First person epistemology

Philosophy

Volumn 74, Issue 290, 1999, Pages 475-497

  Stevenson, Leslie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141535912     PISSN: 00318191     EISSN: 1469817X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0031819199000637     Document Type: Review

References (28)

1. K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge Oxford University Press, 1972), Ch. 3 'Epistemology without a Knowing Subject'
2. C. J. G. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992), Chs 1 and 2
3. C. J. G. Wright, Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), Ch. 5 'Anti-realism and Timeless Truth
4. G. E. Moore, Selected Writings, T. Baldwin (ed.) (London: Routledge, 1993), Ch. 12 'Moore's Paradox'
5. J. L. Austin, 'Other Minds', Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, supplementary Volume XX (1946)
6. Logic and Language, Second Series, A. Flew (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953)
7. 'Towards a General Theory of Infelicities and Implications', forthcoming in Philosophical Inquiry
8. R. Audi, Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge (London: Routledge, 1998), Ch. 8
9. A. I. Goldman, 'Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 73/20, (1976), 771-91
10. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986)
11. E. Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford University Press 1990)
12. R. B. Brandom, 'Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism', The Monist, Vol. 81 (1998), 371-392
13. J. L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (London: Hutchinson. 1987), 137-8
14. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 289
15. 'Why Believe what People Say?', Synthese, 94, No. 3 (March, 1993), 429-51
16. A. I. Goldman, 'Strong and Weak Justification', in Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, Epistemology, J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1989), 51-69
17. Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches, P. K. Moser and A. vander Nat (eds) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition 1995)
18. W. P. Alston, 'Concepts of Epistemic Justification', The Monist, 68 (1985), 57-89.
19. D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: University of Chicago Press, 2nd edition, 1991), Ch. I
20. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971) 9
21. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1912), end of Ch. II
22. N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), Ch. III.2
23. J. Rawls, 'The Independence of Moral Theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47 (1974), 5-22
24. N. Daniels, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. (Cambridge University Press, 1996), Ch. 1
25. S. Stich, 'Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity', Synthese 74 (1988), 391-413
26. F. Nietzche, Beyond Good and Evil, (1886), translated by R. J. Hollingdale, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973)
27. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), translated by N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A761/B789
28. O.O'Neill, 'Vindicating Reason', in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, P. Guyer (ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 280-308