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Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 51-66

Characterizations of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Excludable versus Nonexcludable Public Projects

Author keywords

Strategy proof; mechanism; excludability

Indexed keywords


EID: 0043206312     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0755     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (27)

References (14)
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  • 7
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    • Roth, A.E.1
  • 8
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    • Saijo T. Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality in Public Good Economies. J. Econom. Theory. 55:1991;203-212.
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    • Saijo, T.1
  • 9
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    • Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions
    • Satterthwaite M. A. Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions. J. Econom. Theory. 10:1975;187-217.
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  • 10
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    • Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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    • (1981) Rev. Econom. Stud. , vol.48 , pp. 587-597
    • Satterthwaite, M.A.1    Sonnenschein, H.2
  • 11
    • 0030306648 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
    • Serizawa S. Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies. Econom. Theory. 7:1996;501-512.
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    • Serizawa, S.1
  • 12
    • 0001521868 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
    • Serizawa S. Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies. Econometrica. 67:1999;121-145.
    • (1999) Econometrica , vol.67 , pp. 121-145
    • Serizawa, S.1
  • 13
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    • The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply among a Growing Population
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    • Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Principle
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    • Thomson, W.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.