International trade in narcotic drugs

Futures

Volumn 29, Issue 7, 1997, Pages 605-616

  Akiba, Okon ^a  

^a YORK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DRUGS TRADE; LEGAL REFORM; SECURITY;

EID: 0043225193     PISSN: 00163287     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0016-3287(97)00036-0     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. An estimated 13 million Americans use illegal drugs on a consistent basis; this number is however a decline of about 50% in the number of drug users, which was 25 million in 1979. The United States Government spends about dollar;67 billion each year on drug-related problems, particularly in the areas of health, rehabilitation, and criminal prosecution. It is estimated that consumer spending on drugs in the United States alone exceeds the combined GDPs of 80 developing countries. For these see, Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy, 1997. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 9-27.
2. See Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Policy trend and directions. Uniform Crime Reports. US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 2.
3. Although estimates vary slightly from year to year, an idea of the scale of operations and range of profits from drug trade can be gleaned from United Nations' data, see United Nations, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1995, p. 85. The only other business with profits exceeding the drug trade involves arms sales, and many drug entrepreneurs are beginning to invest in this market, see United Nations Chronicle, June 1997, p. 16.
4. Although estimates vary slightly from year to year, an idea of the scale of operations and range of profits from drug trade can be gleaned from United Nations' data, see United Nations, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalization. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1995, p. 85. The only other business with profits exceeding the drug trade involves arms sales, and many drug entrepreneurs are beginning to invest in this market, see United Nations Chronicle, June 1997, p. 16.
5. US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report No. 10246. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 22-23.
6. See Shenk, J. W., Why you may hate drugs and still want to legalize them. The Washington Monthly, 1995, 27(10), 35.
7. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, op cit, Reference 1, p. 65.
8. Drug business is lucrative and fast expanding; witness the ready availability of cocaine, crack, and marijuana in the streets and the general downward trend in their prices. Law enforcement agents are able to intercept only 1% of the total illegal supplies. For comments on these issues see, US Department of Justice: Drug Enforcement Administration, Illegal Drug Prices/Purity Report, August 1996, pp. 2-7.
9. United Nations, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Publication of the United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 1. For documentation of British policy and strategy see, The UK Government, Tackling Drugs Together, HMSO, 1994.
10. United Nations, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Publication of the United Nations, New York, 1991, p. 1. For documentation of British policy and strategy see, The UK Government, Tackling Drugs Together, HMSO, 1994.
11. United Nations, ibid, p. 1. For a similar emphasis on health and social well-being see also Addiction Research Foundation, International Conference on the Reduction of Drug Related Harm, Toronto, 1994. An extensive review of the literature on the chemical properties of popular drugs and their uses is provided by Tullis, L., Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1991.
12. United Nations, ibid, p. 1. For a similar emphasis on health and social well-being see also Addiction Research Foundation, International Conference on the Reduction of Drug Related Harm, Toronto, 1994. An extensive review of the literature on the chemical properties of popular drugs and their uses is provided by Tullis, L., Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1991.
13. United Nations, ibid, p. 1. For a similar emphasis on health and social well-being see also Addiction Research Foundation, International Conference on the Reduction of Drug Related Harm, Toronto, 1994. An extensive review of the literature on the chemical properties of popular drugs and their uses is provided by Tullis, L., Handbook of Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1991.
14. United Nations, ibid, p. 2; a collection of essays on this subject is also available in Beschner, G. and Friedman, A. (eds), Teen Drug Use. Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1986.
15. United Nations, ibid, p. 2; a collection of essays on this subject is also available in Beschner, G. and Friedman, A. (eds), Teen Drug Use. Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 1986.
16. See United Nations, United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic, op cit, Reference 8, p. 1.
17. See Farah, D., New threat from Colombia: heroin traffickers aggressively marketing nearly pure drugs in the United States. Washington Post, March 27, 1997, pp. A1 and A30.
18. Heroin, cocaine, and marijuana have been the drugs of concern to American society. They were imported from foreign lands and associated in the public mind with immigrant groups and racial minorities who were seen as potentially violent criminals. Prohibitionist anti-drug campaign did not help erode these images, in fact it reinforced them. See Latimer, D. and Goldberg, J., Flowers in the Blood: The Story of Opium. Franklin Watts Publishing, New York, 1981, pp. 217-228. For an analysis of the effects of policies and the misleading view that addiction is deviant behavior particularly common among the lower social classes see, Walker, W., Drug Control in the United States. University of New Mexico Press, New Mexico, 1989, Ch. 1.
19. Heroin, cocaine, and marijuana have been the drugs of concern to American society. They were imported from foreign lands and associated in the public mind with immigrant groups and racial minorities who were seen as potentially violent criminals. Prohibitionist anti-drug campaign did not help erode these images, in fact it reinforced them. See Latimer, D. and Goldberg, J., Flowers in the Blood: The Story of Opium. Franklin Watts Publishing, New York, 1981, pp. 217-228. For an analysis of the effects of policies and the misleading view that addiction is deviant behavior particularly common among the lower social classes see, Walker, W., Drug Control in the United States. University of New Mexico Press, New Mexico, 1989, Ch. 1.
20. Quoted in Musto, M., Opium, cocaine, and marijuana in American history. Scientific American, 265(1), July 1991, p. 46.
21. See Rasmussen, D. W. and Benson, B. L. The Economic Anatomy of a Drug War. Rowman and Littlefield, Boston, 1993, p. 3.
22. As Sheriff Hennessey of the San Francisco Police Department puts it: 'We desperately need the limited space in our nation's jails and prisons to house violent offenders, not minor league dope addicts and dealers' (Hennesssey, W., Our national jail scandal. American Jails, July-August, 1994, p. 3). Under the United States mandatory minimum sentence the corrections system is stretched to the limit with an increasing number of drug offenders. See California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Felony Drug Arrests, 1995, pp. 3-6.
23. As Sheriff Hennessey of the San Francisco Police Department puts it: 'We desperately need the limited space in our nation's jails and prisons to house violent offenders, not minor league dope addicts and dealers' (Hennesssey, W., Our national jail scandal. American Jails, July-August, 1994, p. 3). Under the United States mandatory minimum sentence the corrections system is stretched to the limit with an increasing number of drug offenders. See California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Felony Drug Arrests, 1995, pp. 3-6.
24. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 1996. US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, January 1997; also Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, unpublished statistics.
25. According to a study of state and federal budget priorities, official expenditures on prisons increased by 30% between 1987-1995, while spending on higher education declined by 18%. In 1995 alone, spending on the expansion of prison facilities increased by $926 million. See Suro, R., More is spent on new prisons than colleges. Washington Post, February 24, 1997, p. A12. For viewpoints equally critical of government policy, see Treaster, J., Study says anti-drug dollars are best spent on treatment. The New York Times, June 19, 1994, p. A13; Pazniokas, M., Tough stand on crime may ignore reality. The Hartford Courant, October 20, 1994, pp. 4-6.
26. According to a study of state and federal budget priorities, official expenditures on prisons increased by 30% between 1987-1995, while spending on higher education declined by 18%. In 1995 alone, spending on the expansion of prison facilities increased by $926 million. See Suro, R., More is spent on new prisons than colleges. Washington Post, February 24, 1997, p. A12. For viewpoints equally critical of government policy, see Treaster, J., Study says anti-drug dollars are best spent on treatment. The New York Times, June 19, 1994, p. A13; Pazniokas, M., Tough stand on crime may ignore reality. The Hartford Courant, October 20, 1994, pp. 4-6.
27. According to a study of state and federal budget priorities, official expenditures on prisons increased by 30% between 1987-1995, while spending on higher education declined by 18%. In 1995 alone, spending on the expansion of prison facilities increased by $926 million. See Suro, R., More is spent on new prisons than colleges. Washington Post, February 24, 1997, p. A12. For viewpoints equally critical of government policy, see Treaster, J., Study says anti-drug dollars are best spent on treatment. The New York Times, June 19, 1994, p. A13; Pazniokas, M., Tough stand on crime may ignore reality. The Hartford Courant, October 20, 1994, pp. 4-6.
28. See Bertram, E., Blachman, M. and Andreas, P., Drug War Politics: the Price of Denial. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, Appendix B; see also, Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, January 10, 1995.
29. This is a paraphrase of relevant issues raised by the director, see Bennett, W., Should drugs be legalized? Reader's Digest, March 1990, pp. 90-94.
30. See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 1-47; Riley, K., Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996, Chs 1 and 7; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: The US Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1991; Musto, op cit, Reference 14, pp. 40-47.
31. See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 1-47; Riley, K., Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996, Chs 1 and 7; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: The US Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1991; Musto, op cit, Reference 14, pp. 40-47.
32. See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 1-47; Riley, K., Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996, Chs 1 and 7; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: The US Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1991; Musto, op cit, Reference 14, pp. 40-47.
33. See Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Waging the War on Drugs in Bolivia. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 1-47; Riley, K., Snow Job? The War Against International Cocaine Trafficking. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1996, Chs 1 and 7; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Clear and Present Dangers: The US Military and the War on Drugs in the Andes. WOLA, Washington, DC, 1991; Musto, op cit, Reference 14, pp. 40-47.
34. See Shenk, The Washington Monthly, op cit, Reference 5, p. 37.
35. For views representing official government position against the legalization of marijuana see US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Briefing Book, October 1996, pp. 42-43. For a profile of issues in the lively debate on legalization of Marijuana, see Francis, D., A life and death decision. The New York Times, January 13, 1997, pp. A20-23; Buckley, W. F. Jr, The war on drugs is lost. National Review, December 1996, p. 21; Khantzian, E. J., Frances, R. and Tamerin, J., Legalization of drugs? American Journal on Addictions, 1995, 4(3), 272-273. The medicinal uses and recreational functions of marijuana are exhaustively treated by Grinspoon, L., Marijuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, Chs 1-3.
36. For views representing official government position against the legalization of marijuana see US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Briefing Book, October 1996, pp. 42-43. For a profile of issues in the lively debate on legalization of Marijuana, see Francis, D., A life and death decision. The New York Times, January 13, 1997, pp. A20-23; Buckley, W. F. Jr, The war on drugs is lost. National Review, December 1996, p. 21; Khantzian, E. J., Frances, R. and Tamerin, J., Legalization of drugs? American Journal on Addictions, 1995, 4(3), 272-273. The medicinal uses and recreational functions of marijuana are exhaustively treated by Grinspoon, L., Marijuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, Chs 1-3.
37. For views representing official government position against the legalization of marijuana see US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Briefing Book, October 1996, pp. 42-43. For a profile of issues in the lively debate on legalization of Marijuana, see Francis, D., A life and death decision. The New York Times, January 13, 1997, pp. A20-23; Buckley, W. F. Jr, The war on drugs is lost. National Review, December 1996, p. 21; Khantzian, E. J., Frances, R. and Tamerin, J., Legalization of drugs? American Journal on Addictions, 1995, 4(3), 272-273. The medicinal uses and recreational functions of marijuana are exhaustively treated by Grinspoon, L., Marijuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, Chs 1-3.
38. For views representing official government position against the legalization of marijuana see US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Briefing Book, October 1996, pp. 42-43. For a profile of issues in the lively debate on legalization of Marijuana, see Francis, D., A life and death decision. The New York Times, January 13, 1997, pp. A20-23; Buckley, W. F. Jr, The war on drugs is lost. National Review, December 1996, p. 21; Khantzian, E. J., Frances, R. and Tamerin, J., Legalization of drugs? American Journal on Addictions, 1995, 4(3), 272-273. The medicinal uses and recreational functions of marijuana are exhaustively treated by Grinspoon, L., Marijuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, Chs 1-3.
39. For views representing official government position against the legalization of marijuana see US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Briefing Book, October 1996, pp. 42-43. For a profile of issues in the lively debate on legalization of Marijuana, see Francis, D., A life and death decision. The New York Times, January 13, 1997, pp. A20-23; Buckley, W. F. Jr, The war on drugs is lost. National Review, December 1996, p. 21; Khantzian, E. J., Frances, R. and Tamerin, J., Legalization of drugs? American Journal on Addictions, 1995, 4(3), 272-273. The medicinal uses and recreational functions of marijuana are exhaustively treated by Grinspoon, L., Marijuana Reconsidered. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, Chs 1-3.
40. See Kassirer, J. P., Federal foolishness and marijuana. New England Journal of Medicine, 336(5), 1997, p. 366; see also United Nations, Availability of Opiates for Medical Needs: Special Report Prepared Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1990/31 and 1991/43. International Narcotics Control Board, New York, 1996.
41. See Kassirer, J. P., Federal foolishness and marijuana. New England Journal of Medicine, 336(5), 1997, p. 366; see also United Nations, Availability of Opiates for Medical Needs: Special Report Prepared Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1990/31 and 1991/43. International Narcotics Control Board, New York, 1996.
42. See National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States Intelligence Division, Washington, DC, August 1996, pp. 1-28; see also The Economist, December 24, 1994-January 6, 1995, p. 21.
43. See National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States Intelligence Division, Washington, DC, August 1996, pp. 1-28; see also The Economist, December 24, 1994-January 6, 1995, p. 21.
44. Many analysts compare government intervention in Latin American coca production to the experience of squeezing a balloon. Squeezing the industry in one section merely causes entrepreneurs to relocate and continue production elsewhere. This is referred to as the 'balloon syndrome'. It is estimated that about 250,000 hectares of land is under coca cultivation in Peru; and 27,000 hectares and 40,000 hectares in Columbia and Bolivia, respectively. Columbia and Peru are the main centers for the processing and export of cocaine to the world markets. For all these see, The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Fueling failure: US drug control efforts in the Andes. Briefing series in international drug policy, April 1995; Cabieses, H., Coca and integral development: an Andean proposal. In Counternarcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere, eds Arganaras F. and Yerba, M. York University, Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, Toronto, 1993, pp. 55-77.
45. Many analysts compare government intervention in Latin American coca production to the experience of squeezing a balloon. Squeezing the industry in one section merely causes entrepreneurs to relocate and continue production elsewhere. This is referred to as the 'balloon syndrome'. It is estimated that about 250,000 hectares of land is under coca cultivation in Peru; and 27,000 hectares and 40,000 hectares in Columbia and Bolivia, respectively. Columbia and Peru are the main centers for the processing and export of cocaine to the world markets. For all these see, The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Fueling failure: US drug control efforts in the Andes. Briefing series in international drug policy, April 1995; Cabieses, H., Coca and integral development: an Andean proposal. In Counternarcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere, eds Arganaras F. and Yerba, M. York University, Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean, Toronto, 1993, pp. 55-77.
46. See Clawson, P. L. and Lee, R. W., The Andean Cocaine Industry. St Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 24; Celarier, M., Finance in the Narco State. Global Finance, May 1995, pp. 38-40. However, the massive flow of drug money into Colombia is also responsible for spiraling inflation (30% in 1996) and the astronomical increase in urban property value. Rapid appreciation of the Colombian peso (30-40% in 1995) affects the international market prices for the country's legal exports of oil and coffee.
47. See Clawson, P. L. and Lee, R. W., The Andean Cocaine Industry. St Martin's Press, New York, 1996, p. 24; Celarier, M., Finance in the Narco State. Global Finance, May 1995, pp. 38-40. However, the massive flow of drug money into Colombia is also responsible for spiraling inflation (30% in 1996) and the astronomical increase in urban property value. Rapid appreciation of the Colombian peso (30-40% in 1995) affects the international market prices for the country's legal exports of oil and coffee.
48. Nevertheless the Colombian drug economy is characterized by political instability and the legitimacy that drug capital bestows on the entrepreneurs is a cosmetic one. See Thoumi, F., Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, pp. 182-197; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Colombia Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility, WOLA, Washington, DC, 1989, pp. 1-18; Tokatlian, J., National security and drugs: their impact on Colombia-US relations. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 30, 140-149.
49. Nevertheless the Colombian drug economy is characterized by political instability and the legitimacy that drug capital bestows on the entrepreneurs is a cosmetic one. See Thoumi, F., Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, pp. 182-197; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Colombia Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility, WOLA, Washington, DC, 1989, pp. 1-18; Tokatlian, J., National security and drugs: their impact on Colombia-US relations. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 30, 140-149.
50. Nevertheless the Colombian drug economy is characterized by political instability and the legitimacy that drug capital bestows on the entrepreneurs is a cosmetic one. See Thoumi, F., Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, pp. 182-197; Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Colombia Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility, WOLA, Washington, DC, 1989, pp. 1-18; Tokatlian, J., National security and drugs: their impact on Colombia-US relations. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 30, 140-149.
51. See Clawson and Lee, op cit, Reference 27, p. 13; Rochlin, J., Security and unequal development: the Andean drug war. In Counternarcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere, eds Arganara, F. and Yerba, M. Center for Research on Latin America and the Carribbean, York University, Toronto, p. 66.
52. See Clawson and Lee, op cit, Reference 27, p. 13; Rochlin, J., Security and unequal development: the Andean drug war. In Counternarcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere, eds Arganara, F. and Yerba, M. Center for Research on Latin America and the Carribbean, York University, Toronto, p. 66.
53. For production figures see United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bolivia's Subeconomy in 1994. USAID, La Paz, 1995, Table 4; For general comments on the impact of the drug business on the Bolivian economy see Painter, J., Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1994; Painter, J., Bolivian military leader questions DEA's role in drug bust gone awry. Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1991, p. 6.
54. For production figures see United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bolivia's Subeconomy in 1994. USAID, La Paz, 1995, Table 4; For general comments on the impact of the drug business on the Bolivian economy see Painter, J., Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1994; Painter, J., Bolivian military leader questions DEA's role in drug bust gone awry. Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1991, p. 6.
55. For production figures see United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bolivia's Subeconomy in 1994. USAID, La Paz, 1995, Table 4; For general comments on the impact of the drug business on the Bolivian economy see Painter, J., Bolivia and Coca: A Study in Dependency. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1994; Painter, J., Bolivian military leader questions DEA's role in drug bust gone awry. Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1991, p. 6.
56. See Tullis, L., Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, p. 100; Morales, W., Militarizing the drug war in Bolivia. Third World Quarterly, 1992, 13(3), 363.
57. See Tullis, L., Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995, p. 100; Morales, W., Militarizing the drug war in Bolivia. Third World Quarterly, 1992, 13(3), 363.
58. President Reagan's anti-drug policy emphasized increased spending on law enforcement, and lower investment in programs aimed at reducing domestic demand through drug treatment, education, and rehabilitation. While the government spent $1-4 billion between 1985-1989 on law enforcement, expenditures on rehabilitation and drug education programs dropped from $386 million in 1985 to $362 million in 1989. For a discussion of related issues see, Collett, M., The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. Foreign Policy Association, New York, 1989, p. 24.
59. Panama was branded 'cocaine heaven' and Noriega a 'drug lord'. For comments on the legality of Washington's military action in Panama, including the trial and imprisonment of Manuel Noriega see, Heath, D., US drug control policy: a cultural perspective, Daedalus. Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1992, 121(3), 280.
60. On the forceful extradition of a Mexican medical doctor implicated in the drug trade see Rourke, J. T., International Politics on the World State. The Dushkin Publishing Group, Guilford, Connecticut, 1995, pp. 276-278.
61. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy Summary. US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 13.
62. Some analysts believe that Washington's intervention in the Latin American cocaine industry serves a political purpose; that it helps divert public attention away from the failure of government to deal effectively with the domestic conditions of poverty and alienation that contribute to drug dependency; and that it expands the activities of the military, boosting the Pentagon's financial resources. See lsenberg, D., The Army vs Cocaine. Old Oregon, Spring 1990, p. 26; Marby, D., The US military and the war on drugs in Latin America. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 30, 57.
63. Some analysts believe that Washington's intervention in the Latin American cocaine industry serves a political purpose; that it helps divert public attention away from the failure of government to deal effectively with the domestic conditions of poverty and alienation that contribute to drug dependency; and that it expands the activities of the military, boosting the Pentagon's financial resources. See lsenberg, D., The Army vs Cocaine. Old Oregon, Spring 1990, p. 26; Marby, D., The US military and the war on drugs in Latin America. Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 1988, 30, 57.
64. See Sharpe, K. and Bertram, E., Memo for the new drug Czar, Washington, DC, March 1996, p. 3 (unpublished manuscript); Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug Trafficking Update, Lima, Brief No. 29, November 7, 1992.
65. See Sharpe, K. and Bertram, E., Memo for the new drug Czar, Washington, DC, March 1996, p. 3 (unpublished manuscript); Andean Commission of Jurists, Drug Trafficking Update, Lima, Brief No. 29, November 7, 1992.
66. See Washington Office on Latin America, After the Autogolpe: Human Rights in Peru and the US Response. WOLA, Washington, DC, July 1994, pp. 7-37; Silva, G. R., Crisis, democracy and the Left in Peru. Latin American Perspectives, 1988, 15(3), 80-88.
67. See Washington Office on Latin America, After the Autogolpe: Human Rights in Peru and the US Response. WOLA, Washington, DC, July 1994, pp. 7-37; Silva, G. R., Crisis, democracy and the Left in Peru. Latin American Perspectives, 1988, 15(3), 80-88.
68. Alternative Development also gained the support of the United States Agency for International Development. USAID offered $679 million to the Bolivian government in development assistance and this included a budget for encouraging the voluntary eradication of coca - $2000 per hectare land of coca. For these see, The United States: Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Washington, DC, 1993.
69. Eradication would reduce Bolivia's GDP by about $400 million, leaving about 70,000 people unemployed. This partly explains the government's half-hearted commitment to eradication programs. For an insightful account of the economic impacts of coca production see, State Department: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Economics of the Narcotics Industry, Conference Report, No. 21991, 1995.
70. For a discussion of the complicated financial networks developed by drug cartels see, Andelman, D. M., The drug money maze. Foreign Affairs, 1994, 73(4), 94-108.
71. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994. Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, p. 37.
72. The outline of proposals presented is partly distilled from current debates in publications entirely devoted to the debate on drug related issues, including Porter, R. and Teich, M. (eds), Drugs and Narcotics in History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Grauband, S. R. (ed), Political pharmacology: Thinking about drugs. Daedalus: Journal of American Academy Of Arts and Sciences, 1992, 121(3), 1-304.
73. The outline of proposals presented is partly distilled from current debates in publications entirely devoted to the debate on drug related issues, including Porter, R. and Teich, M. (eds), Drugs and Narcotics in History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Grauband, S. R. (ed), Political pharmacology: Thinking about drugs. Daedalus: Journal of American Academy Of Arts and Sciences, 1992, 121(3), 1-304.
74. See Matthee, R., Exotic substances: The introduction and global spread of tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tea, and distilled liquor. In Drugs and Narcotics in History, eds Porter, R. and Teich. M. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 24-51.
75. Gusfield, J. R., Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1976, p. 1.
76. For an interesting account of the social origins of coffee drinking and the politics surrounding its use, see Hattox, R., Coffee and CoffeeHouses: the Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East. University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1985, particularly Chs 1-3.
77. Alexander, B. K., Peaceful Measures: Canada's Way out of the War on Drugs. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1990, p. 237.
78. Weil, A., The Natural Mind: A New Way of Looking at Drugs and the Higher Consciousness. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1989, p. 149.
79. See Trebach, A. S. and Inciardi, J. A., Legalize it? Debating American Drug Policy. The American University Press, Washington, DC, 1993.
80. Prohibitionists are concerned that legalization will drive up the consumption levels of currently proscribed drugs. Evidence is drawn from the experience of alcohol consumption, and the abuse that followed its legalization in the United States in 1933. However, the rise in alcohol consumption was fueled by media advertising. Besides, decriminalization of marijuana in the Netherlands has not been accompanied by astronomical increases in consumption of the substance. In the Latin American countries, where coca is produced and processed for export, regulation is weak and there is no indication that local consumption of readily available cocaine is directly responsible for the economic crisis threatening political systems there. Our attention is drawn to the European experience in dealing with the 'drug problem' by Ruggiero, V. and South, N., Eurodrugs: Drug Use, Markets and Trafficking in Europe. University College of London Press, London, 1995; Sterling, C., Thieves' World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994; Forlaget, A., Current Swedish Legislation on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, 1990; Bruun, K. (ed.), Controlling Psychotropic Substances: the Nordic Experience. St Martin's Press, New York, 1989.
81. Prohibitionists are concerned that legalization will drive up the consumption levels of currently proscribed drugs. Evidence is drawn from the experience of alcohol consumption, and the abuse that followed its legalization in the United States in 1933. However, the rise in alcohol consumption was fueled by media advertising. Besides, decriminalization of marijuana in the Netherlands has not been accompanied by astronomical increases in consumption of the substance. In the Latin American countries, where coca is produced and processed for export, regulation is weak and there is no indication that local consumption of readily available cocaine is directly responsible for the economic crisis threatening political systems there. Our attention is drawn to the European experience in dealing with the 'drug problem' by Ruggiero, V. and South, N., Eurodrugs: Drug Use, Markets and Trafficking in Europe. University College of London Press, London, 1995; Sterling, C., Thieves' World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994; Forlaget, A., Current Swedish Legislation on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, 1990; Bruun, K. (ed.), Controlling Psychotropic Substances: the Nordic Experience. St Martin's Press, New York, 1989.
82. Prohibitionists are concerned that legalization will drive up the consumption levels of currently proscribed drugs. Evidence is drawn from the experience of alcohol consumption, and the abuse that followed its legalization in the United States in 1933. However, the rise in alcohol consumption was fueled by media advertising. Besides, decriminalization of marijuana in the Netherlands has not been accompanied by astronomical increases in consumption of the substance. In the Latin American countries, where coca is produced and processed for export, regulation is weak and there is no indication that local consumption of readily available cocaine is directly responsible for the economic crisis threatening political systems there. Our attention is drawn to the European experience in dealing with the 'drug problem' by Ruggiero, V. and South, N., Eurodrugs: Drug Use, Markets and Trafficking in Europe. University College of London Press, London, 1995; Sterling, C., Thieves' World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994; Forlaget, A., Current Swedish Legislation on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, 1990; Bruun, K. (ed.), Controlling Psychotropic Substances: the Nordic Experience. St Martin's Press, New York, 1989.
83. Prohibitionists are concerned that legalization will drive up the consumption levels of currently proscribed drugs. Evidence is drawn from the experience of alcohol consumption, and the abuse that followed its legalization in the United States in 1933. However, the rise in alcohol consumption was fueled by media advertising. Besides, decriminalization of marijuana in the Netherlands has not been accompanied by astronomical increases in consumption of the substance. In the Latin American countries, where coca is produced and processed for export, regulation is weak and there is no indication that local consumption of readily available cocaine is directly responsible for the economic crisis threatening political systems there. Our attention is drawn to the European experience in dealing with the 'drug problem' by Ruggiero, V. and South, N., Eurodrugs: Drug Use, Markets and Trafficking in Europe. University College of London Press, London, 1995; Sterling, C., Thieves' World: the Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994; Forlaget, A., Current Swedish Legislation on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances. National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm, 1990; Bruun, K. (ed.), Controlling Psychotropic Substances: the Nordic Experience. St Martin's Press, New York, 1989.
84. See Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV and AIDS Trends, Progress in Prevention. National Centre for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, MD, 1996, pp. 1-14. For in-depth discussion of related health issues, see Berridge, V., AIDS, drugs and history. In Drugs and Narcotics in History, eds Porter, R. and Teich, M. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 187-198.
85. See Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV and AIDS Trends, Progress in Prevention. National Centre for Health Statistics, Hyattsville, MD, 1996, pp. 1-14. For in-depth discussion of related health issues, see Berridge, V., AIDS, drugs and history. In Drugs and Narcotics in History, eds Porter, R. and Teich, M. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 187-198.
86. Much has been written about raids conducted by overzealous drug enforcement agents on minorities in America's inner-cities. For a detailed discussion of law enforcement activities that ultimately entail the violation of civil rights, see Duke, S. B. and Gross, A. C., America's Longest War. G. P. Putman Publishing, New York, 1994.
87. During the Cold War critics were concerned that Washington's collaboration with the military in the Andes was reinforcing the perception that undemocratic institutions could be useful allies in the promotion and maintenance of political order. A reform of prohibitionist policies was necessary to erode the legitimacy that Washington's drug-war alliance bestowed on Latin American dictatorships.
88. See Michael, L. and Potter, G., Organized Crime. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997; Tullis, op cit, Reference 31, Ch. 5; for a discussion on the effects of criminal organizations on the institutions of state governance, see Strange, S., The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, Ch. 8.
89. See Michael, L. and Potter, G., Organized Crime. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997; Tullis, op cit, Reference 31, Ch. 5; for a discussion on the effects of criminal organizations on the institutions of state governance, see Strange, S., The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, Ch. 8.
90. See Michael, L. and Potter, G., Organized Crime. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997; Tullis, op cit, Reference 31, Ch. 5; for a discussion on the effects of criminal organizations on the institutions of state governance, see Strange, S., The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, Ch. 8.