Causality does influence conjunctive probability judgments if context and design allow for it

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Volumn 63, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 1-5

  Fabre, Jean Marc ^a   Caverni, Jean Paul ^a   Jungermann, Helmut ^b  

^a Universit and é de Provence and CNRS ^*  (France)

^b TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042891319     PISSN: 07495978     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/obhd.1995.1056     Document Type: Article

References (4)

1. Bimbaum, M. H. (1982). Controversies in psychological measurement. In B. Wegener (Ed.), Social attitudes and psychological measurement (pp. 401-485). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
2. Thiiring, M., & Jungermann, H. (1990). The conjunction fallacy: Causality vs. Event probability. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3, 61-74.
3. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.
4. Yates, J. F., & Carlson, B. W. (1986). Conjunction errors: Evidence for multiple judgment procedures, including “signed summation.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 230-253.