Wayne, horwich, and evidential diversity

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 63, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 652-660

  Fitelson, Branden ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043271199     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/289982     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. Fitelson, B. (in preparation), "Independent Evidence and Relevance Measures of Confirmation", unpublished manuscript.
2. Forster, M. (1995), "Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist's Approach to Confirmation", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46:399-424.
3. Gaifman, H. (1985), "On Inductive Support and Some Recent Tricks", Erkenntnis 22:5-21.
4. Gillies, D. (1986), "In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument", Philosophy of Science 53:110-113.
5. Horwich, P. (1982), Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. _ "Wittgensteinian Bayesianism", in French et al. (ed.). Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XVIII: Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 62-77.
7. Popper, K. (1992), The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Routledge.
8. Rosenkrantz, R. (1979), Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability, Ridgeview.
9. Sober, E. (1994), "No Model, No Inference: A Bayesian Primer on the Grue Problem", in Stalker (ed.). Gruel: The New Problem of Induction. Open Court.
10. Wayne, A. (1995), "Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence", Philosophy of Science 62:111-121.