Philosophical arguments for and against human reproductive cloning

Bioethics

Volumn 17, Issue 5-6, 2003, Pages 447-460

  Häyry, Matti ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL LANCASHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; CLONING; CONFERENCE PAPER; DEONTOLOGY; ETHICS; GENE POOL; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; GOVERNMENT REGULATION; HUMAN; HUMAN CLONING; HUMAN GENOME; HUMAN RIGHTS; INFERTILITY THERAPY; LEGAL ASPECT; OUTCOMES RESEARCH; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; REPRODUCTION; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

EID: 0142209129     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00360     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (41)

1. G.J. Annas, L.B. Andrews & R.M. Isasi. Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations. American Journal of Law & Medicine 2002; 28: 151-178; P.F. Frisneda. Clonación Humana: Una Lucha Contra el Tiempo. Tiempos del Mundo 2002; September 5-11.
2. G.J. Annas, L.B. Andrews & R.M. Isasi. Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations. American Journal of Law & Medicine 2002; 28: 151-178; P.F. Frisneda. Clonación Humana: Una Lucha Contra el Tiempo. Tiempos del Mundo 2002; September 5-11.
3. J. Harris. 'Goodbye Dolly?' The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical Ethics 1997; 23: 353-360; J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford. Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu. Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 87-95; J. Savulescu. The Ethics of Cloning and Creating Embryonic Stem Cells as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation: Time to Change the Law in Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Medicine 2000; 30: 492-498.
4. J. Harris. 'Goodbye Dolly?' The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical Ethics 1997; 23: 353-360; J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford. Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu. Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 87-95; J. Savulescu. The Ethics of Cloning and Creating Embryonic Stem Cells as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation: Time to Change the Law in Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Medicine 2000; 30: 492-498.
5. J. Harris. 'Goodbye Dolly?' The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical Ethics 1997; 23: 353-360; J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford. Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu. Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 87-95; J. Savulescu. The Ethics of Cloning and Creating Embryonic Stem Cells as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation: Time to Change the Law in Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Medicine 2000; 30: 492-498.
6. J. Harris. 'Goodbye Dolly?' The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical Ethics 1997; 23: 353-360; J. Harris. 1998. Clones, Genes, and Immortality. Oxford. Oxford University Press; J. Savulescu. Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 87-95; J. Savulescu. The Ethics of Cloning and Creating Embryonic Stem Cells as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation: Time to Change the Law in Australia. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Medicine 2000; 30: 492-498.
7. A word of caution is appropriate here. There are two common mistakes in cases like this, and we should try to avoid both. On the one hand, some people may think that since there are so many arguments against human reproductive cloning, one of them must be sound. This, of course, does not follow. No matter how many objections there are to a given practice, they can all, logically speaking, be mistaken. On the other hand, others may think, conversely, that since many arguments against human reproductive cloning are weak, inadequate, and unconvincing, none of them can be sound. This is equally untrue. Even if the first fifty objections to a practice were misplaced, argument number fifty-one could still be good. (This is why it is so difficult to defend any controversial policy or course of action conclusively - I can make a solid case today, but tomorrow someone may come up with a lethal criticism.)
8. J.B. Cibelli, R.P. Lanza, M.D. West & C. Ezzell. The First Human Cloned Embryo. Scientific American 2002; 286: 44-51.
9. J.S. Mill. 1996. On Liberty (1859). In On Liberty and The Subjection of Women. Ware, Hertfordshire. Wordsworth: p. 13.
10. Ibid. pp. 14-15.
11. Harris (1998), op. cit. note 2; J. Savulescu. The Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery and the Cannibalization of Human Beings. Bioethics 2002; 16: 508-529.
12. Harris (1998), op. cit. note 2; J. Savulescu. The Embryonic Stem Cell Lottery and the Cannibalization of Human Beings. Bioethics 2002; 16: 508-529.
13. Cf. J. Feinberg. 1984. Harm to Others. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
14. Cf. M. Häyry & T. Takala. Genetic Engineering and the Risk of Harm. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1998; 1: 61-64; M. Häyry. Forthcoming. Precaution and solidarity. In The Foundations of Health Care. D. Thomasma, D. Novak & D. Weisstub, eds. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
15. Cf. M. Häyry & T. Takala. Genetic Engineering and the Risk of Harm. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 1998; 1: 61-64; M. Häyry. Forthcoming. Precaution and solidarity. In The Foundations of Health Care. D. Thomasma, D. Novak & D. Weisstub, eds. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
16. R.J. Sullivan. 1989. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press; H.E. Allison. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. The word 'transcendental' means 'beyond the limits of experience and knowledge', so the freedom and autonomy in question have next to nothing to do with liberty, self-determination, and self-governance as they are understood in other traditions and ordinary language. See: J.B. Schneewind. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
17. R.J. Sullivan. 1989. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press; H.E. Allison. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. The word 'transcendental' means 'beyond the limits of experience and knowledge', so the freedom and autonomy in question have next to nothing to do with liberty, self-determination, and self-governance as they are understood in other traditions and ordinary language. See: J.B. Schneewind. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
18. R.J. Sullivan. 1989. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press; H.E. Allison. 1990. Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. The word 'transcendental' means 'beyond the limits of experience and knowledge', so the freedom and autonomy in question have next to nothing to do with liberty, self-determination, and self-governance as they are understood in other traditions and ordinary language. See: J.B. Schneewind. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
19. I. Kant. 1994. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785, § 421). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 30.
20. I. Kant. 1994. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785, § 421). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 30.
21. I. Kant. 1994. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (1797, § 7). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 85.
22. I. Kant. 1994. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (1797, § 7). Translated by J.W. Ellington. Reprinted in Ethical Philosophy. Second edition. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 85.
23. Kant, op. cit. note 12, § 429, p. 36.
24. A. Kahn. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man. Nature 1997; 386: 119; K. Labib. Don't Leave Dignity out of the Cloning Debate. Nature 1997; 388: 15; R. Williamson. Human Reproductive Cloning is Unethical because it Undermines Autonomy: Commentary on Savulescu. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 96-97.
25. A. Kahn. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man. Nature 1997; 386: 119; K. Labib. Don't Leave Dignity out of the Cloning Debate. Nature 1997; 388: 15; R. Williamson. Human Reproductive Cloning is Unethical because it Undermines Autonomy: Commentary on Savulescu. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 96-97.
26. A. Kahn. Clone Mammals . . . Clone Man. Nature 1997; 386: 119; K. Labib. Don't Leave Dignity out of the Cloning Debate. Nature 1997; 388: 15; R. Williamson. Human Reproductive Cloning is Unethical because it Undermines Autonomy: Commentary on Savulescu. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 96-97.
27. Cf. M. Häyry. 1994. Categorical Objections to Genetic Engineering - A Critique. In Ethics and Biotechnology. A. Dyson & J. Harris, eds. London and New York. Routledge: 202-215; M. Häyry & T. Takala. 2001. Cloning, Naturalness and Personhood. In Personhood in Health Care. D.C. Thomasma, D.N. Weisstub & C. Hervé, eds. Dordrecht, Boston and London. Kluwer Academic Publishers: 281-298.
28. Cf. M. Häyry. 1994. Categorical Objections to Genetic Engineering - A Critique. In Ethics and Biotechnology. A. Dyson & J. Harris, eds. London and New York. Routledge: 202-215; M. Häyry & T. Takala. 2001. Cloning, Naturalness and Personhood. In Personhood in Health Care. D.C. Thomasma, D.N. Weisstub & C. Hervé, eds. Dordrecht, Boston and London. Kluwer Academic Publishers: 281-298.
29. I should mention, at this point, some other deontological possibilities that are not explored here. One is to say that embryos used in research leading to cloning babies would be treated as a mere means. This, I suppose, is true, but in what sense are they persons? Another is to say that women, who would in some cultures be reduced to producing 'copies' of men, would be treated merely as a means. This, again, is true, if the women in question are coerced into doing what they do. But this point applies to all coerced human reproduction, and can be directed against lack of sexual education and restrictive abortion policies, as well. It is not a specific argument against cloning. Yet another deontological option would be to abandon the Kantian model of intellectual individualism, and to say that our emotions and feelings provide a reason against cloning, or that society would collapse with the acceptance of cloning. I have examined this line of thinking in more detail elsewhere, and concluded that it probably does not provide a valid justification for a total ban on cloning. (M. Häyry. 2003. Deeply Felt Disgust - A Devlinian Objection to Cloning Humans. In Ethical Issues in New Genetics: Are Genes Us? B. Almond & M. Parker, eds. Aldershot. Ashgate: 55-67.) Finally, it has been argued that it would be unjust to pursue high-tech solutions to minor medical problems in a world of poverty and other more basic issues. While this is a tenet easy to agree with, proponents of cloning have countered it by noting that research into cloning can be the key to many medical advances in the future. (R. Winston. 1999. Cloning Technology will Yield Medical Benefits. In Cloning: For and Against. M.L. Rantala & A.J. Milgram, eds. Chicago and La Salle. Open Court.)
30. I should mention, at this point, some other deontological possibilities that are not explored here. One is to say that embryos used in research leading to cloning babies would be treated as a mere means. This, I suppose, is true, but in what sense are they persons? Another is to say that women, who would in some cultures be reduced to producing 'copies' of men, would be treated merely as a means. This, again, is true, if the women in question are coerced into doing what they do. But this point applies to all coerced human reproduction, and can be directed against lack of sexual education and restrictive abortion policies, as well. It is not a specific argument against cloning. Yet another deontological option would be to abandon the Kantian model of intellectual individualism, and to say that our emotions and feelings provide a reason against cloning, or that society would collapse with the acceptance of cloning. I have examined this line of thinking in more detail elsewhere, and concluded that it probably does not provide a valid justification for a total ban on cloning. (M. Häyry. 2003. Deeply Felt Disgust - A Devlinian Objection to Cloning Humans. In Ethical Issues in New Genetics: Are Genes Us? B. Almond & M. Parker, eds. Aldershot. Ashgate: 55-67.) Finally, it has been argued that it would be unjust to pursue high-tech solutions to minor medical problems in a world of poverty and other more basic issues. While this is a tenet easy to agree with, proponents of cloning have countered it by noting that research into cloning can be the key to many medical advances in the future. (R. Winston. 1999. Cloning Technology will Yield Medical Benefits. In Cloning: For and Against. M.L. Rantala & A.J. Milgram, eds. Chicago and La Salle. Open Court.)
31. Cf. M. Häyry. Another Look at Dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming; T. Takala. The (Im)morality of (Un)naturalness. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming.
32. Cf. M. Häyry. Another Look at Dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming; T. Takala. The (Im)morality of (Un)naturalness. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics forthcoming.
33. T. Aquinas. 1988. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J. Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 47-48; Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. 1997. Reflexions on Cloning. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Human Cloning - Position paper of the Catholic Medical Association. Issues in Law and Medicine 2000; 15: 323-324; P.T. Schotsmans & B. Hansen. Cloning: The Human as Created Co-creator. Ethical Perspectives 2001; 8: 75-87.
34. T. Aquinas. 1988. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J. Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 47-48; Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. 1997. Reflexions on Cloning. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Human Cloning - Position paper of the Catholic Medical Association. Issues in Law and Medicine 2000; 15: 323-324; P.T. Schotsmans & B. Hansen. Cloning: The Human as Created Co-creator. Ethical Perspectives 2001; 8: 75-87.
35. T. Aquinas. 1988. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J. Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 47-48; Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. 1997. Reflexions on Cloning. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Human Cloning - Position paper of the Catholic Medical Association. Issues in Law and Medicine 2000; 15: 323-324; P.T. Schotsmans & B. Hansen. Cloning: The Human as Created Co-creator. Ethical Perspectives 2001; 8: 75-87.
36. T. Aquinas. 1988. On Law, Morality and Politics. W.P. Baumgarth & R.J. Regan, eds. Indianapolis and Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company: 47-48; Pontificia Academia Pro Vita. 1997. Reflexions on Cloning. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana; Human Cloning - Position paper of the Catholic Medical Association. Issues in Law and Medicine 2000; 15: 323-324; P.T. Schotsmans & B. Hansen. Cloning: The Human as Created Co-creator. Ethical Perspectives 2001; 8: 75-87.
37. A Report from Germany - an extract from Prospects and Risks of Gene Technology: The Report of the Enquete Commission to the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bioethics 1988; 2: 256-263, at 257. The latter passage is quoted in the report from: R. Loew. Gentechnologie: vom Können zum Dürfen - philosophische Uberlegungen. Die Neue Ordnung 1984; 38: 176 ff.
38. A Report from Germany - an extract from Prospects and Risks of Gene Technology: The Report of the Enquete Commission to the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bioethics 1988; 2: 256-263, at 257. The latter passage is quoted in the report from: R. Loew. Gentechnologie: vom Können zum Dürfen - philosophische Uberlegungen. Die Neue Ordnung 1984; 38: 176 ff.
39. th 29 session on 11 November 1997, articles 1, 2, 11. On the significance given to the document, see, e.g.: C. Dennis, R. Gallagher & P. Campbell. Everyone's Genome. Nature 2001;409:813.
40. Dennis et al., op. cit. note 20.
41. One way to contrast some prevalent consequentialist and teleological views is to draw attention to their different notions of 'harm' and 'personhood.' The standard utilitarian reading is that harm can only be inflicted mentally or physically on sentient living beings. Personhood, in this model, belongs automatically to all beings who are mentally alert enough to be aware of their own subjective existence over time. If cloning produces healthy babies (prospective persons) without inflicting concrete harm on others, it should be approved. But some teleological ethicists, including the ones quoted in the text, seem to be more worried about spiritual damage to the human soul. According to them, people can harm themselves by acting in ungodly ways. One such way would be the production of new human beings by cloning. I am no expert in these matters, but I can think of two partly overlapping reasons for this. If personhood is inexorably connected with an immortal soul, and if immortal souls can only be issued by God, then cloners would risk bringing into this world people without the essential equipment for personhood. And even if God guaranteed that clones, too, have souls, cloning could be construed as an arrogant attempt to force God's hand. The (theologically perplexing) idea in the latter case would be that God somehow plans 'natural reproduction', whereas 'unnatural' reproductive practices take him by surprise.