Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 451-482

  Ma, Chenghu ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043191456     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00089-x     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Aumann R. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior. 8:1995;6-19.
2. Battigalli, P., 1993. On rationalizability in extensive games. Mimeo, Politecnico di Milano.
3. Bennett, ZZ., van Damme, ZZ., 1991. Demand commitment bargaining: the case of apex games. In: Selten, R. (Ed.), Game Equilibrium Models III.
4. Bernheim B.D. Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica. 52:1984;1007-1028.
5. Crawford V.P., Sobel J. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica. 50:1982;1431-1439.
6. Dow J., Werlang S.R.C. Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty. breaking down backward induction Journal of Economic Theory. 64:1994;305-324.
7. Ellsberg D. Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 75:1961;643-669.
8. Epstein, L., 1995. Preference, rationality and equilibrium. Mimeo, University of Toronto.
9. Epstein L., Le Breton M. Dynamically consistent beliefs must be Bayesian. Journal of Economic Theory. 61:1993;1-22.
10. Epstein, L., Wang, T., 1994. A 'Types' space for games of incomplete information with non-bayesian players. Mimeo, University of Toronto.
11. Farrell J., Gibbons R. Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory. 48:1989;221-237.
12. Fudenberg D., Levine D. Self-confirming equilibrium. Econometrica. 61:1993;523-545.
13. Gilboa I., Schmeidler D. Expected utility theory with purely subjective non-additive probabilities. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 16:1987;65-88.
14. Gilboa I., Schmeidler D. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 18:1989;141-153.
15. Greenberg, J., 1989. The Theory of Social Situations: An Alternative Approach to Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
16. Greenberg, J., 1994. Social situations without commonality of beliefs: worlds apart - but acting together. Mimeo, McGill University.
17. Harsanyi, J., 1967-1968. Games with incomplete information played by 'Bayesian' players: Parts I-III. Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334 and 486-502.
18. Harsanyi J. Subjective probability and the theory of games: comments on Kadane and Larkey's paper. Management Science. 28:1982;120-124.
19. Kadane J., Larkey P. Subjective probability and the theory of games. Management Science. 28:1982;113-120.
20. Klibanoff, P., 1993. Uncertainty, decision, and normal-form games. Mimeo, MIT.
21. Knight, F.H., 1921. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
22. Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
23. Lo K.C. Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty. Journal of Economic Theory. 71:1996;443-484.
24. Luo, X., 1995. On rational solution concepts in non-cooperative games. Mimeo, McGill University.
25. Luo, X., Ma, C., 1998. Stable equilibrium in belief in extensive games with perfect information. Mimeo, McGill University.
26. Machina M., Schmeidler D. A more robust definition of subjective probability. Econometrica. 60:1992;745-780.
27. Manelli A. Cheap talk and sequential equilibria in signalling games. Econometrica. 64:1996;917-942.
28. Martin D.A. Borel determinacy. Annals of Mathematics. 102:1975;363-371.
29. Nash J. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics. 54:1951;286-295.
30. Osborne, M., Rubinstein, A., 1994. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge.
31. Pearce D. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection. Econometrica. 52:1984;1029-1050.
32. Savage, L.J., 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York.
33. Seidmann D. Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests. Journal of Economic Theory. 50:1990;445-458.
34. Seidmann D. Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes. Games and Economic Behavior. 4:1992;422-425.
35. Selten R. Re-examination of perfectness concept for equilibrium points on extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory. 4:1975;25-55.
36. van Damme, E., 1987. Equilibria in non-cooperative games. In: Peters, H., Vrieze, O. (Eds.), Surveys in Game Theory and Related Topics, C.W.I. Tract 39, Amsterdam.
37. von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O., 1947. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
38. Young, O., 1975. Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation. University of Illinois Press, Chicago.