Subjective rationality, self-confirming equilibrium, and corporate strategy

Management Science

Volumn 49, Issue 7, 2003, Pages 936-949

  Ryall, Michael D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

Equilibrium; Persistent Advantage; Self Confirming; Strategy; Subjective Rationality

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; OPTIMIZATION; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

SUBJECTIVE RATIONALITY;

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE;

EID: 0042768062     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.49.7.936.16380     Document Type: Review

References (23)

1. Abreu, D., D. Pearce, et al. 1990. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Econometrica 58(5) 1041-1063.
2. Battigalli, P., D. Guatoli. 1988. Conjectural equilibria and rationaliz-ability in a macroeconomic game with incomplete information. Mimeo, Instituto Economia Politica, Milan, Italy.
3. Blume, L. E., D. Easley. 1992. Rational expectations and rational learning. Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
4. Debreu, G. 1959. Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT.
5. Demsetz, H. 1988. Efficiency, Competition and Policy. Basil Blackwell, Inc, Cambridge, MA.
6. Drucker, P. F. 1985. Innovation and Entrepreneurship; Practice and Principles. Harper & Row, New York.
7. Fudenberg, D., D. K. Levine. 1993. Self-confirming equilibrium. Econometrica 61(3) 523-545.
8. Gittens, J., D. Jones. 1974. A dynamic allocation index for the sequential allocation of experiments. J. Gani et al., eds. Progress in Statistics. North Holland, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 241-266.
9. Harsanyi, J. 1967-1968. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players. Management Sci. 14 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
10. Hirshleifer, J., J. G. Riley. 1992. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
11. Kalai, E., E. Lehrer. 1993. Subjective equilibrium in repeated games. Econometrica 61 1231-1240.
12. _, _. 1995. Subjective games and equilibria. Games Econom. Behavior 8 123-163.
13. Lippman, S. A., R. P. Rumelt. 1982. Uncertain imitability: An analysis of interfirm differences in efficiency under competition. Bell J. Econom. 13 418-438.
14. Machina, M. J. 1987. Choice under uncertainty: Problems solved and unsolved. J. Econom. Perspectives 1(1) 121-154.
15. McGahan, A. M. 1999. The performance of US corporations: 1981-1994. J. Indust. Econom. XLVII(4) 373-398.
16. Montgomery, C. A., S. Hariharan. 1991. Diversified expansion by large established firms. J. Econom. Behavior Organ. 15 71-89.
17. _, B. Wernerfelt. 1988. Diversification, Ricardian rents, and Tobin's q. RAND J. Econom. 19(4) 623-632.
18. Nash, J. 1950. Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proc. National Acad. Sci. 36 48-49.
19. Penrose, E. 1959. The Theory of Growth of the Firm, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press, New York.
20. Prahalad, C. K. G. Hamel. 1990. The core-competence of the corporation. Harvard Bus. Rev. 79-91.
21. Russo, J. E., P. J. H. Schoemaker. 1989. Decision Traps. Doubleday, New York.
22. Sculley, J. 1987. Odyssey. Harper and Row, Cambridge, MA.
23. Teece, D. J. 1980. Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise. J. Econom. Behavior Organ. 1 223-247.