On the profitability of horizontal mergers in industries with dynamic competition

Japan and the World Economy

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 195-216

  Dockner, Engelbert J ^a   Gaunersdorfer, Andrea ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

C73; D43; Dynamic Cournot competition; G43; Horizontal mergers; L13; Markov perfect equilibrium; Welfare consequences

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042904330     PISSN: 09221425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0922-1425(01)00061-5     Document Type: Article

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