Consistency, common morality, and reflective equilibrium

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 231-258

  Brand Ballard, Jeffrey ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BEHAVIOR; BENEFICENCE; EUTHANASIA; IDEOLOGY; INFORMED CONSENT; JUSTICE; LOGIC; MEDICAL ETHICS; MORALITY; PUBLIC OPINION; RELIGION; REVIEW; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0141794496     PISSN: 10546863     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/ken.2003.0018     Document Type: Review

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