The gift exchange in the social networks of Silicon Valley

California Management Review

Volumn 45, Issue 4, 2003, Pages

  Ferrary, Michel ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0141537359     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41166191     Document Type: Review

References (91)

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70. For Jewish diamond dealers, see J.S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal of Sociology, 94 (supplement, 1988): 95-120. For the Chinese, see Granovetter (1985), op. cit. For Arab merchants, see C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A Middle Rung in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10 (1962): 240-263. For Parisian breweries, see Ferrary (1999), op. cit.
71. For Jewish diamond dealers, see J.S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal of Sociology, 94 (supplement, 1988): 95-120. For the Chinese, see Granovetter (1985), op. cit. For Arab merchants, see C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A Middle Rung in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10 (1962): 240-263. For Parisian breweries, see Ferrary (1999), op. cit.
72. For Jewish diamond dealers, see J.S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal of Sociology, 94 (supplement, 1988): 95-120. For the Chinese, see Granovetter (1985), op. cit. For Arab merchants, see C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A Middle Rung in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10 (1962): 240-263. For Parisian breweries, see Ferrary (1999), op. cit.
73. For Jewish diamond dealers, see J.S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," American Journal of Sociology, 94 (supplement, 1988): 95-120. For the Chinese, see Granovetter (1985), op. cit. For Arab merchants, see C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A Middle Rung in Development," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 10 (1962): 240-263. For Parisian breweries, see Ferrary (1999), op. cit.
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83. The example of Glen Mueller, an associate of the venture capitalist firm Mayfield Fund, can illustrate this social sanction mechanism. In the early 1990s, he financed Jim Clark, the professor from Stanford who created the firm Silicon Graphics. Taking advantage of the entrepreneur's inexperience, the venture capitalist obtained a larger than standard share of the company's capital. When the firm went public, the venture capitalist was the only one who really increased his wealth. Jim Clark then created another firm, Netscape, and refused to be financed by Glen Mueller. Also, Jim Clark, a recognized figure within Silicon Valley, outlined the greediness of venture capitalists (it is he who in a book popularized the term "vulture capitalist"). The consequences for Glen Mueller proved enormous. On one hand, several entrepreneurs refused to be financed through the Mayfield Fund and his associates reprimanded him for not having invested in Netscape, which seemed to be a promising firm. On April 4, 1994, when Netscape was officially created, Glen Mueller committed suicide [D. Kaplan, The Silicon Boys and Their Valley of Dreams (New York, NY: William Morrow, 1999), p. 243]; this was a direct result of his rejection from the social networks of Silicon Valley which satisfied his economic, social, and psychological needs.
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