Adjusting to the Post-U.S. Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Military's Modernization Program

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 119-138

  Cruz De Castro, Renato ^a,b,c,d  

^a DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY   (Philippines)

^b National University of Singapore   (Singapore)

^c Institut Europeacute en d'Administration Publique   (Netherlands)

^d UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141984941     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327x9902600107     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. While most Southeast Asian countries have reformulated their defense doctrines from internal security to external defense, Philippine security concerns mainly focused on the domestic communist insurgency, the Muslim secessionist movement, and, later, the right-wing military rebellion. While the major Southeast Asian states' air and naval forces have acquired modern corvettes, frigates, and state-of-the-art air assets, the Philippine Navy (PN) and Air Force (PAF) are equipped with outdated Second World War or Vietnam War vintage equipment and are basically support units of the Philippine Army. Even when it comes to the so-called regional arms build-up, the Philippines has lived up to its reputation as the odd man out in Southeast Asia. See Lew Eng Fee, "Arms Control in Southeast Asia: Review of the Debate," Contemporary Southeast Asia 10 (December 1988): 234.
2. See Juan Ponce Enrile, "Survival and Nation-Building: Building Past and Present Defense Policy," in Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1973), 58 and 61.
3. See J. N. Mak, ASEAN Defense Reorientation 1975-1992: The Dynamics of Modernization and Structural Change. (Australia: CPN Publications Pty Ltd., 1993), 108.
4. During the late 1980s, the AFP found its equipment inadequate both in controlling the communist insurgency in the mid-1980s and curtailing the series of attempted military coups d'etat in the late 1980s. For example, the PA suffered from inadequate armor assets. The PA's U.S.-supplied hardware was often either ill-suited for counter-insurgency operations or too difficult to maintain and, in some cases, both. The American-made M-113 and its AIFV derivatives move too slowly in the Philippine terrain and make too much noise. The Army's Scorpion tanks also move slowly, and can be heard a mile away. Then there is the V-150 Commando armored personnel carrier, which often remains idle for lack of spare parts. Domestic security concerns rather than external security was the primary consideration in the AFP's decision to push for arms modernization, according to then Vice-Chief of Staff General Alfredo Filler, then Assistant Deputy for Chief of Staff for Plans General Juanito Malto, and AFP Chief of Staff General Lisandro Abadia. In interviews with the three retired generals, all gave a similar account of the AFP's inadequate equipment for dealing with the resilient communist insurgency and the attempted coup d'etat by military rebels. In an interview with General Filler, he admitted that the AFP realized its inadequacy in anti-aircraft and anti-tank capabilities during the attempted coups launched by the military rebels in the August 1987 and December 1989 coup attempts. The interview with General Alfredo Filler took place at Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 15 February 1995; that with General Lisandro Abadia at the Philippine International Convention Center, Manila, Philippines on 5 February 1995, and that with General Juanito Malto at the Philippine International Convention Center, Manila, Philippines on 5 March 1996.
5. For example, see Armando Doronilla, "It is time to examine our defense requirements," Manila Chronicle, 12 September 1988, p. 1. Also see Wilma N. Yamson, "Modernizing the Philippine Navy," in Panorama 24 June 1990, pp. 16-19; E. T. Suarez's series of articles in the Manila Bulletin from 22-25 June 1990, and Joe Alejandro, "AFP lags behind ASEAN Armies," Manila Chronicle, 21 May 1990, p 1.
6. For example, see Armando Doronilla, "It is time to examine our defense requirements," Manila Chronicle, 12 September 1988, p. 1. Also see Wilma N. Yamson, "Modernizing the Philippine Navy," in Panorama 24 June 1990, pp. 16-19; E. T. Suarez's series of articles in the Manila Bulletin from 22-25 June 1990, and Joe Alejandro, "AFP lags behind ASEAN Armies," Manila Chronicle, 21 May 1990, p 1.
7. For example, see Armando Doronilla, "It is time to examine our defense requirements," Manila Chronicle, 12 September 1988, p. 1. Also see Wilma N. Yamson, "Modernizing the Philippine Navy," in Panorama 24 June 1990, pp. 16-19; E. T. Suarez's series of articles in the Manila Bulletin from 22-25 June 1990, and Joe Alejandro, "AFP lags behind ASEAN Armies," Manila Chronicle, 21 May 1990, p 1.
8. For example, see Armando Doronilla, "It is time to examine our defense requirements," Manila Chronicle, 12 September 1988, p. 1. Also see Wilma N. Yamson, "Modernizing the Philippine Navy," in Panorama 24 June 1990, pp. 16-19; E. T. Suarez's series of articles in the Manila Bulletin from 22-25 June 1990, and Joe Alejandro, "AFP lags behind ASEAN Armies," Manila Chronicle, 21 May 1990, p 1.
9. See Renato De Villa, "Building the AFP of the 90s." Speech delivered at the Philippine Army Tactical Brigade Commanders Seminar-Workshop, 24 August 1991, pp. 3-4.
10. See President Corazon Aquino's Speech during the 93rd Anniversary of the Philippine Navy on 24 June 1991, "Aquino on Philippine Navy's 93rd Anniversary," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-91-123, 26 June 1991, pp. 52-53.
11. Unlike Taiwan, China, and Vietnam, the Philippines does not claim the entire Spratly Archipelago, but instead is limited to 53 islands, clays, shoals, and reefs of this island chain. To strengthen its legal claim, Manila called these islands as Kalayaan (Freedom land) and maintained that they are separate and distinct from the Spratly Archipelago since they are closer to the Philippines. Manila's claim to this part of the Spratly Islands began on 15 May 1956, when a Filipino named Thomas Cloma claimed to be the owner of a marine territory composed of islets, sand clays, sand bars, and coral reefs with a total area of about 64,976 square nautical miles. He called this area Kalayaan and, his claim to the maritime area became the official basis of the Philippine claim to this part of the Spratlys. Currently, Philippine military units are stationed on eight islands, and Manila's claim to them has been rationalized by its assertions that they are very near to its territory, making them important to its national security needs and by the need to protect a possible offshore oil field at the Reed Bank near the Philippine westernmost island of Palawan. For more discussion on the Philippine claim to this portion of the Spratly Islands, see Donald Weatherbee, "The South China Sea: from Zone of Conflict to Zone of Peace," in East Asian Conflict Zones, ed. Lawrence E. Grinter and Young Whan Kihl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 123-148, and Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Hants, England; Vermont: Ashagate Publishing Company, 1997).
12. Unlike Taiwan, China, and Vietnam, the Philippines does not claim the entire Spratly Archipelago, but instead is limited to 53 islands, clays, shoals, and reefs of this island chain. To strengthen its legal claim, Manila called these islands as Kalayaan (Freedom land) and maintained that they are separate and distinct from the Spratly Archipelago since they are closer to the Philippines. Manila's claim to this part of the Spratly Islands began on 15 May 1956, when a Filipino named Thomas Cloma claimed to be the owner of a marine territory composed of islets, sand clays, sand bars, and coral reefs with a total area of about 64,976 square nautical miles. He called this area Kalayaan and, his claim to the maritime area became the official basis of the Philippine claim to this part of the Spratlys. Currently, Philippine military units are stationed on eight islands, and Manila's claim to them has been rationalized by its assertions that they are very near to its territory, making them important to its national security needs and by the need to protect a possible offshore oil field at the Reed Bank near the Philippine westernmost island of Palawan. For more discussion on the Philippine claim to this portion of the Spratly Islands, see Donald Weatherbee, "The South China Sea: from Zone of Conflict to Zone of Peace," in East Asian Conflict Zones, ed. Lawrence E. Grinter and Young Whan Kihl (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 123-148, and Bob Catley and Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea (Hants, England; Vermont: Ashagate Publishing Company, 1997).
13. Business World, 30 January 1992, "De Villa Outlines Military Modernization Plan," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-92-020, 30 January 1992, 53-54.
14. Business World, 30 January 1992, "De Villa Outlines Military Modernization Plan," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-92-020, 30 January 1992, 53-54.
15. Manila Business World, 5 September 1991, "Navy to Buy Ships from Spain, Australia, China," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-91-457, 26 September 1991, 49- 50.
16. Manila Business World, 5 September 1991, "Navy to Buy Ships from Spain, Australia, China," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-91-457, 26 September 1991, 49-50.
17. Manila Bulletin, 31 August 1991, "Says Modernization in Progress," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-91-172, 5 September 1991, 62.
18. Manila Bulletin, 31 August 1991, "Says Modernization in Progress," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-91-172, 5 September 1991, 62.
19. For details of what transpired with the AFP's initial request for funding for its 10-year modernization program, see "Shift military priority to Navy, Dumancas urges," Manila Times, 11 February 1991, p. 1. Department of National Defense Undersecretary Ceasar Bello provided the details of the congressional actions on the AFP's request for funding during an interview with the author at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, March 1996.
20. For the particulars of the Senate's questions and requirements on the AFP modernization bill, see Senator Orlando Mercado, "Memorandum for the President: Status of the ATP Modernization Bill," (Manila: Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, April 1994), 1-2; Defense Group, "Memorandum to Senator Mercado: List of Materials Required from the ATP during various hearings on the AFP Modernization," (Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 30 March 1994), 1-2; and The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Transcript of the 30 March 1994 Public Hearing (Manila: Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, 1994), 5.
21. For the particulars of the Senate's questions and requirements on the AFP modernization bill, see Senator Orlando Mercado, "Memorandum for the President: Status of the ATP Modernization Bill," (Manila: Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, April 1994), 1-2; Defense Group, "Memorandum to Senator Mercado: List of Materials Required from the ATP during various hearings on the AFP Modernization," (Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 30 March 1994), 1-2; and The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Transcript of the 30 March 1994 Public Hearing (Manila: Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, 1994), 5.
22. For the particulars of the Senate's questions and requirements on the AFP modernization bill, see Senator Orlando Mercado, "Memorandum for the President: Status of the ATP Modernization Bill," (Manila: Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, April 1994), 1-2; Defense Group, "Memorandum to Senator Mercado: List of Materials Required from the ATP during various hearings on the AFP Modernization," (Camp Aquinaldo, Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 30 March 1994), 1-2; and The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Transcript of the 30 March 1994 Public Hearing (Manila: Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, Philippine Senate, 1994), 5.
23. Frank Gorospe, "Not So armed forces," Manila Chronicle 26 June 1994, pp. 1 and 4.
24. See John Mcbeth, "Broken Toys: Cash strapped armed forces look for a new role," Far Eastern Economic Review 156 (9 September 1993): 29.
25. For a comprehensive discussion of Abadia's position regarding the AFP modernization, see Lisandro Abadia, "At the Threshold of the 21st Century," Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1992), 256 and his "The Demand of the Future," Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1993). 76 .
26. For a comprehensive discussion of Abadia's position regarding the AFP modernization, see Lisandro Abadia, "At the Threshold of the 21st Century," Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1992), 256 and his "The Demand of the Future," Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1993). 76 .
27. See General Arturo Enrile, "We need a credible military force," Manila Chronicle, 20 April 1994, p. 5.
28. Arturo Enrile, "Responding to the Imperatives of Change, In Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila: Philippine Star Publishers Inc., 1994), 126.
29. "Modernization bill passage pushed," The Philippine Star, 9 November 1994, 1 and 13.
30. The opposition consisted of the Nationalist People's Coalition, headed by Ernesto Maceda, and the Liberal Party, headed by then Senator Jovito Salonga.
31. See Elmer Messina, "AFP Modernization Plan gets House Ok," The Philippine Star, 11 December 1994, pp. 1 and 8.
32. Defense Committee Report No. 535 on Senate Bill No. 1867 (Manila: Philippine Senate, 24 January 1995), pp. 28-29.
33. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
34. Ibid., pp. 107-108.
35. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
36. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
37. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
38. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
39. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
40. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
41. Like most ASEAN states, the Philippines is concerned with the PRC's rapid economic development and military modernization. It is an open secret in the armed forces of the Philippines and in government circles that China is the most probable threat to the country's national security. This perception is due to the Philippine dispute with China over the Spratly Islands and China's build-up of its power projection capability in the South China Sea. Public announcement of this perception of threat had been avoided due to its possible negative effects on Philippine-PRC bilateral relations. However, since mid-1992, government officials have become more vocal about Philippine concern over Chinese moves in the Spratlys. For Philippine government officials' statements about the alleged "China threat," see Manila Broadcasting Company, 24 March 1992, "General Views Conflict with the PRC," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 26; and The Chronicle, 10 July 1992, "Japan Urged to Intervene in Spratlys Issue," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23); Agence France Press, 9 July 1992, "Ramos Seeks ASEAN Role in Spratly Dispute," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 23; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 July 1992, "PRC Seen Flexing its Muscle," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Asia-92-136, 15 July 1992, pp. 27-28.
42. Cynthia D. Balana, "Chinese Warships Still in Kalayaan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 February 1995, pp. 1 and 4.
43. The speedy passage of the AFP modernization law at the time of the Mischief Reef Crisis in 1995 created some unconfirmed reports and rumors that the AFP was aware of the Chinese move on the Mischief Reef but had suppressed the information until the Senate's deliberations on the AFP Modernization bill in early February. Although the author could not totally discount this report, there is some information that weakens this assertion. When the Philippine Senate questioned the AFP Vice Chief of Staff on why the AFP was not able to monitor the Chinese moves on Mischief Reef, he gave a straightforward answer, admitting that the AFP is not capable of a 24-hour surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) due to lack of modern military equipment. This statement has a factual basis, since the PN has only seven Pilates Britten-Norman Islanders and most of them are based at the main naval stations of Cavite, Mactan, Zamboanga, and Poro, all far from the westernmost Island of Palawan. Furthermore, all of the PN patrol ships are either Second World War II auxiliary ships (sub-chasers, rescue ships, and minesweepers) or fast patrol crafts. Hence, they are either unable or ill-designed to conduct constant blue water patrol in that part of South China. The AFP's official explanation was confirmed by the Far Eastern Economic Review, which stated that Chinese naval presence and its construction activity were not spotted earlier simply because the Philippines does not have enough vessels to patrol all of the waters it claims. It should also be pointed out that even the United States Pacific Command had failed to keep an eye on this part of the South China Sea simply because, as one U.S. defense official pointed out, "Mischief Reef is away from the main shipping lanes, thus, there was little likelihood of anyone stumbling upon those Chinese ships." Although it is fact that the government tried to deny that Chinese forces have occupied the disputed reef, this denial was more an effort to prevent a major diplomatic crisis with the PRC similar to the two diplomatic crises the Philippines had had with Malaysia in the late 1980s - both triggered by media hysteria. The delay in the confirmation of Chinese forces on the disputed reef could also be attributed to the fact that it took the AFP more than one week to confirm the presence of forces in that area because of inadequate naval assets. See Business World, 14 February 1995, "De Villa Says No Risk of War on Spratlys," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-95-032, 16 February 1995, pp. 60-61 and Roberto Tiglao and John Mcbeth, "Territorial Imperatives," Far Eastern Economic Review 158 23 February 1995: 15.
44. The speedy passage of the AFP modernization law at the time of the Mischief Reef Crisis in 1995 created some unconfirmed reports and rumors that the AFP was aware of the Chinese move on the Mischief Reef but had suppressed the information until the Senate's deliberations on the AFP Modernization bill in early February. Although the author could not totally discount this report, there is some information that weakens this assertion. When the Philippine Senate questioned the AFP Vice Chief of Staff on why the AFP was not able to monitor the Chinese moves on Mischief Reef, he gave a straightforward answer, admitting that the AFP is not capable of a 24-hour surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) due to lack of modern military equipment. This statement has a factual basis, since the PN has only seven Pilates Britten-Norman Islanders and most of them are based at the main naval stations of Cavite, Mactan, Zamboanga, and Poro, all far from the westernmost Island of Palawan. Furthermore, all of the PN patrol ships are either Second World War II auxiliary ships (sub-chasers, rescue ships, and minesweepers) or fast patrol crafts. Hence, they are either unable or ill-designed to conduct constant blue water patrol in that part of South China. The AFP's official explanation was confirmed by the Far Eastern Economic Review, which stated that Chinese naval presence and its construction activity were not spotted earlier simply because the Philippines does not have enough vessels to patrol all of the waters it claims. It should also be pointed out that even the United States Pacific Command had failed to keep an eye on this part of the South China Sea simply because, as one U.S. defense official pointed out, "Mischief Reef is away from the main shipping lanes, thus, there was little likelihood of anyone stumbling upon those Chinese ships." Although it is fact that the government tried to deny that Chinese forces have occupied the disputed reef, this denial was more an effort to prevent a major diplomatic crisis with the PRC similar to the two diplomatic crises the Philippines had had with Malaysia in the late 1980s - both triggered by media hysteria. The delay in the confirmation of Chinese forces on the disputed reef could also be attributed to the fact that it took the AFP more than one week to confirm the presence of forces in that area because of inadequate naval assets. See Business World, 14 February 1995, "De Villa Says No Risk of War on Spratlys," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-95-032, 16 February 1995, pp. 60-61 and Roberto Tiglao and John Mcbeth, "Territorial Imperatives," Far Eastern Economic Review 158 23 February 1995: 15.
45. The speedy passage of the AFP modernization law at the time of the Mischief Reef Crisis in 1995 created some unconfirmed reports and rumors that the AFP was aware of the Chinese move on the Mischief Reef but had suppressed the information until the Senate's deliberations on the AFP Modernization bill in early February. Although the author could not totally discount this report, there is some information that weakens this assertion. When the Philippine Senate questioned the AFP Vice Chief of Staff on why the AFP was not able to monitor the Chinese moves on Mischief Reef, he gave a straightforward answer, admitting that the AFP is not capable of a 24-hour surveillance of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) due to lack of modern military equipment. This statement has a factual basis, since the PN has only seven Pilates Britten-Norman Islanders and most of them are based at the main naval stations of Cavite, Mactan, Zamboanga, and Poro, all far from the westernmost Island of Palawan. Furthermore, all of the PN patrol ships are either Second World War II auxiliary ships (sub-chasers, rescue ships, and minesweepers) or fast patrol crafts. Hence, they are either unable or ill-designed to conduct constant blue water patrol in that part of South China. The AFP's official explanation was confirmed by the Far Eastern Economic Review, which stated that Chinese naval presence and its construction activity were not spotted earlier simply because the Philippines does not have enough vessels to patrol all of the waters it claims. It should also be pointed out that even the United States Pacific Command had failed to keep an eye on this part of the South China Sea simply because, as one U.S. defense official pointed out, "Mischief Reef is away from the main shipping lanes, thus, there was little likelihood of anyone stumbling upon those Chinese ships." Although it is fact that the government tried to deny that Chinese forces have occupied the disputed reef, this denial was more an effort to prevent a major diplomatic crisis with the PRC similar to the two diplomatic crises the Philippines had had with Malaysia in the late 1980s - both triggered by media hysteria. The delay in the confirmation of Chinese forces on the disputed reef could also be attributed to the fact that it took the AFP more than one week to confirm the presence of forces in that area because of inadequate naval assets. See Business World, 14 February 1995, "De Villa Says No Risk of War on Spratlys," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-95-032, 16 February 1995, pp. 60-61 and Roberto Tiglao and John Mcbeth, "Territorial Imperatives," Far Eastern Economic Review 158 23 February 1995: 15.
46. V. G. Kulkari, "Mid-Term Blues," Far Eastern Economic Review 58 (27 April 1995), 17.
47. Business World, 14 February 1995, "Article Deplores Sorry State of Military," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-95-033, 17 February 1995, p. 67-68.
48. Business World, 14 February 1995, "Article Deplores Sorry State of Military," Foreign Broadcast Information Service-EAS-95-033, 17 February 1995, p. 67-68.
49. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 February 1995, "AFP to Start Shopping for War Equipment," Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-EAS-91-038, 27 February 1995, p. 61.
50. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 February 1995, "AFP to Start Shopping for War Equipment," Foreign Broadcasting Information Service-EAS-91-038, 27 February 1995, p. 61.
51. Ibid.
52. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 168.
53. Roberto Tiglao, "What Tiger?" Far Eastern Economic Review 160 (October 23, 1997): 92.
54. Shalendra D. Sharma, "Asia's Economic Crisis and the IMF," Survival 401 (Summer 1998): 43.
55. Richel B. Langit, "Palace Vows Full Support for AFP Plan," The Manila Times, 23 December 1998, p. 1.
56. Ibid. Also see Manchu Villianueva, "Where's [the] money for AFP upgrade?" The Philippine Star, 24 December 1998, p. 1.
57. The only major arms acquisition by the AFP since 1995 is the purchase of three Peacock class offshore large patrol craft (PG) from the United Kingdom for a basement price of $9.7 million. Given their displacement of 690 tons and their main armament of one 76-mm/62 OTO Melara compact gun, these vessels are designed for protecting Philippine internal waters and long coastline. They are, however, ill-designed for blue water deployment in the Kalayaan/Spratly Islands and in other parts of the Philippine EEZ. The Philippines has also received five F-SAs from South Korea, and there is a standing offer from the United States for the Philippine navy to "lease" some Oliver Perry Class frigates. However, it should be pointed that these purchases and offers are not part of the program; see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 351. Also see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170 and 174.
58. The only major arms acquisition by the AFP since 1995 is the purchase of three Peacock class offshore large patrol craft (PG) from the United Kingdom for a basement price of $9.7 million. Given their displacement of 690 tons and their main armament of one 76-mm/62 OTO Melara compact gun, these vessels are designed for protecting Philippine internal waters and long coastline. They are, however, ill-designed for blue water deployment in the Kalayaan/Spratly Islands and in other parts of the Philippine EEZ. The Philippines has also received five F-SAs from South Korea, and there is a standing offer from the United States for the Philippine navy to "lease" some Oliver Perry Class frigates. However, it should be pointed that these purchases and offers are not part of the program; see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1998: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 351. Also see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1998/99 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170 and 174.