Coexistence of public and private job agencies: Screening with heterogeneous institutions

Public Choice

Volumn 101, Issue 1-2, 1999, Pages 85-107

  Kübler, Dorothea ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043080174     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1018315611084     Document Type: Article

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