The struggle to reform Russia's bureaucracy

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 22-33

  Huskey, Eugene ^b   Obolonsky, Alexander ^a  

^a Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences   (Russian Federation)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042707784     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2003.11656044     Document Type: Article

References (59)

1. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
2. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
3. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
4. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
5. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
6. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
7. Moskovskaia pravda (March 14, 2003): 1. A major participant in the reform, Mikhail Dmitriev of the Ministry of Economic Development, estimated that it would take decades to complete civil service reform in Russia. See Izvestiia (July 18, 2002): 4. The literature on the post-communist Russian bureaucracy is small but growing. Among the most notable works are the recently completed study by Vladimir Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty na Rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi i munitsipalnoi sluzhbe (Young Specialists in the Russian State and Municipal Service: Scientific Report on Results of Research on Regional and Municipal Administrations) (Moscow, 2003), available at www.chass.utoronto.ca/brym/home.htm; E. Vinogradova, O. Kirichenko, and P. Kudiukin, Gosudarstvennaia i munitsipalnaia sluzhba: s chem stolknetsia budushchaia reforma (State and Municipal Service: Members Agree on Future Reforms) (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000); A. Obolonskii, Gosudarstvennaia sluzhba (State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 1999); A. Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka? Modeli gosudarstvennoi sluzhby (Bureaucracy for the 21st Century? Models of State Service) (Moscow: Delo, 2002); and the studies undertaken by the World Bank, which are available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/. For a general analysis of the role of the bureaucracy in the transition from authoritarianism, see B. Guy Peters, "The Civil Service in the Consolidation of Democracy," International Social Science Journal, no. 1 (1995): 127-40.
8. Alexander Obolonsky, "Competing Models of Russian Bureaucratic Reform" (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, November 22, 2002).
9. The number of federal workers reached a peak of 442,500 in 1997 and then declined to 404,700 by 2000 (Statisticheskii biulleten [August 2001]).
10. Ibid., pp. 39-40, and Appendix 17. Whereas the average age of the Russian bureaucracy at all levels is forty, among federal civil servants working in Moscow it is forty-three. For a detailed analysis of the age distribution in the Russian bureaucracy, see Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty.
11. Ibid., pp. 39-40, and Appendix 17. Whereas the average age of the Russian bureaucracy at all levels is forty, among federal civil servants working in Moscow it is forty-three. For a detailed analysis of the age distribution in the Russian bureaucracy, see Magun et al., Molodye spetsialisty.
12. Kelly K. Spors and John J. Fialka, "Filling a Public-Service Void," Wall Street Journal (September 19, 2002): A4.
13. Alexander Obolonskii, "Biurokratiia: teorii, istoriia, sovremennost," (Bureaucracy: Theory, History, Current Practice), Znamia, no. 7 (1997): 179.
14. Thus, whereas slightly more than 20 percent of the 1,755,000 American federal civilian employees work in the Washington, DC, area, fewer than 10 percent of Russia's civilian federal employees work in Moscow.
15. Quoted in Alexei Barabashev, Reforma gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v Rossii (Reforms of State Laws in Russia), available at www.pareform.ru/bulletin/.
16. "Ob osnovakh gosudarstvennoi sluzhby RF" (Fundamentals of State Service), Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 31 (1995), art. 2990. There was, however, a little-noticed directive of the Russian president on the civil service issued in 1994.
17. Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 125.
18. "O predstavlenii litsami, zameshchaiushchimi gosudarstvennye dolzhnosti RF, i litsami, zameshchaiushchimi gosudarstvennye dolzhnosti gosudarstvennoi sluzhby i dolzhnosti v organakh mestnogo samoupravleniia, svedenii o dokhodakh i imushchestve" (On the presenting of information on income and property by persons occupying state positions and by persons occupying state positions in the state service and in municipal service), Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 20 (1997), art. 2239.
19. "Predlozheniia, postupivshie v adres Komiteta Gosudarstvennoi Dumy po delam Federatsii i regionalnoi politiki" (Proposals addressed to the Committee of the State Duma on Federalism and Regional Politics), in Materials of the Parliamentary Hearings at the Federal Gathering of the State Duma, RF (November 16, 2001), pp. 13-14.
20. V.I. Oseichuk, "Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby: kadrovoi aspekt" (State Service Reforms: Cadres Aspect), Chinovnik, no. 1 (2002): 20-23, citing Nastolnaia kniga gos. sluzhashchego, ed. M. Shkatula (Moscow, 1999), p. 311. For local legislation mandating competitive hiring, see, for example, "Postanovlenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraia ot 14.08.2001 g. N 76 g. Krasnodar" (Directive of the Head of Administration of Krasnodar province of 14.08.2001, no. 76, city of Krasnodar), Kubanskie novosti (March 16, 2002), and "Kadry reshaiut vse" (Personnel Decide Everything), Krasnyi sever (March 2, 2002).
21. V.I. Oseichuk, "Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby: kadrovoi aspekt" (State Service Reforms: Cadres Aspect), Chinovnik, no. 1 (2002): 20-23, citing Nastolnaia kniga gos. sluzhashchego, ed. M. Shkatula (Moscow, 1999), p. 311. For local legislation mandating competitive hiring, see, for example, "Postanovlenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraia ot 14.08.2001 g. N 76 g. Krasnodar" (Directive of the Head of Administration of Krasnodar province of 14.08.2001, no. 76, city of Krasnodar), Kubanskie novosti (March 16, 2002), and "Kadry reshaiut vse" (Personnel Decide Everything), Krasnyi sever (March 2, 2002).
22. V.I. Oseichuk, "Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby: kadrovoi aspekt" (State Service Reforms: Cadres Aspect), Chinovnik, no. 1 (2002): 20-23, citing Nastolnaia kniga gos. sluzhashchego, ed. M. Shkatula (Moscow, 1999), p. 311. For local legislation mandating competitive hiring, see, for example, "Postanovlenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraia ot 14.08.2001 g. N 76 g. Krasnodar" (Directive of the Head of Administration of Krasnodar province of 14.08.2001, no. 76, city of Krasnodar), Kubanskie novosti (March 16, 2002), and "Kadry reshaiut vse" (Personnel Decide Everything), Krasnyi sever (March 2, 2002).
23. V.I. Oseichuk, "Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby: kadrovoi aspekt" (State Service Reforms: Cadres Aspect), Chinovnik, no. 1 (2002): 20-23, citing Nastolnaia kniga gos. sluzhashchego, ed. M. Shkatula (Moscow, 1999), p. 311. For local legislation mandating competitive hiring, see, for example, "Postanovlenie glavy administratsii Krasnodarskogo kraia ot 14.08.2001 g. N 76 g. Krasnodar" (Directive of the Head of Administration of Krasnodar province of 14.08.2001, no. 76, city of Krasnodar), Kubanskie novosti (March 16, 2002), and "Kadry reshaiut vse" (Personnel Decide Everything), Krasnyi sever (March 2, 2002).
24. For the links between Barabashev and the "Generation of '97," led by Mikhail Krasnov, see Novye izvestiia (November 22, 2002): 2.
25. It appears in edited form in "O Federalnoi programe 'Reformirovanie gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii (2003-2005 gody')" (On the Federal Program "Reform of the State Service of the Russian Federation [2003-2005]"), Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 47 (2002), art. 4664. This document differed from the typical "conception" of public policy reform in its empirical and analytical depth. It contains an exhaustive assessment of the state of the Russian civil service at the beginning of the millennium along with a detailed action program and division of labor among government agencies to be involved in the reform.
26. Yuzhakov was instrumental in compiling information on the condition of the civil service, whether through zaprosy (official inquiries) directed to executive agencies (see, for example, his zapros to Goskomstat of May 10, 2001), or in a parliamentary hearing on the bureaucracy held in November 2001. He also submitted a draft Code of Behavior of State Servants of the Russian Federation in early 2002.
27. Khakamada's attitude to the bureaucracy was based in good measure on her own dismal experience as a minister. She claimed that only the political appointees at the top were competent, and all the other personnel "understood nothing . . . and were simply afraid of being fired." Her assistant was caught taking bribes from people who wanted appointments with her. See Irina Khadamada, "Administrativnaia reforma v Rossii uzhe davno nazrela" (Administrative Reforms in Russia Have Been Needed for a Long Time), Chinovnik, no. 1 (2002): 6-9.
28. There are some reports that the minister of labor, Aleksandr Pochinok, has sought to use his position as chief drafter of the law on the civilian civil service to undo some of the progressive measures in the framework law. See Nezavisimaia gazeta (March 24, 2003): 4; Vedomosti (March 6, 2003). Some new initiatives will probably be introduced as pilot projects in a limited number of regions, a tactic that gives conservatives the opportunity to block their broader implementation (Rossiiskaia gazeta [March 27, 2003]: 10).
29. There are some reports that the minister of labor, Aleksandr Pochinok, has sought to use his position as chief drafter of the law on the civilian civil service to undo some of the progressive measures in the framework law. See Nezavisimaia gazeta (March 24, 2003): 4; Vedomosti (March 6, 2003). Some new initiatives will probably be introduced as pilot projects in a limited number of regions, a tactic that gives conservatives the opportunity to block their broader implementation (Rossiiskaia gazeta [March 27, 2003]: 10).
30. There are some reports that the minister of labor, Aleksandr Pochinok, has sought to use his position as chief drafter of the law on the civilian civil service to undo some of the progressive measures in the framework law. See Nezavisimaia gazeta (March 24, 2003): 4; Vedomosti (March 6, 2003). Some new initiatives will probably be introduced as pilot projects in a limited number of regions, a tactic that gives conservatives the opportunity to block their broader implementation (Rossiiskaia gazeta [March 27, 2003]: 10).
31. Kommersant-vlast (August 28, 2001).
32. The idea is to move from a system that emphasizes klassnye chiny (service ranks) over kvalifikatsionnye razriady (skill rating).
33. Interview with Rafael Khakimov, Kazan, Russia, May 24, 2003.
34. This is not the place to reach conclusions about how many people work for the Russian state. Suffice it to say that the 1.1 million civil servants noted earlier do not include the so-called biudzhetniki, such as teachers, doctors, or letter-carriers, the support personnel of the civil service itself, such as drivers and cleaners, or those in the uniformed services, such as the armed forces, the police, and the customs service. The last agency alone has more than 60,000 employees (Dalnevostochnyi Pogranichnik [November 2, 2001]: 6).
35. Statisticheskii biulleten (August 2001): 61-71. See also Trud (January 12, 2001) and Delovye vesti (Volgograd) (November 27, 2001).
36. Statisticheskii biulleten (August 2001): 61-71. See also Trud (January 12, 2001) and Delovye vesti (Volgograd) (November 27, 2001).
37. Statisticheskii biulleten (August 2001): 61-71. See also Trud (January 12, 2001) and Delovye vesti (Volgograd) (November 27, 2001).
38. The dolzhnostnoi oklad (base pay) accounts for only 28.7 percent of the total remuneration. In the case of senior civil servants, the percentage would be even lower. Statisticheskii biulleten(August 2001), p. 18. Dmitrii Medvedev and other participants in the debate want to begin by eliminating the privileges accorded family members of civil servants (Nezavisimaia gazeta [March 27, 2003]: 2).
39. The dolzhnostnoi oklad (base pay) accounts for only 28.7 percent of the total remuneration. In the case of senior civil servants, the percentage would be even lower. Statisticheskii biulleten(August 2001), p. 18. Dmitrii Medvedev and other participants in the debate want to begin by eliminating the privileges accorded family members of civil servants (Nezavisimaia gazeta [March 27, 2003]: 2).
40. Moskovskaia pravda (February 12, 2003): 1.
41. On bureaucratic training in post-communist Russia, see Eugene Huskey, "From Higher Party Schools to Academies of State Service: The Marketization of Bureaucratic Training in Russia" (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, November 22, 2002).
42. Novgorodskie vedomosti (March 25, 2003). Among those reluctant to create a new cadres department in Moscow are officials in the Presidential Administration, where at present the Administration of Personnel Policy has a broad mandate, but little authority, over personnel matters. For an example of a regional cadres department, a common feature of provincial bureaucracies, see Severnyi kurer (Petrozavodsk) (November 11, 2000). A Russian academic specialist on the civil service notes that there are cadres departments in many Moscow institutions, including the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance, that seek to play a role in broader cadres policy (Komsomolskaia pravda [August 28, 2002]: 8).
43. Novgorodskie vedomosti (March 25, 2003). Among those reluctant to create a new cadres department in Moscow are officials in the Presidential Administration, where at present the Administration of Personnel Policy has a broad mandate, but little authority, over personnel matters. For an example of a regional cadres department, a common feature of provincial bureaucracies, see Severnyi kurer (Petrozavodsk) (November 11, 2000). A Russian academic specialist on the civil service notes that there are cadres departments in many Moscow institutions, including the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance, that seek to play a role in broader cadres policy (Komsomolskaia pravda [August 28, 2002]: 8).
44. Novgorodskie vedomosti (March 25, 2003). Among those reluctant to create a new cadres department in Moscow are officials in the Presidential Administration, where at present the Administration of Personnel Policy has a broad mandate, but little authority, over personnel matters. For an example of a regional cadres department, a common feature of provincial bureaucracies, see Severnyi kurer (Petrozavodsk) (November 11, 2000). A Russian academic specialist on the civil service notes that there are cadres departments in many Moscow institutions, including the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance, that seek to play a role in broader cadres policy (Komsomolskaia pravda [August 28, 2002]: 8).
45. "Ob utverzhdenii obshchikh printsipov sluzhebnogo povedeniia gosudarstvennykh sluzhashchikh, Sobranie zakonodatelstva" (On the confirmation of general principles of professional behavior of civil servants), no. 33 (2002), art. 3196; Izvestiia (August 15, 2002): 1.
46. "Ob utverzhdenii obshchikh printsipov sluzhebnogo povedeniia gosudarstvennykh sluzhashchikh, Sobranie zakonodatelstva" (On the confirmation of general principles of professional behavior of civil servants), no. 33 (2002), art. 3196; Izvestiia (August 15, 2002): 1.
47. Whatever the actual level of corruption in the Russian bureaucracy, and assessments vary widely, there is a deep-seated popular belief in the venality of officialdom. A popular anecdote illustrates this perception. A crowd of unemployed workers bursts into the office of the governor and begins shouting: "We have no money!" The governor answers generously, "Never mind, come in anyway."
48. Itogi (May 27, 2003): 16.
49. "O gosudarstvennoi registratsii iuridicheskikh lits" (On the state registration of judicial persons), Sobranie zakonodatelstva, no. 33 (2001), art. 3431.
50. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
51. The federal program for civil service reform envisions the wider use of new technologies in the bureaucracy as a means of making deloproizvodstvo (official documentation) more efficient and accessible. According to Iaroslav Kuzminov, who offers no evidence for the assertion, shifting to electronic deloproizvodstvo would allow the bureaucracy to cut its numbers by half (Nezavisimaia gazeta [March 26, 2003]: 3). The current system is now held hostage to the requirement for multiple signatures on key documents. According to Mikhail Dmitriev, deputy minister for economic development, "at any given moment two or three employees from subordinate offices are traveling around Moscow carrying documents that require a signature by an official from a different ministry. Electronic signatures are prohibited" (Sharon LaFraniere, "Russia Pushes Reform of Soviet-era Civil Service," Washington Post [July 15, 2002]: A13). For a more detailed critique by Dmitriev, see Izvestiia (August 28, 2001): 1. See also "Interviu-Rabotniki Upravelenie delami Pravitelststva subekta Federatsii" (available at www.pareform.ru/ve/reports/materials/) for an interview on the impediments to introducing a single computerized system.
52. The federal program for civil service reform envisions the wider use of new technologies in the bureaucracy as a means of making deloproizvodstvo (official documentation) more efficient and accessible. According to Iaroslav Kuzminov, who offers no evidence for the assertion, shifting to electronic deloproizvodstvo would allow the bureaucracy to cut its numbers by half (Nezavisimaia gazeta [March 26, 2003]: 3). The current system is now held hostage to the requirement for multiple signatures on key documents. According to Mikhail Dmitriev, deputy minister for economic development, "at any given moment two or three employees from subordinate offices are traveling around Moscow carrying documents that require a signature by an official from a different ministry. Electronic signatures are prohibited" (Sharon LaFraniere, "Russia Pushes Reform of Soviet-era Civil Service," Washington Post [July 15, 2002]: A13). For a more detailed critique by Dmitriev, see Izvestiia (August 28, 2001): 1. See also "Interviu-Rabotniki Upravelenie delami Pravitelststva subekta Federatsii" (available at www.pareform.ru/ve/reports/materials/) for an interview on the impediments to introducing a single computerized system
53. The federal program for civil service reform envisions the wider use of new technologies in the bureaucracy as a means of making deloproizvodstvo (official documentation) more efficient and accessible. According to Iaroslav Kuzminov, who offers no evidence for the assertion, shifting to electronic deloproizvodstvo would allow the bureaucracy to cut its numbers by half (Nezavisimaia gazeta [March 26, 2003]: 3). The current system is now held hostage to the requirement for multiple signatures on key documents. According to Mikhail Dmitriev, deputy minister for economic development, "at any given moment two or three employees from subordinate offices are traveling around Moscow carrying documents that require a signature by an official from a different ministry. Electronic signatures are prohibited" (Sharon LaFraniere, "Russia Pushes Reform of Soviet-era Civil Service," Washington Post [July 15, 2002]: A13). For a more detailed critique by Dmitriev, see Izvestiia (August 28, 2001): 1. See also "Interviu-Rabotniki Upravelenie delami Pravitelststva subekta Federatsii" (available at www.pareform.ru/ve/reports/materials/) for an interview on the impediments to introducing a single computerized system.
54. Ekspert (March 2003): 61. Researchers at the Higher Economics School conducted the survey.
55. For a revealing treatment of the symbols of bureaucratic power, including uniforms, in late imperial Russia, see L.E. Shepelev, Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII-nachalo XX v (The World of Ranks in Russia, Nineteenth to the Early Twentieth Century) (St. Petersburg: Iskusstvo-SPB, 1999).
56. See Obolonskii, Biurokratiia dlia XXI veka?
57. For a preliminary investigation of these typologies in post-communist Russian politics, see Alexander Obolonsky, "Storonniki i protivniki reformy" (Advocates and Opponents of Reform) (unpublished manuscript, 2003). This paper, available from the author, finds diverse motivations in both camps, with opponents of reform driven by concerns as varied as Russian exceptionalism, disrespect for law and legal culture, and professional turf protection.
58. There are, then, numerous "referring provisions" in every framework law, which essentially state that rules on this or that matter must await the passage of a detailed law or substatutory acts.
59. The reasons for this approach are varied, but they include the fear that a more public crafting of innovative legislation would allow forces hostile to change to scuttle reform at its inception, which suggests that innovators are rare in the Russian government. One high-ranking official estimated that in the entire country there were only thirty or forty "competent reformers" trying to transform the country. See Izvestiia (March 28, 2003): 1.