Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 417-440

  Anderberg, Dan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; D72; H42; H55; Insurance; Pensions; Public provision; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043082637     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(99)00020-8     Document Type: Article

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