Transitions and transformations: Building international cooperation

Security Studies

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 154-179

  Lebow, Richard Ned ^a  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042828356     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429317     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
2. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
3. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
4. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
5. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
6. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
7. For example, George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," Comparative Studies of Society and History 20 (April 1978): 214-35; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," The American Political Science Review 74 (December 1960): 947-65; William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Raimo Väyrynen, "Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars Between Major Powers," International Studies Quarterly 27 (December 1983): 389-418; Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). This literature is reviewed by Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40 (October 1987): 82-107.
8. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security 16 (winter 1991/92): 74-118, and "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," Review of International Studies 17 (summer 1991): 225-50; Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold Wan Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace," in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 57-84; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (winter 1994/95): 91-129.
9. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security 16 (winter 1991/92): 74-118, and "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," Review of International Studies 17 (summer 1991): 225-50; Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold Wan Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace," in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 57-84; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (winter 1994/95): 91-129.
10. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security 16 (winter 1991/92): 74-118, and "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," Review of International Studies 17 (summer 1991): 225-50; Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold Wan Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace," in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 57-84; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (winter 1994/95): 91-129.
11. See, for example, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," International Security 16 (winter 1991/92): 74-118, and "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," Review of International Studies 17 (summer 1991): 225-50; Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold Wan Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace," in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, ed. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 57-84; William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (winter 1994/95): 91-129.
12. Gilpin, War and Change, 192-97; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," and Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
13. Gilpin, War and Change, 192-97; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," and Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
14. Gilpin, War and Change, 192-97; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," and Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
15. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). See Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, InternationalRelations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 46-49, for a critique of Waltz's use of Darwin.
16. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). See Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, The End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, InternationalRelations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 46-49, for a critique of Waltz's use of Darwin.
17. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948), Part 3, recognized this problem, and acknowledged that leaders do not always grasp the imperatives of structure and that their policies are influenced by nonmaterial factors like ideology. Morgenthau's theory was not determinist, and he invoked nonmaterial considerations to explain behavior at variance with his theory. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 97-98, also acknowledges that "decisionmakers' assessments of power are what matters." At the outset of his article, he uses the word perception in its psychological sense, and appears to acknowledge the inherently subjective nature of assessment. Later on, however, when discussing Soviet policy, perception represents objective and rational understanding of capabilities. What Wohlforth appears to concede in his theory section he takes back in its empirical application.
18. Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Knopf, 1948), Part 3, recognized this problem, and acknowledged that leaders do not always grasp the imperatives of structure and that their policies are influenced by nonmaterial factors like ideology. Morgenthau's theory was not determinist, and he invoked nonmaterial considerations to explain behavior at variance with his theory. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," 97-98, also acknowledges that "decisionmakers' assessments of power are what matters." At the outset of his article, he uses the word perception in its psychological sense, and appears to acknowledge the inherently subjective nature of assessment. Later on, however, when discussing Soviet policy, perception represents objective and rational understanding of capabilities. What Wohlforth appears to concede in his theory section he takes back in its empirical application.
19. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
20. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
21. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
22. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
23. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
24. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (summer 1990): 5-56; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18 (fall 1993): 44-79; Valerie Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon: the Gorbachev Regime and Eastern Europe," Eastern European Politics and Societies 3 (spring 1989): 235-67; "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War," International Journal 46 (spring 1991): 220-41; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War"; Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War."
25. For evidence, see Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers (New York: Norton, 1989), passim; Jack F. Matlack, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 68-154; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 7.
26. For evidence, see Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers (New York: Norton, 1989), passim; Jack F. Matlack, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 68-154; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 7.
27. For evidence, see Stephen F. Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel, Voices of Glasnost: Interviews with Gorbachev's Reformers (New York: Norton, 1989), passim; Jack F. Matlack, Jr., Autopsy of an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 68-154; Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 7.
28. Patrick Morgan, Deterrence, A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), is generally credited with this distinction.
29. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Domestic Change," International Security 13 (winter 1991/92): 74-118; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War." Learning and adaptation to unsuccessful competition are also important components of the explanations for the shift in Soviet policy in the arguments of Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," and Jack Snyder, "Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 85-108, 109-26.
30. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Domestic Change," International Security 13 (winter 1991/92): 74-118; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War." Learning and adaptation to unsuccessful competition are also important components of the explanations for the shift in Soviet policy in the arguments of Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," and Jack Snyder, "Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 85-108, 109-26.
31. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Domestic Change," International Security 13 (winter 1991/92): 74-118; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War." Learning and adaptation to unsuccessful competition are also important components of the explanations for the shift in Soviet policy in the arguments of Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," and Jack Snyder, "Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 85-108, 109-26.
32. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Domestic Change," International Security 13 (winter 1991/92): 74-118; Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War." Learning and adaptation to unsuccessful competition are also important components of the explanations for the shift in Soviet policy in the arguments of Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and the End of the Cold War," and Jack Snyder, "Myths, Modernization, and the Post-Gorbachev World," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 85-108, 109-26.
33. Elli Lieberman, "The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate and the Role of Deterrence in Enduring Rivalries." Unpublished paper.
34. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon."
35. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon."
36. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon."
37. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future"; Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics"; Bunce, "Soviet Decline as a Regional Hegemon."
38. For a discussion of the methodological problems of studying general deterrence, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990); Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence," paper prepared for the Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
39. For a discussion of the methodological problems of studying general deterrence, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990); Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence," paper prepared for the Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
40. In his analysis of Israeli-Syrian relations, Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), maintains that general deterrence succeeded between 1975 and 1985 because the two countries fought only one major war. Evron counts any year without a war as a success, making deterrence 90 percent successful during the decade. He also begins his ten-year period in 1975, conveniently excluding the Israeli-Syrian conflicts of 1973 and 1974. Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Practice," World Politics 41 (January 1989): 183-207, also notes the arbitrary use of temporal indicators of success.
41. In his analysis of Israeli-Syrian relations, Yair Evron, War and Intervention in Lebanon (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), maintains that general deterrence succeeded between 1975 and 1985 because the two countries fought only one major war. Evron counts any year without a war as a success, making deterrence 90 percent successful during the decade. He also begins his ten-year period in 1975, conveniently excluding the Israeli-Syrian conflicts of 1973 and 1974. Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Practice," World Politics 41 (January 1989): 183-207, also notes the arbitrary use of temporal indicators of success.
42. On Khrushchev and Brezhnev, see Richard Ned Lcbow and Janice Gross Stein, We Al Lost the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1994 esp. chap. 14.
43. John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
44. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War.
45. Richard Ned Lebow, "The Search for Accommodation: Gorbachev in Comparative Perspective," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 167-86.
46. See Janice Gross Stein, "The Political Economy of Strategic Agreement The Linked Costs of Failure at Camp David," in Domestic Politics and International Negotiation: An Integrative Perspective, ed. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 77-103.
47. Ibid.
48. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: Free Press, 1991), xi.
49. Author's interviews with Fedor Burlatsky, Cambridge, 12 October 1987; Vadim Zagladin, Moscow, 18 May 1989; Oleg Grinevsky, Vienna and New York, 11 October and 10 November 1991; Georgiy Arbatov, Ithaca, New York, 15 November 1991; Anatoliy Dobrynin, Moscow, 17 December 1991.
50. For a good discussion of "new thinking" in foreign policy, see David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," Foreign Affairs 68 (winter 1988/89): 66-81.
51. Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, xii.
52. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 8.
53. Author's interviews with Oleg Grinevsky, Vienna, 11 October 1991, New York, 10 November 1991, Stockholm, 25 April 1992; Leonid Zamyatin, Moscow, 16 December 1991; and Anatoliy Dobrynin, Moscow, 17 December 1991. See also, Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Explaining Change in Foreign Policy: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Columbia University dissertation, 1993, and the forthcoming Cornell University dissertation of Robert Herman, "Soviet New Thinking: Ideas, Interests and the Redefinition of Security."
54. Author's interviews with Oleg Grinevsky, Vienna, 11 October 1991, New York, 10 November 1991, Stockholm, 25 April 1992; Leonid Zamyatin, Moscow, 16 December 1991; and Anatoliy Dobrynin, Moscow, 17 December 1991. See also, Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Explaining Change in Foreign Policy: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," Columbia University dissertation, 1993, and the forthcoming Cornell University dissertation of Robert Herman, "Soviet New Thinking: Ideas, Interests and the Redefinition of Security."
55. Ibid., and Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, passim.
56. Ibid., and Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, passim.
57. Ibid.; Interviews with Oleg Grinevsky, Vadim Zagladin and Anatoliy Dobrynin.
58. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 3, on Khrushchev's strategy.
59. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Place and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); "Deterrence Failure Revisited: A Reply to the Critics," International Security 12 (summer 1987): 197-213; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," and "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59, 60-88; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69, on how not to study immediate deterrence.
60. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Place and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); "Deterrence Failure Revisited: A Reply to the Critics," International Security 12 (summer 1987): 197-213; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," and "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59, 60-88; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69, on how not to study immediate deterrence.
61. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Place and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); "Deterrence Failure Revisited: A Reply to the Critics," International Security 12 (summer 1987): 197-213; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," and "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59, 60-88; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69, on how not to study immediate deterrence.
62. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Place and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); "Deterrence Failure Revisited: A Reply to the Critics," International Security 12 (summer 1987): 197-213; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," and "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59, 60-88; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69, on how not to study immediate deterrence.
63. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Place and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); "Deterrence Failure Revisited: A Reply to the Critics," International Security 12 (summer 1987): 197-213; Janice Gross Stein, "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence I: The View from Cairo," and "Calculation, Miscalculation, and Conventional Deterrence II: The View from Jerusalem," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 34-59, 60-88; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 42 (April 1990): 336-69, on how not to study immediate deterrence.
64. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 3, argue that there was a similar contradiction in Khrushchev's goals and that it was a fundamental cause of many of his most important foreign and domestic policy miscalculations.
65. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
66. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
67. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
68. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
69. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
70. See, for example, Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 187-222; Sarah E. Mendelsohn, "Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan," World Politics 45 (April 1993): 327-60; George Breslauer, "Explaining Soviet Policy Change: The Interaction of Politics and Learning," in Soviet Policy in Africa: From the Old to the New Thinking, ed. George Breslauer (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1992); Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," World Politics 45 (January 1993): 271-300; Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993). For a critical review of some of these explanations see Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, 223-58.
71. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 3; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 563-1009.
72. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, chap. 3; Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 563-1009.
73. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
74. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
75. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
76. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
77. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
78. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
79. Some useful work has been done in this connection by scholars studying enduring rivalries. See, for example, Palmira Brummett, "The Ottoman Empire, Venice, and the Question of Enduring Rivalries"; Gary Goertz, "Enduring Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence"; Edward Ingram, "Enduring Rivalries: Britain and Russia"; Jack S. Levy and Salvatore Ali, "Economic Competition, Domestic Politics, and Systemic Change: The Rise and Decline of the Anglo-Dutch Rivalry, 1609-88"; Paul W. Schroeder, "The Enduring Rivalry between France and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1715-1918"; William R. Thompson, "The Evolution of a Great Power Rivalry: The Anglo-American Case"; John A. Vasquez, "Are There Patterns in Interstate Rivalries?" All these papers were prepared for a Conference on Great Power Rivalries, held on 27-29 April 1996 at the Center for the Study of International Relations at the University of Indiana.
80. New York Times, 21 August 1995, A1.
81. This point is also made by Richard K. Herrmann, "Conclusion: The End of the Cold War - What Have We Learned?" in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 259-84.
82. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 127-66; John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48-62; Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?" and Metta Spencer, "Political Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (July/August 1995): 57-61 and 62-68.
83. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 127-66; John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48-62; Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?" and Metta Spencer, "Political Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (July/August 1995): 57-61 and 62-68.
84. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 127-66; John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48-62; Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?" and Metta Spencer, "Political Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (July/August 1995): 57-61 and 62-68.
85. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 127-66; John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48-62; Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?" and Metta Spencer, "Political Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (July/August 1995): 57-61 and 62-68.
86. See, for example, Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely"; Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," in Lebow and Risse-Kappen, International Relations and the End of the Cold War, 127-66; John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 48-62; Mary Kaldor, "Who Killed the Cold War?" and Metta Spencer, "Political Scientists," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51 (July/August 1995): 57-61 and 62-68.