America's Search for a Technological Solution to the Arms Race: The Surprise Attack Conference of 1958 and a Challenge for "Eisenhower Revisionists"

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 417-451

  Suri, Jeremi ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0042687273     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00079     Document Type: Article

References (122)

1. Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; idem, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" Political Psychology 1 (Fall 1979): 3-20; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982), esp. 58-65.
2. Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; idem, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" Political Psychology 1 (Fall 1979): 3-20; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982), esp. 58-65.
3. Richard H. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; idem, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" Political Psychology 1 (Fall 1979): 3-20; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York, 1982), esp. 58-65.
4. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
5. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
6. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
7. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
8. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
9. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
10. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
11. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
12. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
13. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
14. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
15. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
16. General statements of the revisionist case can be found in Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist"; Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984); and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York, 1981). Accounts emphasizing the fiscal conservatism of the New Look and its use of "asymmetrical" threats and acts of restraint include John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), 127-97; and McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 256-257. Studies focusing on American covert activities during the Eisenhower presidency include Stephen E. Ambrose and Richard H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY, 1981), 181-322; Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin, 1982); and Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair (New York, 1986). Peter Grose's recent biography of Allen Dulles provides an excellent discussion of CIA covert activities during the Eisenhower years. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston, 1994), 333-528. H. W. Brands, Jr., has both embraced and criticized the revisionist interpretation of the Eisenhower administration; see Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1988), and "The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 963-89. In the latter work Brands emphasizes the ambivalence, passivity, and sometime confusion of Eisenhower's leadership. The author argues that the inadequacies of the president's leadership contributed to unprecedented increases in American defense spending and strategic vulnerability - the "national insecurity state." In this article I will contend that in the case of arms control, and the Surprise Attack Conference in particular, the latter Brands assessment of Eisenhower proves more persuasive than the general revisionist case. Eisenhower faced intractable problems in arms control, but, as in the case of nuclear strategy described by Brands, the president failed to articulate and oversee a practical, coordinated administration policy. Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, 626.
17. Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate (New York, 1978), 213-323, quotation from 318; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 554-80.
18. Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate (New York, 1978), 213-323, quotation from 318; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 554-80.
19. In June 1994, Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary revealed that the U.S. nuclear stockpile totaled 22,229 in 1961.
20. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
21. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
22. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
23. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
24. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
25. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3-71; Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, 1993). Government studies, most notably the Killian Report (1954-55) and the more apocalyptic Gaither Report (1957), engendered fears of a devastating Soviet surprise attack on the United States. For a discussion of the government studies of surprise attack see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York, 1983), 125-43; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61 (Washington, 1961), 1038-40; H. W. Brands makes a similar point regarding Eisenhower's "Farewell Address": "More than any administration before or after, Eisenhower's promoted the growth of the military-industrial complex he decried." Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 988-89.
26. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 340-41.
27. David Holloway, after thoughtfully examining an impressive array of newly accessible documents and remembrances from the former Soviet Union, writes that Stalin's successors, in spite of their fears of thermonuclear holocaust, remained committed to socialist expansion and ultimate worldwide victory over the capitalist system. "This ideological position," in Holloway's words, "precluded the adoption of a more limited policy, such as minimum deterrence" (p. 344). In this sense, the Soviet Union in the middle and late 1950s sought arms control but lacked the ideological inclination for equal and reciprocal agreement with the West. Holloway concludes his seminal work, writing, "I have been skeptical in this book about the possibility that changes in American policy would have elicited significant shifts in Soviet policy. . . . [Stalin's] death resulted in a significant relaxation of tension in the Soviet Union and abroad, but the patterns that had been set in the early postwar years remained strong. The Soviet Union and the United States took new steps to manage their nuclear relationship, but the arms race continued apace" (p. 370). David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-56 (New Haven, 1994), 320-71, citation in text from 369. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, the latter a member of the former Soviet arms control establishment, write that the Soviet Union did not develop the administrative apparatus for serious arms control negotiations until the late 1960s. The "Big Five," which the authors describe as the high-level interagency core for Moscow's negotiation efforts through 1991, first formed in November 1969 by order of the Politburo. The authors argue that in the years between the Cuban missile crisis and the creation of the "Big Five," the Soviet Union began to consider serious disarmament proposals. Revealingly, the authors do not provide any evidence or references to Soviet arms control ambitions before the 1960s. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT, 1995). 1-42. For a dissenting opinion see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, 1988), esp. 262-67. In the 1950s, the author argues, the Soviets expressed interest in trading quantity (in this case, conventional forces) for quality (new American nuclear technology) as concessions in an arms control agreement. The United States, seeking to capitalize on its technological prowess, refused the Soviet offers, according to this explanation. Evangelista appears correct in his general analysis of American policy. The new, albeit incomplete, evidence presented by Holloway, Savel'yev, and Detinov, however, leads me to conclude that the Soviets lacked the political will and the administrative means for negotiated agreement in the late 1950s.
28. David Holloway, after thoughtfully examining an impressive array of newly accessible documents and remembrances from the former Soviet Union, writes that Stalin's successors, in spite of their fears of thermonuclear holocaust, remained committed to socialist expansion and ultimate worldwide victory over the capitalist system. "This ideological position," in Holloway's words, "precluded the adoption of a more limited policy, such as minimum deterrence" (p. 344). In this sense, the Soviet Union in the middle and late 1950s sought arms control but lacked the ideological inclination for equal and reciprocal agreement with the West. Holloway concludes his seminal work, writing, "I have been skeptical in this book about the possibility that changes in American policy would have elicited significant shifts in Soviet policy. . . . [Stalin's] death resulted in a significant relaxation of tension in the Soviet Union and abroad, but the patterns that had been set in the early postwar years remained strong. The Soviet Union and the United States took new steps to manage their nuclear relationship, but the arms race continued apace" (p. 370). David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-56 (New Haven, 1994), 320-71, citation in text from 369. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, the latter a member of the former Soviet arms control establishment, write that the Soviet Union did not develop the administrative apparatus for serious arms control negotiations until the late 1960s. The "Big Five," which the authors describe as the high-level interagency core for Moscow's negotiation efforts through 1991, first formed in November 1969 by order of the Politburo. The authors argue that in the years between the Cuban missile crisis and the creation of the "Big Five," the Soviet Union began to consider serious disarmament proposals. Revealingly, the authors do not provide any evidence or references to Soviet arms control ambitions before the 1960s. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT, 1995). 1-42. For a dissenting opinion see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, 1988), esp. 262-67. In the 1950s, the author argues, the Soviets expressed interest in trading quantity (in this case, conventional forces) for quality (new American nuclear technology) as concessions in an arms control agreement. The United States, seeking to capitalize on its technological prowess, refused the Soviet offers, according to this explanation. Evangelista appears correct in his general analysis of American policy. The new, albeit incomplete, evidence presented by Holloway, Savel'yev, and Detinov, however, leads me to conclude that the Soviets lacked the political will and the administrative means for negotiated agreement in the late 1950s.
29. David Holloway, after thoughtfully examining an impressive array of newly accessible documents and remembrances from the former Soviet Union, writes that Stalin's successors, in spite of their fears of thermonuclear holocaust, remained committed to socialist expansion and ultimate worldwide victory over the capitalist system. "This ideological position," in Holloway's words, "precluded the adoption of a more limited policy, such as minimum deterrence" (p. 344). In this sense, the Soviet Union in the middle and late 1950s sought arms control but lacked the ideological inclination for equal and reciprocal agreement with the West. Holloway concludes his seminal work, writing, "I have been skeptical in this book about the possibility that changes in American policy would have elicited significant shifts in Soviet policy. . . . [Stalin's] death resulted in a significant relaxation of tension in the Soviet Union and abroad, but the patterns that had been set in the early postwar years remained strong. The Soviet Union and the United States took new steps to manage their nuclear relationship, but the arms race continued apace" (p. 370). David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-56 (New Haven, 1994), 320-71, citation in text from 369. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, the latter a member of the former Soviet arms control establishment, write that the Soviet Union did not develop the administrative apparatus for serious arms control negotiations until the late 1960s. The "Big Five," which the authors describe as the high-level interagency core for Moscow's negotiation efforts through 1991, first formed in November 1969 by order of the Politburo. The authors argue that in the years between the Cuban missile crisis and the creation of the "Big Five," the Soviet Union began to consider serious disarmament proposals. Revealingly, the authors do not provide any evidence or references to Soviet arms control ambitions before the 1960s. Aleksandr' G. Savel'yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT, 1995). 1-42. For a dissenting opinion see Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, 1988), esp. 262-67. In the 1950s, the author argues, the Soviets expressed interest in trading quantity (in this case, conventional forces) for quality (new American nuclear technology) as concessions in an arms control agreement. The United States, seeking to capitalize on its technological prowess, refused the Soviet offers, according to this explanation. Evangelista appears correct in his general analysis of American policy. The new, albeit incomplete, evidence presented by Holloway, Savel'yev, and Detinov, however, leads me to conclude that the Soviets lacked the political will and the administrative means for negotiated agreement in the late 1950s.
30. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 190; Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York, 1987), esp. 193-96.
31. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 190; Herbert F. York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (New York, 1987), esp. 193-96.
32. Eisenhower wrote: "I also renew my proposal that we begin progressively to take measures to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack. . . . The capacity to verify the fulfillment of commitments is of the essence in all these matters, including the reduction of conventional forces and weapons, and it would surely be useful for us to study together through technical groups what are the possibilities in this respect upon which we could build if we then decide to do so." "Inspection Zone Proposals: 1955-1958," 18 July 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 2, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July-December 1958] (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Department of State Bulletin 58 (1958): 122-27. For the correspondence between the U.S. and the Soviet leadership that continued through November 1958 see Department of State Bulletin 39 (1958): 278-81, 648-49; Johan J. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look," in Why ABM? Policy Issues and Missile Defense Controversy, ed. Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (New York, 1969), 253.
33. Eisenhower wrote: "I also renew my proposal that we begin progressively to take measures to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack. . . . The capacity to verify the fulfillment of commitments is of the essence in all these matters, including the reduction of conventional forces and weapons, and it would surely be useful for us to study together through technical groups what are the possibilities in this respect upon which we could build if we then decide to do so." "Inspection Zone Proposals: 1955-1958," 18 July 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 2, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July-December 1958] (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Department of State Bulletin 58 (1958): 122-27. For the correspondence between the U.S. and the Soviet leadership that continued through November 1958 see Department of State Bulletin 39 (1958): 278-81, 648-49; Johan J. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look," in Why ABM? Policy Issues and Missile Defense Controversy, ed. Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (New York, 1969), 253.
34. Eisenhower wrote: "I also renew my proposal that we begin progressively to take measures to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack. . . . The capacity to verify the fulfillment of commitments is of the essence in all these matters, including the reduction of conventional forces and weapons, and it would surely be useful for us to study together through technical groups what are the possibilities in this respect upon which we could build if we then decide to do so." "Inspection Zone Proposals: 1955-1958," 18 July 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 2, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July-December 1958] (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Department of State Bulletin 58 (1958): 122-27. For the correspondence between the U.S. and the Soviet leadership that continued through November 1958 see Department of State Bulletin 39 (1958): 278-81, 648-49; Johan J. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look," in Why ABM? Policy Issues and Missile Defense Controversy, ed. Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (New York, 1969), 253.
35. Both Immerman and Brands agree that Eisenhower often emphasized Soviet intentions more than capabilities when confronted with prospect of mutually assured destruction. Immerman describes the president's "defensive avoidance" (an attempt "to avoid the trauma of thinking about the unthinkable") and his firsthand impressions of Soviet rationality in pursuit of power and personal ambition. Eisenhower, according to Immerman, thought the Soviets would use probes and subversion to achieve world domination, but, as the president told his special assistant for national security affairs, Robert Cutler, "I don't believe for a second they will ever attack." Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 332-35. Brands explains that Eisenhower emphasized Soviet intentions over capabilities to keep defense expenditures down and to avoid the existential angst of a life without hope. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 976. Fred Kaplan corroborates the Immerman and Brands analyses, arguing that Eisenhower believed Pearl Harbor was the exception, not the rule, for how wars generally begin. "Eisenhower had enough background in military history and military affairs to know that wars tend not to start with a 'bolt from the blue,' that they arise out of extremely high tension; and that being the case, SAC was probably in pretty good shape." Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 150-51.
36. Both Immerman and Brands agree that Eisenhower often emphasized Soviet intentions more than capabilities when confronted with prospect of mutually assured destruction. Immerman describes the president's "defensive avoidance" (an attempt "to avoid the trauma of thinking about the unthinkable") and his firsthand impressions of Soviet rationality in pursuit of power and personal ambition. Eisenhower, according to Immerman, thought the Soviets would use probes and subversion to achieve world domination, but, as the president told his special assistant for national security affairs, Robert Cutler, "I don't believe for a second they will ever attack." Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 332-35. Brands explains that Eisenhower emphasized Soviet intentions over capabilities to keep defense expenditures down and to avoid the existential angst of a life without hope. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 976. Fred Kaplan corroborates the Immerman and Brands analyses, arguing that Eisenhower believed Pearl Harbor was the exception, not the rule, for how wars generally begin. "Eisenhower had enough background in military history and military affairs to know that wars tend not to start with a 'bolt from the blue,' that they arise out of extremely high tension; and that being the case, SAC was probably in pretty good shape." Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 150-51.
37. Both Immerman and Brands agree that Eisenhower often emphasized Soviet intentions more than capabilities when confronted with prospect of mutually assured destruction. Immerman describes the president's "defensive avoidance" (an attempt "to avoid the trauma of thinking about the unthinkable") and his firsthand impressions of Soviet rationality in pursuit of power and personal ambition. Eisenhower, according to Immerman, thought the Soviets would use probes and subversion to achieve world domination, but, as the president told his special assistant for national security affairs, Robert Cutler, "I don't believe for a second they will ever attack." Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 332-35. Brands explains that Eisenhower emphasized Soviet intentions over capabilities to keep defense expenditures down and to avoid the existential angst of a life without hope. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 976. Fred Kaplan corroborates the Immerman and Brands analyses, arguing that Eisenhower believed Pearl Harbor was the exception, not the rule, for how wars generally begin. "Eisenhower had enough background in military history and military affairs to know that wars tend not to start with a 'bolt from the blue,' that they arise out of extremely high tension; and that being the case, SAC was probably in pretty good shape." Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, 150-51.
38. Evidence related closely to Sputnik and the Soviet missile developments of the late 1950s does not negate the conclusions of the preceding note, but it gives reason to believe that Eisenhower entertained some doubts about the Soviet aversion to a surprise nuclear attack. David Alan Rosenberg writes that Eisenhower voiced apprehensions that modern weapons "had made it easier for a hostile nation with an open society." Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 38. James Killian, who authored the government study in 1955 that greatly contributed to fears of Soviet surprise attack and who from 1957 to 1959 served as the president's special assistant for science and technology, writes in his memoirs that the strategic threat posed by Soviet secrecy "haunted Eisenhower throughout his presidency." James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA, 1977), 68. Brands also acknowledges the fears Soviet technological developments raised for Eisenhower and his advisers. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 974-75. In the end, as technological considerations could not be separated from political concerns, assessments of intentions could not be divorced from capabilities.
39. Evidence related closely to Sputnik and the Soviet missile developments of the late 1950s does not negate the conclusions of the preceding note, but it gives reason to believe that Eisenhower entertained some doubts about the Soviet aversion to a surprise nuclear attack. David Alan Rosenberg writes that Eisenhower voiced apprehensions that modern weapons "had made it easier for a hostile nation with an open society." Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 38. James Killian, who authored the government study in 1955 that greatly contributed to fears of Soviet surprise attack and who from 1957 to 1959 served as the president's special assistant for science and technology, writes in his memoirs that the strategic threat posed by Soviet secrecy "haunted Eisenhower throughout his presidency." James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA, 1977), 68. Brands also acknowledges the fears Soviet technological developments raised for Eisenhower and his advisers. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 974-75. In the end, as technological considerations could not be separated from political concerns, assessments of intentions could not be divorced from capabilities.
40. Evidence related closely to Sputnik and the Soviet missile developments of the late 1950s does not negate the conclusions of the preceding note, but it gives reason to believe that Eisenhower entertained some doubts about the Soviet aversion to a surprise nuclear attack. David Alan Rosenberg writes that Eisenhower voiced apprehensions that modern weapons "had made it easier for a hostile nation with an open society." Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," 38. James Killian, who authored the government study in 1955 that greatly contributed to fears of Soviet surprise attack and who from 1957 to 1959 served as the president's special assistant for science and technology, writes in his memoirs that the strategic threat posed by Soviet secrecy "haunted Eisenhower throughout his presidency." James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA, 1977), 68. Brands also acknowledges the fears Soviet technological developments raised for Eisenhower and his advisers. Brands, "The Age of Vulnerability," 974-75. In the end, as technological considerations could not be separated from political concerns, assessments of intentions could not be divorced from capabilities.
41. Eisenhower and other administration officials frequently made serious statements claiming that the Soviets were bent on world domination and harbored an inherently greater capability for surprise nuclear attack than the United States. For instance, see "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 236, 10 February 1955. Immerman confirms that Eisenhower believed the Soviet leadership sought world domination. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 334. For a detailed discussion of the 1956 and 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conferences see Charles Albert Appleby, Jr., "Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953-1961: A Balance of Risks" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 190-218. On 5 May 1958, Eisenhower approved NSC-5810/1, which stated that "[t]he trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. . . . Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring." "Extracts from Basic National Security Policy," Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 23, folder: Killian, James R. 1957 (1), Eisenhower Library. Raymond Garthoff argues that the American emphasis on inspection in arms control negotiations dated back to 1955 and the deliberations surrounding the Geneva Conference. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and
42. Eisenhower and other administration officials frequently made serious statements claiming that the Soviets were bent on world domination and harbored an inherently greater capability for surprise nuclear attack than the United States. For instance, see "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 236, 10 February 1955. Immerman confirms that Eisenhower believed the Soviet leadership sought world domination. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 334. For a detailed discussion of the 1956 and 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conferences see Charles Albert Appleby, Jr., "Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953-1961: A Balance of Risks" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 190-218. On 5 May 1958, Eisenhower approved NSC-5810/1, which stated that "[t]he trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. . . . Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring." "Extracts from Basic National Security Policy," Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 23, folder: Killian, James R. 1957 (1), Eisenhower Library. Raymond Garthoff argues that the American emphasis on inspection in arms control negotiations dated back to 1955 and the deliberations surrounding the Geneva Conference. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities," Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, 1991), 25-29.
43. Eisenhower and other administration officials frequently made serious statements claiming that the Soviets were bent on world domination and harbored an inherently greater capability for surprise nuclear attack than the United States. For instance, see "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 236, 10 February 1955. Immerman confirms that Eisenhower believed the Soviet leadership sought world domination. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 334. For a detailed discussion of the 1956 and 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conferences see Charles Albert Appleby, Jr., "Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953-1961: A Balance of Risks" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 190-218. On 5 May 1958, Eisenhower approved NSC-5810/1, which stated that "[t]he trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. . . . Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring." "Extracts from Basic National Security Policy," Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 23, folder: Killian, James R. 1957 (1), Eisenhower Library. Raymond Garthoff argues that the American emphasis on inspection in arms control negotiations dated back to 1955 and the deliberations surrounding the Geneva Conference. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities," Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, 1991), 25-29.
44. Eisenhower and other administration officials frequently made serious statements claiming that the Soviets were bent on world domination and harbored an inherently greater capability for surprise nuclear attack than the United States. For instance, see "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 236, 10 February 1955. Immerman confirms that Eisenhower believed the Soviet leadership sought world domination. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 334. For a detailed discussion of the 1956 and 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conferences see Charles Albert Appleby, Jr., "Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953-1961: A Balance of Risks" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 190-218. On 5 May 1958, Eisenhower approved NSC-5810/1, which stated that "[t]he trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. . . . Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring." "Extracts from Basic National Security Policy," Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 23, folder: Killian, James R. 1957 (1), Eisenhower Library. Raymond Garthoff argues that the American emphasis on inspection in arms control negotiations dated back to 1955 and the deliberations surrounding the Geneva Conference. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities," Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, 1991), 25-29.
45. Eisenhower and other administration officials frequently made serious statements claiming that the Soviets were bent on world domination and harbored an inherently greater capability for surprise nuclear attack than the United States. For instance, see "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 236, 10 February 1955. Immerman confirms that Eisenhower believed the Soviet leadership sought world domination. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 334. For a detailed discussion of the 1956 and 1957 United Nations Disarmament Conferences see Charles Albert Appleby, Jr., "Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953-1961: A Balance of Risks" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 190-218. On 5 May 1958, Eisenhower approved NSC-5810/1, which stated that "[t]he trends in military technology, together with the threat of catastrophic war, in the continuing development of nuclear weapons systems emphasize the overwhelming importance of seeking sound ways of limiting armaments. . . . Since any kind of arms limitation will probably have to be accompanied by a monitoring system, it is important to establish the principle of monitoring and inspection and to achieve an agreement which will give us experience in monitoring." "Extracts from Basic National Security Policy," Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 23, folder: Killian, James R. 1957 (1), Eisenhower Library. Raymond Garthoff argues that the American emphasis on inspection in arms control negotiations dated back to 1955 and the deliberations surrounding the Geneva Conference. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary: Estimates by the Eisenhower Administration of Soviet Intentions and Capabilities," Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, 1991), 25-29.
46. Robert Divine writes that the first true American reconnaissance satellites, Discoverer flights 13 and 14, provided revealing photographs of the Soviet Union from outerspace in August 1960. These satellites were part of the code-named Corona project run by the CIA. Divine applauds Eisenhower's emphasis on reconnaissance satellites, arguing that they "proved invaluable in protecting American security in the early 1960s." Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, 154, 189-98. John Lewis Gaddis corroborates Divine's last point, writing that the tacit Soviet and American approval of reconnaissance satellites in the post-Eisenhower years provided for greater superpower stability. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquires in the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), 195-214. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 350-51.
47. Robert Divine writes that the first true American reconnaissance satellites, Discoverer flights 13 and 14, provided revealing photographs of the Soviet Union from outerspace in August 1960. These satellites were part of the code-named Corona project run by the CIA. Divine applauds Eisenhower's emphasis on reconnaissance satellites, arguing that they "proved invaluable in protecting American security in the early 1960s." Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, 154, 189-98. John Lewis Gaddis corroborates Divine's last point, writing that the tacit Soviet and American approval of reconnaissance satellites in the post-Eisenhower years provided for greater superpower stability. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquires in the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), 195-214. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 350-51.
48. Robert Divine writes that the first true American reconnaissance satellites, Discoverer flights 13 and 14, provided revealing photographs of the Soviet Union from outerspace in August 1960. These satellites were part of the code-named Corona project run by the CIA. Divine applauds Eisenhower's emphasis on reconnaissance satellites, arguing that they "proved invaluable in protecting American security in the early 1960s." Divine, The Sputnik Challenge, 154, 189-98. John Lewis Gaddis corroborates Divine's last point, writing that the tacit Soviet and American approval of reconnaissance satellites in the post-Eisenhower years provided for greater superpower stability. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquires in the History of the Cold War (New York, 1987), 195-214. See also Bundy, Danger and Survival, 350-51.
49. Walt W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955, (Austin, 1982). Rostow writes that while the "open skies" proposal served propaganda and negotiating purposes for the United States, elements within the administration, including Eisenhower, were serious about the idea. Divine's analyses of the nuclear test ban debate and American space policy seem to confirm the seriousness of Eisenhower's search for a means of opening the pall of secrecy around Soviet military activities and beginning a process of serious arms control. See Divine, Blowing on the Wind and The Sputnik Challenge. My examination of the Surprise Attack Conference confirms this argument. Superpower inspection served the more open society disproportionately. While the Soviets had more to lose, the Eisenhower administration sincerely believed that a more transparent world would be safer and more stable for all nations. See also Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary," esp. 50-52.
50. Walt W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955, (Austin, 1982). Rostow writes that while the "open skies" proposal served propaganda and negotiating purposes for the United States, elements within the administration, including Eisenhower, were serious about the idea. Divine's analyses of the nuclear test ban debate and American space policy seem to confirm the seriousness of Eisenhower's search for a means of opening the pall of secrecy around Soviet military activities and beginning a process of serious arms control. See Divine, Blowing on the Wind and The Sputnik Challenge. My examination of the Surprise Attack Conference confirms this argument. Superpower inspection served the more open society disproportionately. While the Soviets had more to lose, the Eisenhower administration sincerely believed that a more transparent world would be safer and more stable for all nations. See also Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary," esp. 50-52.
51. Walt W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955, (Austin, 1982). Rostow writes that while the "open skies" proposal served propaganda and negotiating purposes for the United States, elements within the administration, including Eisenhower, were serious about the idea. Divine's analyses of the nuclear test ban debate and American space policy seem to confirm the seriousness of Eisenhower's search for a means of opening the pall of secrecy around Soviet military activities and beginning a process of serious arms control. See Divine, Blowing on the Wind and The Sputnik Challenge. My examination of the Surprise Attack Conference confirms this argument. Superpower inspection served the more open society disproportionately. While the Soviets had more to lose, the Eisenhower administration sincerely believed that a more transparent world would be safer and more stable for all nations. See also Garthoff, "Assessing the Adversary," esp. 50-52.
52. Dulles to Killian, 3 July 1958, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, file 600.0012/7-158, National Archives (hereafter RG 59, with filing information); Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 225-28.
53. Killian to Dulles July 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 2, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July-December 1958] (1).
54. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 12, 1958," 4 August 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 35, folder: Staff Memos July 1958.
55. "Memorandum for the Secretary of State," 14 July 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959]; "Report of the Interagency Working Group on Surprise Attack," 15 August 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 2, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July-December 1958] (2). The members of the Interagency Working Group were Richard M. Bissell, Jr. (CIA), Philip J. Farley (State), John N. Irwin II (Defense), Curtis E. LeMay (Air Force), Gerard Smith (State), Jerold Zacharias (PSAC), and George Kistiakowsky, chairman (PSAC).
56. The documents from NSC Meeting 236, convened on 10 February 1955, clearly reveal the early differences between elements of the State and Defense departments on arms control policy. See "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, "Review of NSC 112," 7 February 1955, "Department of Defense Comments on State Department Working Group Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments," and "Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President of the NSC to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC," 10 December 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 256, 10 February 1955. Interestingly, Secretary of State Dulles meandered between the positions articulated by State and Defense papers during the NSC meetings from 1955 through 1958. Dulles did not trust the Soviets, but he seemed to find Defense's hard line unsatisfactory. On this general point see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 47-77. Detailed discussions of the rift between State and Defense during the later half of 1958 appear in two PSAC documents. PSAC to Killian, 11 September 1958, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, box 5, folder: President's Science Advisory Committee (3), Eisenhower Library; and "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," from W. H. Minshull, Jr., 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959].
57. The documents from NSC Meeting 236, convened on 10 February 1955, clearly reveal the early differences between elements of the State and Defense departments on arms control policy. See "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, "Review of NSC 112," 7 February 1955, "Department of Defense Comments on State Department Working Group Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments," and "Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President of the NSC to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC," 10 December 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 256, 10 February 1955. Interestingly, Secretary of State Dulles meandered between the positions articulated by State and Defense papers during the NSC meetings from 1955 through 1958. Dulles did not trust the Soviets, but he seemed to find Defense's hard line unsatisfactory. On this general point see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 47-77. Detailed discussions of the rift between State and Defense during the later half of 1958 appear in two PSAC documents. PSAC to Killian, 11 September 1958, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, box 5, folder: President's Science Advisory Committee (3), Eisenhower Library; and "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," from W. H. Minshull, Jr., 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959].
58. The documents from NSC Meeting 236, convened on 10 February 1955, clearly reveal the early differences between elements of the State and Defense departments on arms control policy. See "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, "Review of NSC 112," 7 February 1955, "Department of Defense Comments on State Department Working Group Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments," and "Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President of the NSC to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC," 10 December 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 256, 10 February 1955. Interestingly, Secretary of State Dulles meandered between the positions articulated by State and Defense papers during the NSC meetings from 1955 through 1958. Dulles did not trust the Soviets, but he seemed to find Defense's hard line unsatisfactory. On this general point see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 47-77. Detailed discussions of the rift between State and Defense during the later half of 1958 appear in two PSAC documents. PSAC to Killian, 11 September 1958, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, box 5, folder: President's Science Advisory Committee (3), Eisenhower Library; and "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," from W. H. Minshull, Jr., 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959].
59. The documents from NSC Meeting 236, convened on 10 February 1955, clearly reveal the early differences between elements of the State and Defense departments on arms control policy. See "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, "Review of NSC 112," 7 February 1955, "Department of Defense Comments on State Department Working Group Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments," and "Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President of the NSC to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC," 10 December 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 256, 10 February 1955. Interestingly, Secretary of State Dulles meandered between the positions articulated by State and Defense papers during the NSC meetings from 1955 through 1958. Dulles did not trust the Soviets, but he seemed to find Defense's hard line unsatisfactory. On this general point see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 47-77. Detailed discussions of the rift between State and Defense during the later half of 1958 appear in two PSAC documents. PSAC to Killian, 11 September 1958, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, box 5, folder: President's Science Advisory Committee (3), Eisenhower Library; and "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," from W. H. Minshull, Jr., 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959].
60. The documents from NSC Meeting 236, convened on 10 February 1955, clearly reveal the early differences between elements of the State and Defense departments on arms control policy. See "Review of U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments," 29 November 1954, "Review of NSC 112," 7 February 1955, "Department of Defense Comments on State Department Working Group Review of United States Policy on Control of Armaments," and "Memorandum from the Executive Office of the President of the NSC to the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC," 10 December 1954, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 256, 10 February 1955. Interestingly, Secretary of State Dulles meandered between the positions articulated by State and Defense papers during the NSC meetings from 1955 through 1958. Dulles did not trust the Soviets, but he seemed to find Defense's hard line unsatisfactory. On this general point see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians," in John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, ed. Richard H. Immerman (Princeton, 1990), 47-77. Detailed discussions of the rift between State and Defense during the later half of 1958 appear in two PSAC documents. PSAC to Killian, 11 September 1958, U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee, box 5, folder: President's Science Advisory Committee (3), Eisenhower Library; and "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," from W. H. Minshull, Jr., 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959].
61. On 29 April 1958, Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the United Nations, proposed an Arctic inspection zone to the Security Council. This initiative served as an American response to public Soviet protests regarding American nuclear-armed training flights in the Arctic Circle proximate to Russian airspace. During a conference with members of State, as well as the British, French, and Canadian embassies, Dulles pointed out that the proposal served propaganda and allied arms control interests. Like "open skies," the Arctic inspection proposal was a win-win proposition for America. Dulles wished "to emphasize the high degree of importance the United States attaches to this proposed action both as a desirable step in itself if agreed to bY the Soviet Union, and as a counter to Soviet propaganda whether they accept or refuse." "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense," from the JCS, 31 December 1957, National Security Council Papers, folder: NSC Meeting 350, 6 January 1958. The nuclear-armed training flight issue reemerged as a point of contention at the meetings of the Surprise Attack Conference.
62. Memorandum of conversation, 26 September 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/9-2658.
63. Memorandum of conversation, 3 September 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/9-358. Reports regarding the Surprise Attack Conference appeared on the front page of the New York Times on seven occasions between October and December 1958. Many other prominent articles on the conference were published in the New York Times throughout the period.
64. At the technical conference on a possible nuclear test ban, in July and August 1958, the U.S. delegates agreed to an inspection system for verifying adherence to underground nuclear test restrictions. Later, when American scientists realized that the inspection scheme would not allow effective distinction between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions of 20 kilotons or less, the Eisenhower administration encountered public difficulties backing away from its previous arrangement. Divine, Blowing on the Wind, 225-31, 241-61; interview with Henry Rowen, 19 January 1994, Stanford, California.
65. See also Minshull's discussion of the JCS position on the Surprise Attack Conference in "Memorandum for Dr. Killian," 23 September 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959]. Gordon Gray's comments can be found in memorandum of conversation, 26 September 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/9-2658.
66. For a discussion of general Defense Department concerns during this period see Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, 155-73, 233-38.
67. Andrew Goodpaster, the commander in chief's close aide, summarized Eisenhower's response to Killian's proddings: "The president thought the first step is to determine what are the fields or areas wherein by certain actions we could limit or eliminate the danger of surprise attack. Then what are the means of doing this, i.e., through observation or inspection; then what programs should be carried out to establish these means; then finally in what areas or in what respects could these measures be expected to be effective. Dr. Killian concluded by saying that the president may have to decide, before the matter is resolved, as to whether to include limitation of arms and inspection of such limitation in the Surprise Attack proposal." "Memorandum of Conference with the President, September 30, 1958," 2 October 1958, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 36, folder: Staff Memos September 1958.
68. Policy Planning Staff memorandum, "U.S.-Soviet Surprise Attack Discussions," written by Henry Owen, 6 October 1958, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff, 1957-61, State Department Lot File 6705-48, box 125, Atomic Energy - Armaments. The cover sheet for the memorandum reveals that Gerard Smith, then Dulles's assistant for arms control matters, received this staff summary report. One can safely assume, from Killian's close relationship with Eisenhower, that the president received either the full text or a summary of this last interagency report as well. I thank the anonymous reviewer from Diplomatic History for providing me with a photocopy of this document.
69. "Draft Objectives and Terms of Reference for the U.S. Delegation to Technical-Military Talks on Suprise Attack Safeguards," 14 October 1958, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, box 16, folder: Surprise Attack Negotiations 1958, Eisenhower Library.
70. Memorandum from William C. Foster to the secretary of state, 31 October 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/10-3158.
71. Appleby cites a memorandum of conversation with the president, dated 25 October 1958, from the Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs at the Eisenhower Library. Appleby, "Eisenhower and Arms Control," 293. I could not find this particular document in the archive. Assuming this conversation did indeed take place, contextual evidence indicates that Eisenhower made cryptic comments rather than a clear, authoritative statement on the scope of American activities at the Surprise Attack Conference. See note 30.
72. Appleby, "Eisenhower and Arms Control," 293. It appears that Gordon Gray himself did not believe that Eisenhower made a decisive decision on 24 October. In a telephone conversation after the morning Eisenhower-Gray meeting, Gray recounted to Herter that he had told the president "nothing in the surprise attack instructions . . . would require his [Eisenhower's] making a decision at this time." Gray did not add, in his recounting for Herter, that the president disagreed or made a decision anyway Instead, Gray left the distinct impression that Eisenhower followed the advice of his national security assistant and did not make an authoritative decision. Record of telephone conversation, 24 October 1958, Christian A. Herter Papers, box 10, folder: Presidential Telephone Calls, Eisenhower Library.
73. On 7 October V. H. B. Macklen of the British Ministry of Defense wrote a letter to H. C. Hainworth of the Foreign Office, recounting a discussion Macklen had with George Kistiakowsky and William Minshull (PSAC). Macklen writes that the two Americans admitted that, because of time constraints, the U.S. preparatory committees for the conference failed to assess all issues related to surprise attack. Macklen to Hainworth, 7 October 1958, FO 371, 132676 IAD 111/21, Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, England (hereafter PRO). After the adjournment of the Surprise Attack Conference Jerome Wiesner, who served as staff director in Geneva, wrote that the United States "went to the conference knowing full well that it was ill-prepared." Jerome Bert Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet (New York, 1965), 184.
74. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185; telephone interview with Philip Farley, 7 October 1993.
75. General Hull was appointed in August and resigned on 3 September. General Gruenther was appointed on 4 September and resigned on 23 September. The evidence surrounding the resignations of Hull and Gruenther, while sparse, seems to indicate that the two men found the work of the American delegation tedious, frustrating, and fated for failure at the conference table. See memorandum from Max V. Krebs to Mr. Greene, 2 September 1958, Christian A. Herter Papers, box 5, file: [Chronological File] September, 1958 (3), Eisenhower Library.
76. General Doolittle resigned from the American delegation to the Surprise Attack Conference on 26 September 1958. He cited the need for a more influential military figure in the delegation. Telephone calls, 26 September 1958, Herter Papers, box II, folder: CAH Telephone Calls 7/1/58-9/50/58(1).
77. Letter to author from Lawrence Weiler, 13 October 1993; "Official Report of the United States Delegation to the Surprise Attack Conference," William C. Foster Papers, box II, folder 8, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Lexington, Virginia.
78. Ian N. Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks? The 1958 Surprise Attack Conference" (M.A. thesis, University of Oxford, 1993), 56.
79. Memorandum of conversation, 18 July 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/7-1858; memorandum of conversation, 22 September 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/9-2258.
80. Memorandum of conversation, 24 April 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/4-2458; memorandum of conversation, July 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/7-1058; memorandum of conversation, 18 July 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/7-185-8; memorandum of conversation, 30 September 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/9-3058; FO tel. 7246 to Washington, 15 October 1958, FO 371, 132677; Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 48. See my discussion of the Rapacki Plan later in this article.
81. In December 1958, Eisenhower warned that "de Gaulle is capable of the most extraordinary actions . . . watch out for him." Eisenhower told Dulles that "it does not seem that our friend should cease insisting upon attempting to control the whole world . . . even before he had gotten France itself in good order." Ambrose, Eisenhower, 502.
82. Hugh T. Morgan, a first secretary in the British Foreign Office, wrote that allied proposals at the Surprise Attack Conference were reduced "to the lowest common factor between the five delegations." Minute by H. T. Morgan, 29 December 1958, FO 371, 132683. George Kistiakowsky, reporting from Geneva to Killian in Washington, lamented that "[h]aving four allies on our side, each pulling in a different direction, or not even knowing in which direction to pull and therefore objecting to everything, isn't making my life any easier." Kistiakowsky to Killian, 20 November 1978, Record Group 359, White House Office of Science and Technology, box 79, folder: Disarmament - N/T Surprise Attack - Misc., National Archives. I thank the anonymous reviewer from Diplomatic History for this citation.
83. Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 66.
84. "List of Members of Delegations to the Conference," FO 371, 132679.
85. Kistiakowsky to Killian, 20 November 1958, RG 359, White House Office of Science and Technology, box 79, folder: Disarmament - N/T Surprise Attack - Misc.
86. Morgan to Con D. W. O'Neill, 18 November 1958, FO 371 132680; Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 76. The four Western states on the UN Disarmament Subcommittee, with the Soviet Union, were the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and France.
87. Memorandum of conversation Foster, Kuznetsov, et al., 10 November 1958, RG, 59, 600.0012/11.
88. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, 1961), 470. On 17 November the West added a fifth point to its agenda: "a report to governments." "Revised plan of work submitted by the Western experts," 17 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. For the proposed Eastern agenda see "Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania," 11 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. See also Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 77.
89. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, 1961), 470. On 17 November the West added a fifth point to its agenda: "a report to governments." "Revised plan of work submitted by the Western experts," 17 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. For the proposed Eastern agenda see "Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania," 11 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. See also Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 77.
90. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, 1961), 470. On 17 November the West added a fifth point to its agenda: "a report to governments." "Revised plan of work submitted by the Western experts," 17 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. For the proposed Eastern agenda see "Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania," 11 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. See also Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 77.
91. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, 1961), 470. On 17 November the West added a fifth point to its agenda: "a report to governments." "Revised plan of work submitted by the Western experts," 17 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. For the proposed Eastern agenda see "Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania," 11 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. See also Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 77.
92. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, 470. Kistiakowsky expressed frustration at the presence of irreconcilable agendas. "Unless there is a shift in position of one of the two sides, no technical discussions could ever develop in this conference. Had we had the freedom which was successfully objected to, it would have been possible to fight on another ground and thus possibly accomplish something useful." Kistiakowsky to Killian, 20 November 1958, RG 359, White House Office of Science and Technology, box 79, folder: Disarmament - N/T Surprise Attack - Misc. For reference to Eisenhower's 12 January letter see note 9.
93. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991), 169-91. While the United States never provided the Western European states with authorization to fire American nuclear warheads unilaterally, Washington did give its allies control over delivery vehicles on their territory.
94. William Burr "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959," Diplomatic History 18 (Spring 1994): 177, 192; "Address by the Chairman Khrushchev," Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, 1985), 542-46, 552-59.
95. William Burr "Avoiding the Slippery Slope: The Eisenhower Administration and the Berlin Crisis, November 1958-January 1959," Diplomatic History 18 (Spring 1994): 177, 192; "Address by the Chairman Khrushchev," Documents on Germany, 1944-1985 (Washington, 1985), 542-46, 552-59.
96. R. Craig Nation, in his history of Soviet security policy, identifies the middle and late 1950s as a period of transition in Moscow's military doctrine. Advances in the long-range striking capability, accuracy, speed, and fire power of American nuclear forces led prominent Soviet military thinkers, like Nikolai Talenskii and Vasilii Sokolovskii, to place newfound emphasis on strategic nuclear weapons (aircraft and rockets) and the importance of surprise in modern warfare. While these developments in Soviet military doctrine merit notice, the author carefully explains that until the middle of the next decade, Moscow focused its strategic worries most closely on the European continent. Immediately following the official admittance of West Germany into NATO on 9 May 1955, the author points out that Moscow created the Warsaw Pact as "the keystone of the [sic] Moscow's security posture in Europe" (p. 219). "During the early 1960s the Soviets devoted most of their energy to the development of the SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate range ballistic missiles, primarily relevant to the European theater where the real focus of Soviet military strategy continued to lie" (p. 216). R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy (Ithaca, 1992), 202-44.
97. Geneva tel. to the secretary of state, 13 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-1358; Geneva tel. to the secretary of state, 4 December 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/12-458; Geneva tel. to the secretary of state, 28 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11 (emphasis in original); Department of State tel. to the American consul general in Geneva, 28 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-2858.
98. "Proposal regarding the establishment of ground control posts, the taking of aerial photographs and the putting into operation simultaneously of a number of disarmament measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," 5 December 1958, and "Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts and aerial inspection: submitted by the delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR," 12 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. Trachtenberg argues that the Eisenhower administration neglected Soviet worries about nuclear weapons in Germany because "the Soviets, in diplomatic contacts, did not stress the issue nearly as much as one might have expected." Trachtenberg's references are to meetings between Khrushchev and Richard Nixon, Averell Harriman, and Llewelyn Thompson in 1959. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 207. Trachtenberg, however, neglects the Rapacki proposals of 1957-58 and the various Eastern initiatives at the Surprise Attack Conference. In all of these cases the Eastern bloc unmistakably stressed worries of German militarism and the instabilities that nuclear weapons would create in Central Europe. The Eisenhower administration understood the Soviet position. The United States rejected the Eastern proposals because the administration desired an arrangement for superpower inspection in Central Europe and elsewhere that did not include immediate arms reductions. The Soviets would only accept superpower inspection in Central Europe if accompanied by a nuclear disarmament agreement in the region.
99. "Proposal regarding the establishment of ground control posts, the taking of aerial photographs and the putting into operation simultaneously of a number of disarmament measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," 5 December 1958, and "Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts and aerial inspection: submitted by the delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR," 12 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 10. Trachtenberg argues that the Eisenhower administration neglected Soviet worries about nuclear weapons in Germany because "the Soviets, in diplomatic contacts, did not stress the issue nearly as much as one might have expected." Trachtenberg's references are to meetings between Khrushchev and Richard Nixon, Averell Harriman, and Llewelyn Thompson in 1959. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 207. Trachtenberg, however, neglects the Rapacki proposals of 1957-58 and the various Eastern initiatives at the Surprise Attack Conference. In all of these cases the Eastern bloc unmistakably stressed worries of German militarism and the instabilities that nuclear weapons would create in Central Europe. The Eisenhower administration understood the Soviet position. The United States rejected the Eastern proposals because the administration desired an arrangement for superpower inspection in Central Europe and elsewhere that did not include immediate arms reductions. The Soviets would only accept superpower inspection in Central Europe if accompanied by a nuclear disarmament agreement in the region.
100. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability," 274; "Explanatory document of the first point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a survey of the relevant technical aspects of possible instruments of surprise attack as a prerequisite for examining means of detection and systems of inspection and control," 18 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11 folder: 10; Geneva tel. to the secretary of state, 5 December 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/12-258; Geneva tel. to the secretary of state, 4 December 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/12-358.
101. Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," 177-205. According to Alan K. Henrikson, a decision maker formulates a "mental map" when he or she "acquires, codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in thought or in action, information about his or her large-scale geographical environment, in part or in its entirety." Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1991), 177-92.
102. Burr, "Avoiding the Slippery Slope," 177-205. According to Alan K. Henrikson, a decision maker formulates a "mental map" when he or she "acquires, codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in thought or in action, information about his or her large-scale geographical environment, in part or in its entirety." Alan K. Henrikson, "Mental Maps," in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1991), 177-92.
103. Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 14 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-1458; A. E. Davidson minute to C. D. W. O'Neill, 17 November 1958, FO 571, 132679.
104. "Draft recommendation regarding the undertaking by States of an obligation not to carry out flights of their aircraft with atomic and hydrogen weapons over the territories of other States and over open seas: Proposal submitted by the Delegation of the USSR," 17 November 1958, Foster Papers box 11, folder. 10; Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 17 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-1758; Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 18 November 1958, RG 59, 600.00.2/11-18; Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 18 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-1958.
105. Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 20 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-2058; Department of State tel. to Geneva, 21 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-2158; "Explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: an illustrative outline of possible systems for observation and inspection of long-range aircraft," 24 November 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder. 10; Weyland report to Nathan Twining (chairman of the JCS), 24 November 1958, RG 59, 700.5611/11-2458. Weyland informed Twining that "[m]y evaluation is that USSR absolutely convinced of efficacy of US air power, is scared of it, and probably feels they have no adequate counter at this time." Within the context of the conference, I believe Weyland misconstrued Soviet intentions. The Soviet proposal to limit American nuclear training flights seemed more an attempt to link inspection with restrictions on nuclear weapons deployments than an expression of fear regarding U.S. air power American air forces, of course, did threaten Soviet security, but the nuclear training flight issue stood out for the Soviets because it provided an apparently reasonable platform from which to argue for nuclear disarmament, especially in Central Europe and the Arctic Circle. I thank the anonymous reviewer from Diplomatic History for the last document. Contrary to the arguments of the American delegation, Scott Sagan writes that nuclear training nights in the Arctic proved very dangerous. Sagan concludes, from empirical evidence and normal accidents theory, that the risk of serious accidents on nuclear-armed aircraft was not negligible. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, 1993), 156-203.
106. New Delhi tel. to secretary of state, 2 December 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/12-158. Immerman provides the same criticism of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy in general. Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist," 341-42.
107. Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 18 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-1858; Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 22 November 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/11-2258. During a recent research trip to Moscow, I did not uncover any documentary evidence in the former Soviet Communist party archives regarding Khrushchev's feelings about the Surprise Attack Conference.
108. Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 99-100, 108.
109. William C. Foster to John Foster Dulles, 23 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 1. Foster expressed this same point to the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament. "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1359. Jerome Wiesner and Lawrence Weiler made statements similar to Foster's. Wiesner wrote that "inspection and observation sytems alone most decidedly detract more from the actual security of the Warsaw Pact powers than from that of NATO powers because of the greater dependence that the Warsaw members have placed upon secrecy. Consequently, the Western group was in the position of advocating only those plans which would have involved much greater security concessions by the Warsaw powers than by us." See Weisner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185. Weisner originally prepared this chapter of the book as an unpublished report on the Surprise Attack Conference in the winter of 1959. Lawrence Weiler told a representative from the British embassy in Washington that any system of inspection and control was liable to work to the "relative disavantage" of the Soviet Union because of its closed society. See Gibson, "Six Futile Week?" 106-7; letter to author from Lawrence Weiler, 13 October 1993. Jerome Kahan writers that the Surprise Attack Conference provided the West with a better understanding of the Soviet views toward secrecy. Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, 1975), 61-62.
110. William C. Foster to John Foster Dulles, 23 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 1. Foster expressed this same point to the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament. "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1359. Jerome Wiesner and Lawrence Weiler made statements similar to Foster's. Wiesner wrote that "inspection and observation sytems alone most decidedly detract more from the actual security of the Warsaw Pact powers than from that of NATO powers because of the greater dependence that the Warsaw members have placed upon secrecy. Consequently, the Western group was in the position of advocating only those plans which would have involved much greater security concessions by the Warsaw powers than by us." See Weisner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185. Weisner originally prepared this chapter of the book as an unpublished report on the Surprise Attack Conference in the winter of 1959. Lawrence Weiler told a representative from the British embassy in Washington that any system of inspection and control was liable to work to the "relative disavantage" of the Soviet Union because of its closed society. See Gibson, "Six Futile Week?" 106-7; letter to author from Lawrence Weiler, 13 October 1993. Jerome Kahan writers that the Surprise Attack Conference provided the West with a better understanding of the Soviet views toward secrecy. Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, 1975), 61-62.
111. William C. Foster to John Foster Dulles, 23 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 1. Foster expressed this same point to the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament. "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1359. Jerome Wiesner and Lawrence Weiler made statements similar to Foster's. Wiesner wrote that "inspection and observation sytems alone most decidedly detract more from the actual security of the Warsaw Pact powers than from that of NATO powers because of the greater dependence that the Warsaw members have placed upon secrecy. Consequently, the Western group was in the position of advocating only those plans which would have involved much greater security concessions by the Warsaw powers than by us." See Weisner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185. Weisner originally prepared this chapter of the book as an unpublished report on the Surprise Attack Conference in the winter of 1959. Lawrence Weiler told a representative from the British embassy in Washington that any system of inspection and control was liable to work to
112. William C. Foster to John Foster Dulles, 23 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 1. Foster expressed this same point to the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament. "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1359. Jerome Wiesner and Lawrence Weiler made statements similar to Foster's. Wiesner wrote that "inspection and observation sytems alone most decidedly detract more from the actual security of the Warsaw Pact powers than from that of NATO powers because of the greater dependence that the Warsaw members have placed upon secrecy. Consequently, the Western group was in the position of advocating only those plans which would have involved much greater security concessions by the Warsaw powers than by us." See Weisner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185. Weisner originally prepared this chapter of the book as an unpublished report on the Surprise Attack Conference in the winter of 1959. Lawrence Weiler told a representative from the British embassy in Washington that any system of inspection and control was liable to work to the "relative disavantage" of the Soviet Union because of its closed society. See Gibson, "Six Futile Week?" 106-7; letter to author from Lawrence Weiler, 13 October 1993. Jerome Kahan writers that the Surprise Attack Conference provided the West with a better understanding of the Soviet views toward secrecy. Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, 1975), 61-62.
113. William C. Foster to John Foster Dulles, 23 December 1958, Foster Papers, box 11, folder: 1. Foster expressed this same point to the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament. "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommitte on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1359. Jerome Wiesner and Lawrence Weiler made statements similar to Foster's. Wiesner wrote that "inspection and observation sytems alone most decidedly detract more from the actual security of the Warsaw Pact powers than from that of NATO powers because of the greater dependence that the Warsaw members have placed upon secrecy. Consequently, the Western group was in the position of advocating only those plans which would have involved much greater security concessions by the Warsaw powers than by us." See Weisner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 185. Weisner originally prepared this chapter of the book as an unpublished report on the Surprise Attack Conference in the winter of 1959. Lawrence Weiler told a representative from the British embassy in Washington that any system of inspection and control was liable to work to the "relative disavantage" of the Soviet Union because of its closed society. See Gibson, "Six Futile Week?" 106-7; letter to author from Lawrence Weiler, 13 October 1993. Jerome Kahan writers that the Surprise Attack Conference provided the West with a better understanding of the Soviet views toward secrecy. Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, 1975), 61-62.
114. On 12 January 1959, George Kistiakowsky told Eisenhower that the United States could not monitor submarines effectively. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 12, 1959," 14 January 1959, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 38, Administration Subseries, folder: Staff Notes, January 1959 (2). On 14 January 1959, Kistiakowsky told a meeting of Herter, Killian, Gray, and Farley that inspection would eliminate the deterrent value of mobile missile-carrying submarines. Memorandum of conversation, 14 January 1959, RG 59, 600.0012/1-1459. Wiesner made similar points in 1959 and later years.
115. Wiesner, Where Science and Politics Meet, 197, 219-20.
116. "Memorandum of Conference with the President, January 12, 1959," 14 January 1959, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Administration Subseries, box 38, folder: Staff Notes, January 1959 (2). On 14 January, Kistiakowsky made the same report to Herter, Gray, and Farley. They also seemed receptive but noncommittal when confronted with Kistiakowsky's claim that "in the missile age such limited measures [of inspection] might well strengthen the hand of a would-be aggressor rather than reducing the chances for a successful surprise attack." Memorandum of conversation, 14 January 1959, RG 59, 600.0012/1-1459.
117. Geneva tel. to secretary of state, 5 December 1958, RG 59, 600.0012/12-558. Villard served as the liaison between the American delegation in Geneva and the State Department. He transmitted most daily reports and telegrams from Geneva to Washington.
118. William C. Foster, in his testimony to the Senate, stated that "we also have now a much more precise notion of the difficulty of separating the technical from the political in analyzing the problems of surprise attack and of the need, in pursuing technical discussions on the subject, to have agreement all around on what questions should be answered." "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1358. Dulles also advocated a broader approach to arms control in a draft memorandum for the president in late January 1959. The secretary of state wrote that "in such future discussions we should be prepared to engage in an expert examination of disarmament measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it appears desirable that a future conference allow for both political and technical discussions. Prior to a future conference, therefore, it is necessary for the United States to examine the problem in a broader framework than was used for the studies prior to the recent technical conference." "Draft Memorandum for the President. Subject: Future Preparations for Surprise Attack Safeguards Discussions," White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959]. Hugh T. Morgan of the British Foreign Office and General Mansergh, chairman of the British delegation to the conference, argued for a linkage between inspection and arms reductions, which was certainly passed on to Washington. On 29 December 1958, Morgan wrote that the conference "was really a political conference and the Western team was no match for Kuznetsov. Our procedures were far too rigid, and the lack of a real Western policy reduced all our utterances to the lowest common factor between the five delegations. We should be made to look very silly another time unless we have a clear policy and a much stronger political element." H. T. Morgan minute, 29 December 1958, FO 371, 132683. On 2 January 1959, Mansergh expressed a similar opinion in a letter to the British chief of the defense staff at the Ministry of Defense. Mansergh to the chief of the Defense staff, 2 January 1959, FO 371, 140429. In February 1959, Lawrence Weiler advocated an identical viewpoint in communications with the British embassy in Washington. See Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 107.
119. William C. Foster, in his testimony to the Senate, stated that "we also have now a much more precise notion of the difficulty of separating the technical from the political in analyzing the problems of surprise attack and of the need, in pursuing technical discussions on the subject, to have agreement all around on what questions should be answered." "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1358. Dulles also advocated a broader approach to arms control in a draft memorandum for the president in late January 1959. The secretary of state wrote that "in such future discussions we should be prepared to engage in an expert examination of disarmament measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it appears desirable that a future conference allow for both political and technical discussions. Prior to a future conference, therefore, it is necessary for the United States to examine the problem in a broader framework than was used for the studies prior to the recent technical conference." "Draft Memorandum for the President. Subject: Future Preparations for Surprise Attack Safeguards Discussions," White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959]. Hugh T. Morgan of the British Foreign Office and General Mansergh, chairman of the British delegation to the conference, argued for a linkage between inspection and arms reductions, which was certainly passed on to Washington. On 29 December 1958, Morgan wrote that the conference "was really a political conference and the Western team was no match for Kuznetsov. Our procedures were far too rigid, and the lack of a real Western policy reduced all our utterances to the lowest common factor between the five delegations. We should be made to look very silly another time unless we have a clear policy and a much stronger political element." H. T. Morgan minute, 29 December 1958, FO 371, 132683. On 2 January 1959, Mansergh expressed a similar opinion in a letter to the British chief of the defense staff at the Ministry of Defense. Mansergh to the chief of the Defense staff, 2 January 1959, FO 371, 140429. In February 1959, Lawrence Weiler advocated an identical viewpoint in communications with the British embassy in Washington. See Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 107.
120. William C. Foster, in his testimony to the Senate, stated that "we also have now a much more precise notion of the difficulty of separating the technical from the political in analyzing the problems of surprise attack and of the need, in pursuing technical discussions on the subject, to have agreement all around on what questions should be answered." "Testimony by Ambassador William C. Foster before the Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament [Extracts], January 30, 1959," Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, 1358. Dulles also advocated a broader approach to arms control in a draft memorandum for the president in late January 1959. The secretary of state wrote that "in such future discussions we should be prepared to engage in an expert examination of disarmament measures which might affect the surprise attack problem, and it appears desirable that a future conference allow for both political and technical discussions. Prior to a future conference, therefore, it is necessary for the United States to examine the problem in a broader framework than was used for the studies prior to the recent technical conference." "Draft Memorandum for the President. Subject: Future Preparations for Surprise Attack Safeguards Discussions," White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, box 8, folder: Disarmament - Surprise Attack [July 1958-April 1959]. Hugh T. Morgan of the British Foreign Office and General Mansergh, chairman of the British delegation to the conference, argued for a linkage between inspection and arms reductions, which was certainly passed on to Washington. On 29 December 1958, Morgan wrote that the conference "was really a political conference and the Western team was no match for Kuznetsov. Our procedures were far too rigid, and the lack of a real Western policy reduced all our utterances to the lowest common factor between the five delegations. We should be made to look very silly another time unless we have a clear policy and a much stronger political element." H. T. Morgan minute, 29 December 1958, FO 371, 132683. On 2 January 1959, Mansergh expressed a similar opinion in a letter to the British chief of the defense staff at the Ministry of Defense. Mansergh to the chief of the Defense staff, 2 January 1959, FO 371, 140429. In February 1959, Lawrence Weiler advocated an identical viewpoint in communications with the British embassy in Washington. See Gibson, "Six Futile Weeks?" 107.
121. Robert A. Strong, "Eisenhower and Arms Control," in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, ed. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers (Urbana, IL, 1987), 241-63.
122. See note 7.