The geopolitics of tolerance: Minority rights under EU expansion in East-Central Europe

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 483-532+576

  Tesser, Lynn M ^a  

^a LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

European norms on minority rights; European Union expansion; International institutions and democratization; Liberalism in Eastern Europe; Minority rights in Eastern Europe; National identity in East Central Europe; Nationalism in Eastern Europe

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043016340     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325403255310     Document Type: Article

References (138)

1. The League Treaties included Saint Germain-en-Laye signed on 10 September 1919 (Austria; Czechoslovakia; and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes); Trianon on 4 June 1920 (Hungary); Neuilly-sur-Seine on 27 November 1919 (Bulgaria); Lausanne on 24 July 1923 (Turkey); Versailles on 28 June 1919 (Poland); Paris on 9 December 1919 (Romania); and Sèvres on 10 August 1920 (Greece). Albania, Lithuania, and more distant Iraq were also brought into the League after signing treaties in the early 1920s. Though Germany only signed one treaty that was part of the League system (the Upper Silesia Agreement), the 1922 Geneva Convention did bring Germany a bit more into the system when Poland and Germany established a framework for minority protections for Silesia. Like Germany, Finland participated in a more indirect way in the League through providing minority protections with regard to the Åland Islands. See Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 73-74.
2. League states agreed to give citizenship to residents of a given state's territory as well as to those already possessing citizenship rights when the respective treaty came into force. Citizenship was also granted to those individuals born where their parents happened to live (though they may not have been residents of the given state when the particular treaty came into effect). Finally, any individual born in a certain state who happened to be unable to claim citizenship within another country would automatically acquire citizenship of the state responsible for the administration of the particular territory (Preece, National Minorities, 74).
3. Signatories to these treaties were required to allow minorities to use their respective languages in the courts and to provide language education in primary schools in areas with a concentration of the respective minority.
4. Preece, National Minorities, 74-75.
5. For a description of documents and events leading up to creation of European norms on minority rights, see chapter 8 of Preece, National Minorities, and also her article, "National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations?" Nations and Nationalism 3:3(1997): 345-64. Polish readers, see Stanisław Pawlak, Ochrona Mniejszósci Narodowych w Europie (Protections for National Minorities in Europe) (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2001).
6. For a description of documents and events leading up to creation of European norms on minority rights, see chapter 8 of Preece, National Minorities, and also her article, "National Minority Rights vs. State Sovereignty in Europe: Changing Norms in International Relations?" Nations and Nationalism 3:3(1997): 345-64. Polish readers, see Stanisław Pawlak, Ochrona Mniejszósci Narodowych w Europie (Protections for National Minorities in Europe) (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2001).
7. Preece, "National Minority Rights," 353.
8. Admittedly, Article 1 of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act references the "rights of persons belonging to such minorities," indicating that this notion precedes the post-cold war era. Subsequent documents following along the lines of Copenhagen include the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990). the Geneva Report on National Minorities (1991), the Moscow Document (1991), the Helsinki Document (1992), the Budapest Document (1994), and the Framework Convention for the Protection of Nationalities (1995). For the texts of these documents, see http://www.osce.org/docs and http://www.conventions.coe.int.
9. The difference between "individual" and "collective" minority rights often simply boils down to the difference between positive and negative rights. Collective rights tend to be painted as positive rights ("freedom to" do or acquire certain things), while individual-based rights are more akin to negative rights ("freedom from" hindrances).
10. For a more extensive critique of the individual-collective dichotomy, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
11. Copenhagen (Section IV, Article 32); Framework Convention (Section I, Article 3).
12. Copenhagen (Section IV, Article 32.6); Geneva (Section V); Framework Convention (Section I, Article 3).
13. Copenhagen (Section I, Article 5.9); Geneva (Section IV); Framework Convention (Section II, Article 4).
14. Copenhagen (Section IV, Article 32); Geneva (Section III); Framework Convention (Section II, Articles 5, 12, 13, and 14).
15. Copenhagen (Section IV, Article 32.4); Geneva (Section VII); Framework Convention (Section II, Article 17).
16. Of these three documents treating minorities more extensively, only Copenhagen references this idea (Section I, 5.21) - though not with much bite. I nevertheless include this general principle because the right for persons belonging to minorities to take charges against their national governments to a higher, European-wide power has nevertheless been a part of the emerging post-cold war framework. The European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, after all, provide for the right of individuals to bring charges against their governments before the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. For other means of redress, see Liz Heffernan, "A Comparative View of Individual Petition Procedures under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 19:2(1997): 79.
17. 16. Only the Framework Convention (Section 3, Article 20) lists this idea with respect to national legislation and the rights of the titular majority as well as other minorities. Yet I include it because it is a key (though not often outwardly stated) assumption of contemporary standards stemming from earlier cold war human rights formulations.
18. Andrew Moravcsik, "Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe," European Journal of International Relations 1 (June 1995): 157-89.
19. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," European Journal of International Relations 3:4(1997): 482. See also Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 83-114.
20. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," European Journal of International Relations 3:4(1997): 482. See also Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," International Studies Quarterly 43 (1999): 83-114.
21. Checkel, "International Norms," 473.
22. Most post-communist Central and East European states aimed to join the Council of Europe (COE) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to ultimately gain entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Though joining NATO might seem adequate for reasons of security, EU membership was equally important for two reasons. First, economic integration in a Westerly direction was needed to create distance from Moscow and the very recent era of Soviet domination. Second, EU entry held the promise of a quicker rise in living standards thought crucial for forestalling nationality-based conflicts. The initial moves toward adopting still-developing European norms on minority rights came when post-communist Central and East European states made swift preparations to join the COE and the OSCE after 1989. Political elites in these countries aimed to join the COE, on one hand, for at least three reasons: (1) to better position themselves for membership in the EU, (2) to signal to political and economic elites abroad that they are rejoining the European mainstream, and (3) to use the COE to further the aims of "kin" living in nearby states. Post-communist Central and East European political elites aimed to join the OSCE (formerly called the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]), on the other hand, not so much because of minority rights issues but, rather, to help bring an end to Soviet control over the region by (1) encouraging the withdrawal of Soviet forces, (2) involving Western countries in the region's security, (3) bringing an end to the Warsaw Pact, and finally, (4) helping these countries to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union acknowledging their de jure sovereignty. The OSCE helped bring immediate security to the region, if only by serving as a protective, "Western" umbrella under which these countries could "display their new sovereign identities." See Richard Weitz, "The Expanding Role of the Council of Europe," Report on Eastern Europe 1:34(1990): 49; and Piotr Switalski, "An Ally for the Central and Eastern European States," Transition 1:11(1995): 27.
23. Most post-communist Central and East European states aimed to join the Council of Europe (COE) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to ultimately gain entry to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. Though joining NATO might seem adequate for reasons of security, EU membership was equally important for two reasons. First, economic integration in a Westerly direction was needed to create distance from Moscow and the very recent era of Soviet domination. Second, EU entry held the promise of a quicker rise in living standards thought crucial for forestalling nationality-based conflicts. The initial moves toward adopting still-developing European norms on minority rights came when post-communist Central and East European states made swift preparations to join the COE and the OSCE after 1989. Political elites in these countries aimed to join the COE, on one hand, for at least three reasons: (1) to better position themselves for membership in the EU, (2) to signal to political and economic elites abroad that they are rejoining the European mainstream, and (3) to use the COE to further the aims of "kin" living in nearby states. Post-communist Central and East European political elites aimed to join the OSCE (formerly called the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE]), on the other hand, not so much because of minority rights issues but, rather, to help bring an end to Soviet control over the region by (1) encouraging the withdrawal of Soviet forces, (2) involving Western countries in the region's security, (3) bringing an end to the Warsaw Pact, and finally, (4) helping these countries to conclude agreements with the Soviet Union acknowledging their de jure sovereignty. The OSCE helped bring immediate security to the region, if only by serving as a protective, "Western" umbrella under which these countries could "display their new sovereign identities." See Richard Weitz, "The Expanding Role of the Council of Europe," Report on Eastern Europe 1:34(1990): 49; and Piotr Switalski, "An Ally for the Central and Eastern European States," Transition 1:11(1995): 27.
24. Beyond offering less extensive minority protections than the League of Nations, post-cold war European standards differ in two important ways from this earlier system. First, countries adopting European norms today choose to be bound by them rather than to be forced into such obligations by more powerful states. They do so by becoming members of the principal organizations concerned with securing minority protections - the COE and the OSCE. Second, domestic political elites - in consultation with the COE and the OSCE, the minorities themselves, and the minorities' respective mother states - determine the actual form and content of minority protection legislation rather than the dominant (or victorious) powers.
25. Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
26. His explanation also points out that the contradictory way communists institutionalized nationality in the Soviet Union laid the grounds for the particular character of post-Soviet nationality politics in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
27. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 83.
28. Preece, National Minorities, 91.
29. I b i d.
30. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 57.
31. Ibid., 47.
32. With regard to the European context, Brubaker points to a paradox noted by Anthony D. Smith, namely, that nationalist revivals occur alongside the globalization thought to herald their demise. See Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," International Affairs 68:1(1992): 56. Yet Brubaker does not question whether the contradiction is more apparent than real, as Smith contemplates. Two things account for this in my view. First, it was hardly evident in the mid-1990s (when Nationalism Reframed came out) that European norms could positively affect nationality politics in the mid-1990s. Second, globalization in the European context involves the establishment of a "hard" outer border (Schengen) to define the area in which borders can be opened to allow the freer movement of goods, capital, and people - in other words, globalization. The Yugoslav conflicts, however, fell well outside of this border and were likely exacerbated by Europeans' sense that problems lying outside the "fence" could not affect them - thus stalling the EU-15's involvement. It was in this particular way that globalization in the European context affected the recent Yugoslav conflicts.
33. Concerning the effect of European norms on ethnic groups in Europe - the Sami and Sorbs in particular - see Reetta Toivanen, "Strategies of Cultural Survival: The Influence of European Minority Rights" (Paper presented at the 2001 European Community Studies Association Conference, Madison, WI, 31 May to 3 June 2001).
34. "Europe's Gypsies: Are They a Nation?" The Economist, 25 November 2000.
35. The government established several offices to handle minority issues and formulate official minority policy. Given the Ministry of Internal Affairs' frequent infiltration of minority networks during communism, jurisdiction over such matters was transferred to a newly created office affiliated with the Ministry of Culture in 1989. See David McQuaid, "The Growing Assertiveness of Minorities," Report on Eastern Europe 2:50(1991): 20. During the same year, the Sejm established the first permanent parliamentary group concerning minorities since the end of World War II: the Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities (Komisja Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych). 1989 also witnessed the Council of Ministers' vote to create the Committee on National Minorities (Komisja ds. Mniejszości Narodowych) to formulate government policy on minority issues. This committee, however, disbanded not long thereafter, and the envisioned advisory council of minority representatives never came into being. Beginning in April 1992, the Office of Minority Affairs (Biuro do Spraw Mniejszości Narodowych) in the Ministry of Culture instead took over this task. See Marian Kallas, "Prace parlamentarne nad uregulowaniem statusu mniejszości w Polsce (1989-1995)" (Parliamentary Proceedings concerning the Regulation of Minorities' Status in Poland [1989-1995]), Przegla̧d Sejmowy 3:11(1995): 66.
36. The government established several offices to handle minority issues and formulate official minority policy. Given the Ministry of Internal Affairs' frequent infiltration of minority networks during communism, jurisdiction over such matters was transferred to a newly created office affiliated with the Ministry of Culture in 1989. See David McQuaid, "The Growing Assertiveness of Minorities," Report on Eastern Europe 2:50(1991): 20. During the same year, the Sejm established the first permanent parliamentary group concerning minorities since the end of World War II: the Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities (Komisja Mniejszości Narodowych i Etnicznych). 1989 also witnessed the Council of Ministers' vote to create the Committee on National Minorities (Komisja ds. Mniejszości Narodowych) to formulate government policy on minority issues. This committee, however, disbanded not long thereafter, and the envisioned advisory council of minority representatives never came into being. Beginning in April 1992, the Office of Minority Affairs (Biuro do Spraw Mniejszości Narodowych) in the Ministry of Culture instead took over this task. See Marian Kallas, "Prace parlamentarne nad uregulowaniem statusu mniejszości w Polsce (1989-1995)" (Parliamentary Proceedings concerning the Regulation of Minorities' Status in Poland [1989-1995]), Przegla̧d Sejmowy 3:11(1995): 66.
37. Tending to contain the earlier-delineated European standards, these agreements included the 1991 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Germany; the 1991 Treaty of Friendship, Solidarity, and Friendly Cooperation with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; the 1992 Treaty of Friendship, Friendly Relations and Cooperation with Ukraine; the 1992 Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation with Belarus; the 1994 Treaty of Friendly Relations and Neighborly Cooperation with Lithuania; and the 1992 Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Cooperation with the Russian Federation. For the text of these treaties, see Anna Przyborowska-Klimczak and Wojciech Staszewski, eds., Stosunki Traktatowe Polski z Państwami Sa̧siednimi: Wybór Dokumentów (Poland's Treaties with Neighboring States: A Collection of Documents) (Lublin, Poland: Lubelskie Wydawnictwa Prawnicze, 1998).
38. See Articles 20 through 22 in the treaty with Germany, Article 8 in the treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Articles 11 and 12 in the Ukraine treaty, Articles 13 through 15 in the treaty with Belarus, and Articles 13 through 16 in the treaty with Lithuania. Articles 16 and 17 in the treaty with Russia, however, make no mention of identity as being a choice or of minorities being allowed to form their own organizations but are focused to an unusual degree on minorities' ability to have unrestricted access to cultural and religious sites.
39. The oppositional Solidarity trade union movement dominating Polish politics immediately after the end of the cold war expressly intended to do so.
40. See Antonina Kłoskowska, Kultury narodowe u korzeni (The Roots of National Culture) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1996); and Stanisław Ossowski, Ojczyźnie i Narodzie (On the Fatherland and the Nation) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984). On the German minority in Poland, see Zbigniew Kurcz, Mniejszośc niemiecka w Polsce i Polacy w Niemczech (The German Minority in Poland and Poles in Germany) (Wroclaw, Poland: University of Wroclaw Press, 1994).
41. See Antonina Kłoskowska, Kultury narodowe u korzeni (The Roots of National Culture) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1996); and Stanisław Ossowski, Ojczyźnie i Narodzie (On the Fatherland and the Nation) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984). On the German minority in Poland, see Zbigniew Kurcz, Mniejszośc niemiecka w Polsce i Polacy w Niemczech (The German Minority in Poland and Poles in Germany) (Wroclaw, Poland: University of Wroclaw Press, 1994).
42. See Antonina Kłoskowska, Kultury narodowe u korzeni (The Roots of National Culture) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1996); and Stanisław Ossowski, Ojczyźnie i Narodzie (On the Fatherland and the Nation) (Warsaw, Poland: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1984). On the German minority in Poland, see Zbigniew Kurcz, Mniejszośc niemiecka w Polsce i Polacy w Niemczech (The German Minority in Poland and Poles in Germany) (Wroclaw, Poland: University of Wroclaw Press, 1994).
43. "Czy jesteśmy dumni ze swej polskości?" (Are We Proud of Our Polishness?) Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) (June 1994): 2(N = 1,157).
44. Listed at the conclusion of Article 20 in the Polish-German Treaty.
45. Danuta Berlinska, "Oczekiewania i Realizacja Praw Mniejszości Niemieckiej po Podpisaniu Traktatu o Dobrym Sa̧siedztwie i Przyjaźnej Współpracy Miȩdzy Polska̧ a Niemcami" (The Expectation and Realization of Minority Rights for Germans after the Signing of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation), in Michał Lis and Alexander Trzcielinski-Polus, eds., Polacy i Niemcy (Poles and Germans) (Opole, Poland: Institute of Silesia, 1997), 59-60.
46. McQuaid, "Growing Assertiveness," 20.
47. Zbigniew Kurcz, "Dlaczego Śla̧zacy Staja̧ Siȩ Niemcami?" (Why Did the Silesians Become Germans?), Odra 5 (May 1991): 30.
48. Though the figures on Germans in Poland vary widely depending on the source, official Polish government figures claim them to form the most numerous minority ranging between 350,000 and 450,000. Other significant minorities include Belorussians (200,000 to 300,000), Ukrainians (150,000 to 300,000), Roma (25,000 to 30,000), and Lithuanians (20,000 to 25,000). See Gabriele Simoncini, "National Minorities of Poland at the End of the Twentieth Century," Polish Review 43:2(1998): 180-86.
49. Results of both surveys are reported in: "Polacy Wobec Kwestii Niemieckiej" (Poles on the German Question), CBOS (March 1990): 2-3 (N = 1,500).
50. Two percent said it was "entirely unnecessary." See "Polacy Wobec Zjednoczenia Niemiec" (Poles on German Unification), CBOS (October 1990): 5 (N = 1,477). For a more systematic discussion of survey results from this time, see Andrzej Sakson, "Naród Niemiecki w Świadomości Społecznej Polaków" (The German Nation in Poles' Social Consciousness), Życie i Myś 3:341(1996): 29-38.
51. Two percent said it was "entirely unnecessary." See "Polacy Wobec Zjednoczenia Niemiec" (Poles on German Unification), CBOS (October 1990): 5 (N = 1,477). For a more systematic discussion of survey results from this time, see Andrzej Sakson, "Naród Niemiecki w Świadomości Społecznej Polaków" (The German Nation in Poles' Social Consciousness), Życie i Myś 3:341(1996): 29-38.
52. Kamusella, "Asserting Minority Rights in Poland," Transition 2:11(1996): 16.
53. The Polish government's rejection of the German minority's demands for more extensive rights after 1989 ultimately contradicted Germany's support for greater autonomy for all Germans abroad at this time. While interwar German political elites supported and manipulated the League of Nations to fulfill their revisionist intentions, German leaders after 1989 also supported generous minority provisions - only this time to stem the high tide of post-cold war ethnic German immigration. Approximately 21/2 million ethnic Germans moved from Eastern Europe and the former USSR to Germany between 1987 and 1997. See Rogers Brubaker, "Migrations of Ethnic Unmixing in the 'New Europe,' " International Migration Review 32:4(1998): 1049. Beyond more open borders, difficult living conditions, and discrimination toward minorities, German citizenship policy was indeed an important factor in the acute rise of immigration after the fall of communism. Special provisions within this policy did not apply in principle to all ethnic Germans abroad but only to "refugees and expellees" (ibid.). Yet a 1953 law defined an "expellee" not merely as a person forced to leave his or her home but also as an ethnic German leaving the USSR or Eastern Europe after the official expulsions occurred. This definition essentially opened Germany's doors to all ethnic Germans from the east. Though recent legislative changes have helped to stem the flow of immigrants, approximately two hundred thousand ethnic Germans from the east (mostly from the former Soviet Union) continue to settle in Germany yearly (ibid., 1050).
54. Andrzej Sakson, "Die Nationalitätenpolitik der III Republic" (The Nationality Politics of the Third Republic), Welt Trends 27 (2000): 69.
55. Andrzej Kaczynski, "Kompendium praw mniejszości" (A Compendium of Minority Rights), Rzeczpospolita, 17 March 1999.
56. Stanislaw Podemski, "Obywatel, choć nie polak" (A Citizen, though Not a Pole), Rzeczpospolita, 15 April 1999.
57. Quoted in Podemski, "Obywatel," 19.
58. Dorota Simonides, "Standardy Europejskie Dotycza̧ce Mniejszości Narodowych" (European Standards Concerning National Minorities), in Iwona Kabzinska-Stawarz, ed., Konflikty Etniczne: Źródła-Typy-Sposoby Rostrzygania (Ethnic Conflicts: Sources-Types-Possibilities for Solution) (Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 1996), 113 (my translation).
59. Jan Dziadul, "Jaskółka kala gniazdo" (The Swallow Defecates in the Nest), Polityka, 29 April 2000.
60. Slawomir Starzynski, "Narodziny narodu" (The Birth of a Nation), Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 July 1997.
61. I b i d.
62. Jan Dziadul, "My, Naród Sła̧dski" (We the Silesian Nation), Polityka, 14 June 1997 (emphasis and translation mine).
63. I b i d.
64. I b i d.
65. Danuta Lubin-Cipinska, "Nie ma mniejszości bez wiȩkszości" (No Minority without a Majority), Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 September 1997.
66. Joanna Pszon, "Opolsa gmina chce być Śla̧ska" (A County in Opole Wants to Be Silesian), Gazeta Wyborcza, 30 June 1998.
67. Quoted in Dziadul, "Jaskółka," 80 (my translation).
68. The State Protection Office took this report off its home page immediately after this story made front-page headlines.
69. Andrzej Sakson lists this amount in Rola Mniejszości Niemieckiej w Stosunkach Polsko-Niemteckich na Przykładzie Warmii i Mazur (The Role of the German Minority in Polish-German Relations in the Case of Warmia and Mazuria), Notebooks of the Institute of the West (Poznań, Poland: Institute of the West, 1998), vol. 11, 13.
70. Nearly 98 percent of Hungary's residents declared Hungarian nationality in the 1990 census. Of the more numerous minorities, 1.4 percent chose "Gypsy," 0.3 percent German, and 1 percent each Slovak, Romanian, and Croatian. See Statistical Yearbook of Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 1999), 40.
71. Alfred A. Reisch, "First Law on Minorities Drafted," Report on Eastern Europe 2:50(1951): 15.
72. I b i d.
73. Marian Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa Wegier i jej wpływ na status mniejszości wegierskiej w państwach sasiedzkich" (The Influence of Hungary's Minority Politics on the Status of the Hungarian Minority in Neighboring States), in Kabzinska-Stawarz, Konflikty Etniczne, 138; and Reisch, "First Law," 16.
74. Marian Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa Wegier i jej wpływ na status mniejszości wegierskiej w państwach sasiedzkich" (The Influence of Hungary's Minority Politics on the Status of the Hungarian Minority in Neighboring States), in Kabzinska-Stawarz, Konflikty Etniczne, 138; and Reisch, "First Law," 16.
75. Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 138; and Reisch, "First Law," 16.
76. Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 138; and Reisch, "First Law," 16.
77. Reisch, "First Law," 16.
78. It appeared in two out of four major foreign policy goals in May 1990: (1) Hungary's quick reintegration with Western Europe; (2) support for regional collaboration; (3) the establishment of friendly relations with neighboring states; and finally, (4) support for both individual and collective minority rights, particularly for Hungarians living next door. See Geza Jeszenszky, "Traktaty Wegier z sasiednimi państwami a kwestia mniejszości narodowych" (Hungary's Treaties with Neighboring States and the Question of National Minorities), Przeglad Zachodni 53:4(1997): 47.
79. Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 136.
80. Albert Blaustein and Gisbert Flanz, eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Supplement for Hungary) (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1993), 1.
81. At the very same assembly mentioned above, Antall also made a statement cited less often by Slovak and Romanian nationalists: Though we condemn Trianon historically, we realize however that signing the agreement in Helsinki obliges us to resign from pursuing border changes through force. At the same time, we recognize that - on the basis of Trianon through which we lost quite a lot - we have a moral right to demand a guarantee for national minorities that were, after all, guaranteed in the same treaty. (Quoted in Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 136).
82. The Council ultimately supported two Hungarian-driven changes to Slovakia's entrance requirements: monitoring to see if Slovakia complied with the Council's recommendations and repealing post-World War II decrees deemed discriminatory to Hungarians. See Bennett Kovrig, "Partitioned Nation: Hungarian Minorities in Central Europe," in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 57.
83. Their unintended integration into Hungarian culture and society occurred because minorities in Hungary tend to exhibit a lower degree of national consciousness. This stems from the fact that their ancestors settled in the territory of present-day Hungary prior to the rise of Slovak, Romanian, and Croatian national movements. Evidence of their assimilation comes from the 1990 elections. Parties with a minority-nationality orientation took a far smaller share of the vote (less than 0.04 percent) than their respective share of the population (at least 2 percent). See Reisch, "First Law," 15-17.
84. Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 140.
85. Edith Oltay, "Hungary Passes Law on Minority Rights," RFE/RL Research Report 2:33(1993): 58.
86. Szczepaniak, "Polityka mniejszościowa," 140.
87. Ibid., 142.
88. Hungary even joined Austria's cultural cousin, Germany, in an attempt to regain lost territory during World War II.
89. Like Hungary, Slovakia promotes both Slovak nationality and integration into the EU simultaneously; yet it differs in the greater extent to which elites and nationality-minded citizens interpret Slovakia's entry into the EU as a potential drain on the distinctness of Slovak identity.
90. Evidence for this claim comes from the fact that Vladimir Meciar, Slovakia's prime minister essentially from 1992 to 1998, gained votes to a significant extent from manipulating fears of Hungarian revanchism.
91. Jan Obrman, "Language Law Stirs Controversy in Slovakia," Report on Eastern Europe 1:46(1990): 15.
92. Jiri Pehe, "Bill of Fundamental Rights and Liberties Adopted," Report on Eastern Europe 2:4(1991): 1-4.
93. Pavel Mates, "The Czech Constitution," RFE/RL Research Report 2:10(1993): 42.
94. Article 152 states, after all, that all other laws will be considered valid only if they do not contradict the new document. Ambiguity was also present in the Constitution's curious combination of the Charter's "civic" principles with a very pro-Slovak preamble. The emphasis on Slovak nationality, however, is not entirely surprising given that the Constitution was written at a time when Slovak politicians were using national discourse to legitimate the idea of Slovak sovereignty. Only several months later, on 1 January 1993, did the international community recognize the formal breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
95. Sharon Fisher, "Tottering in the Aftermath of Elections," Transition 1:4(1995): 20.
96. The potentially difficult consequences of following another COE recommendation, the formal renunciation of Czechoslovakia's Benes Decrees mandating the expulsion of Hungarians and Germans in 1945, led Slovak elites to essentially shelve this recommendation. See Fisher, "Tottering," 3.
97. Rudolf Chmel, "Nikt nie chce pozbyć sie kompleksów" (No One Wants to Get Rid of Their Complexes), Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 May, 1996.
98. Jeszenszky, "Traktaty Wegier," 52.
99. Fisher, "Tottering," 4.
100. I b i d.
101. Quoted in ibid., 5.
102. I b i d.
103. Chmel, "Nikt nie chce," 9 (my translation).
104. Representatives of the Hungarian minority similarly abstained from the vote on the Framework Convention in 1995 to protest government policies.
105. Josephine Schmidt, "Excerpts from Speeches, Editorials and Other Notable Documents," Transition 1:23(1995): 60.
106. Tomasz Mackowiak, "Braterstwo ekstremistów" (A Brotherhood of Extremists), Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 February 2000.
107. RFE/RL Newsline, 16 February 2000 (http://www.rferl.org/newsline).
108. Rachel Tritt, Struggling for Ethnic Identity: Czechoslovakia's Endangered Gypsies (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), 39.
109. I b i d.
110. Alaina Lemon, "No Land, No Contracts for Romani Workers," Transition 2:13(1990): 30.
111. Jiri Pehe, "Law on Romanies Causes Uproar in Czech Republic," RPE/RL Research Report 2:7(1993): 20.
112. Pavel Mates, "Czech Constitution," 53-54.
113. Mathew Rhodes, "National Identity and Minority Rights in the Constitutions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia," East European Quarterly 29:3(1995): 354.
114. Ibid., 353.
115. If no allowance for regional identity is made, Moravians and Czechs make up 94.5 percent of the Czech Republic's population (13.2 and 81.3 percent, respectively), while Roma constitute only 0.3 percent. Other ethnic and national minorities include the Slovaks, making up 3 percent of the population as well as the following groups, each of which makes up less than 1 percent: Poles (0.6 percent), Germans (0.5 percent), Silesians (0.3 percent). All remaining identities make up less than 0.8 percent of the Czech Republic's population See Regina Wasilewska, "Czechy" (The Czechs), Europa Śrȯdkowo-Wschodnia 11 (March 1999): 77.
116. Jan Obrman, "The Issue of Autonomy for Moravia and Silesia," Report on Eastern Europe 2:15(1991): 13.
117. Ibid., 18.
118. Ibid., 20.
119. Pehe, "Law," 20.
120. " 'Dividing' the Citizens of Czechoslovakia," Transitions 2:6(1996): 60.
121. Melanie H. Ram, "European Union Policymaking in Candidate States: Legislating Minority Rights in the Czech Republic and Romania" (Paper presented at the European Community Studies Association Conference, Madison, WI, 31 May to 1 June 2001.)
122. Ibid., 16.
123. Ibid., 39.
124. Interview with Petr Uhl, "Mur w Każdym z Nas" (The Wall in Each of Us), Gazeta Wyborcza, 16 December 1999.
125. RFE/RL Newsline, 14 October 1999.
126. Tomasz Mackowiak, "Mur stana̧ł" (The Wall Is Erected), Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 October 1999.
127. RFE/RL Newsline, 14 October 1999.
128. On 12 April 2000, the Czech Constitutional Court overruled parts of the Chamber of Deputies' revocation of the Usti and Nestemice city councils' decision to build the wall. See RFE/RL Newsline, 12 April 2000.
129. Tomasz Mackowiak and Jacek Pawlicki, "Bruksela: Murów w Europie Nie chcemy" (From Brussels: We Don't Want Walls in Europe), Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 October 1999.
130. RFE/RL Newsline, 16 October 1999.
131. Mackowiak and Pawlicki, "Bruksela," 11.
132. RFE/RL Newsline, 24 November 1999.
133. Tomasz Mackowiak, "Nie Ma Muru!" (There Is No Wall!), Gazeta Wyborcza, 25 November 1999.
134. RFE/RL Newsline, 31 January 2000.
135. RFE/RL Newsline, 26 April 2000.
136. "Europe's Gypsies: Are They a Nation?" The Economist, 25 November 2000.
137. Provided that at least 40 percent of the minority community desires this right.
138. RFE/RL Newsline, 25 May 2001.