Heidegger, humanism, and the destruction of history

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 547-576

  Soffer, Gail ^a  

^a NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH   (United States)

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EID: 0042731125     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (126)

1. See, for example, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1987), 138. Even as early as 1969, Derrida criticized Heidegger for remaining humanistic and metaphysical because still attached to an essentialist conception of man. See Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), especially 127-30.
2. See, for example, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1987), 138. Even as early as 1969, Derrida criticized Heidegger for remaining humanistic and metaphysical because still attached to an essentialist conception of man. See Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), especially 127-30.
3. For this definition of humanism, see Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Heidegger and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 4; Heidegger et les modernes (Paris: Grasset, 1988), 15. For the claim that this definition embodies reflection on the "true nature of humanism," see the English edition, p. 41; French edition, p. 95. An alternate characterization is proposed by Grondin, according to whom the essential insight of humanism is that "one never ceases to learn from the encounter with the tradition and that, through the human sciences, we can grasp truths we would never gain access to if scienticism were the sole model of knowledge"; Jean Grondin, "Humanism and the Limits of Rationality: A Hermeneutical Perspective," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 16, no. 2 (1993): 429.
4. For this definition of humanism, see Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Heidegger and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 4; Heidegger et les modernes (Paris: Grasset, 1988), 15. For the claim that this definition embodies reflection on the "true nature of humanism," see the English edition, p. 41; French edition, p. 95. An alternate characterization is proposed by Grondin, according to whom the essential insight of humanism is that "one never ceases to learn from the encounter with the tradition and that, through the human sciences, we can grasp truths we would never gain access to if scienticism were the sole model of knowledge"; Jean Grondin, "Humanism and the Limits of Rationality: A Hermeneutical Perspective," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 16, no. 2 (1993): 429.
5. For this definition of humanism, see Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Heidegger and Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 4; Heidegger et les modernes (Paris: Grasset, 1988), 15. For the claim that this definition embodies reflection on the "true nature of humanism," see the English edition, p. 41; French edition, p. 95. An alternate characterization is proposed by Grondin, according to whom the essential insight of humanism is that "one never ceases to learn from the encounter with the tradition and that, through the human sciences, we can grasp truths we would never gain access to if scienticism were the sole model of knowledge"; Jean Grondin, "Humanism and the Limits of Rationality: A Hermeneutical Perspective," Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 16, no. 2 (1993): 429.
6. "Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or makes itself into the ground of one. Any determination of the essence of man which knowingly or unknowingly presupposes an interpretation of beings without [posing] the question of the truth of Being, is metaphysical. From this emerges the proper characteristic of all metaphysics: that it is 'humanistic', specifically in the way it determines the essence of man": "Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik oder er macht sich selbst zum Grund einer solchen. Jede Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen, die schon die Auslegung des Seienden ohne die Frage der Wahrheit des Seins voraussetzt, sei es mit Wissen, sei es ohne Wissen, ist metaphysisch. Darum zeigt sich, und zwar im Hinblick auf die Art, wie das Wesen des Menschen bestimmt wird, das Eigentümlicher aller Metaphysik darin, daß sie 'humanistisch' ist"; Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 202; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 321. I have modified existing translations, and supplied them where none exists.
7. "Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or makes itself into the ground of one. Any determination of the essence of man which knowingly or unknowingly presupposes an interpretation of beings without [posing] the question of the truth of Being, is metaphysical. From this emerges the proper characteristic of all metaphysics: that it is 'humanistic', specifically in the way it determines the essence of man": "Jeder Humanismus gründet entweder in einer Metaphysik oder er macht sich selbst zum Grund einer solchen. Jede Bestimmung des Wesens des Menschen, die schon die Auslegung des Seienden ohne die Frage der Wahrheit des Seins voraussetzt, sei es mit Wissen, sei es ohne Wissen, ist metaphysisch. Darum zeigt sich, und zwar im Hinblick auf die Art, wie das Wesen des Menschen bestimmt wird, das Eigentümlicher aller Metaphysik darin, daß sie 'humanistisch' ist"; Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 202; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 321. I have modified existing translations, and supplied them where none exists.
8. Schürmann goes so far as to assert that "the concept of anti-humanism is of Marxist origin"; Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger, On Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 45. However, this is far truer of the anti-humanism of Heidegger's French interpreters than of Heidegger's own.
9. See, for example, Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990), 166-8.
10. This is the view, for example, of Vito Giustiniani; see his "Homo, Humanus, and the Meanings of 'Humanism'," Journal of the History of Ideas 46, no. 2 (April 1985): 167-96.
11. For Heidegger's explicit claim that his account applies to historical phenomena including the Renaissance retrieval of the classical heritage; the return to the classics promoted by Germans such as Goethe, Winckelmann, and Burkhardt; and the classical education of the Gymnasium, see Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 200-1; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 320. See also his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann of Dec 19, 1932, in Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel, 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach: Deutscheschillergesellschaft, 1989). For the English translation see Frank H. W. Edler in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 15, no. 1 (1991): 568.
12. For Heidegger's explicit claim that his account applies to historical phenomena including the Renaissance retrieval of the classical heritage; the return to the classics promoted by Germans such as Goethe, Winckelmann, and Burkhardt; and the classical education of the Gymnasium, see Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 200-1; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 320. See also his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann of Dec 19, 1932, in Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel, 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach: Deutscheschillergesellschaft, 1989). For the English translation see Frank H. W. Edler in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 15, no. 1 (1991): 568.
13. For Heidegger's explicit claim that his account applies to historical phenomena including the Renaissance retrieval of the classical heritage; the return to the classics promoted by Germans such as Goethe, Winckelmann, and Burkhardt; and the classical education of the Gymnasium, see Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 200-1; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 320. See also his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann of Dec 19, 1932, in Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel, 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach: Deutscheschillergesellschaft, 1989). For the English translation see Frank H. W. Edler in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 15, no. 1 (1991): 568.
14. For Heidegger's explicit claim that his account applies to historical phenomena including the Renaissance retrieval of the classical heritage; the return to the classics promoted by Germans such as Goethe, Winckelmann, and Burkhardt; and the classical education of the Gymnasium, see Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 200-1; "Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 320. See also his letter to Elisabeth Blochmann of Dec 19, 1932, in Martin Heidegger-Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel, 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach: Deutscheschillergesellschaft, 1989). For the English translation see Frank H. W. Edler in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 15, no. 1 (1991): 568.
15. The fact that Renaissance humanists did not use the term 'humanism' is not of much import (similarly, Kierkegaard did not call his philosophy 'existentialism'). They did refer to themselves as humanists (unlike, for example, the Romans, not to mention Plato or Descartes) and were conscious of belonging to a unified group and movement. Later thinkers adopting this term use it by way of appeal to Renaissance humanism (Sartre), or by way of polemics with it (Heidegger), or by way of historical insensitivity. Arguably, even Sartre indirectly acknowledges the historical reference to the Renaissance. For although much has been made by Ferry and Renaut of Sartre's characterization of humanism as the view that man's essence is to be able to choose his own nature, they fail to notice that this is taken straight from that cornerstone of Renaissance humanism, Pico della Mirandola's Discourse on the Dignity of Man. Thus Sartre himself argues that his philosophy is humanistic not in the abstract, but by showing its similarity to Renaissance humanism. As has been discussed above, Heidegger also treats humanism as an historical phenomenon, after his own fashion.
16. For a similar criticism of Heidegger's over-essentialism, see Richard J. Bernstein, "Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia," Review of Metaphysics 42, no. 2 (December 1988): 255-73.
17. This is obviously the case for Ferry and Renaut, whose reflections on the "true" nature of humanism have led them to the conclusion that it is the view that there is no human nature. To some extent, this also holds for Grondin. Unlike Ferry and Renaut, Grondin discusses historical forms of humanism, although his priority also seems to be to determine their philosophically acceptable "essence": for the Renaissance, the view that man is both ashes and the image of God; for German humanism of the Enlightenment, the idea that the constant task of man is self-perfection and self-realization. See Jean Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," unpublished manuscript, p. 1. The same essentialism is reflected in Grondin's positive characterization of humanism as an unending quest for civility and vigilance against the animal in man, to be achieved through Bildung (Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," 8); and his claim that the sole essential insight of humanism is that the human sciences reveal truths inaccessible to the other sciences; Grondin, "Humanism and the Limits of Rationality: A Hermeneutical Perspective," 429.
18. This is obviously the case for Ferry and Renaut, whose reflections on the "true" nature of humanism have led them to the conclusion that it is the view that there is no human nature. To some extent, this also holds for Grondin. Unlike Ferry and Renaut, Grondin discusses historical forms of humanism, although his priority also seems to be to determine their philosophically acceptable "essence": for the Renaissance, the view that man is both ashes and the image of God; for German humanism of the Enlightenment, the idea that the constant task of man is self-perfection and self-realization. See Jean Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," unpublished manuscript, p. 1. The same essentialism is reflected in Grondin's positive characterization of humanism as an unending quest for civility and vigilance against the animal in man, to be achieved through Bildung (Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," 8); and his claim that the sole essential insight of humanism is that the human sciences reveal truths inaccessible to the other sciences; Grondin, "Humanism and the Limits of Rationality: A Hermeneutical Perspective," 429.
19. Indeed he explicitly locates the origin of humanism in Plato's theory of ideas in "Plato's Theory of Truth," and somewhat more ambiguously suggests Plato and Aristotle as its sources in the "Letter on Humanism." See Martin Heidegger, "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit," in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 236. See also Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 194/"Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 314.
20. Indeed he explicitly locates the origin of humanism in Plato's theory of ideas in "Plato's Theory of Truth," and somewhat more ambiguously suggests Plato and Aristotle as its sources in the "Letter on Humanism." See Martin Heidegger, "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit," in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe 9 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 236. See also Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 194/"Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 314.
21. In a letter written to Blochmann in June, 1932, Heidegger refers to the authority of Nietzsche to support the unique kinship between the Germans and the Greeks. In a defense of his distaste for the Centrist Party, he also suggests the following constellations: Rome-Moscow-the Catholic Church-the Centrist Party-liberalism; Greece-Germany-the National Socialist Party. See Heidegger-Blochmann Briefwechsel, 52/English translation, 566-7. Of course this negative assessment of Latinity provides a powerful if sometimes unspoken motivation underlying the French polemics over humanism, not to mention - notoriously - the Farias book. This particular Heideggerian view has been countered by Rémi Brague with the thesis that Latinity or "Romanity" is the true defining and unifying characteristic of Europe. According to Brague, Latinity consists essentially of the dynamic appropriation of the foreign, the mediation between a classical ideal and the barbaric tendencies in human nature. Although Brague is restrained in his polemics, his book opens with a map of Europe where the Teutonic regions are suggestively shaded in black, and ends with a peon to Catholicism. Its determination of Latinity remains within a Heideggerian essentialism: "The Roman is the experience of the beginning as a (re)beginning." "To be Roman is to have a classicism before oneself to be imitated, and a barbarism behind oneself to overcome": "Est romaine l'expérience du commencement comment (re)commencement;" "Être 'romaine,' c'est avoir en avant de soi un classicisme à imiter, et en aval de soi un barbarie à soumettre"; Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine (Paris: Criterion, 1992), 35 and 36.
22. In a letter written to Blochmann in June, 1932, Heidegger refers to the authority of Nietzsche to support the unique kinship between the Germans and the Greeks. In a defense of his distaste for the Centrist Party, he also suggests the following constellations: Rome-Moscow-the Catholic Church-the Centrist Party-liberalism; Greece-Germany-the National Socialist Party. See Heidegger-Blochmann Briefwechsel, 52/English translation, 566-7. Of course this negative assessment of Latinity provides a powerful if sometimes unspoken motivation underlying the French polemics over humanism, not to mention - notoriously - the Farias book. This particular Heideggerian view has been countered by Rémi Brague with the thesis that Latinity or "Romanity" is the true defining and unifying characteristic of Europe. According to Brague, Latinity consists essentially of the dynamic appropriation of the foreign, the mediation between a classical ideal and the barbaric tendencies in human nature. Although Brague is restrained in his polemics, his book opens with a map of Europe where the Teutonic regions are suggestively shaded in black, and ends with a peon to Catholicism. Its determination of Latinity remains within a Heideggerian essentialism: "The Roman is the experience of the beginning as a (re)beginning." "To be Roman is to have a classicism before oneself to be imitated, and a barbarism behind oneself to overcome": "Est romaine l'expérience du commencement comment (re)commencement;" "Être 'romaine,' c'est avoir en avant de soi un classicisme à imiter, et en aval de soi un barbarie à soumettre"; Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine (Paris: Criterion, 1992), 35 and 36.
23. "We encounter the first humanism in Rome. It therefore remains in essence a specifically Roman phenomenon, emerging from the encounter of Roman civilization with the Bildung of late Greek civilization. The so-called Renaissance of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Italy is a renascentia romanitatis. Because romanitas is what matters, it is concerned with humanitas and therefore with Greek naioeia. But Greek civilization is always seen in its later form and from a Roman point of view. The homo romanus of the Renaissance also stands in opposition to homo barbarus. Now, however, the in-human is the supposed barbarism of the gothic Scholasticism of the Middle Ages. Therefore historically understood, humanism always includes a studium humanitatis, which in a certain way reaches back to antiquity and thus becomes a revival of Greek civilization. This is apparent in the humanism of the eighteenth century in Germany, as advanced by Winckelmann, Goethe, and Schiller": "Im Rom begegnen wir dem ersten Humanismus. Er bleibt daher im Wesen eine spezifisch römische Erscheinung, die aus der Begegnung des Römertums mit der Bildung des späten Griechentums entspringt. Die sogenannte Renaissance des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts in Italien ist eine renascentia romanitatis. Weil es auf die romanitas ankommt, geht es um die humanitas und deshalb um die griechische -naioeia. Das Griechentums wird aber stets in seiner späten Gestalt und diese selbst römisch gesehen. Auch der homo romanus der Renaissance steht in einem Gegensatz zum homo barbarus. Aber das In-humane ist jetzt die vermeintliche Barbarei der gotischen Scholastik des Mittelalters. Zum historischen verstandenen Humanismus gehört deshalb stets ein studium humanitatis, das in einer bestimmten Weise auf das Altertum zurückgreift und so jeweils auch zu einer Wiederbelebung des Griechentums wird. Das zeigt sich im Humanismus des 18. Jahrhunderts bei uns, der durch Winckelmann, Goethe und Schiller getragen ist"; Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 201/"Brief über den 'Humanismus'," 320.
24. Heidegger's affirmation of the unique kinship between the German and Greek languages and peoples goes back as far as 1930. See Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesamtausgabe 31 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 50-1. Although the juxtaposition of Latin to Greek is especially characteristic of Heidegger's writings of the thirties and forties, there are also earlier instances. For example, in Being and Time, he juxtaposes the Greek and Latin versions of "rational animal," and the Genesis "Let us make man in our own image and likeness." In this earlier version of the Greek/Latin contrast, the emphasis is on the alleged distortion of the Greek introduced by Scholasticism. However, the use of the koinē version of the Old Testament to represent the "primordial" is odd, given that the Greek itself is a translation, and not even feasibly the embodiment of an original Greek experience. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §10, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 74 ; Sein und Zeit, §10 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), 48-9. Hereafter cited as BT/SZ.
25. Heidegger's affirmation of the unique kinship between the German and Greek languages and peoples goes back as far as 1930. See Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesamtausgabe 31 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 50-1. Although the juxtaposition of Latin to Greek is especially characteristic of Heidegger's writings of the thirties and forties, there are also earlier instances. For example, in Being and Time, he juxtaposes the Greek and Latin versions of "rational animal," and the Genesis "Let us make man in our own image and likeness." In this earlier version of the Greek/Latin contrast, the emphasis is on the alleged distortion of the Greek introduced by Scholasticism. However, the use of the koinē version of the Old Testament to represent the "primordial" is odd, given that the Greek itself is a translation, and not even feasibly the embodiment of an original Greek experience. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §10, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 74 ; Sein und Zeit, §10 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), 48-9. Hereafter cited as BT/SZ.
26. Heidegger's affirmation of the unique kinship between the German and Greek languages and peoples goes back as far as 1930. See Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Gesamtausgabe 31 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 50-1. Although the juxtaposition of Latin to Greek is especially characteristic of Heidegger's writings of the thirties and forties, there are also earlier instances. For example, in Being and Time, he juxtaposes the Greek and Latin versions of "rational animal," and the Genesis "Let us make man in our own image and likeness." In this earlier version of the Greek/Latin contrast, the emphasis is on the alleged distortion of the Greek introduced by Scholasticism. However, the use of the koinē version of the Old Testament to represent the "primordial" is odd, given that the Greek itself is a translation, and not even feasibly the embodiment of an original Greek experience. See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, §10, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 74 ; Sein und Zeit, §10 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1984), 48-9. Hereafter cited as BT/SZ.
27. See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 153-4; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 7. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 128; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 86.
28. See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 153-4; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 7. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 128; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 86.
29. See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 153-4; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 7. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 128; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 86.
30. See Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 153-4; "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 7. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 128; "Die Zeit des Weltbildes," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 86.
31. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche by Martin Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 1:xl; Nietzsche. Erster Band (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 10.
32. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche by Martin Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 1:xl; Nietzsche. Erster Band (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), 10.
33. Martin Heidegger, "European Nihilism," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes Three and Four, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1991), 4:96; Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus, Gesamtausgabe 48 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 181.
34. Martin Heidegger, "European Nihilism," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes Three and Four, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1991), 4:96; Nietzsche: Der europäische Nihilismus, Gesamtausgabe 48 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 181.
35. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 96-100/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 181-5. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 89-90; "Nietzsches Wort: Gott is Tot," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 240.
36. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 96-100/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 181-5. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 89-90; "Nietzsches Wort: Gott is Tot," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 240.
37. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 96-100/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 181-5. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 89-90; "Nietzsches Wort: Gott is Tot," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 240.
38. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 96-100/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 181-5. See also Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead'," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 89-90; "Nietzsches Wort: Gott is Tot," in Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 240.
39. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 169-74 /Der europäische Nihilismus, 301-6.
40. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 169-74 /Der europäische Nihilismus, 301-6.
41. For a detailed textual reconstruction, see Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, 174-7.
42. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 165/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 297.
43. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 165/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 297.
44. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
45. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
46. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
47. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
48. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
49. Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 88/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 163-4. See also Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1992), 45; Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe 54 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1982), 67; and "The Word of Nietzsche," 63-4/ "Nietzsches Wort," 215-6. In this latter passage, following Nietzsche, Heidegger contrasts the Christianity of the early Christians to the "Hellenistic-Jewish" metaphysics of the Roman Catholic Church.
50. "But what does the Latin verum mean? . . . . 'Ver' means: standing steady, remaining at a stand, i.e. not falling (not falsum), remaining above, asserting oneself, being the head, commanding": "Doch was bedeutet das lateinische verum? . . . . 'Ver', das sagt: in Stand-stehen, in Stand-bleiben, d.h. nicht-fallen (kein falsum), oben bleiben, sich behaupten, das Haupt-sein, befehlen"; Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 69.
51. "But what does the Latin verum mean? . . . . 'Ver' means: standing steady, remaining at a stand, i.e. not falling (not falsum), remaining above, asserting oneself, being the head, commanding": "Doch was bedeutet das lateinische verum? . . . . 'Ver', das sagt: in Stand-stehen, in Stand-bleiben, d.h. nicht-fallen (kein falsum), oben bleiben, sich behaupten, das Haupt-sein, befehlen"; Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 69.
52. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 49-50/ Parmenides (Ger.), 73-4.
53. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 49-50/ Parmenides (Ger.), 73-4.
54. "Now why is falsum, 'bringing-to-a-fall, essential for the Romans? . . . . The decisive and essential field for the unfolding of the Roman falsum is that of the 'imperium' and the 'imperial'": "Warum ist aber nun im Römischen das falsum, das 'Zu-fall-bringen', wesentlich? . . . . Der für die Entfaltung des römischen falsum das Maßgebende Wesensbereich ist der des 'Imperiums' und des 'Imperialen'"; Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58.
55. "Now why is falsum, 'bringing-to-a-fall, essential for the Romans? . . . . The decisive and essential field for the unfolding of the Roman falsum is that of the 'imperium' and the 'imperial'": "Warum ist aber nun im Römischen das falsum, das 'Zu-fall-bringen', wesentlich? . . . . Der für die Entfaltung des römischen falsum das Maßgebende Wesensbereich ist der des 'Imperiums' und des 'Imperialen'"; Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58.
56. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 59. Here the commandment-giving God of the Old Testament is put forth as evidence of the imperialistic, dominating, un-Greek quality of Latinity, again suggesting the affinity between Latinity and Judaism, a suggestion also to be found in Nietzsche and Bertram.
57. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 59. Here the commandment-giving God of the Old Testament is put forth as evidence of the imperialistic, dominating, un-Greek quality of Latinity, again suggesting the affinity between Latinity and Judaism, a suggestion also to be found in Nietzsche and Bertram.
58. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 95-6, 90-1/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142, 134-5. See also Parmenides (Eng.), 43/ Parmenides (Ger.), 63, where Nietzsche is attacked for his wholly "Roman," un-Greek interpretation of the Greeks.
59. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 95-6, 90-1/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142, 134-5. See also Parmenides (Eng.), 43/ Parmenides (Ger.), 63, where Nietzsche is attacked for his wholly "Roman," un-Greek interpretation of the Greeks.
60. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 95-6, 90-1/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142, 134-5. See also Parmenides (Eng.), 43/ Parmenides (Ger.), 63, where Nietzsche is attacked for his wholly "Roman," un-Greek interpretation of the Greeks.
61. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 95-6, 90-1/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142, 134-5. See also Parmenides (Eng.), 43/ Parmenides (Ger.), 63, where Nietzsche is attacked for his wholly "Roman," un-Greek interpretation of the Greeks.
62. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
63. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
64. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
65. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
66. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
67. Heidegger, Parmenides (Eng.), 39, 44/ Parmenides (Ger.), 57, 65, where Heidegger quotes the Brothers Grimm to support his claim that falsch is an un-German word, originating from the Roman falsum. Similarly, Befehlen or Befelhen is said to originally have meant to protect or recommend, but came to mean commandieren through the influence of French. Wahr is also held to have been corrupted by the Latin verum. For Befehl, see Parmenides (Eng.), 40/ Parmenides (Ger.), 58; for wahr, see Parmenides (Eng.), 47/ Parmenides (Ger.), 68.
68. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 7; "Die Frage nach der Technik," in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985), 12.
69. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 7; "Die Frage nach der Technik," in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985), 12.
70. Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 165-6; "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985), 50.
71. Martin Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 165-6; "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," in Vorträge und Aufsätze (Pfullingen: Neske, 1985), 50.
72. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 24-6/ "Die Frage nach der Technik," 28-30.
73. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 24-6/ "Die Frage nach der Technik," 28-30.
74. Brague gives Roman rootlessness a positive interpretation by emphasizing its relation to Roman (as well as Roman Catholic) universalism. Although Heidegger does not discuss the universalism of the Romans in contrast to the nationalism or parochialism of the Greeks, it is clear that he views the former negatively, as imperialism and rootlessness, and the latter positively, as rootedness and a sense of what is particular to a people and a nation.
75. "Such knightly, life-loving Protestant freedom, such 'anti-Christian', 'Saxon' Christianity in Goethe's sense is also for Nietzsche a creation of the nordic man, whereas the Roman Church, and with it and through it the entirety of southern Europe, is the 'legacy of the deep Orient, of ancient, secretive Asia and its contemplation'. And this is precisely what Nietzsche fought most bitterly in its various transformations, as 'historical sense', as Schopenhauerian pessimism, as the music of Parsifal, as Judeo-Christian morality, as Paul": "Solches ritterlich lebenslustige protestantische Freiheit, solch 'antichristliches', 'sächsiches' Christentum im goetheschen Sinne ist auch für Nietzsche eine Schöpfung des nordischen Menschen, während die römische Kirche und mit ihr und durch sie der ganze europäische Süden 'die Erbschaft des tiefen Orients, des uralten geheimnisreichen Asien und seiner Kontemplation gemacht' habe. Und eben diese ist es ja, welche von Nietzsche in ihren wechselnden Verwandlungen aufs bitterste bekämpft wird, als 'historischer Sinn', als schopenhauerscher Pessimismus, als Parsifalmusik, als judenchristliche Moral, als Paulus"; Ernst Bertram, Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie, 8th rev. ed. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1929), 64.
76. "Being is a Roman reality, as 'becoming' is a German reality": "Sein ist eine römische realität, wie "Werden" eine deutsche Wirklichkeit"; Bertram, Nietzsche, 84; see also 74-5.
77. Ibid., 93.
78. Ibid., 98-9.
79. For details of Bäumler's relation to Heidegger and his official role within National Socialism, see Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 125-9, 223. Even Krell, who treats Bäumler's Nietzsche interpretation and its influence on Heidegger in some detail, completely overlooks Bäumlers Rome thematic and its haunting resonances in Heidegger. See Krell's commentary in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes Three and Four (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 4:269-72.
80. For details of Bäumler's relation to Heidegger and his official role within National Socialism, see Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 125-9, 223. Even Krell, who treats Bäumler's Nietzsche interpretation and its influence on Heidegger in some detail, completely overlooks Bäumlers Rome thematic and its haunting resonances in Heidegger. See Krell's commentary in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes Three and Four (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991), 4:269-72.
81. Alfred Bäumler, Nietzsche: der Philosopher und Politiker (Leipzig: Reclam, 1931), 104. According to Bäumler, Nietzsche's concern with the conflict between the Roman and the German cultures stems from Wagner, see Bäumler, Nietzsche, 122.
82. Alfred Bäumler, Nietzsche: der Philosopher und Politiker (Leipzig: Reclam, 1931), 104. According to Bäumler, Nietzsche's concern with the conflict between the Roman and the German cultures stems from Wagner, see Bäumler, Nietzsche, 122.
83. "Why has there never been a firmly established German state? Because according to the Germanic conception, the king is not an emperor but only a warrior-leader and defender of justice. The Germanics knew only a leader [Führer] in times of danger, not a master": "Warum hat es denn nie einen festgegründeten deutschen Staat gegeben? Weil nach germanische Auffassung der König nicht Imperator ist, sondern lediglich heerführer und Schützer des Rechts. Nur einen Führer in der Gefahr erkannten die Germane an, nicht einen Herrn"; Bäumler, Nietzsche, 91.
84. "The young Nietzsche already saw an opposition between the Germanic and the Roman, the Greek and the Roman essence. The state as we know it is an invention of the Orient. The Romans took it over from the Orient and developed it. The imperium romanum (which is to be distinguished from the 'aristocratic communal essence' of republican Rome) signifies the culmination of the entire Mediterranean culture": "Aus derselben Unmittelbarkeit heraus hat schon der junge Nietzsche germanisches und romanisches, griechisches und römisches Wesen einander gegenübergesehen. Der Staat, wie wir ihn kennen, ist eine Erfindung des Orients. Vom Orient haben ihn die Römer übernommen und zur Ausbildung gebracht; das Imperium Romanum (wohl zu unterscheiden von dem 'aristokratischen Gemeinwesen' des republikanischen Rom) bedeutet die Vollendung der gesamten Mittelmeerkultur"; Bäumler, Nietzsche, 92.
85. Bäumler, Nietzsche, 90-4. Bäumler puts forward the opposition to universalism as evidence of the special affinity between the Germans and the Greeks: [T]he same aversion to the universalism of the state which we notice among the Germanics is to be found among their kindred people, the Greeks, who earned Nietzsche's most abiding love": "Und dieselbe Abneigung gegen den Universalismus des Staates, die wir bei den Germanen bemerken, finden wir bei dem den Germanen Stammverwandten Volke der Griechen, dem Nietzsches dauerndste Liebe galt"; Bäumler, Nietzsche, 92.
86. Bäumler, Nietzsche, 90-4. Bäumler puts forward the opposition to universalism as evidence of the special affinity between the Germans and the Greeks: [T]he same aversion to the universalism of the state which we notice among the Germanics is to be found among their kindred people, the Greeks, who earned Nietzsche's most abiding love": "Und dieselbe Abneigung gegen den Universalismus des Staates, die wir bei den Germanen bemerken, finden wir bei dem den Germanen Stammverwandten Volke der Griechen, dem Nietzsches dauerndste Liebe galt"; Bäumler, Nietzsche, 92.
87. Ibid., 98-100.
88. BT 435-6 (§75), 448 (§76)/SZ 384 (§74), 396 (§76). See also the Beiträge zur Philosophie for the conception of Geschichte as producing decisions and preparing the transition to a new age: "Transitional thinking brings about the founding projection of the truth of Being in the form of historical [geschichtliche] meditation. Here history [Geschichte] is not the object and sphere of an investigation, but rather what thoughtful questioning first awakens as the place of its decisions": "Das übergängliche Denken leistet den gründenden Entwurf der Wahrheit des Seyns als geschichtliche Besinnung. Die Geschichte ist dabei nicht der Gegenstand und Bezirk einer Betrachtung, sondern jenes, was das denkerische Fragen erst erweckt als die Stätte seiner Entscheidungen"; Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe 65 (Frankfurt: Klosterman, 1989), 5.
89. BT 427 (§72)/SZ 375 (§72).
90. BT, 42-3 (§6), 448 (§76)/SZ, 21 (§6), 396 (§76). See also Parmenides, for the notion that Historie, in contrast to Geschichte, merely solidifies existing pre-conceptions: "Historiographical research never discloses Geschichte, because such research always brings with it an unthought opinion about Geschichte. Since Historie would like to prove this so-called taken-for-granted opinion through its research, it only rigidifies what is unthought and taken for granted": "Die Geschichte erschließt sich nie der historischen Forschung, weil diese jedesmal schon eine Meinung über die Geschichte, und zwar eine unbedachte, eine sogennante selbstverständliche, mitbringt und durch die Forschung bestätigen möchten und so das unbedachte Selbstverständliche nur verfestigt"; Parmenides (Eng.), 96/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142.
91. BT, 42-3 (§6), 448 (§76)/SZ, 21 (§6), 396 (§76). See also Parmenides, for the notion that Historie, in contrast to Geschichte, merely solidifies existing pre-conceptions: "Historiographical research never discloses Geschichte, because such research always brings with it an unthought opinion about Geschichte. Since Historie would like to prove this so-called taken-for-granted opinion through its research, it only rigidifies what is unthought and taken for granted": "Die Geschichte erschließt sich nie der historischen Forschung, weil diese jedesmal schon eine Meinung über die Geschichte, und zwar eine unbedachte, eine sogennante selbstverständliche, mitbringt und durch die Forschung bestätigen möchten und so das unbedachte Selbstverständliche nur verfestigt"; Parmenides (Eng.), 96/ Parmenides (Ger.), 142.
92. BT, 44 (§6)/SZ, 22 (§6).
93. BT, 447 (§75)/SZ, 395 (§75).
94. BT, 436-7 (§74)/SZ, 384-5 (§74).
95. Martin Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, 15-6 and 63; Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländlische Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Gesamtausgabe 44, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 15-6, 66. See also "Nietzsche's Word," 85/ "Nietzsches Wort," 236.
96. Martin Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, 15-6 and 63; Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländlische Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Gesamtausgabe 44, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 15-6, 66. See also "Nietzsche's Word," 85/ "Nietzsches Wort," 236.
97. Martin Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, 15-6 and 63; Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländlische Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Gesamtausgabe 44, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 15-6, 66. See also "Nietzsche's Word," 85/ "Nietzsches Wort," 236.
98. Martin Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," in Nietzsche by Heidegger. Volumes One and Two, 15-6 and 63; Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländlische Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, Gesamtausgabe 44, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1986), 15-6, 66. See also "Nietzsche's Word," 85/ "Nietzsches Wort," 236.
99. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana, 1990), xviii; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe 3 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), xvii.
100. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana, 1990), xviii; Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe 3 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), xvii.
101. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, xviii/ Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, xvii.; BT 270 (§44c), 447 (§76)/SZ, 227 (§44c), 395 (§76): Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
102. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, xviii/ Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, xvii.; BT 270 (§44c), 447 (§76)/SZ, 227 (§44c), 395 (§76): Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
103. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, xviii/ Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, xvii.; BT 270 (§44c), 447 (§76)/SZ, 227 (§44c), 395 (§76): Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
104. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, xviii/ Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, xvii.; BT 270 (§44c), 447 (§76)/SZ, 227 (§44c), 395 (§76): Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
105. "For many reasons we doubt whether Nietzsche's interpretation of the Dionysian is justified, or whether it is not a coarse interpretative projection of an uncritical 19th century 'biologism' onto the Greek world": "Aus vielen Gründen dürfen wir bezweifeln, ob Nietzsches Auslegung des Dionysischen zu Recht besteht, ob sie nicht eine grobschlächtige Zurückdeutung eines kritiklosen 'Biologismus' des 19. Jahrhunderts in das Griechentum darstellt"; Parmenides (Eng.), 122/ Parmenides (Ger.), 182. Similar remarks occur throughout the Parmenides. There is the clear rhetorical suggestion that Heidegger's own reading is not a similar "Zurückdeutung," but something, if not more historically objective, at least more "authentic" or "primordial."
106. "For many reasons we doubt whether Nietzsche's interpretation of the Dionysian is justified, or whether it is not a coarse interpretative projection of an uncritical 19th century 'biologism' onto the Greek world": "Aus vielen Gründen dürfen wir bezweifeln, ob Nietzsches Auslegung des Dionysischen zu Recht besteht, ob sie nicht eine grobschlächtige Zurückdeutung eines kritiklosen 'Biologismus' des 19. Jahrhunderts in das Griechentum darstellt"; Parmenides (Eng.), 122/ Parmenides (Ger.), 182. Similar remarks occur throughout the Parmenides. There is the clear rhetorical suggestion that Heidegger's own reading is not a similar "Zurückdeutung," but something, if not more historically objective, at least more "authentic" or "primordial."
107. "We understand our task as the destruction of the traditional content of ancient ontology. Using the question of Being as a guide, this destruction is to reach the original experiences in which the first and henceforth governing determinations of Being were achieved": "Diese Aufgabe verstehen wir als die am Leitfaden der Seinsfrage sich vollziehende Destruktion des überlieferten Bestandes der antiken Ontologie auf die ursprünglichen Erfahrungen, in denen die ersten und fortan leitenden Bestimmungen des Seins gewonnen wurden"; BT, 44 (§6)/SZ, 22 (§6).
108. Gadamer clearly distances his philosophical hermeneutics from Heidegger's mode of historical interpretation, characterizing it as "violent" and noting that it does not follow from the theory of the understanding in Being and Time, the cornerstone of Gadamer's own philosophical hermeneutics: "[Löwith] fails to see that the violence which appears in many of Heidegger's interpretations in no way follows from his theory of understanding. Rather, it is much more a productive misuse of the texts, which sooner betrays a lack of hermeneutical consciousness": "Ferner sieht er nicht, daß die Gewaltsamkeit, die bei vielen heideggerschen Interpretationen auftritt, keineswegs aus dieser Theorie des Verstehens folgt. Sie ist vielmehr ein produktiver Mißbrauch der Texte, der eher einen Mangel an hermeneutischer Bewußtheit verrät"; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., rev. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads, 1989), 501; "Excurse IV," in Hermeneutik II, vol. 2 of Gesammelte Werke (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986), 382. For a more detailed discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics, see Gail Soffer, "Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation," Praxis International 12, no. 3 (October 1992): 231-68.
109. Gadamer clearly distances his philosophical hermeneutics from Heidegger's mode of historical interpretation, characterizing it as "violent" and noting that it does not follow from the theory of the understanding in Being and Time, the cornerstone of Gadamer's own philosophical hermeneutics: "[Löwith] fails to see that the violence which appears in many of Heidegger's interpretations in no way follows from his theory of understanding. Rather, it is much more a productive misuse of the texts, which sooner betrays a lack of hermeneutical consciousness": "Ferner sieht er nicht, daß die Gewaltsamkeit, die bei vielen heideggerschen Interpretationen auftritt, keineswegs aus dieser Theorie des Verstehens folgt. Sie ist vielmehr ein produktiver Mißbrauch der Texte, der eher einen Mangel an hermeneutischer Bewußtheit verrät"; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., rev. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads, 1989), 501; "Excurse IV," in Hermeneutik II, vol. 2 of Gesammelte Werke (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986), 382. For a more detailed discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics, see Gail Soffer, "Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation," Praxis International 12, no. 3 (October 1992): 231-68.
110. Gadamer clearly distances his philosophical hermeneutics from Heidegger's mode of historical interpretation, characterizing it as "violent" and noting that it does not follow from the theory of the understanding in Being and Time, the cornerstone of Gadamer's own philosophical hermeneutics: "[Löwith] fails to see that the violence which appears in many of Heidegger's interpretations in no way follows from his theory of understanding. Rather, it is much more a productive misuse of the texts, which sooner betrays a lack of hermeneutical consciousness": "Ferner sieht er nicht, daß die Gewaltsamkeit, die bei vielen heideggerschen Interpretationen auftritt, keineswegs aus dieser Theorie des Verstehens folgt. Sie ist vielmehr ein produktiver Mißbrauch der Texte, der eher einen Mangel an hermeneutischer Bewußtheit verrät"; Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed., rev. trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroads, 1989), 501; "Excurse IV," in Hermeneutik II, vol. 2 of Gesammelte Werke (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986), 382. For a more detailed discussion of Gadamer's hermeneutics, see Gail Soffer, "Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation," Praxis International 12, no. 3 (October 1992): 231-68.
111. "There is no need to comment upon the fact that historiography, like every science, is a mode of being of Dasein and therefore factically 'dependent' upon the 'prevailing world-view' of the time": "Daß die Historie wie jede Wissenschaft als eine Seinsart des Daseins faktisch und jeweils von der 'herrschenden Weltanschauung' 'abhängig' ist, bedarf keine Erörterung"; BT, 444 (§76)/SZ, 392 (§76). See also Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
112. "There is no need to comment upon the fact that historiography, like every science, is a mode of being of Dasein and therefore factically 'dependent' upon the 'prevailing world-view' of the time": "Daß die Historie wie jede Wissenschaft als eine Seinsart des Daseins faktisch und jeweils von der 'herrschenden Weltanschauung' 'abhängig' ist, bedarf keine Erörterung"; BT, 444 (§76)/SZ, 392 (§76). See also Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/ Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
113. BT, 446-7 (§76)/SZ, 394-5 (§76); Heidegger, Beiträge, 5; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 15-6 /Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 15-6.
114. BT, 446-7 (§76)/SZ, 394-5 (§76); Heidegger, Beiträge, 5; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 15-6 /Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 15-6.
115. BT, 446-7 (§76)/SZ, 394-5 (§76); Heidegger, Beiträge, 5; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 15-6 /Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 15-6.
116. BT, 270 (§44c)/SZ, 227 (§44c).
117. "Gemessen nach den Zollschranken des Horizonts der Historie und des historisch Festellbaren und der allerwärts beliebten 'Tatsachen,' ist 'in der Tat' das hier 'über' die aletheia Gesagte hineingedeutet. Wenn wir dagegen der Geschichte nicht historische Horizonten aufzwingen und sie damit zudecken, wenn wir vielmehr den Anfang den Anfang sein lassen, der er ist, dann gilt ein anderes Gesetz. Diesem gemäß können wir gar nicht genug in das Anfängliche hinein, besser gesagt, aus ihm heraus deuten, wenn wir nur dieses Anfängliche in der Strenge seines Wesens achten und nicht an einer unsengen Willkür hängenbleiben; denn das Nachdenken, das in solcher Weise dem wesenden Wesen der 'Wahrheit' nachzugehen versucht, will keineswegs in selbstzufriedenem Eifer einer Gelehrsamkeit früher Gemeintes nur entdecken oder vormals Nichtgemeintes erfinden. Dies Nachdenken möchte nur darauf vorbereiten, daß die wesende Wahrheit, die 'lebendiger' ist als das vielberufene 'Leben' zu ihrer Zeit geschichthafter das Menschenwesen geschichtlich angeht, weil dieses Wesen jetzt schon und sein langem, ohne daß wir daran denken und uns darauf 'gefaßt' machen auf uns zu-west"; Parmenides (Eng.), 134-5/
118. Parmenides (Ger.), 200.
119. A similar view is developed in the Nietzsche lectures, in the context of the problem of humanization. Here Heidegger claims that humanization in the sense of an imposition of a human or personal perspective can be overcome not by the avoidance of all perspectives, but by the intensification of one's own most essential perspective: "From this essential connection we also derive the insight that humanization becomes proportionately less destructive of truth (a\f]9eua~) as human beings relate themselves more originally to the location of an essential corner, that is to say, as they recognize and ground Da-sein as such. Yet the essentiality of the corner is defined by the originality and the breadth in which the entity as a whole is experienced and grasped - with a view to its sole decisive aspect, that of its Being": "Wir entnehmen aber zugleich aus diesem Wesenszusammenhang die Einsicht: die Vermenschung wird um so unwesentlicher als Gefährung der Wahrheit (a\770eta), je ursprünglicher der Mensch den Standort einer wesentlichen Ecke bezieht, d.h. das Da-sein als solches erkennt und gründet. Die Wesentlichkeit der Ecke aber bestimmt sich aus der Ursprünglichkeit und Weite, in der das Seiende im Ganzen hinsichtlich der allein entscheidenen Hinsicht, nämlich der seines Seins erfahren und begriffen ist"; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 119/ Das ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 129. See also Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 72-4/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 119-20.
120. A similar view is developed in the Nietzsche lectures, in the context of the problem of humanization. Here Heidegger claims that humanization in the sense of an imposition of a human or personal perspective can be overcome not by the avoidance of all perspectives, but by the intensification of one's own most essential perspective: "From this essential connection we also derive the insight that humanization becomes proportionately less destructive of truth (a\f]9eua~) as human beings relate themselves more originally to the location of an essential corner, that is to say, as they recognize and ground Da-sein as such. Yet the essentiality of the corner is defined by the originality and the breadth in which the entity as a whole is experienced and grasped - with a view to its sole decisive aspect, that of its Being": "Wir entnehmen aber zugleich aus diesem Wesenszusammenhang die Einsicht: die Vermenschung wird um so unwesentlicher als Gefährung der Wahrheit (a\770eta), je ursprünglicher der Mensch den Standort einer wesentlichen Ecke bezieht, d.h. das Da-sein als solches erkennt und gründet. Die Wesentlichkeit der Ecke aber bestimmt sich aus der Ursprünglichkeit und Weite, in der das Seiende im Ganzen hinsichtlich der allein entscheidenen Hinsicht, nämlich der seines Seins erfahren und begriffen ist"; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 119/ Das ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 129. See also Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 72-4/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 119-20.
121. A similar view is developed in the Nietzsche lectures, in the context of the problem of humanization. Here Heidegger claims that humanization in the sense of an imposition of a human or personal perspective can be overcome not by the avoidance of all perspectives, but by the intensification of one's own most essential perspective: "From this essential connection we also derive the insight that humanization becomes proportionately less destructive of truth (a\f]9eua~) as human beings relate themselves more originally to the location of an essential corner, that is to say, as they recognize and ground Da-sein as such. Yet the essentiality of the corner is defined by the originality and the breadth in which the entity as a whole is experienced and grasped - with a view to its sole decisive aspect, that of its Being": "Wir entnehmen aber zugleich aus diesem Wesenszusammenhang die Einsicht: die Vermenschung wird um so unwesentlicher als Gefährung der Wahrheit (a\770eta), je ursprünglicher der Mensch den Standort einer wesentlichen Ecke bezieht, d.h. das Da-sein als solches erkennt und gründet. Die Wesentlichkeit der Ecke aber bestimmt sich aus der Ursprünglichkeit und Weite, in der das Seiende im Ganzen hinsichtlich der allein entscheidenen Hinsicht, nämlich der seines Seins erfahren und begriffen ist"; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 119/ Das ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 129. See also Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 72-4/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 119-20.
122. A similar view is developed in the Nietzsche lectures, in the context of the problem of humanization. Here Heidegger claims that humanization in the sense of an imposition of a human or personal perspective can be overcome not by the avoidance of all perspectives, but by the intensification of one's own most essential perspective: "From this essential connection we also derive the insight that humanization becomes proportionately less destructive of truth (a\f]9eua~) as human beings relate themselves more originally to the location of an essential corner, that is to say, as they recognize and ground Da-sein as such. Yet the essentiality of the corner is defined by the originality and the breadth in which the entity as a whole is experienced and grasped - with a view to its sole decisive aspect, that of its Being": "Wir entnehmen aber zugleich aus diesem Wesenszusammenhang die Einsicht: die Vermenschung wird um so unwesentlicher als Gefährung der Wahrheit (a\770eta), je ursprünglicher der Mensch den Standort einer wesentlichen Ecke bezieht, d.h. das Da-sein als solches erkennt und gründet. Die Wesentlichkeit der Ecke aber bestimmt sich aus der Ursprünglichkeit und Weite, in der das Seiende im Ganzen hinsichtlich der allein entscheidenen Hinsicht, nämlich der seines Seins erfahren und begriffen ist"; Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same," 119/ Das ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 129. See also Heidegger, "European Nihilism," 72-4/ Der europäische Nihilismus, 119-20.
123. "But if fateful Dasein, as being-in-the-world, exists essentially in being-together with others, then its happening is a happening-together and is determined as destiny [Geschick]. With this term we indicate the happening of the community, of the people. Destiny is not comprised of individual fates put together, just as little as being-with-one-another can be conceived as several individual subjects occurring together. These fates are already implicated in being-together in the same world and in resoluteness for determinate possibilities. The power of destiny is first freed by communication and battle. The complete, authentic happening of Dasein is made up of its fateful destiny in and with its 'generation'": "Wenn aber das schicksalhafte Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein wesenhaft im Mitsein mit Anderen existiert, ist sein Geschehen ein Mitgeschehen und bestimmt als Geschick. Damit bezeichen wir das Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes. Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen, sowenig also das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte begriffen werden kann. Im Miteinandersein in derselben Welt und in der Entschlossenheit für bestimmte Möglichkeiten sind die Schicksale im vorhinein schon geleitet. In der Mitteilung und im Kampf wird die Macht des Geschickes erst frei. Das schicksalhafte Geschick des Daseins in und mit seiner 'Generation' macht das volle, eigentliche Geschehen des Daseins aus"; BT, 436 (§74)/SZ, 384-5 (§74).
124. A good example of an unconventional Heideggerian interpretation which has proved at least defensible along traditional philological lines is his claim of the similarities between Parmenides and Heraclitus. For an extensive historical-philological defense of this position, see, for example, the introductory essay and commentary by Luigi Ruggiu in Parmenide: poema sutta natura (Milan: Rusconi, 1991), as well as the preface by Giovanni Reale in the same volume.
125. Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 166/ "Wissenchaft und Besinnung," 50.
126. Heidegger, "Science and Reflection," 166/ "Wissenchaft und Besinnung," 50.