International relations theory and the second Korean war

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 301-324

  Kang, David C ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; GEOPOLITICS; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; WAR;

KOREA;

EID: 0141483747     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2478.4703001     Document Type: Article

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