Gender Differences in Public Attitudes toward the Use of Force by the United States, 1990-2003

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 110-141

  Eichenberg, Richard C ^a  

^a TUFTS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0141725853     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228803322427992     Document Type: Review

References (75)

1. Virginia Sapiro and Pamela Johnston Conover, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 4 (November 1993), pp. 1079-1099 at p. 1095.
2. Alexandra Marks, "Gender Gap Narrows over Kosovo," Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 1999, p. 1.
3. Council on Foreign Relations, press release, November 1, 2001, http://www.cfr.org/Public/ media/pressreleases_110101a.html.
4. Sapiro and Conover, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War"; and Lisa Brandes, "Public Opinion, International Security Policy, and Gender: The United States and Great Britain since 1945," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1994.
5. Sapiro and Conover, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War"; and Lisa Brandes, "Public Opinion, International Security Policy, and Gender: The United States and Great Britain since 1945," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1994.
6. Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 172.
7. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973).
8. Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Autumn 1976), pp. 411-423
9. Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 49-74; and Bruce W. Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1998), pp. 395-417.
10. Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 49-74; and Bruce W. Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1998), pp. 395-417.
11. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," p. 50; and Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent," p. 400.
12. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," p. 50; and Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent," p. 400.
13. Ibid., pp. 399-400.
14. Quoted in Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," pp. 53-54 The original quotation appears in C.D.B. Bryan, "Operation Desert Norm: Getting to Know the General," New Republic, March 11, 1991, p. 25.
15. Quoted in Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," pp. 53-54 The original quotation appears in C.D.B. Bryan, "Operation Desert Norm: Getting to Know the General," New Republic, March 11, 1991, p. 25.
16. Ibid., especially pp. 58, 71.
17. Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996).
18. Ibid., chap. 4. Larson draws heavily on the broader theoretical and research contributions reported in John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
19. Ibid., chap. 4. Larson draws heavily on the broader theoretical and research contributions reported in John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
20. Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent," pp. 408-414.
21. Another study finds that presidential approval actually increased slightly after the U.S. military suffered casualties during the use of force between 1933 and 1992. See Richard J. Stoll, "Rules of Engagement? Disputes, Casualties, and Support for the President, 1933-1992," Rice University, 2002.
22. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990).
23. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, The Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990).
24. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, does study some surveys on casualties, but there is no systematic comparison across all historical cases of the sort that I mention in the text.
25. There are a number of additional studies subsequent to those of Jentleson and Larson that confirm their results. For additional analysis of the Lebanon, Persian Gulf, and Somali cases, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 205-228; and James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 53-78. For two studies that begin by arguing that the casualties hypothesis is "to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy; politicians use it as an alibi to avoid taking their responsibilities seriously," but that appear to conclude that public opinion is in fact quite sensitive to casualties, see Philip Everts, "Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 177-194; and Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259. Finally, Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi argue forcefully on the basis of their own public opinion survey that "success" is the truly decisive factor that underlies public support. See Feaver and Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B03.
26. There are a number of additional studies subsequent to those of Jentleson and Larson that confirm their results. For additional analysis of the Lebanon, Persian Gulf, and Somali cases, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 205-228; and James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 53-78. For two studies that begin by arguing that the casualties hypothesis is "to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy; politicians use it as an alibi to avoid taking their responsibilities seriously," but that appear to conclude that public opinion is in fact quite sensitive to casualties, see Philip Everts, "Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 177-194; and Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259. Finally, Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi argue forcefully on the basis of their own public opinion survey that "success" is the truly decisive factor that underlies public support. See Feaver and Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B03.
27. There are a number of additional studies subsequent to those of Jentleson and Larson that confirm their results. For additional analysis of the Lebanon, Persian Gulf, and Somali cases, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 205-228; and James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 53-78. For two studies that begin by arguing that the casualties hypothesis is "to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy; politicians use it as an alibi to avoid taking their responsibilities seriously," but that appear to conclude that public opinion is in fact quite sensitive to casualties, see Philip Everts, "Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 177-194; and Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259. Finally, Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi argue forcefully on the basis of their own public opinion survey that "success" is the truly decisive factor that underlies public support. See Feaver and Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B03.
28. There are a number of additional studies subsequent to those of Jentleson and Larson that confirm their results. For additional analysis of the Lebanon, Persian Gulf, and Somali cases, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 205-228; and James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 53-78. For two studies that begin by arguing that the casualties hypothesis is "to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy; politicians use it as an alibi to avoid taking their responsibilities seriously," but that appear to conclude that public opinion is in fact quite sensitive to casualties, see Philip Everts, "Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 177-194; and Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259. Finally, Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi argue forcefully on the basis of their own public opinion survey that "success" is the truly decisive factor that underlies public support. See Feaver and Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B03.
29. There are a number of additional studies subsequent to those of Jentleson and Larson that confirm their results. For additional analysis of the Lebanon, Persian Gulf, and Somali cases, see Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "The Myth of the Reactive Public: American Public Attitudes on Military Fatalities in the Post-Cold War Period," in Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 205-228; and James Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 53-78. For two studies that begin by arguing that the casualties hypothesis is "to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy; politicians use it as an alibi to avoid taking their responsibilities seriously," but that appear to conclude that public opinion is in fact quite sensitive to casualties, see Philip Everts, "Public Opinion after the Cold War: A Paradigm Shift," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., Decision-making in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 177-194; and Philip Everts, "War without Bloodshed? Public Opinion and the Conflict over Kosovo," in Everts and Isernia, Public Opinion and the International Use of Force, pp. 229-259. Finally, Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi argue forcefully on the basis of their own public opinion survey that "success" is the truly decisive factor that underlies public support. See Feaver and Gelpi, "How Many Deaths Are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer," Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B03.
30. For reviews of data and a vast literature, see Karen M. Kaufman and John R. Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 864-887; and Virginia Sapiro, "Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research," in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert L. Jervis, eds., Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
31. For reviews of data and a vast literature, see Karen M. Kaufman and John R. Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 864-887; and Virginia Sapiro, "Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research," in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert L. Jervis, eds., Handbook of Political Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
32. Robert Y. Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 42-61; and Thomas Smith, "The Polls: Gender and Attitudes toward Violence," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 384-396.
33. Robert Y. Shapiro and Harpreet Mahajan, "Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 42-61; and Thomas Smith, "The Polls: Gender and Attitudes toward Violence," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 384-396.
34. Brandes, "Public Opinion, International Security Policy, and Gender."
35. Ibid., pp. 99-154.
36. Ibid.; and Sapiro and Conover, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War."
37. Ibid.; and Sapiro and Conover, "Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War."
38. Clyde Wilcox, Joseph Ferrara, and Dee Alsop, "Group Differences in Early Support for Military Action in the Gulf: The Effects of Gender, Generation, and Ethnicity," American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 343-359. The "costs" of a possible war were measured by asking if "the death of American soldiers in a fight with Iraq is too high a price to pay."
39. It is difficult to make an exact comparison, given the differences in question wordings employed during the Vietnam and Gulf Wars, but the aggregate numbers do suggest that gender polarization was higher during the Gulf War. For a wealth of data, see Brandes, "Public Opinion, International Security Policy, and Gender," pp. 99-155.
40. David Fite, Marc Genese, and Clyde Wilcox, "Gender Differences in Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Longitudinal Analysis," American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (October 1990), pp. 492-513.
41. The last survey on the prospect of initiating a war against Iraq occurred on March 17, 2003 - three days before hostilities began. In the concluding section, I review surveys on the war that were conducted through May 30, 2003. For full case summaries of the episodes studied here, see Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public"; Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent"; and the analytical histories provided in Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 1-30.
42. The last survey on the prospect of initiating a war against Iraq occurred on March 17, 2003 - three days before hostilities began. In the concluding section, I review surveys on the war that were conducted through May 30, 2003. For full case summaries of the episodes studied here, see Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public"; Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent"; and the analytical histories provided in Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 1-30.
43. The last survey on the prospect of initiating a war against Iraq occurred on March 17, 2003 - three days before hostilities began. In the concluding section, I review surveys on the war that were conducted through May 30, 2003. For full case summaries of the episodes studied here, see Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public"; Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent"; and the analytical histories provided in Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 1-30.
44. The signal works are James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Mood, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999); and Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. The same philosophy is also evident in the following works: Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 211-247; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
45. The signal works are James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Mood, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999); and Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. The same philosophy is also evident in the following works: Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 211-247; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
46. The signal works are James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Mood, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999); and Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. The same philosophy is also evident in the following works: Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 211-247; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
47. The signal works are James A. Stimson, Public Opinion in America: Mood, Cycles, and Swings (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999); and Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. The same philosophy is also evident in the following works: Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 211-247; and Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
48. I include only nationally representative probability samples of the entire population (thus excluding surveys of likely or registered voters or segmented polls of particular population subgroups). The average sample size is 989. The largest number of gender breakdowns came from the IPOLL database available to members of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut (and also available via Lexis-Nexis). In addition, I retrieved original survey responses and tabulated gender breakdowns from archives at the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of North Carolina; the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research; the Pew Center for the People and the Press; and the Program on International Policy Attitudes. Gallup surveys on the Persian Gulf War are taken from John Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). These are supplemented by gender breakdowns available in monthly and yearly Gallup publications.
49. As further described below, these military actions include air/missile strikes/bombing; war/all-out conflict; military force/action (general); providing/sending of arms; sending of troops abroad; and keeping/maintaining troops abroad.
50. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," pp. 54-55; and Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent," p. 400.
51. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public," pp. 54-55; and Jentleson, "Still Pretty Prudent," p. 400.
52. Survey by CBS/New York Times, December 13-17, 1998.
53. There is a fairly standard sequence in survey questionnaires on the potential or actual uses of military force. Generally, survey organizations ask about (1) attention to the matter; (2) approval of the president's "handling" of the situation; (3) approval of the action itself (e.g., "air strikes" or "sending troops"); and (4) occasionally about approval if casualties would be suffered (including the "worth it" question discussed here). For an analysis that supports my argument that the "worth it" question is tied to military actions through questionnaire effects, see John Zaller and Stanley Feldman, "A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions versus Revealing Preferences," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 36, No. 3 (August 1992), pp. 579-616.
54. For example, there were fifty-eight survey questions during the war over Kosovo concerning approval of air strikes, deployment of ground troops, and deployment of peacekeepers. None of these questions inquired of the risk of casualties within the active question itself, although some news organizations did ask the "worth it" question separately.
55. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence,: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982-83), p. 309.
56. Concerning the long confrontation with Iraq from 1992 through the prewar period in 2003, the support levels and gender differences reported in Table 2 are very stable. In the concluding section, I return to the question of any recent change in opinion on using force against Iraq, especially after September 11, 2001; during and after the debate in the U.S. Congress and the United Nations in late 2002 and early 2003; and after the beginning of the war against Iraq on March 20, 2003.
57. I accomplished this by classifying only two types of action as true "peacekeeping operations." The first is mention of sending peacekeepers when there is no suggestion that these forces would participate in an internal conflict or assist one side in an internal conflict. The second involves questions about military actions to protect peacekeepers or facilitate their evacuation, but again only if there is no suggestion that the forces would participate in the conflict by assisting one party in the conflict.
58. My criteria for classifying surveys into these four categories are described in Richard C. Eichenberg, "The Gender Gap and National Security in the United States: Dynamics and Correlates of Public Opinion on Defense Spending and the Use of Military Force," paper presented to the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 24-27, 2002.
59. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this line of analysis.
60. An interesting starting point might be the survey sponsored by the Center for Gender Equality, The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on Women, conducted during November 2001. The survey showed widespread knowledge among American women of the situation of women in Afghanistan. The results of the survey can be found at http://www. Greenbergresearch.com/publications/press_releases/pr_centerforgenderequality. pdf.
61. Not surprisingly, mention of the word "war" occurs, with a single exception, only in surveys on the Gulf War; Iraq, 1992-2003; and North Korea. The exception is a single poll on "winning the war" against Serbia in 1999.
62. It also seems plausible that the consistently low levels of support for using force against North Korea are related to the large number of casualties suffered during the Korean War.
63. Larson, Casualties and Consensus, pp. 112-120.
64. There is evidence that support for the Somali operation began to decline early in the summer of 1993 in response to the death of UN peacekeepers, but this merely adjusts the timing of the pattern reported here; it does not change it. For detailed analysis of the Somalia case, see ibid.; and Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia."
65. There is evidence that support for the Somali operation began to decline early in the summer of 1993 in response to the death of UN peacekeepers, but this merely adjusts the timing of the pattern reported here; it does not change it. For detailed analysis of the Somalia case, see ibid.; and Burk, "Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia."
66. Readers with a statistical bent will recognize these figures as the parameters from a multiple regression analysis containing all of the factors (variables) listed in the table. Because the variables take the values of 1 and 0 (indicating the presence or absence of a particular question wording), they are readily interpretable as the percentage change in opinion due to the presence of a particular wording. Based on previous analysis, only those factors that are statistically significant are reported in the table. The baseline average is the constant in the regression.
67. Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men"; and Sapiro, "Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research."
68. Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men"; and Sapiro, "Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research."
69. The generalizations presented in this paragraph represent a synthesis of Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 78-91; Benjamin I. Page and Richard Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1972), pp. 979-995; John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 123-141; and Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men."
70. The generalizations presented in this paragraph represent a synthesis of Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 78-91; Benjamin I. Page and Richard Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1972), pp. 979-995; John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 123-141; and Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men."
71. The generalizations presented in this paragraph represent a synthesis of Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 78-91; Benjamin I. Page and Richard Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1972), pp. 979-995; John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 123-141; and Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men."
72. The generalizations presented in this paragraph represent a synthesis of Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 78-91; Benjamin I. Page and Richard Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 1972), pp. 979-995; John H. Aldrich, Eugene Borgida, and John L. Sullivan, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting," American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1989), pp. 123-141; and Kaufman and Petrocik, "The Changing Politics of American Men."
73. Although the analysis above suggests that, should the perception of success in the war against terror gradually erode, it could reduce public support and/or increase gender polarization, which could be electorally significant. Further, should the war against terror lead to sustained involvement in internal conflicts, support among men and women would likely decline.
74. Support for using force against Iraq averaged 66 percent among men and 57 percent among women between September 11, 2001 and March 17, 2003. Between August 1, 2002, and March 17, 2003, support averaged 62 percent among men and 52 percent among women. These figures are 6 to 10 percentage points lower than the support levels for the entire period of confrontation with Iraq that are reported in Table 5.
75. The observations in this paragraph are based on polling through May 30, 2003. Overall support is the average in four major surveys: Gallup, ABC/Washington Post, CBS/New York Times, and Pew Center for the People and the Press, all reported at http://www.pollingreport. com/iraq. The question that asks whether the war is "worth the cost" in human lives is reported at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/03/28/opinion/polls/main546585.shtml. A Time/CNN poll of March 27, 2003, suggested that support for the war could drop below a majority if 1,000 casualties were suffered: "American Opinion on the War," Time, April 7, 2003, p. 40.