Distinguishing offensive from defensive biological weapons research

Critical Reviews in Microbiology

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 223-257

  Leitenberg, Milton ^a  

^a Ctr for Intl Secty Studs at MD   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANTIGEN; CHLORAMPHENICOL; DOXYCYCLINE; GENTAMICIN; HORMONE; HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS VACCINE; IMMUNOMODULATING AGENT; RECOMBINANT PROTEIN; STREPTOMYCIN; TETRACYCLINE; TOXIN; VACCINE;

ANTHRAX; ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE; ARMY; ATOMIC WARFARE; BACTERIAL GENE; BACTERIUM; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; BIOSENSOR; BIOTECHNOLOGY; CHEMICAL WARFARE; CHINESE; CIVIL DEFENSE; CLASSIFICATION; CUBA; DNA MODIFICATION; ESCHERICHIA COLI; EUROPE; FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION; GAS GANGRENE; GENE INSERTION; GENE THERAPY; GERMANY; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HUMAN; HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS; IMMUNIZATION; INDIA; INFLUENZA VIRUS; ISRAEL; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MICROBIOLOGY; MICROORGANISM; MURINE ENCEPHALOMYELITIS VIRUS; NONHUMAN; PATHOGENICITY; PLAGUE; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REVIEW; SALMONELLA; SMALLPOX; TULAREMIA; TYPHOID FEVER; UNITED KINGDOM; UNITED STATES; USSR; VACCINE PRODUCTION; VACCINIA; VIRUS RECOMBINANT; VIRUS STRAIN; YERSINIA PESTIS;

ANTHRAX; BACTERIA (MICROORGANISMS); ESCHERICHIA COLI; HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS; INFLUENZA VIRUS; INSERTION SEQUENCES; MURINAE; SALMONELLA; THEILER'S ENCEPHALOMYELITIS VIRUS; VACCINIA VIRUS; VARIOLA VIRUS; YERSINIA; YERSINIA PESTIS;

EID: 0141785599     PISSN: 1040841X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713610450     Document Type: Review

References (146)

1. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction," in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations, 1990 edition, Washington, DC: United States Aims Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 133-137.
2. The UK draft language read as follows: "Article II. Each of the Parties to the Convention undertakes (a) not to produce or otherwise acquire, or assist in or permit the production or acquisition of (i) microbial or other biological agents of types and in quantities that have no independent peaceful justification for prophylactic or other purposes; (ii) ancillary equipment or vectors the purpose of which is to facilitate the use of such agents for hostile purposes; (b) not to conduct, assist or permit research aimed at production of the kind prohibited in sub-paragraph (a) of this Article." ENDC 255, July 10, 1969. Reprinted in Documents on Disarmament, 1969, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 324-326.
3. Disarmament Conference Document, ENDC/231, August 6, 1968.
4. Milton Leitenberg, "Research and Development in (C)BW: On the Distinguishability of Basic vs. Applied, Civil vs. Military, Offensive vs. Defensive. An Example of the Inter-relations of Scientific Research and Weapons Development." An updated version of this paper was included as a chapter in a book-length examination, Studies of Military R&D and Weapons Development, prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden in 1984, as background material for a United Nations Secretary-General's study of military R&D.
5. Raymond A. Zilinskas and Tazewell Wilson, "Introduction," pp. xi-xii, in The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, ed. Raymond A Zilinskas, vol. 666, 1992.
6. "Scientific Principles to Guide Biological Weapons Verification," American Society of Microbiology, May 21, 1993. Reference to intent in fact became something of a cliché, as in the remark made in 1984 by a former director of research at Fort Detrick, Dr. William Beisel, that "It all comes down to intent...with technology plus intent you can do great good or great harm."
7. R. Jeffrey Smith, "The Dark Side of Biotechnology: Experts Say That Recent Scientific Achievements Threaten an International Treaty Banning Biological Warfare," Science, (June 15, 1984), pp. 1215-1216.
8. Elizabeth Finkle, "Engineered Mouse Virus Spurs Bioweapons Fears," Science, 291, (January 26, 2001) p. 585. Ronald J. Jackson et al., "Expression of Morse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Electromelic Virus Surpresses Cytoclytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Morse Pox," J Virology, Feb 2001, p. 1205-1210.
9. Elizabeth Finkle, "Engineered Mouse Virus Spurs Bioweapons Fears," Science, 291, (January 26, 2001) p. 585. Ronald J. Jackson et al., "Expression of Morse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Electromelic Virus Surpresses Cytoclytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Morse Pox," J Virology, Feb 2001, p. 1205-1210.
10. "Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare Defense," Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, US Department of Defense, January 8, 2002.
11. National Security Decision Memorandum 35, "United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program," November 25, 1969. Declassified.
12. "US Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents: Report to the National Security Council," Submitted to the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in response to NSSM [National Security Study Memorandum] 59, November 10, 1969, p. 26. Declassified.
13. Forrest Russel Frank, "U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention Case," PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, California, November 1974, p. 239.
14. The US National Science Foundation (NSF) uses the following definitions: Basic research: Basic research has as its objective a fuller knowledge or understanding of the subject under study, rather than a practical application thereof. As applied to the industrial sector, basic research is defined as research that advances scientific knowledge but does not have specific commercial objectives, although each investigations may be in fields of present or potential interest to the reporting company. Applied research:: Applied research is directed toward gaining knowledge or understanding necessary for determining the means by which a recognized and specific need may be met. In industry, applied research includes investigations directed to the discovery of new scientific knowledge having specific commercial objectives with respect to products or processes. Development: Development is the systematic use of the knowledge or understanding gained from research toward the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including design and development of prototypes and processes. National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators - 1989, p. 89. The US Department of Defense also has RDT&E definitional categories, but these have no application beyond US DOD decision-making for acquisition and procurement. The most relevant of these are: Research: Includes all effort directed toward increased knowledge of natural phenomena and environment and efforts directed toward the solution of problems in the physical, behavioral and social sciences that have no clear direct military application. Exploratory Development: Includes all effort directed toward the solution of specific military problems, short of major development projects. It is possible that some combination of these could be adapted for international diplomatic use, but that is difficult to envision.
15. Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, "Dangers in the 1990s: Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Missile Proliferation," in Disarmament: Topical Paper 6: Confidence Building Measures in the Asia Pacific Region, New York: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1991, p. 38.
16. The named countries, as well as those identified in a 1993 Russian government report, have been reviewed in earlier papers. See Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, CISSM PRAC Paper #18, May 1996, as well as the papers referenced in footnotes 1 and 2. See also Milton Leitenberg "Biological Weapons in the 20th Century: A Review and Analysis." Crit Rev Microbiol. v27 (.4): 267-320, 2001.
17. The named countries, as well as those identified in a 1993 Russian government report, have been reviewed in earlier papers. See Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, CISSM PRAC Paper #18, May 1996, as well as the papers referenced in footnotes 1 and 2. See also Milton Leitenberg "Biological Weapons in the 20th Century: A Review and Analysis." Crit Rev Microbiol. v27 (.4): 267-320, 2001.
18. The Counterproliferation Imperative. Meeting Tomorrow's Challenges, A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, November 2001, p. 38.
19. John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction," Heritage Foundation Lectures, no. 743, May 6, 2002.
20. Ford's testimony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations read: "The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited developmental offensive biological warfare research and development effort."
21. Judith Miller, "Washington Accuses Cuba of Germ-Warfare Research," New York Times, May 7, 2002.
22. David Gonzalez, "Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba," New York Times, May 14, 2002; Mark Fineman, "Carter Doubts Claim of Cuba Bioterror," Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2002. Notably, both headlines in two of the best newspapers in the United States, misrepresent the original US charge: it referred neither to "Bioarms," nor to "Bioterror."
23. David Gonzalez, "Carter and Powell Cast Doubt on Bioarms in Cuba," New York Times, May 14, 2002; Mark Fineman, "Carter Doubts Claim of Cuba Bioterror," Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2002. Notably, both headlines in two of the best newspapers in the United States, misrepresent the original US charge: it referred neither to "Bioarms," nor to "Bioterror."
24. Kevin Sullivan, "Carter Says He Was Told US Had No Proof Cuba Shared Bioweapons Data. State Dept. Officials Claim Contradicted," Washington Post, May 14, 2002. (The Washington Post headline is a misrepresentation. Carter stated only that he had asked about possible Cuban information-sharing "for terrorist purposes," and not regarding Cuba's own BW program.)
25. "Castro's Response to Statements Made by US on Biological Weapons," Havana AIN (Internet Version-www), LAP2000205110001311, May 11, 2002. See also, "Castro Sees 'Sinister' Move in U.S. Biowar Charge," (Reuters Dispatch), New York Times, May 10, 2002,; "Biological Weapons: U.S. Should Present Evidence of Cuban Threat," Dallas Morning News, May 9, 2002; and David Gonzalez, "Castro Says Carter Can Inspect Biotechnology Centers," New York Times, May 13, 2002,
26. "Castro's Response to Statements Made by US on Biological Weapons," Havana AIN (Internet Version-www), LAP2000205110001311, May 11, 2002. See also, "Castro Sees 'Sinister' Move in U.S. Biowar Charge," (Reuters Dispatch), New York Times, May 10, 2002,; "Biological Weapons: U.S. Should Present Evidence of Cuban Threat," Dallas Morning News, May 9, 2002; and David Gonzalez, "Castro Says Carter Can Inspect Biotechnology Centers," New York Times, May 13, 2002,
27. "Castro's Response to Statements Made by US on Biological Weapons," Havana AIN (Internet Version-www), LAP2000205110001311, May 11, 2002. See also, "Castro Sees 'Sinister' Move in U.S. Biowar Charge," (Reuters Dispatch), New York Times, May 10, 2002,; "Biological Weapons: U.S. Should Present Evidence of Cuban Threat," Dallas Morning News, May 9, 2002; and David Gonzalez, "Castro Says Carter Can Inspect Biotechnology Centers," New York Times, May 13, 2002,
28. "Castro's Response to Statements Made by US on Biological Weapons," Havana AIN (Internet Version-www), LAP2000205110001311, May 11, 2002. See also, "Castro Sees 'Sinister' Move in U.S. Biowar Charge," (Reuters Dispatch), New York Times, May 10, 2002,; "Biological Weapons: U.S. Should Present Evidence of Cuban Threat," Dallas Morning News, May 9, 2002; and David Gonzalez, "Castro Says Carter Can Inspect Biotechnology Centers," New York Times, May 13, 2002,
29. "Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction," BWC/CONF.IV/4, October 30, 1996, pp. 1-5.
30. Martin Arostegui, "Fidel Castro's Deadly Secret - Five BioChem Warfare Labs," Insight Magazine (Washington Times), 14:26 (July 20, 1998). In October 2002 an informal three day visit was made by a group from the U.S. Center for Defense Information to nine Cuban biotechnology and research facilities. It was in no sense a thorough inspection exercise but was extremely united on its parameters. The report of that trip appeared after this study was prepared and is not further discussed here. See "Cuban Biotechnology: A First Hand Report," edited by Glen Baker, The Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C. 2003.
31. Martin Arostegui, "Fidel Castro's Deadly Secret - Five BioChem Warfare Labs," Insight Magazine (Washington Times), 14:26 (July 20, 1998). In October 2002 an informal three day visit was made by a group from the U.S. Center for Defense Information to nine Cuban biotechnology and research facilities. It was in no sense a thorough inspection exercise but was extremely united on its parameters. The report of that trip appeared after this study was prepared and is not further discussed here. See "Cuban Biotechnology: A First Hand Report," edited by Glen Baker, The Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C. 2003.
32. Personal communication, May 2001.
33. Wayne Biddle, "Proposed Installation Raises Questions and Fears: Just What Germs Would the Army Grow in Utah," New York Times, December 16, 1984.
34. Department of Defense appropriations for 1970. Part 5: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC, 1969, p. 589.
35. Pan Zhenqiang, Xia Liping, Wang Zhongchun, eds., Guoji Caijun yu Junbei Kongzhi, [International Disarmament and Arms Control], Beijing: Chinese National Defense University Press, December 1996, pp. 52, 182. References 90 and 91 were kindly supplied by Eric Croddy.
36. Chen Jisheng, "21 Shiji Huasheng Wuqi ji Junkong Fazhan Fenxi" [Analysis of Chemical and Biological Weapons in the 21st Century and Arms Control Developments], Fanghua Yanjiu, no. 1, 2000, p. 44.
37. The Cuban allegations have also been extensively reviewed elsewhere. See Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare by the United States: Assessing the Evidence," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 25:3 (1999): 173-227, and Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation," Asian Perspective, 21:3 (Winter 1997):7-39.
38. The Cuban allegations have also been extensively reviewed elsewhere. See Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Cuban Allegations of Biological Warfare by the United States: Assessing the Evidence," Critical Reviews in Microbiology, 25:3 (1999): 173-227, and Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons, International Sanctions and Proliferation," Asian Perspective, 21:3 (Winter 1997):7-39.
39. "Details on Bonn's Bug Warfare Plans," Democratic German Report, 17:24 (December 23, 1968), pp. 186-187. The reader who is interested in comparing these charges with descriptions of Germany' s defensive BW program in approximately the same period will find several useful sources: the section on "West Germany," pp. 218-219 in Volume II, CB Weapons Today. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971, and Roland Metzner, "The Bundeswehr NBC Defense and Development Institute, " Military Technology, #4, 1978, pp. 50-51.
40. "Details on Bonn's Bug Warfare Plans," Democratic German Report, 17:24 (December 23, 1968), pp. 186-187. The reader who is interested in comparing these charges with descriptions of Germany' s defensive BW program in approximately the same period will find several useful sources: the section on "West Germany," pp. 218-219 in Volume II, CB Weapons Today. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971, and Roland Metzner, "The Bundeswehr NBC Defense and Development Institute, " Military Technology, #4, 1978, pp. 50-51.
41. "Details on Bonn's Bug Warfare Plans," Democratic German Report, 17:24 (December 23, 1968), pp. 186-187. The reader who is interested in comparing these charges with descriptions of Germany' s defensive BW program in approximately the same period will find several useful sources: the section on "West Germany," pp. 218-219 in Volume II, CB Weapons Today. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971, and Roland Metzner, "The Bundeswehr NBC Defense and Development Institute, " Military Technology, #4, 1978, pp. 50-51.
42. Jan van Aken, "Biologische Waffen: Foschungsprojkete der Bundeswehr," Sunshine Project, June 2001.
43. "Germany Increases Biological Weapon Defense Funding," Reuters Medical News, April 5, 2002.
44. Personal communication, March 2002.
45. Jan van Aken and Edward Hammond, "Some Thoughts on Biodefense Research," INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 19 (March 2002): 11-14.
46. Dirk Eckert, "Expansion of Defensive Bioweapons Research: The Bundeswehr is Also Using Genetic Engineering," Hanover Telepolis, April 10, 2002.
47. Kathryn Nixdorff and Wolfgang Bender, "Biotechnology, Ethics of Research, and Potential Spin-off," INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 19 (March 2002), pp. 19-22.
48. "Genetic Engineering in German Biodefense Research," Sunshine Project Germany, April 2, 2002.
49. • Andrew Pollack, "Scientists Ponder Limits on Access to Germ Research," New York Times, November 27, 2001. • William J. Broad, "US Sells Papers on Making Germ Weapons," New York Times, January 13, 2002. • Scott Lindlaw, "Bush May Censor Germ-Warfare Guides; The US Has Been Selling the Documents, Which Demonstrates How to Manufacture Weapons," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 2002. • Steven Aftergood, "Do Declassified Bioweapon Documents Pose a Threat," Secrecy News, #6 (January 15, 2002).
50. • Andrew Pollack, "Scientists Ponder Limits on Access to Germ Research," New York Times, November 27, 2001. • William J. Broad, "US Sells Papers on Making Germ Weapons," New York Times, January 13, 2002. • Scott Lindlaw, "Bush May Censor Germ-Warfare Guides; The US Has Been Selling the Documents, Which Demonstrates How to Manufacture Weapons," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 2002. • Steven Aftergood, "Do Declassified Bioweapon Documents Pose a Threat," Secrecy News, #6 (January 15, 2002).
51. • Andrew Pollack, "Scientists Ponder Limits on Access to Germ Research," New York Times, November 27, 2001. • William J. Broad, "US Sells Papers on Making Germ Weapons," New York Times, January 13, 2002. • Scott Lindlaw, "Bush May Censor Germ-Warfare Guides; The US Has Been Selling the Documents, Which Demonstrates How to Manufacture Weapons," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 2002. • Steven Aftergood, "Do Declassified Bioweapon Documents Pose a Threat," Secrecy News, #6 (January 15, 2002).
52. • Andrew Pollack, "Scientists Ponder Limits on Access to Germ Research," New York Times, November 27, 2001. • William J. Broad, "US Sells Papers on Making Germ Weapons," New York Times, January 13, 2002. • Scott Lindlaw, "Bush May Censor Germ-Warfare Guides; The US Has Been Selling the Documents, Which Demonstrates How to Manufacture Weapons," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 2002. • Steven Aftergood, "Do Declassified Bioweapon Documents Pose a Threat," Secrecy News, #6 (January 15, 2002).
53. William J. Broad, "US is Tightening Rules in Keeping Scientific Secrets, Terrorist Threat Cited; Chemical and Germ Weapons Data Withdrawn - Some Researchers Are Wary," New York Times, February 17, 2002; David Enrich, "Extra Care Taken in Declassifying Documents; Pentagon Standards Tougher After Sept. 11," Washington Post, March 29, 2002.
54. William J. Broad, "US is Tightening Rules in Keeping Scientific Secrets, Terrorist Threat Cited; Chemical and Germ Weapons Data Withdrawn - Some Researchers Are Wary," New York Times, February 17, 2002; David Enrich, "Extra Care Taken in Declassifying Documents; Pentagon Standards Tougher After Sept. 11," Washington Post, March 29, 2002.
55. Foreign and Military Intelligence: Book I, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, US Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, April 1976, pp. 388-389.
56. Intelligence Activities: Senate Resolution 21. Volume I: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, September 1975, pp. 1, 189-199.
57. Rick Weiss and Susan Schmidt, "Capitol Hill Anthrax Matches Army's Stocks. Five Labs Can Trace Spores to Fort Detrick," Washington Post, December 16, 2001. It appears that CIA programs in this area have always been pushed aggressively: a notorious and early instance, although not one with international treaty implications, was the 1953 experiments with LSD in project MK:ULTRA that led to the death of a CIA staffer. Ted Cup, "Bad Chemistry: The Haunting Legacy of a CIA Scientist and His Unwitting Victims - Where Patriotism and Madness Meet," The Washington Post Magazine, December 16, 2001.
58. Rick Weiss and Susan Schmidt, "Capitol Hill Anthrax Matches Army's Stocks. Five Labs Can Trace Spores to Fort Detrick," Washington Post, December 16, 2001. It appears that CIA programs in this area have always been pushed aggressively: a notorious and early instance, although not one with international treaty implications, was the 1953 experiments with LSD in project MK:ULTRA that led to the death of a CIA staffer. Ted Cup, "Bad Chemistry: The Haunting Legacy of a CIA Scientist and His Unwitting Victims - Where Patriotism and Madness Meet," The Washington Post Magazine, December 16, 2001.
59. "Statement of Robert E. Waldron, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation Research and Engineering, National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate," April 10, 2002.
60. Dr. Ken Alibek, Testimony to the Joint Economic Committee, US Senate, May 20, 1998.
61. Personal communication, November 7, 1998, and July 2002.
62. Personal communication, November 1998. It is not altogether clear what the rationale behind production of such a molecular genetic "chimera" of two pathogens would have been, as against simply combining the two independent pathogens and delivering them simultaneously. One suggestion has been that it would provide a mechanism to enclose a more lethal but non-contagious pathogen inside the genome of a less lethal but more contagious pathogen to obtain the combination of high contagiousness and high lethality. However, this explanation does not fit the two organisms involved in the alleged case. Another suggestion was to escape disease identification by automated detection and identification devices. However, rapid identification devices did not exist at the time that the supposed "chimera" development took place (and they are only now in development, 15-20 years later). In addition, the strategic rationale that Alibek has described for the potential circumstances in which Soviet military planners conceived of using these agents offered little reason to be concerned with whether the attacked party could identify the disease agent rapidly or not. Nevertheless, as indicated, the project almost certainly did exist.
63. Sergey Popov, Interview with PBS TV NOVA program "Bioterror," November 17, 2001.
64. • B. Moss, "Use of Vaccinia Virus for the Development of Live Vaccines," in Genetically Altered Viruses and the Environment, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, 1985, pp. 291-298, • G. Thomas et al., "Expression and Cell Type-Specific Processing of Human Prepro-enkephalin with a Vaccinia Recombinant," Science, vol. 232 (1986):1641-1643. • B. Roizman, and F.J. Jenkins, "Genetic Engineering of Novel Genomes of Large DNA Viruses," Science, vol. 229 (1985):1208-1214. • Dale Short and Kathleen Blount, "Microscopic Missiles: Revamping Viruses to Demolish Disease," UAB (University of Alabama-Birmingham) 22:1 (Winter 2002):3-9. • O.I. Serpinski et al., "Design of Orthopoxvirus Recombinant Variants by Foreign Gene Insertion into an Intergene Region of Viral Genome," Molecular Biology [Russia], 30: 5 (1996):1055-1065.
65. • B. Moss, "Use of Vaccinia Virus for the Development of Live Vaccines," in Genetically Altered Viruses and the Environment, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, 1985, pp. 291-298, • G. Thomas et al., "Expression and Cell Type-Specific Processing of Human Prepro-enkephalin with a Vaccinia Recombinant," Science, vol. 232 (1986):1641-1643. • B. Roizman, and F.J. Jenkins, "Genetic Engineering of Novel Genomes of Large DNA Viruses," Science, vol. 229 (1985):1208-1214. • Dale Short and Kathleen Blount, "Microscopic Missiles: Revamping Viruses to Demolish Disease," UAB (University of Alabama-Birmingham) 22:1 (Winter 2002):3-9. • O.I. Serpinski et al., "Design of Orthopoxvirus Recombinant Variants by Foreign Gene Insertion into an Intergene Region of Viral Genome," Molecular Biology [Russia], 30: 5 (1996):1055-1065.
66. • B. Moss, "Use of Vaccinia Virus for the Development of Live Vaccines," in Genetically Altered Viruses and the Environment, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, 1985, pp. 291-298, • G. Thomas et al., "Expression and Cell Type-Specific Processing of Human Prepro-enkephalin with a Vaccinia Recombinant," Science, vol. 232 (1986):1641-1643. • B. Roizman, and F.J. Jenkins, "Genetic Engineering of Novel Genomes of Large DNA Viruses," Science, vol. 229 (1985):1208-1214. • Dale Short and Kathleen Blount, "Microscopic Missiles: Revamping Viruses to Demolish Disease," UAB (University of Alabama-Birmingham) 22:1 (Winter 2002):3-9. • O.I. Serpinski et al., "Design of Orthopoxvirus Recombinant Variants by Foreign Gene Insertion into an Intergene Region of Viral Genome," Molecular Biology [Russia], 30: 5 (1996):1055-1065.
67. • B. Moss, "Use of Vaccinia Virus for the Development of Live Vaccines," in Genetically Altered Viruses and the Environment, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, 1985, pp. 291-298, • G. Thomas et al., "Expression and Cell Type-Specific Processing of Human Prepro-enkephalin with a Vaccinia Recombinant," Science, vol. 232 (1986):1641-1643. • B. Roizman, and F.J. Jenkins, "Genetic Engineering of Novel Genomes of Large DNA Viruses," Science, vol. 229 (1985):1208-1214. • Dale Short and Kathleen Blount, "Microscopic Missiles: Revamping Viruses to Demolish Disease," UAB (University of Alabama-Birmingham) 22:1 (Winter 2002):3-9. • O.I. Serpinski et al., "Design of Orthopoxvirus Recombinant Variants by Foreign Gene Insertion into an Intergene Region of Viral Genome," Molecular Biology [Russia], 30: 5 (1996):1055-1065.
68. • B. Moss, "Use of Vaccinia Virus for the Development of Live Vaccines," in Genetically Altered Viruses and the Environment, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, NY, 1985, pp. 291-298, • G. Thomas et al., "Expression and Cell Type-Specific Processing of Human Prepro-enkephalin with a Vaccinia Recombinant," Science, vol. 232 (1986):1641-1643. • B. Roizman, and F.J. Jenkins, "Genetic Engineering of Novel Genomes of Large DNA Viruses," Science, vol. 229 (1985):1208-1214. • Dale Short and Kathleen Blount, "Microscopic Missiles: Revamping Viruses to Demolish Disease," UAB (University of Alabama-Birmingham) 22:1 (Winter 2002):3-9. • O.I. Serpinski et al., "Design of Orthopoxvirus Recombinant Variants by Foreign Gene Insertion into an Intergene Region of Viral Genome," Molecular Biology [Russia], 30: 5 (1996):1055-1065.
69. W. Wayt Gibbs, "Bioterrorism: Innocence Lost. Is Enough Being Doing to Keep Biotechnology Out of the Wrong Hands?" Scientific American, January 2002, pp. 14-15.
70. A. Lucht et al., "Development of Monoclonal Antibodies to Ebola Virus,"....
71. "In Memoriam: Joel M. Dalrymple," p. ix, in The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, ed. Raymond A Zilinskas, vol. 666, 1992, and Laurence K. Altman, "Vaccine for Hanta Virus Found Safe in Early Test," New York Times, May 23, 1995.
72. "In Memoriam: Joel M. Dalrymple," p. ix, in The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, ed. Raymond A Zilinskas, vol. 666, 1992, and Laurence K. Altman, "Vaccine for Hanta Virus Found Safe in Early Test," New York Times, May 23, 1995.
73. Severin Carrell, "Porton Down Makes New Plague and Pox," Independent, February 10, 2002. "Porton Down" is essentially a misnomer, as there are two separate research establishments at the site - the Centre for Applied Microbiological Research (CAMR) under the UK Department of Health, and the Chemical and Biological Defence Sector of DERA (Ministry of Defence, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) at which most of the work referred to is taking place.
74. Personal communication, February 2002.
75. A. M. Bonnet et al., "Recombinant vaccinia viruses protect against Clostridium perfringens a-toxin," Viral Immunology, 12 (1991):97-105.
76. • Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits: Pentagon Says Projects Are Defensive, and is Pressing A head," New York Times, September 4, 2001. See also Chapter 12 in Germs by Miller, Engelberg, and Broad (2001), pp. 287-299. • Vernon Loeb, "US Seeks Duplicate of Russian Anthrax: Microbe to be Used to Check Vaccine," Washington Post, September 5, 2001. Since this project was carried out by initiated and professional DTRA and contractor staff members, it would simulate an effort of a small national program. However, according to Germs, it was concluded that "a nation or bioterrorist" could carry out the project without producing any signature. There is no validity to the conclusion that a "bioterrorist could do what professionals can do."
77. • Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits: Pentagon Says Projects Are Defensive, and is Pressing A head," New York Times, September 4, 2001. See also Chapter 12 in Germs by Miller, Engelberg, and Broad (2001), pp. 287-299. • Vernon Loeb, "US Seeks Duplicate of Russian Anthrax: Microbe to be Used to Check Vaccine," Washington Post, September 5, 2001. Since this project was carried out by initiated and professional DTRA and contractor staff members, it would simulate an effort of a small national program. However, according to Germs, it was concluded that "a nation or bioterrorist" could carry out the project without producing any signature. There is no validity to the conclusion that a "bioterrorist could do what professionals can do."
78. • Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William J. Broad, "U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits: Pentagon Says Projects Are Defensive, and is Pressing A head," New York Times, September 4, 2001. See also Chapter 12 in Germs by Miller, Engelberg, and Broad (2001), pp. 287-299. • Vernon Loeb, "US Seeks Duplicate of Russian Anthrax: Microbe to be Used to Check Vaccine," Washington Post, September 5, 2001. Since this project was carried out by initiated and professional DTRA and contractor staff members, it would simulate an effort of a small national program. However, according to Germs, it was concluded that "a nation or bioterrorist" could carry out the project without producing any signature. There is no validity to the conclusion that a "bioterrorist could do what professionals can do."
79. Personal communication, 2002.
80. Judith Miller, "When is Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront US," New York Times, September 5, 2001; Elisa D. Harris, "Research Not to be Hidden," New York Times, September 6, 2001.
81. Judith Miller, "When is Bomb Not a Bomb? Germ Experts Confront US," New York Times, September 5, 2001; Elisa D. Harris, "Research Not to be Hidden," New York Times, September 6, 2001.
82. "US Approves Development of Enhanced Anthrax," Arms Control Today, 31:9 (November 2001).
83. Chemical and Biological National Security Program 2000, FY 2000 Annual Report, US Department of Energy, 2000.
84. "US Declarations Under the BWC CBMs Do Not Mention the US Bio-defense Projects Disclosed by the New York Times on 4 September 2001," SIPRI CBW Forum website, Stockholm, Sweden, September 2001.
85. Scott Shane, "Anthrax Matches Army Spores," Baltimore Sun, December 12, 2001; Scott Shane, "Army Confirms Making Anthrax in Recent Years," Baltimore Sun, December 13, 2001.
86. Scott Shane, "Anthrax Matches Army Spores," Baltimore Sun, December 12, 2001; Scott Shane, "Army Confirms Making Anthrax in Recent Years," Baltimore Sun, December 13, 2001.
87. Personal communication, April 2002.
88. "US/UK Non-lethal Weapons (NLW) Urban Operations Executive Seminar, Assessment Report," November 30, 2000, London. Most of the discussion at this meeting pertained to chemical "non-lethal" agents, however an appendix stipulated the Biological Weapons Convention as one of the legal instruments pertaining to the considerations being discussed. Quoted from Barbara H. Rosenberg, "Defending Against Biodefense: The Need for Limits," Disarmament Diplomacy, #69 (February-March 2002)
89. "US/UK Non-lethal Weapons (NLW) Urban Operations Executive Seminar, Assessment Report," November 30, 2000, London. Most of the discussion at this meeting pertained to chemical "non-lethal" agents, however an appendix stipulated the Biological Weapons Convention as one of the legal instruments pertaining to the considerations being discussed. Quoted from Barbara H. Rosenberg, "Defending Against Biodefense: The Need for Limits," Disarmament Diplomacy, #69 (February-March 2002)
90. Gugliotta and Matsumoto, October 28, 2002, op. cit.
91. Seth Brugger, "International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted," Arms Control Today, 31:7 (October 2001). See also Menno Steketee, "US Building Biological Bomb in Grey Area," Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, September 6, 2001; "US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians," Associated Press, September 5, 2001; "US Military Produces Anthrax for Defensive Purposes," Press Center Russia, on NTV, September 6, 2001; and "Cuban Television Reacts to NY Times Article on Biological Weapons," Havana Cubavision, September 5, 2001.
92. Seth Brugger, "International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted," Arms Control Today, 31:7 (October 2001). See also Menno Steketee, "US Building Biological Bomb in Grey Area," Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, September 6, 2001; "US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians," Associated Press, September 5, 2001; "US Military Produces Anthrax for Defensive Purposes," Press Center Russia, on NTV, September 6, 2001; and "Cuban Television Reacts to NY Times Article on Biological Weapons," Havana Cubavision, September 5, 2001.
93. Seth Brugger, "International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted," Arms Control Today, 31:7 (October 2001). See also Menno Steketee, "US Building Biological Bomb in Grey Area," Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, September 6, 2001; "US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians," Associated Press, September 5, 2001; "US Military Produces Anthrax for Defensive Purposes," Press Center Russia, on NTV, September 6, 2001; and "Cuban Television Reacts to NY Times Article on Biological Weapons," Havana Cubavision, September 5, 2001.
94. Seth Brugger, "International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted," Arms Control Today, 31:7 (October 2001). See also Menno Steketee, "US Building Biological Bomb in Grey Area," Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, September 6, 2001; "US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians," Associated Press, September 5, 2001; "US Military Produces Anthrax for Defensive Purposes," Press Center Russia, on NTV, September 6, 2001; and "Cuban Television Reacts to NY Times Article on Biological Weapons," Havana Cubavision, September 5, 2001.
95. Seth Brugger, "International Reaction to Secret U.S. Bio-Weapons Research Muted," Arms Control Today, 31:7 (October 2001). See also Menno Steketee, "US Building Biological Bomb in Grey Area," Rotterdam NRC Handelsblad, September 6, 2001; "US Anthrax Plan Worries Russians," Associated Press, September 5, 2001; "US Military Produces Anthrax for Defensive Purposes," Press Center Russia, on NTV, September 6, 2001; and "Cuban Television Reacts to NY Times Article on Biological Weapons," Havana Cubavision, September 5, 2001.
96. "Indian Safeguard Against Nuclear, Biochemical Attack Developed," [Agence France Presse], The Daily Star (New Delhi), July 12, 2002; "Indian Scientists Reveal Nuclear, Germ Tests," Washington Times, July 13, 2002.
97. "Indian Safeguard Against Nuclear, Biochemical Attack Developed," [Agence France Presse], The Daily Star (New Delhi), July 12, 2002; "Indian Scientists Reveal Nuclear, Germ Tests," Washington Times, July 13, 2002.
98. Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, seminar presentation at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2001. A Dept. of Defense workshop that surveyed the state of the art for simulation models of the effects of the release of biological or chemical agents assessed similarly ongoing work in seven areas: intelligence integration and source term; transport, dispersion, fate and terrain; weather (athmospheric dynamics); dose-response; population epidemiology; agriculture and biota; and materiel. Under "transport, dispersion, fate and terrain," it asked, "What happens to the agent after release, through dilution, transformation, deposition, re-suspension, and terrain-related processes?" Precisely the same questions would be asked if the simulations were made in the context of an offensive BW program as in a defensive one. Madhu Beriwal and Peter B. Merkle, Defense Threat Reducation Agency CB Modeling and Simulation Futures Workshop, May 2001.
99. Biological Testing Involving Human Subjects by the Department of Defense, 1977, Hearings before the Committee on Human Resources, United States Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977, p. 110.
100. Chemical and Biological National Security Program, FY00 Annual Report, US Department of Energy, pp. 175-177.
101. Chemical and Biological National Security Program, FY 00 Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 115-117, 123-126.
102. "Chemical and Biological National Security Program: A DOE Mission," in Genomes to Life: Neutralizing the Biological Threat, November 2001. It is likely that the aerosol test chamber reportedly situated at the Nevada Test Site is the one being used for the Sandia National Laboratory studies.
103. "NIH Plans Bioterrorism Research," Associated Press, March 15, 2002; "MAID Unveils Bioterrorism Research Agenda," NIH Press Release, March 14, 2002, and Responding Through Research: The Counter-Bioterrorism-Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for CDC Category A Agents, February 2002.
104. "NIH Plans Bioterrorism Research," Associated Press, March 15, 2002; "MAID Unveils Bioterrorism Research Agenda," NIH Press Release, March 14, 2002, and Responding Through Research: The Counter-Bioterrorism-Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for CDC Category A Agents, February 2002.
105. "NIH Plans Bioterrorism Research," Associated Press, March 15, 2002; "MAID Unveils Bioterrorism Research Agenda," NIH Press Release, March 14, 2002, and Responding Through Research: The Counter-Bioterrorism-Research Agenda of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for CDC Category A Agents, February 2002.
106. • Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, Hearings, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1988, pp. 206, 284-287. • Bill Richards and Tim Carrington, "Military Science: Controversy Grows Over Pentagon's Work on Biological Agents. Army Says Work is Defensive, but Critics Fear Research Presages Germ Warfare. The Attraction of Big Money," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 1986. • Seth Shulman, "Funding for Biological Weapons Research Grows Amidst Controversy. Some Biologists Fear that Military Funding Will Skew Research Priorities," Bioscience 37:6 (June 1987):372-375. • Charles Piller, "Biological Warfare: Lethal Lies about Fatal Diseases," The Nation, October 3, 1988, pp. 271-274.
107. • Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, Hearings, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1988, pp. 206, 284-287. • Bill Richards and Tim Carrington, "Military Science: Controversy Grows Over Pentagon's Work on Biological Agents. Army Says Work is Defensive, but Critics Fear Research Presages Germ Warfare. The Attraction of Big Money," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 1986. • Seth Shulman, "Funding for Biological Weapons Research Grows Amidst Controversy. Some Biologists Fear that Military Funding Will Skew Research Priorities," Bioscience 37:6 (June 1987):372-375. • Charles Piller, "Biological Warfare: Lethal Lies about Fatal Diseases," The Nation, October 3, 1988, pp. 271-274.
108. • Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, Hearings, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1988, pp. 206, 284-287. • Bill Richards and Tim Carrington, "Military Science: Controversy Grows Over Pentagon's Work on Biological Agents. Army Says Work is Defensive, but Critics Fear Research Presages Germ Warfare. The Attraction of Big Money," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 1986. • Seth Shulman, "Funding for Biological Weapons Research Grows Amidst Controversy. Some Biologists Fear that Military Funding Will Skew Research Priorities," Bioscience 37:6 (June 1987):372-375. • Charles Piller, "Biological Warfare: Lethal Lies about Fatal Diseases," The Nation, October 3, 1988, pp. 271-274.
109. • Department of Defense Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, Hearings, Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1988, pp. 206, 284-287. • Bill Richards and Tim Carrington, "Military Science: Controversy Grows Over Pentagon's Work on Biological Agents. Army Says Work is Defensive, but Critics Fear Research Presages Germ Warfare. The Attraction of Big Money," Wall Street Journal, September 17, 1986. • Seth Shulman, "Funding for Biological Weapons Research Grows Amidst Controversy. Some Biologists Fear that Military Funding Will Skew Research Priorities," Bioscience 37:6 (June 1987):372-375. • Charles Piller, "Biological Warfare: Lethal Lies about Fatal Diseases," The Nation, October 3, 1988, pp. 271-274.
110. Wayne Biddle, "Proposed Installation Raises Questions," op. cit.
111. Melissa Hendricks, "Germ War: Designing Disease," Washington Post, January 1, 1989. (It is possible that memory of the large "Dugway sheep kill" in 1968, caused by an accident during open-air chemical tests, may also have contributed to safety concerns by members of the US Senate.)
112. Senator Sasser, Letter to Senator Mack Mattingly, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction. Cited in Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, " The U.S. Biological Defense Research Program in the 1980s: A Critique," p. 145, in Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1990.
113. Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, Gene Wars: Military Control Over the New Genetic Technologies (New York: William Morrow, 1988), p. 139.
114. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Subgroup on Army Biological Defense Research Program, Army Science Board, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, July 1987.
115. "Biological Warfare Testing," Joint Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, May 3, 1988. See also, "Preliminary Report of the Majority Staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management on DOD's Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, May 11, 1988 and United States General Accounting Office, "DOD's Risk Assessment and Safeguards Management of Chemical and Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities," Statement for the Record by Eleanor Chelimsky, before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO/T-PEMD-88-10, July 27, 1988.
116. "Biological Warfare Testing," Joint Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, May 3, 1988. See also, "Preliminary Report of the Majority Staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management on DOD's Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, May 11, 1988 and United States General Accounting Office, "DOD's Risk Assessment and Safeguards Management of Chemical and Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities," Statement for the Record by Eleanor Chelimsky, before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO/T-PEMD-88-10, July 27, 1988.
117. "Biological Warfare Testing," Joint Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, May 3, 1988. See also, "Preliminary Report of the Majority Staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management on DOD's Safety Programs for Chemical and Biological Warfare Research, May 11, 1988 and United States General Accounting Office, "DOD's Risk Assessment and Safeguards Management of Chemical and Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities," Statement for the Record by Eleanor Chelimsky, before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO/T-PEMD-88-10, July 27, 1988.
118. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Defends Germ War Test Facility; Critics See Possible Political Repercussions, Question Utility in Developing Defenses," Washington Post, May 4, 1988.
119. Piller and Yamamoto, Gene Wars, op. cit., pp. 129-138. See also Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race, op. cit., particularly chapters 5-8. These charges regarding the 1980-1986 US biodefense program were reiterated in April 2002 by Francis Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Indiana. He stated that he had read two of the old DOD contracts that had been given to researchers at the University of Indiana, and "They were clearly biological warfare contracts, and the tip-off on any of these contracts is they call for the development in the contract of an aerosol delivery device. That is how biological warfare agents are delivered, by air." Francis A. Boyle, "Faculty Lecture on Bio/Warfare/Terrorism/Weapons," Verbatim Transcript, April 18, 2002.
120. Piller and Yamamoto, Gene Wars, op. cit., pp. 129-138. See also Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race, op. cit., particularly chapters 5-8. These charges regarding the 1980-1986 US biodefense program were reiterated in April 2002 by Francis Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Indiana. He stated that he had read two of the old DOD contracts that had been given to researchers at the University of Indiana, and "They were clearly biological warfare contracts, and the tip-off on any of these contracts is they call for the development in the contract of an aerosol delivery device. That is how biological warfare agents are delivered, by air." Francis A. Boyle, "Faculty Lecture on Bio/Warfare/Terrorism/Weapons," Verbatim Transcript, April 18, 2002.
121. Piller and Yamamoto, Gene Wars, op. cit., pp. 129-138. See also Susan Wright, ed., Preventing a Biological Arms Race, op. cit., particularly chapters 5-8. These charges regarding the 1980-1986 US biodefense program were reiterated in April 2002 by Francis Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Indiana. He stated that he had read two of the old DOD contracts that had been given to researchers at the University of Indiana, and "They were clearly biological warfare contracts, and the tip-off on any of these contracts is they call for the development in the contract of an aerosol delivery device. That is how biological warfare agents are delivered, by air." Francis A. Boyle, "Faculty Lecture on Bio/Warfare/Terrorism/Weapons," Verbatim Transcript, April 18, 2002.
122. Col. David Huxsoll, Testimony, in Hearings: Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Committee on Government Affairs, US Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, May 1989, pp. 199-203.
123. Comment at conference in Washington, DC, July 2002.
124. Iris Hunger, "BWC Conference Fails: What Needs to be Done Next," INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 19, March 2002, pp. 7-10.
125. Gerald R. Thrush et al., "Immunotoxins: An Update," Annual Review of Immunology, vol 14 (1996):49-71.
126. Nicholas Wade, "Experts Dissect Last Layer of Anthrax Toxin," New York Times, April 2002. Identity of the funding agencies was ascertained from the publications of Liddington (lethal factor), Drum et al. (edema factor), and Collier and Young (toxin action).
127. S.D. Miller, "A Virus Induced Molecular Mimicry Model of Multiple Sclerosis," Abstracts of the 41st Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents, 2001. See also D.J. Theil, et al., "Viruses Can Silently Prime For and Trigger Central Nervous System Autoimmune Disease," Journal of Neurovirology, 7:3 (June 2001):220-227. This research used a recombinant vaccine virus as a nonspecific inducer of multiple scleroris.
128. S.D. Miller, "A Virus Induced Molecular Mimicry Model of Multiple Sclerosis," Abstracts of the 41st Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents, 2001. See also D.J. Theil, et al., "Viruses Can Silently Prime For and Trigger Central Nervous System Autoimmune Disease," Journal of Neurovirology, 7:3 (June 2001):220-227. This research used a recombinant vaccine virus as a nonspecific inducer of multiple scleroris.
129. Jon Cohen, "Longtime Rivalry Ends in Collaboration," Science, Vol. 295 (February 22, 2002), pp. 1441-1442.
130. Stephen Mihm, "Attaching Good Genes to Bad Viruses," New York Times, December 9, 2001.
131. A. Ramsey et al., "A Case for Cytokines as Effector Molecules in the Resolution of Virus Infection," Immunology Today, 14 (1993):155-157.
132. "Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and On Their Destruction," BWC/Conf.IV/4Add.1, November 21, 1996. Contribution by Sweden, p. 4.
133. Executive Summary, Solicitation Number DAAD 13-02-R-0016, US Army Robert Morris Acquisition Center (RMAC), 2002.
134. See the discussion in Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, CISSM, Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Paper #16, May 1996, pp. 69-79. The relevant material in that publication is not repeated here.
135. Personal communication, April 2002. In the case of three large subjects touched on in this paper - the Soviet BW program, the Iraqi BW program, and the general subject of verification, inspection, BW site signatures, and so on - I have not repeated material included in earlier publications.
136. Stephen Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control," Politics and the Life Sciences, (March 1999), p. 65. See also UNSCOM, Report: Disarmament, Report to the Security Council, January 25, 1999; Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London: Harper Collins, 1999; and Milton Leitenberg, "Deadly Unknowns About Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Asian Perspective, 24:1 (2000):217-223.
137. Stephen Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control," Politics and the Life Sciences, (March 1999), p. 65. See also UNSCOM, Report: Disarmament, Report to the Security Council, January 25, 1999; Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London: Harper Collins, 1999; and Milton Leitenberg, "Deadly Unknowns About Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Asian Perspective, 24:1 (2000):217-223.
138. Stephen Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control," Politics and the Life Sciences, (March 1999), p. 65. See also UNSCOM, Report: Disarmament, Report to the Security Council, January 25, 1999; Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London: Harper Collins, 1999; and Milton Leitenberg, "Deadly Unknowns About Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Asian Perspective, 24:1 (2000):217-223.
139. Stephen Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Control," Politics and the Life Sciences, (March 1999), p. 65. See also UNSCOM, Report: Disarmament, Report to the Security Council, January 25, 1999; Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London: Harper Collins, 1999; and Milton Leitenberg, "Deadly Unknowns About Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Asian Perspective, 24:1 (2000):217-223.
140. Black, "UNSCOM and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program," op. cit., p. 64.
141. Milton Leitenberg, 'The Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities to Peaceful Uses," in SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies, Vol. 15, Control of Dual Threat Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme, ed. Erhard Geissler and John P. Woodall, Stockholm, 1994, pp. 77-105.
142. Personal communications, April 2002.
143. Ken Alibek, quoted in Miller at al, Germs, 2001, p. 310.
144. "Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks," GAO-NSIAD-00-138, April 28, 2000, US General Accounting Office, Washington, DC.
145. Judith Miller and William J. Broad, Bioweapons in Mind, Iranians Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists," New York Times, December 8, 1998.
146. Excellent reviews of the relevant technical advances are found in the series of Background Papers on "Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the (BWC) Convention..." which have been submitted by member states at success BWC Review Conferences. See, for example, • BWC/CONF.I/5, February 8, 1980; • BWC/CONF.I/6, February 29, 1980; • BWC/CONF.IV/4, October 30, 1996; • BWC/CONF.IV/4/Add.1, November 21, 1996; • BWC/CONF.IV/4/Add.2, November 25, 1996; • BWC/CONF.V/4/Add. 1, October 26, 2001; • BWC/CONF.V/7, November 15, 2001.