Reed, and C. E. Landwehr. Towards an analysis of Onion Routing security. In Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, LNCS 2009. 2000.
25. M. Wright, M. Adler, B. Levine, and C. Shields. An analysis of the degradation of anonymous protocols. In ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security. 2002.