Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 489-502

  Kaplan, Todd R ^a   Wettstein, David ^a  

^a BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Cost sharing; D51; D61; D78; Increasing returns to scale; Marginal cost pricing equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043233766     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00068-8     Document Type: Article

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