Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 109, Issue 1-4, 2002, Pages 229-264

  van Aarle, Bas ^a   Engwerda, Jacob ^b   Plasmans, Joseph ^c  

^a RADBOUD UNIVERSITY NIJMEGEN   (Netherlands)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP   (Belgium)

Author keywords

EMU; Full and partial cooperation; LQ dynamic game; Stabilisation policies

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141682357     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016308420460     Document Type: Article

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