Knowing about the Good: A Problem with Antiperfectionism

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 311-338

  McCabe, David ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042686662     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233271     Document Type: Review

References (60)

1. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 4.
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1971).
3. It may be helpful to indicate how subjectivism differs from skepticism and why I have employed the cumbersome phrase "knowledge of the objective human good." Subjectivists see the good for persons as determined ultimately by some aspect of their individual psychologies (e.g., successful pursuit of their desires, values, or life plans). Whatever approach they take here, subjectivists offer an account of the human good and are thus not skeptics about it. What subjectivists deny is that there is any criterion independent of a person's standpoint by which the worth (in terms of its contribution to that person's good) of pursuing such desires, values, or life plans may be assessed. Such a criterion would constitute an objective (i.e., nonsubjectively determined) measure of the human good, and in denying its existence, subjectivists join skeptics in rejecting the possibility of knowledge about the objective human good. (Skeptics, of course, go farther and deny knowledge about the human good in any substantive form.) It is important to note that subjectivism and skepticism are not the only positions available if one rejects the claim that reason can yield knowledge of the objective good: a third possibility is that we can achieve such knowledge only through nondiscursive means such as grace or personal revelation. In this article I shall not spend much time considering this third position, not because it lacks adherents but because it cannot meet the criterion of public reason giving central to liberal theory and thus poses a far less serious problem to antiperfectionist liberalism than does reasonbased objectivism about the good. See also n. 18 below.
4. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 327.
5. Ibid., p. 136.
6. As George Sher points out in his illuminating study Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 80.
7. Joseph Raz makes this point in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p. 126.
8. Raz makes a similar point when, after suggesting that Rawls's view is that "people care most about their ability to realize their own conceptions of the good," he adds, "I am inclined to say that they care more about realizing the sound conception of the good" ("Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence," in his Ethics in the Public Domain [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994], pp. 60-96, p. 82, n. 57).
9. As we shall see below, one of the main goals of Political Liberalism is to offer reasons to doubt that any such convergence of views about the good can reasonably be expected. In sec. II of this article, I show why this response will not satisfy the objectivist.
10. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 330-31.
11. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. xv-xvi.
12. Ibid., p. 147.
13. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
14. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
15. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
16. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
17. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
18. See Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), and The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Political liberalism is also defended, with some variations, in Thomas Nagel, "Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy," in Authority, ed. Joseph Raz (New York: New York University Press, 1990), pp. 300-324; Joshua Cohen, "Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus," in The Idea of Democracy, ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-91; J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls," Ethics 105 (1995): 516-34.
19. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. See Larmore's suggestion that the defining feature of liberalism is "the idea that the fundamental principles of political association, being coercive, should be justifiable to all whom they are to bind" ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 152) Rawls makes a point of saying that this principle refers to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and he appears uncertain as to whether public-reason giving in general should also forgo appeals to comprehensive doctrines. At one point he seems inclined to think that the constraints of liberal legitimacy should apply at less basic levels as well (Political Liberalism, p. 215). Later, however, he states that citizens may be guided by their comprehensive views when voting on nonbasic issues (ibid., p. 235). It is hard not to see Rawls's equivocation here as reflecting a difficulty in the distinction between basic and nonbasic issues. The broader constraint seems to be the only sensible position for Rawls given his emphasis on the state as the author of ultimate coercive power. Since the liberal principle of legitimacy has to do with the exercise of coercive power over individuals, even if exercised only in taxing citizens to support various programs, it's not clear why it makes a difference whether that exercise concerns matters of basic justice or other, less basic matters.
20. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. See Larmore's suggestion that the defining feature of liberalism is "the idea that the fundamental principles of political association, being coercive, should be justifiable to all whom they are to bind" ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 152) Rawls makes a point of saying that this principle refers to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and he appears uncertain as to whether public-reason giving in general should also forgo appeals to comprehensive doctrines. At one point he seems inclined to think that the constraints of liberal legitimacy should apply at less basic levels as well (Political Liberalism, p. 215). Later, however, he states that citizens may be guided by their comprehensive views when voting on nonbasic issues (ibid., p. 235). It is hard not to see Rawls's equivocation here as reflecting a difficulty in the distinction between basic and nonbasic issues. The broader constraint seems to be the only sensible position for Rawls given his emphasis on the state as the author of ultimate coercive power. Since the liberal principle of legitimacy has to do with the exercise of coercive power over individuals, even if exercised only in taxing citizens to support various programs, it's not clear why it makes a difference whether that exercise concerns matters of basic justice or other, less basic matters.
21. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. See Larmore's suggestion that the defining feature of liberalism is "the idea that the fundamental principles of political association, being coercive, should be justifiable to all whom they are to bind" ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 152) Rawls makes a point of saying that this principle refers to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and he appears uncertain as to whether public-reason giving in general should also forgo appeals to comprehensive doctrines. At one point he seems inclined to think that the constraints of liberal legitimacy should apply at less basic levels as well (Political Liberalism, p. 215). Later, however, he states that citizens may be guided by their comprehensive views when voting on nonbasic issues (ibid., p. 235). It is hard not to see Rawls's equivocation here as reflecting a difficulty in the distinction between basic and nonbasic issues. The broader constraint seems to be the only sensible position for Rawls given his emphasis on the state as the author of ultimate coercive power. Since the liberal principle of legitimacy has to do with the exercise of coercive power over individuals, even if exercised only in taxing citizens to support various programs, it's not clear why it makes a difference whether that exercise concerns matters of basic justice or other, less basic matters.
22. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. See Larmore's suggestion that the defining feature of liberalism is "the idea that the fundamental principles of political association, being coercive, should be justifiable to all whom they are to bind" ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 152) Rawls makes a point of saying that this principle refers to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and he appears uncertain as to whether public-reason giving in general should also forgo appeals to comprehensive doctrines. At one point he seems inclined to think that the constraints of liberal legitimacy should apply at less basic levels as well (Political Liberalism, p. 215). Later, however, he states that citizens may be guided by their comprehensive views when voting on nonbasic issues (ibid., p. 235). It is hard not to see Rawls's equivocation here as reflecting a difficulty in the distinction between basic and nonbasic issues. The broader constraint seems to be the only sensible position for Rawls given his emphasis on the state as the author of ultimate coercive power. Since the liberal principle of legitimacy has to do with the exercise of coercive power over individuals, even if exercised only in taxing citizens to support various programs, it's not clear why it makes a difference whether that exercise concerns matters of basic justice or other, less basic matters.
23. These two senses are not always adequately distinguished. Rawls says, for example, that "since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common" (Political Liberalism, p. 100 [my emphasis]). Larmore seems more clearly committed to the view that justification depends on there being in fact common ground (not just the potential for it). According to him, the search for common ground with other citizens involves appealing to "what they already believe in" ("Political Liberalism," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 135). Larmore also is willing to allow public decisions to rely on those conceptions of the good on which there is unanimous agreement among citizens (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 67).
24. These two senses are not always adequately distinguished. Rawls says, for example, that "since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common" (Political Liberalism, p. 100 [my emphasis]). Larmore seems more clearly committed to the view that justification depends on there being in fact common ground (not just the potential for it). According to him, the search for common ground with other citizens involves appealing to "what they already believe in" ("Political Liberalism," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 135). Larmore also is willing to allow public decisions to rely on those conceptions of the good on which there is unanimous agreement among citizens (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 67).
25. These two senses are not always adequately distinguished. Rawls says, for example, that "since justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common" (Political Liberalism, p. 100 [my emphasis]). Larmore seems more clearly committed to the view that justification depends on there being in fact common ground (not just the potential for it). According to him, the search for common ground with other citizens involves appealing to "what they already believe in" ("Political Liberalism," in The Morals of Modernity, p. 135). Larmore also is willing to allow public decisions to rely on those conceptions of the good on which there is unanimous agreement among citizens (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 67).
26. For similar objections, see Raz, "Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence," pp. 69 ff.; and Sher, p. 85.
27. Though he expresses some reservations about Rawls's account, Larmore agrees that one of the burdens Rawls identifies - in Larmore's words, "the great variety of life experiences created by modern society, with all its complex divisions of labor and its rich heritage of many different cultural traditions" - provides the key to explaining reasonable disagreement over comprehensive views ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," p. 170). The burdens of judgment may also explain the distinction Larmore draws between what he calls proof ("the logical relations among a set of propositions") and justification ("a proof directed at those who disagree with us to show them that they should join us in believing what we do," one that "can fulfill this pragmatic role only by appealing to what they already believe in") ("Political Liberalism," p. 135).
28. Though he expresses some reservations about Rawls's account, Larmore agrees that one of the burdens Rawls identifies - in Larmore's words, "the great variety of life experiences created by modern society, with all its complex divisions of labor and its rich heritage of many different cultural traditions" - provides the key to explaining reasonable disagreement over comprehensive views ("Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement," p. 170). The burdens of judgment may also explain the distinction Larmore draws between what he calls proof ("the logical relations among a set of propositions") and justification ("a proof directed at those who disagree with us to show them that they should join us in believing what we do," one that "can fulfill this pragmatic role only by appealing to what they already believe in") ("Political Liberalism," p. 135).
29. It bears repeating that the assumption invoked throughout this essay involves reason and discursive argument as a source for claims about the good. As a contrast, consider the claim that one has achieved insight into the good through transcendent personal experience. Political liberals do not always distinguish between these two groundings for knowledge claims, but given the priority of reason and reason-giving in liberal theory, the distinction is critical. Where citizens' claims are grounded in transcendent personal experience alone, they do violate liberal legitimacy if they seek to have the state act on their views. From a public perspective, the assertion of inner experience as a warrant for truth carries no epistemic authority, for it cannot be distinguished from mere belief. Providing reasons, in contrast, claims a public authority that distinguishes it from mere belief. On this see Nagel, passim; and Cohen, passim. Nagel is especially careful to distinguish reason-based claims from faith-based claims, arguing only that the latter be excluded from political argument as failing to meet standards of liberal justification. For this reason, his criterion is potentially more inclusive in allowing views about the good into political argument.
30. Berys Gaut's distinction between the merely and the maximally reasonable parallels roughly the one I am drawing here between a view's being understandable and its being reasonable ("Rawls and the Claims of Liberal Legitimacy," Philosophical Papers 24 [1995]: 1-22). He too argues for the appropriateness of the stronger criterion in political argument.
31. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 57.
32. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this response on behalf of political liberalism.
33. This is a notorious problem in debates over the extent to which evidence can support and disconfirm religious claims. As Basil Mitchell puts it, "The situation [between believers and nonbelievers] is not one in which there is clear agreement among all concerned as to what would constitute evidence for a particular conclusion, as there is agreement, for example, as to what would constitute evidence for the existence of a new planet" ("Introduction," in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971], p. 9). Mitchell's point is that the relation between evidence and what he calls one's "conceptual scheme" does not run in only one direction, a claim reinforced by much work in contemporary philosophy of science. Though Mitchell concentrates on the status of evidence in the context of religious beliefs, the burdens of judgment are similarly undermined by the general problem he identifies: disagreement over comprehensive views often leads to disagreement over what counts as evidence. William Galston points to similar problems involving appeals to evidence (Liberal Purposes [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 111 ff.).
34. This is a notorious problem in debates over the extent to which evidence can support and disconfirm religious claims. As Basil Mitchell puts it, "The situation [between believers and nonbelievers] is not one in which there is clear agreement among all concerned as to what would constitute evidence for a particular conclusion, as there is agreement, for example, as to what would constitute evidence for the existence of a new planet" ("Introduction," in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil Mitchell [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971], p. 9). Mitchell's point is that the relation between evidence and what he calls one's "conceptual scheme" does not run in only one direction, a claim reinforced by much work in contemporary philosophy of science. Though Mitchell concentrates on the status of evidence in the context of religious beliefs, the burdens of judgment are similarly undermined by the general problem he identifies: disagreement over comprehensive views often leads to disagreement over what counts as evidence. William Galston points to similar problems involving appeals to evidence (Liberal Purposes [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 111 ff.).
35. The importance of consensus figures in Brian Barry's explanation of why teaching evolution instead of creationism in public schools does not violate neutrality: "For the purposes of teaching and research, the consensus of the scientific community is precisely what government within a neutral constitutional system should defer to" (Justice as Impartiality [New York: Oxford University Press, 1995], p. 161, n. a).
36. Nagel, p. 316.
37. The importance of equal respect figures explicitly in Larmore's argument (as a self-evident requirement of morality) and implicitly in Rawls's (exemplified both in the liberal principle of legitimacy, which insists that political power be endorsable by those over whom it is exercised, and in the design of the original position). For an argument that Rawls's argument in A Theory of Justice rests centrally on the norm of equal respect, see Ronald Dworkin, "Justice and Rights," in his Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 150-83.
38. Rawls locates the relevant exercise of nationality in the two moral powers of persons: "A capacity for a sense of justice that enables them to understand, apply, and to act from the reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation. . . . [And] a capacity for a conception of the good: a conception of the ends and purposes worthy of our devoted pursuit, together with an ordering of those elements to guide us over a complete life" (Political Liberalism, pp. 103-4). Larmore explicitly locates the source of respect in the second of these, suggesting that "we owe one another [equal respect] as beings capable of affirming a vision of the good life" ("Political Liberalism," p. 136). But as his discussion proceeds, it becomes clear that the capacity for reason-giving in public debate is, for political philosophy, the critical way in which our capacity for reason manifests itself. For this reason, I read his suggestion that "the distinctive feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons" as referring to our capacities both to pursue our conceptions of the good and to justify our actions to others ("Political Liberalism," p. 137).
39. Rawls locates the relevant exercise of nationality in the two moral powers of persons: "A capacity for a sense of justice that enables them to understand, apply, and to act from the reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation. . . . [And] a capacity for a conception of the good: a conception of the ends and purposes worthy of our devoted pursuit, together with an ordering of those elements to guide us over a complete life" (Political Liberalism, pp. 103-4). Larmore explicitly locates the source of respect in the second of these, suggesting that "we owe one another [equal respect] as beings capable of affirming a vision of the good life" ("Political Liberalism," p. 136). But as his discussion proceeds, it becomes clear that the capacity for reason-giving in public debate is, for political philosophy, the critical way in which our capacity for reason manifests itself. For this reason, I read his suggestion that "the distinctive feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons" as referring to our capacities both to pursue our conceptions of the good and to justify our actions to others ("Political Liberalism," p. 137).
40. Rawls locates the relevant exercise of nationality in the two moral powers of persons: "A capacity for a sense of justice that enables them to understand, apply, and to act from the reasonable principles of justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation. . . . [And] a capacity for a conception of the good: a conception of the ends and purposes worthy of our devoted pursuit, together with an ordering of those elements to guide us over a complete life" (Political Liberalism, pp. 103-4). Larmore explicitly locates the source of respect in the second of these, suggesting that "we owe one another [equal respect] as beings capable of affirming a vision of the good life" ("Political Liberalism," p. 136). But as his discussion proceeds, it becomes clear that the capacity for reason-giving in public debate is, for political philosophy, the critical way in which our capacity for reason manifests itself. For this reason, I read his suggestion that "the distinctive feature of persons is that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons" as referring to our capacities both to pursue our conceptions of the good and to justify our actions to others ("Political Liberalism," p. 137).
41. As Larmore puts it, equal respect is the concept "that however much we may disagree with others and repudiate what they stand for, we cannot treat them merely as objects of our will, but owe them an explanation for those actions of ours that affect them" (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 62).
42. Margaret Moore, "On Reasonableness," Journal of Applied Philosophy 13 (1996): 167-77.
43. As Galston suggests, "We show others respect when we offer them, as explanation, what we take to be our true and best reasons for acting as we do" (Galston, p. 109). Compare Barry's claim: "It is perfectly consistent with everything that Larmore says about equal respect that we should believe that the explanation required is an explanation of the superiority of our conception of the good. If we are convinced that nobody could reasonably reject our explanation, we would seem to have done all that 'equal respect' can demand of us" (Barry, p. 176).
44. The problem here is similar to that faced by Kant's Categorical Imperative phrased in terms of treating people as ends in themselves. This is usually seen as establishing the importance of persons' consenting to how they are treated, but whichever way we interpret that requirement, problems arise. If they must in fact consent, then, for example, sentencing unwilling criminals would be immoral, and this seems ludicrous. If what matters is what one would consent to if fully rational, this opens the door to disputes over what full rationality entails. Given this choice, the only plausible approach for a Kantian is to opt for the latter and engage in the messy business of explaining what is involved in being fully rational. Neo-Kantian political philosophers who stress the principle of equal respect must make a parallel move in explaining the reasonable. As my argument suggests, I do not believe they have satisfactorily met this challenge.
45. Rawls simply asserts that citizens "possess the two moral powers to die requisite degree" (Political Liberalism, p. 109; see also p. 79). Perhaps he is not making an empirical claim and is offering only a definition: if so, the question arises whether the definition is adequately instantiated. While Larmore recognizes that some people have the capacity for working out a coherent view of the world to a greater degree than others, he too suggests that "respect is something that others as persons are due just by virtue of having that capacity, so it should be given equally to all" (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 64). As it stands, this requires more argument: if respect is owed those possessing a respect-meriting capacity, it seems at least prima facie plausible that those who possess this capacity to a greater degree merit more respect. (The latter is a much more accurate explanation, of course, of how respect for others arises in normal human intercourse.)
46. Rawls simply asserts that citizens "possess the two moral powers to die requisite degree" (Political Liberalism, p. 109; see also p. 79). Perhaps he is not making an empirical claim and is offering only a definition: if so, the question arises whether the definition is adequately instantiated. While Larmore recognizes that some people have the capacity for working out a coherent view of the world to a greater degree than others, he too suggests that "respect is something that others as persons are due just by virtue of having that capacity, so it should be given equally to all" (Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 64). As it stands, this requires more argument: if respect is owed those possessing a respect-meriting capacity, it seems at least prima facie plausible that those who possess this capacity to a greater degree merit more respect. (The latter is a much more accurate explanation, of course, of how respect for others arises in normal human intercourse.)
47. Against his intent, Larmore does, I think, come close to endorsing a form of value pluralism when he asserts, "the ideals of autonomy and individuality effectively blind us to the real merits of many ways of life" ("Political Liberalism," p. 130). To say that other ways of life have real merit seems to make a value judgment about them.
48. Sher makes a parallel point regarding the value of autonomy (pp. 56 ff.).
49. Colin Bird, "Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification," Ethics 107 (October 1996): 62-96, p. 66.
50. Something like what I am calling pluralist perfectionism is outlined byjohn Kekes (The Morality of Pluralism [Princeton, N.J.: Princetcn University Press, 1993], chap. 12).
51. I am grateful to Susan Moller Okin for alerting me to the importance of this final response on behalf of the antiperfectionist.
52. Charles Taylor discusses the ways in which liberal democracies are predicated upon citizens' voluntarily imposing sacrifices on themselves in "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 159-82.
53. For contemporary attempts to outline objective elements of the human good, see, e.g., Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Sher, chap. 9; and John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
54. In his persuasive argument that antiperfectionism implicitly relies on the form of skepticism he endorses, Barry concentrates on religious conceptions of the good but leaves open the question of whether skepticism is appropriate regarding all disputed claims about the human good. For this reason, his conclusions there will not obviously satisfy the objectivist I am considering here (though Barry's position appears to be that skepticism is appropriate regarding most disputed questions of the good). See Barry, secs. 26-30.
55. See, e.g., L. W. Sumner's "Two Theories of the Good" (in The Good Life and the Human Good, ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992], pp. 1-14), an essay that otherwise makes several important points on the relationship between perfectionism and subjectivism.
56. Bernard Boxill has discussed what he calls "the culture of poverty" in the context of the problem of cultural pluralism ("The Culture of Poverty," in Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, ed. Ellen Frankel, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994], pp. 249-80). One who believed that this culture offered its own standards of excellence might then offer an argument, grounded in the need to respect different views of the good life, on the moral importance of letting the poor stay poor. This is, of course not Boxill's position, and I trust that such an argument needs no comment here.
57. Rawls himself hints at the possibility of such a pessimistic conclusion: "If the liberal conceptions correctly framed from fundamental ideas of a democratic public culture are supported by and encourage deeply conflicting political and economic interests, and if there be no way of designing a constitutional regime so as to overcome that, a full overlapping consensus cannot, it seems, be achieved" (Political Liberalism, p. 168). A similar view seems borne out both in the weakened commitment to the difference principle that many have identified in Rawls's recent work and in his concession that justice as fairness is "but one example of a liberal political conception" (p. 226).
58. An argument similar to the one I advance here is pressed by Nicholas Wolterstorff in his exchange with Robert Audi on the relationship between religion and politics. See their Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 162 ff.
59. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 253.
60. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 147.