The human face of self-interest

Journal of Business Ethics

Volumn 38, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 3-17

  Maitland, Ian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0141627394     PISSN: 01674544     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015716928549     Document Type: Article

References (101)

1. Stephen Holmes, "The secret history of self-interest." In Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 269. Michael Novak says that "[l]ike prudence in Aristotelian thought, self-interest in democratic capitalist thought has an inferior reputation among moralists… " The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: American Enterprise Institute/Simon & Schuster, 1991 (1982)), p. 93. It is of course not just moralists who deprecate self-interest. Self-interest has attracted a long and formidable roster of foes including the medieval church, romantics, humanists, nationalists, feminists, communitarians, communists, neo-Aristotelians, civic republicans, Tories, socialists, German National Socialists, Italian Fascists, neo-conservatives, and other too numerous to list. With enemies like these, who needs friends?
2. Stephen Holmes, "The secret history of self-interest." In Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 269. Michael Novak says that "[l]ike prudence in Aristotelian thought, self-interest in democratic capitalist thought has an inferior reputation among moralists… " The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: American Enterprise Institute/Simon & Schuster, 1991 (1982)), p. 93. It is of course not just moralists who deprecate self-interest. Self-interest has attracted a long and formidable roster of foes including the medieval church, romantics, humanists, nationalists, feminists, communitarians, communists, neo-Aristotelians, civic republicans, Tories, socialists, German National Socialists, Italian Fascists, neo-conservatives, and other too numerous to list. With enemies like these, who needs friends?
3. Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. xi.
4. Kelly Rogers, "Beyond self and other." In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 1. This section is heavily indebted to Kelly Rogers' delightful essay and the others in the same volume.
5. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 53.
6. Jean Hampton, "The wisdom of the egoist: The moral and political implications of valuing the self." In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 21.
7. Thomas Hill, Jr. "Reasonable self-interest." In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 52.
8. "For a single man on a desert island, moral reasoning would be unnecessary and pointless, except on the assumption that he is in interaction with persons beyond his island, whether men or gods." Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged version (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 110-111. Quoted in Kelly Rogers, "Beyond self and other," in Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.), Self-Interest, op. cit.
9. "For a single man on a desert island, moral reasoning would be unnecessary and pointless, except on the assumption that he is in interaction with persons beyond his island, whether men or gods." Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View, abridged version (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 110-111. Quoted in Kelly Rogers, "Beyond self and other," in Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.), Self-Interest, op. cit.
10. Kelly Rogers, "Beyond self and other," p. 14.
11. Id., p. 15.
12. The term is borrowed from Holmes's "The secret history of self-interest," in Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
13. Norman E. Bowie, "Challenging the egoistic paradigm," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1 (1991), p. 3.
14. Rogers, "Beyond self and others," p. 20.
15. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 53.
16. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) Section II, chapter II.
17. Rogers, "Beyond self and other," p. 6.
18. Ibid. Id.
19. Jean Hampton, "The wisdom of the egoist." In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 48.
20. Id., p. 49.
21. Ronald Green, "Jewish ethics and beneficence." In Earl E. Shelp (ed.), Beneficence and Health Care (Dordrecht, Holland & Boston: Reidel, 1982), p. 112.
22. Roland N. McKean, "Economics of trust, altruism, and corporate responsibility." In E. S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), p. 30.
23. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 61.
24. David Schmidtz, "Self-interest: What's in it for me?" In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 110.
25. This is consistent with the first definition of selfishness offered by the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1964), viz., "deficien[cy] in consideration for others."
26. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 16. Quoted by David Schmidtz, "Reasons for altruism," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 10, no. 1 (1993), p. 56.
27. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 16. Quoted by David Schmidtz, "Reasons for altruism," Social Philosophy & Policy, vol. 10, no. 1 (1993), p. 56.
28. Christopher Jencks, "Varieties of altruism." In Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 55.
29. David Schmidtz, "Self-interest: What's in it for me?" In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 110.
30. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Part I, section I, chapter I.
31. Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (New York: American Enterprise Institute/Simon & Schuster, 1991 (1982)), p. 93.
32. David Schmidtz, "Reasons for altruism," Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 10, no. 1 (1993), p. 57.
33. Michael Stocker, "The schizophrenia of modern ethical theories," Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73 (1976), p. 457.
34. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), vol. I, chapter 2.
35. This is, of course, a paraphrase of Adam Smith. SEE Wealth of Nations, Book 4, chapter 2.
36. John Gray, The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1992).
37. Adam Potkay, The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 149. The classic discussion is Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). The crucial importance of trust in a capitalist civilization is a commonplace, e.g., "Unwritten agreements and trust (that is, confidence in each other's voluntary compliance) eventually played pervasive roles in business and social intercourse. Written contracts in business hit only the highspots of agreements…. It would be extremely expensive to pin down in writing every aspect of an agreement…. Competition for repeat customers makes much dishonesty unprofitable in the private sector, of course…. The idea of a private enterprise, market exchange system is almost absurd unless there is a good deal of mutual trust." (Roland McKean, "Economics of trust, altruism, and corporate responsibility." In E. S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), pp. 30, 31).
38. Adam Potkay, The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 149. The classic discussion is Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). The crucial importance of trust in a capitalist civilization is a commonplace, e.g., "Unwritten agreements and trust (that is, confidence in each other's voluntary compliance) eventually played pervasive roles in business and social intercourse. Written contracts in business hit only the highspots of agreements…. It would be extremely expensive to pin down in writing every aspect of an agreement…. Competition for repeat customers makes much dishonesty unprofitable in the private sector, of course…. The idea of a private enterprise, market exchange system is almost absurd unless there is a good deal of mutual trust." (Roland McKean, "Economics of trust, altruism, and corporate responsibility." In E. S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), pp. 30, 31).
39. Adam Potkay, The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 149. The classic discussion is Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). The crucial importance of trust in a capitalist civilization is a commonplace, e.g., "Unwritten agreements and trust (that is, confidence in each other's voluntary compliance) eventually played pervasive roles in business and social intercourse. Written contracts in business hit only the highspots of agreements…. It would be extremely expensive to pin down in writing every aspect of an agreement…. Competition for repeat customers makes much dishonesty unprofitable in the private sector, of course…. The idea of a private enterprise, market exchange system is almost absurd unless there is a good deal of mutual trust." (Roland McKean, "Economics of trust, altruism, and corporate responsibility." In E. S. Phelps (ed.), Altruism, Morality, and Economic Theory (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), pp. 30, 31).
40. Michael Novak, Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, pp. 92-93.
41. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 250-251.
42. One representative finding comes from Robert Lane: "[T]hose lacking this supporting friendship network are not those most exposed to the market but marginal people who have failed in the market…. " Robert E. Lane, "Market choice and human choice." In John W. Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, Markets and Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1989), p. 235.
43. Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), p. 191.
44. SEE, e.g., Jon Elster, "Selfishness and altruism." In Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 51.
45. Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason, p. 196.
46. Id., p. 253.
47. It is no less plausible to hypothesize that natural selection favors some degree and type of self-interest. The point is that it is inconceivable that natural selection favors unrestrained or sociopathic self-interest. SEE for an excellent discussion of this point Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). Bill Frederick has kindly drawn my attention to the intersection of these ideas with work in evolutionary psychology. SEE, especially, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "The psychological foundations of culture," and "Cognitive adaptations for social exchange." In Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
48. It is no less plausible to hypothesize that natural selection favors some degree and type of self-interest. The point is that it is inconceivable that natural selection favors unrestrained or sociopathic self-interest. SEE for an excellent discussion of this point Gregory S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). Bill Frederick has kindly drawn my attention to the intersection of these ideas with work in evolutionary psychology. SEE, especially, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, "The psychological foundations of culture," and "Cognitive adaptations for social exchange." In Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
49. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I, section I, chapter I.
50. Robert Lekachman, "Is there virtue in profit?" Harper's Magazine, December 1986, p. 42.
51. Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 295.
52. Robert E. Goodin, Political Theory and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), chapter 6.
53. Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), passim.
54. Norman E. Bowie, "The firm as a moral community." In Richard M. Coughlin (ed.), Morality, Rationality, and Efficiency: New Perspectives on Socio-Economics 1990 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc. 1991), p. 178.
55. John Gray, The Moral Foundations of Market Institutions (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1992), p. 79.
56. Robert E. Lane, The Market Experience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 268.
57. Id., p. 405.
58. Id., p. 102.
59. Id., p. 405.
60. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Part I, section III, chapter II.
61. Robert N. Bellah et al., The Good Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p. 49
62. Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper?: Social Science and Moral Obligation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 96.
63. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995), pp. 95-96.
64. Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 21-22.
65. Kelly Rogers, "Beyond self and other." In Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul (eds.), Self-Interest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 17.
66. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 198.
67. Id., p. 188.
68. Robert E. Lane, The Market Experience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 397.
69. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 190.
70. Ibid. Id.
71. See Lane, Market Experience, pp. 397, 403.
72. Eric Mack, "Dominos and fear of commodification." In John W. Chapman and J. Roland Pennock, Markets and Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1989), p. 215.
73. Lane, Market Experience, p. 403.
74. Will Kymlicka," Liberal individualism & liberal neutrality," Ethics, vol. 99 (July 1989), p. 888, n. 13.
75. Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Baba Kamma 85a, cited by Ronald Green, "Guiding principles of Jewish ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 7 (1997), p. 23.
76. Lane, Market Experience, p. 396.
77. Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence, p. 110. John Boatright takes Solomon to task on this point. See "Aristotle meets Wall Street: The case for virtue ethics in business," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 5 (1995), pp. 353-359.
78. Robert C. Solomon, Ethics and Excellence, p. 110. John Boatright takes Solomon to task on this point. See "Aristotle meets Wall Street: The case for virtue ethics in business," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 5 (1995), pp. 353-359.
79. Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the communitarian critique of liberalism," Ethics, vol. 99 (July 1989), p. 859.
80. Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. viii.
81. Id., p. 285.
82. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 253.
83. Benjamin Barber, The Logic and Limits of Trust (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984), p. 75.
84. Norman E. Bowie, "Challenging the egoistic paradigm," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1 (1991), pp. 11-12.
85. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 139.
86. Ibid. Id.
87. Id., p. 127.
88. Id., p. 126.
89. Federalist No. 57.
90. Federalist No. 51.
91. Ibid. Id.
92. None of this, of course, implies that the framers "assumed the worst" about human beings - Norman Bowie and R. Edward Freeman's charge against economists - any more than building prisons assumes the worst about the citizenry or locking one's door reflects a judgment about one's neighbors' kleptomania. Such acts make no statement about the propensities of human beings in general, though no doubt they do tell us about the propensities of some (possibly minuscule) minority. What David Hume said about designing the institutions of government applies equally well to economic institutions: "[in] contriving any system of government, and fixing the checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good…. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact." (Cited in Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 134). SEE Norman E. Bowie and R. Edward Freeman, "Ethics and agency theory: An introduction," in Bowie and Freeman (eds.), Ethics and Agency Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 4.
93. None of this, of course, implies that the framers "assumed the worst" about human beings - Norman Bowie and R. Edward Freeman's charge against economists - any more than building prisons assumes the worst about the citizenry or locking one's door reflects a judgment about one's neighbors' kleptomania. Such acts make no statement about the propensities of human beings in general, though no doubt they do tell us about the propensities of some (possibly minuscule) minority. What David Hume said about designing the institutions of government applies equally well to economic institutions: "[in] contriving any system of government, and fixing the checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-operate to public good…. It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact." (Cited in Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 134). SEE Norman E. Bowie and R. Edward Freeman, "Ethics and agency theory: An introduction," in Bowie and Freeman (eds.), Ethics and Agency Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 4.
94. Norman E. Bowie, "Challenging the egoistic paradigm," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1 (1991), p. 1.
95. Robert C. Solomon, "The moral psychology of business: Care and compassion in the corporation," Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 8, Issue 3 (1998), p. 530.
96. Stephen Macedo, "Community, diversity, and civic education," in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Jeffrey Paul, The Communitarian Challenge to Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 259.
97. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p. 89.
98. Susan Wolf, "Moral saints," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982), pp. 424 & 433.
99. Adam Potkay, The Passion for Happiness: Samuel Johnson and David Hume (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 103.
100. Bernard Williams, "Persons, character and morality." In Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 214. Quoted by Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982), p. 430.
101. Bernard Williams, "Persons, character and morality." In Amelie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 214. Quoted by Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79 (1982), p. 430.