Is Social Security Really Bad for Growth?

Review of Economic Dynamics

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 796-819

  Bellettini, Giorgio ^a   Ceroni, Carlotta Berti ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042617393     PISSN: 10942025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0050     Document Type: Article

References (38)

1. Alesina, A., and Rodrick, D. (1994). "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(2), 465-490.
2. Aschauer, D. A. (1989). "Is Public Expenditure Productive?" Journal of Monetary Economomics 23, 177-200.
3. Aschauer, D. A. (1989b). "Public Investment and Productivity Growth in the Group of Seven," Economic Perspectives 13, 17-25.
4. Barro, R. J. (1989). "A Cross-Country Study of Growth, Saving and Government," NBER working paper 2855.
5. Barro, R. J. (1990). "Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Political Economy 98, 103-125.
6. Barro, R. J. (1991). "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 407-443.
7. Barro, R. J., and Lee, J. (1993). "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment," Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 363-394.
8. Becker, G. "A Treatise on the Family," Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993.
9. Bellettini, G., and Berti Ceroni, C. (1997). "Social Security and Growth: New Empirical Evidence," University of Bologna, Department of Economics, working paper no. 269.
10. Bertola, G. (1993). "Factor Shares, Income Distribution and Economic Growth," American Economic Review 83(5), 1184-1210.
11. Boadwin, R., and Wildasin, D. (1989). Voting models of social security determination, in "The Political Economy of Social Security" (B. A. Gustaffson and N. A. Klevmarken, Eds.), North-Holland, Amsterdam.
12. Boadwin, R., and Wildasin, D. (1989). "A Median Voter Model of Social Security," International Economic Review 30, 307-328.
13. Boldrin, M. (1992). "Public Education and Capital Accumulation," working paper no. 1017, Northwestern University.
14. Boldrin, M., and Rustichini, A. (1995). Equilibria with social security, mimeo.
15. Browning, E. K. (1975). "Why the Social Insurance Budget is Too Large in a Democratic Society," Economic Inquiry 13, 373-388.
16. Canning, D., Fay, M., and Perotti, R. (1992). "Infrastructure and growth," mimeo, Columbia University, 1992.
17. Cooley, T. F., and Soares, J. (1994). A positive theory of social security based on reputation, mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Rochester.
18. Cukierman, A., and Meltzer, A. (1989). "A Political Theory of Government Debt and Deficits in the Neo-Ricardian Framework," American Economic Review 79, 713-732.
19. Easterly, W. R., and Wetzel, D. L. (1989). "Policy Determinants of Growth," mimeo.
20. Gramlich, E. M. (1997). "Infrastructure Investment: A Review Essay," Journal of Economic Literature 32, 1176-1196.
21. Katzenstein, P. J. (1984). "Corporatism and Change: Austria, Switzerland, and the Politics of Industry," Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, NY.
22. Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). "Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe," Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, NY.
23. Kotlikoff, L., Persson, T., and Svensson, L. (1988). "Social Contracts and Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time Consistency Problem, Amererican Economic Review 78(4), 662-677.
24. Krusell, P., and Rios-Rull, J. V. (1994). "What Constitutions Promote Capital Accumulation? A Political-Economy Approach," mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
25. Krusell, P., Quadrini, V., and Rios-Rull, J. V. (1994). "Politico-Economic Equilibrium and Economic Growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21(1), 243-272.
26. Hu, S. C. (1982). "Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency," International Economic Review 23, 269-287.
27. Perotti, R. (1996). "Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say," Journal of Economic Growth 1(2), 149-187.
28. Perotti, R. (1993). "Political Equilibrium, Income Distribution and Growth," Review of Economic Studies 60(4), 755-766.
29. Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (1994). "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review 84(3), 600-621.
30. Rimlinger, G. V. (1971). "Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America and Russia," Wiley, New York.
31. Roseveare, D., Leibfritz, E. W., Fore, D., and Wurzel, E. (1996). "Ageing Populations, Pension Systems and Government Budgets: Simulations for 20 OECD Countries," mimeo, Economics Department, OECD.
32. Sachs, J. (1989). "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America," NBER working paper 2897.
33. Samuelson, P. (1975). "Optimum Social Security in a Life-Cycle Growth Model," International Economic Review 16, 539-544.
34. Sjoblom, K. (1985). "Voting for Social Security," Public Choice 45, 225-240.
35. Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996). "A Positive Theory of Social Security," Journal of Economic Growth 1(2), 277-304.
36. Tabellini, T. (1990). "A Positive Theory of Social Security," NBER working paper 3272.
37. Verbon, H. A. A. (1986). "Altruism, Political Power and Public Pensions," Kyklos 39, 343-358.
38. Verbon, H. A. A. (1987). "The Rise and Evolution of Public Pensions System," Public Choice 52, 75-100.