Error-proneness as a handicap signal

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 224, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 139-152

  De Jaegher, Kris ^a  

^a VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Error prone signalling; Handicap principle; Signalling theory

Indexed keywords

SIGNALING; THEORY;

ACCURACY; ANALYTICAL ERROR; ARTICLE; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; QUALITY CONTROL;

EID: 0043123313     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00135-8     Document Type: Article

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