The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II. Representation

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 299-338

  Sudhölter, Peter ^a   Rosenmüller, Joachim ^a   Peleg, Bezalel ^a  

^a BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

05C05; 90D10; 90D35; Extensive form; Games; Normal form; Strategic form

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043210859     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00019-1     Document Type: Article

References (7)

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3. Kohlberg E., Mertens J.-F. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica. 54:1986;1003-1037.
4. R.B. Myerson, Game Theory, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
5. J. von Neumann, O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1944.
6. B. Peleg, J. Rosenmüller, P. Sudhölter, The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form: Part I - Symmetries. WP 253, Institute of Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 1996.
7. A. Rapoport, Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, 1994.