-
1
-
-
0041838596
-
-
There are notable exceptions to this trend in the areas of criminal law, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (federal car-jacking statute); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (Violence Against Women Act), and tort reform, see, e.g., Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.; Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong.; Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong.
-
There are notable exceptions to this trend in the areas of criminal law, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (federal car-jacking statute); 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (Violence Against Women Act), and tort reform, see, e.g., Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.; Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong.; Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
0042339718
-
-
note
-
I use the term "assign" rather than the term "delegate" to describe Congress's action in order to avoid conceptual confusion. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress may not delegate the authority vested in it by Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737, 1743-44 (1996). The Court has also repeatedly held that Congress does not necessarily violate this nondelegation doctrine when it assigns other actors rule-making power. See, e.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939) (Hughes, C.J.), In upholding such assignments of rule-making authority, the Court has frequently stated that Congress has not delegated its legislative power within the meaning of Article I, Section I and the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., id. at 16-18. In none of these cases has the Court held that Congress assigned no authority at all. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 318 (1936) (Hughes, C.J., concurring in part) (stating that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act authorizes a group of producers and employees to regulate other producers and employees), with Currin, 306 U.S. at 15-18 (holding that the Tobacco Inspection Act grants power to growers, but not legislative power). Because the Court has frequently characterized statutes that do not violate the nondelegation doctrine as "not involv[ing] any delegation of legislative authority," see, e.g., Currin, 306 U.S. at 15, some commentators have understood the largely ineffectual
-
-
-
|
