Reconciliation with the utility of chance by elaborated outcomes destroys the axiomatic basis of expected utility theory

Theory and Decision

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 223-234

  Pope, Robin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

Author keywords

Axiomatised expected utility theory; Elaborated outcomes; Representation theorem; Utility of chance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042688303     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1026520128623     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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12. Pope, R.E. (1985), Timing Contradictions in von Neumann and Morgenstern's Axioms and in Savage's Sure-Thing Proof, Theory and Decision 18: 229-261.
13. Pope, R.E. (1988a), The Bayesian Approach: Irreconcilable with Expected Utility Theory?, in B. Munier (ed.), Risk, Decision and Rationality, Reidel, Dordrecht, 221-230.
14. Pope, R.E. (1988b), Reality versus Intention in the Expected Utility Procedure, Fourth International Conference on the Foundations and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory, Budapest.
15. Pope, R.E. (1991a), The Delusion of Certainty in Savage's Sure-Thing Principle, Journal of Economic Psychology 12 (2): 209-241.
16. Pope, R.E. (1991b), Lowered Welfare under the Expected Utility Procedure, in A. Chikán (ed.), Progress in Decision, Utility and Risk, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 125-133.
17. Pope, R.E. (1996/7) and forthcoming, Debates on the Utility of Chance: A Look Back to Move Forward, Journal for Science of Research (Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftsforschung), 11/12: 43-92
18. to be reprinted in On the Dynamics of Modern, Complex Social and Democratic Systems, Theory and Decision Library, Series A, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
19. Pope, R.E. (1998), Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance, in Werner Leinfellner and Eckehart Köhler (eds.), Game Theory, Experience, Rationality, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 95-107.
20. Pope, R.E., forthcoming, Evidence of Deliberate Violations of Dominance due to Secondary Satisfactions - Attractions to Chance, Homo Economicus, 33pp.
21. Savage, L.J. (1972), Foundations of Statistics, Dover, New York.
22. Savage, L.J. (1997), Letter from Leonard Savage to Robert Aumann, 27 January 1971, in R.J. Aumann, Collected Papers, Vol. 1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 307-310.
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