Why there is no law of relational contracts

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 94, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 805-820

  Eisenberg, Melvin A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0043027985     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 15, 20-21 (2d ed. 1880).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 238 (1920).
3. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876).
4. See. e.g., Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1928).
5. See Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 MEDIA. L. REP. 1789, 1790 (1984). Hellman sued for libel, but died while the suit was pending. See Daniel Komstein, The Case Against Lillian Hellman: A Literary/Legal Defense, 57 FORD. L. REV. 683 (1989).
6. See Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 MEDIA. L. REP. 1789, 1790 (1984). Hellman sued for libel, but died while the suit was pending. See Daniel Komstein, The Case Against Lillian Hellman: A Literary/Legal Defense, 57 FORD. L. REV. 683 (1989).
7. See Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990).
8. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
9. See Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385 (1989).
10. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. S251, at S251 (Supp. 1986).
11. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493 (1979).
12. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
13. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
14. See id. at 443.
15. See id.
16. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 8, at S252.
17. See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 92-94 (Jerome Kagan ed., 1988).
18. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1, 5 (1982).
19. See Martin Feldstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits, 100 Q. J. ECON. 303, 307 (1985).
20. Id. at 307.
21. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 237-40 (1986).
22. Arrow, supra note 17, at 5.
23. Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 348 (1983).
24. Victor Goldberg, Towards an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45, 49 (1976). I interpret this definition to mean that no contractual duties exist prior to contract formation. As Macneil has pointed out, in discussing this definition, if no duties of any kind exist between the parties prior to a contractual exchange, "then theft by the stronger party is more likely to occur than is exchange." Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1981).
25. Victor Goldberg, Towards an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45, 49 (1976). I interpret this definition to mean that no contractual duties exist prior to contract formation. As Macneil has pointed out, in discussing this definition, if no duties of any kind exist between the parties prior to a contractual exchange, "then theft by the stronger party is more likely to occur than is exchange." Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1981).
26. See IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS 12-13 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS].
27. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981).
28. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 950 (W. Ashley ed., 1965).
29. Id. at 959-60.
30. Goetz & Scott, supra note 25, at 1091.
31. FRITZ LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 18-19 (3d ed. 1880).
32. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 10 (1980).
33. EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 13.
34. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 247 (1979). This transaction, however, involves little or no promise and little or no futurity. The same is true of another example, given by Macneil: "A purchase of nonbrand name gasoline in a strange town one does not expect to see again." EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 13.
35. See Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 247 (1979). This transaction, however, involves little or no promise and little or no futurity. The same is true of another example, given by Macneil: "A purchase of nonbrand name gasoline in a strange town one does not expect to see again." EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 24, at 13.
36. Ian. R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 857 n.10 (1978).
37. MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 11.
38. See. e.g., David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC. 166 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Macneil, supra note 33; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
39. See. e.g., David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC. 166 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Macneil, supra note 33; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
40. See. e.g., David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC. 166 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Macneil, supra note 33; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
41. See. e.g., David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC. 166 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Macneil, supra note 33; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
42. See. e.g., David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & SOC. 166 (1993); Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REV. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1 (1987); Macneil, supra note 33; Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 369 (1981).
43. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
44. 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A. 1903).
45. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Case for Loss Sharing, 56 S. CAL L. REV. 573 (1983).
46. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 897 (2000).
47. See, e.g., id. at 878; EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 13; MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 4-5, 13, 20; William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 545 (stating that Macneil's theory "becomes in effect a general theory of the social order.").
48. See, e.g., id. at 878; EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 13; MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 4-5, 13, 20; William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 545 (stating that Macneil's theory "becomes in effect a general theory of the social order.").
49. See, e.g., id. at 878; EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 13; MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 4-5, 13, 20; William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 545 (stating that Macneil's theory "becomes in effect a general theory of the social order.").
50. See, e.g., id. at 878; EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS, supra note 23, at 13; MACNEIL, supra note 30, at 4-5, 13, 20; William C. Whitford, Ian Macneil's Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 545 (stating that Macneil's theory "becomes in effect a general theory of the social order.").
51. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1997); Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 455 (1995); Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contracts as a Relationship Management Form, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1271 (1995).
52. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1997); Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 455 (1995); Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contracts as a Relationship Management Form, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1271 (1995).
53. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REV. 821 (1997); Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 455 (1995); Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contracts as a Relationship Management Form, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1271 (1995).